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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the origin of refugee flows and the reasons for and timing of the 
development of the international refugee regime. It follows the development of that regime, 
especially during the period after World War II. There is particular analysis of recent 
challenges that have led to the realization that forced migrants, beyond refugees as defined 
in international legal instruments, are and ought to be of concern to the international 
community. The paper describes the main actors in the international forced migration 
regime. Six current tensions are analysed with proposals to address rethinking assumptions 
and steps to take to alter the regime. Particular stress is put on the relationship between 
relief and development assistance. Finally, the paper analyses initiatives of the current 
forced migration regime: the Agenda for Protection, Convention Plus and the Standing 
Committee Work Program. The paper concludes that the current regime is inadequate to 
address forced migration globally, particularly regarding internally displaced persons, and 





The global regime that addresses forced migration is not up to the task. This paper reviews 
the evolution of that regime from its origins after World War I and follows the development 
to the present with particular attention to the post World War II period. The narrative 
indicates how the development of the regime, especially in the Cold War and in the post 
Cold War period of the last decade and a half have led to the widespread recognition of the 
regime’s inadequacies.1 
 
The paper continues with a description of the main players in the international refugee 
regime. The following section analyses the major tensions in the international system to 
address forced migrants and provides suggestions about steps needed to bring about 
meaningful change. 
 
The next sections address aspects of the Agenda for Protection, the Convention Plus 
initiative, and the Standing Committee Work Plan. The paper ends with a set of conclusions 
and suggestions for DFID. 
 
 
2. THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FORCED MIGRATION 
REGIME 
 
2.1. Why Are There Refugees? 
The word refugees was first applied to the Huguenots. At the time, the dominant economic 
theory was mercantilism and the demographic policy could be summarised as to rule is to 
                                                 
1. Much of the analysis and narrative in this paper is drawn from a collaborative research program funded 
by the MacArthur Foundation and led by the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the 
Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Collaborating institution in the project are: 
the Refugee Studies Centre of Oxford University; the Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement; 
The Centre for Development Research in Denmark; the Centre for Forced Migration Studies at the 
University of Dar Es Salaam; and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The 
results will be published in Martin et al. (forthcoming). 
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populate. The expulsion of religious dissidents was seen only as a necessary evil. Generally 
sovereigns were interested in prohibiting exit, especially of valuable citizens with 
commercial or trade skills. (Keely, 1996) 
 
In the period after the Treaties of Westphalia, the development of the nation state 
increasingly gave weight to the notion that a people, a nation provided the legitimacy of the 
state. By the end of World War I, with the end of European empire, divine right and shear 
military force were no longer considered legitimators of claims to sovereignty.  
 
The “nation” in the nation state system can best be described by the analytic tool of the 
ideal type: a collection of the characteristics of concrete examples of a social construction 
like a bureaucracy of a state. A nation can be roughly described as a relatively 
homogeneous, self-reproducing group rooted in shared values, with a sense of its own 
uniqueness and importance that are worth saving, with a history, sense of shared fate, 
elements of a shared culture, and a territorial referent that figures in its identity and history. 
The elements of culture can vary including a shared language and religion. Not every 
nation shares all the elements. Roma, for example, have a tenuous territorial aspect to their 
identity.  
 
Broadly this describes what the members of a state should be. It justifies that nationality 
group’s claim to a territory, a control over membership, and sovereignty, the right to rule 
within their territory without external interference. 
 
There are two major sorts of nations, ethnic and civic. An ethnic nation traces its origins to 
a common founder and a purported or real shared genetic heritage provides the basis for 
shared identity and culture. A civic nation is grounded in shared political beliefs that 
provide the basis for shared interests and culture. Civic nations emerged out of the 
Enlightenment-induced revolutions, especially in France and the United States. The 
adoption of democratic political institutions introduced aspects of civic identity even in 
ethnic nations. 
 
Over time some civic nations have taken on beliefs of an ethnic similarity and identity. In 
France, the Dreyfus Affair and current social uncertainties about the capacity to assimilate 
large numbers of North Africans into French society indicate that there is some element of 
assumption about who can be French. In the United States, the claim that it is a European 
nation overlooks the history of slavery, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and the 
realities of 19th and early 20th century immigration debates.  
 
The distinction between ethnic and civic nations has important implications, especially 
regarding immigration and integration of foreigners. Civic nations generally have an easier 
time of it. An American of Irish background can never be Japanese because he is not 
Japanese. But to say a Japanese could never be an American does not make the same sense. 
 
The nation state system is premised on the idea that the nation legitimates the claim to a 
state. Unfortunately for the theory and doctrine of nation state political structure around the 
globe, most states are multinational. Societies and political regimes in states address the 
issue of creating and fostering national identity and loyalty in four ways. Some have 
generally addressed the problem of multinational realities by creating a super-national 
identity like British, French, Indonesian or Kenyan out of regional nationalities. A second 
mode has been for one nationality to dominate and try to destroy other cultures. Some in 
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Canada claim this was the aim of Anglo policy for much of Canada’s history. Attempts to 
destroy indigenous cultures in North America and Australia is another example. 
Sovietization can be seen as a thin veil for Russification. A third mode has been 
confederation. Switzerland is the longest existing example, but one can add Belgium, 
Canada, the former Czechoslovakia, and former Yugoslavia. Finally, some states have 
addressed multi-nationality by expulsion or genocide. 
 
All of these attempts at creating a dominant national identity have the possibility of 
resulting in violent conflict and producing refugees.  
 
Refugees have also resulted from attempts at social transformation (revolution) for 
ideological reasons. The 20th century saw attempts from the left (Marxist and Maoist), the 
right (various forms of fascism and national socialism), and religion (especially and 
continuingly related to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam). It should be noted that in 
early modern European history it was Christianity that produced refugees due to 
persecution and murder of religious dissidents. 
 
Refugees are also produced by state failure or terminal state weakness making operation of 
state institutions and apparatus virtually impossible. Finally, interstate wars have produced 
refugees fleeing for safety. 
 
Refugee production in the modern nation state, therefore, is a political phenomenon related 
to the failure of the state system to operate. A state erupts into violent conflict due to 
projects to develop national identity, due to violence over ideological difference on social 
organization, or because of state failure. Note that economic or social issues are not the 
direct cause of refugee production. They must take on political salience to the point of 
violent conflict to change or defend the status quo or because there is no state apparatus or 
because power brokers (barons, war lords, thugs - depending on viewpoint) vie to develop 
new political and social order. Many poor states do not produce forced migrants and forced 
migrants have regularly been a feature of relatively prosperous states in the last century. 
 
Refugees and internally displaced persons from internal violent conflicts in states are the 
result of systematic and often prolonged human rights violations. Given the ubiquity of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to political reasons, as well as the 
destabilising potential for the international community, perhaps it is time to rethink whether 
human rights is a third or fourth order international relations issue. From the most hard 
headed real politik point of view, human rights perhaps deserves another look not just as a 
humanitarian issue but also as a threat to global political order. 
 
2.2. Why Do States React Collectively and Why Did They Only Begin To Do So in 
the 1920s? 
Why did states only take collective action to a systemic threat such as refugees in the early 
20th century? Until the 19th century, mercantilism held sway. Sovereigns focused on 
controlling exit. The pro-population growth ideology began to be questioned. The Rev. 
Thomas Malthus raised the spectre of overpopulation due to the imbalance between 
population growth rates (exponential) and resource growth, particularly agriculture 
(arithmetic). In the mid 19th century Marx contributed the idea of surplus labour. Social 
Darwinism, within the context of the 19th century’s focus on nationalism, led to the idea of 
undesirable aliens. By the end of the 19th century, mercantilism had been pushed aside for a 
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tendency to adopt liberal economics and the demographic doctrine held that there could be 
too many people, too many workers, and too many of the wrong kind. According to nation 
state doctrine, people belonged in their own state, under their government’s protection and 
states had an obligation and right to control entry. By the time of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, the world’s states supported the notion in the Declaration that a 
person had the right to leave a country and to return to his or her country of citizenship. The 
doctrine of sovereignty had shifted 180 degrees in practice form an assertion of a sovereign 
right of the state to control exit to a right of a citizen to leave. In practice immigration 
control replaced emigration control. 
 
2.3. The Origins of the Refugee Regime: The Inter-War Years 
After World War I, the number of Russians in Germany overwhelmed private charity and 
status of the émigré was perilous. (Holborn, 1975) They had no right of residence, work, or 
travel documents. At the request of private relief agencies, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) petitioned the League of Nations to take action. In 1921, the League 
appointed Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian explorer and organizer of prisoner exchanges 
after the Great War, as High Commissioner to organize protection and international 
assistance. Greek and Turkish population exchanges were added to his mandate in 1923, 
followed shortly afterwards by Armenian refugees. One of Nansen’s innovations was the 
Nansen passport, a document indicating a person under the High Commissioner’s 
protection that was accepted as  valid travel papers. 
 
In 1924 the International Labour Organization established a refugee office to address the 
work needs of refugees to complement Nansen’s protection and relief efforts. 
 
After Nansen’s death in 1929, the High Commissioner’s work was established under what 
became known as the Nansen Office. A High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany 
was established in 1933. At the Evian refugee conference in 1938, the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was established, which had little support and 
accomplished little given the lack of resettlement opportunities. 
 
With the end of the war in sight, the Allies met at the Bermuda Conference in 1943 and 
established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) to carry out 
repatriation of the displaced persons (DPs) in Europe after the war. 
 
UNRRA repatriated over five million DPs, when a dispute broke out among the Allies over 
forced repatriation. Many DPs refused to return to the Soviet Union and other states with 
communist governments, some even committing suicide. Many relief agencies and other 
parts of Western countries’ constituencies opposed forced repatriation. UNRRA was 
dissolved and replaced by the International Refugee Organizational with the objective of 
emptying the DP camps and settling the inhabitants in Europe or overseas. (Holborn, 1956) 
 
The period after World War II saw the establishment in 1950 of the UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which still operates. The UN Korean 
Reconstruction Agency operated for 10 years between 1950 and 1960. The were no UN 
agencies established to address refugees from the People’s Republic of China or assist in 
the population transfers on the Indian subcontinent following the separation of Pakistan and 
India into two countries. 
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2.4. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Convention, 
and Statute 
Negotiations for the creation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) began in 1948. (Holborn, 1975; Keely, 1981; Loescher, 2001) The 
Soviets absented themselves from the discussions claiming refugees were not produced by 
socialist states and, reflecting disagreements about forced repatriation, held that all persons 
should be returned to their home country and not be settled elsewhere. The office was 
created as a temporary one requiring renewal of authority. The UNHCR was to be non-
operational in regard to humanitarian assistance. It was to coordinate collection of funds 
and work through governments and non-governmental organizations. The definition in the 
Convention contained a clause limiting the Convention’s protection to those who became 
refugees due to events taking place prior to 1951 and also allowed signatories to limit their 
obligations only to refugees in Europe. The Statute contained no such time and 
geographical limits. The Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 1967 removed the temporal 
referent and disallowed a reservation to cover only refugees in Europe. The office was set 
up as a separate agency with the High Commissioner elected by the General Assembly. 
 
2.5. Characteristics of the Refugee Agencies Under the League and United Nations 
This brief recitation of the origins of international collective actions on refugees reveals a 
number of characteristics that continue to influence thinking to this day. All of the attempts 
at action through the League and UN have assumed that refugees were and are a temporary 
phenomenon that needs addressing and solution in a limited time frame. Until the Statute 
and Convention - one could even argue until the Protocol - refugees were defined as groups 
and mandates defined members of groups based on nationality, ethnicity and so on who 
were affected by events in a specific time frame. The Convention introduced the individual 
definition and the notion of an individual determination about persecution under the 
Convention definition, as opposed to a determination that one was a member of a specified 
group. The UNHCR and cooperating agencies were to provide humanitarian aid to meet 
immediate critical needs and to sustain life during a period of displacement. Humanitarian 
aid was not seen as part of development aid. The rebuilding of Europe, for example, after 
the Second World War was perceived as a separate process from emptying the displaced 
persons (DP) camps. The regime’s main concerns were affording state-like protection, 
humanitarian assistance, and permanent settlement. The emptying of camps, however, was 
part of European development. It was meant to remove excess population that might 
exacerbate post-war unemployment and recovery. It was meant to remove a potential 
source of political opposition that might lead to communist electoral victories in countries 
such as Italy, France, and Germany. Assisting, protecting, and resettling DPs was part of 
European development to help create sustainable economies and democratic societies and, 
therefore, contribute to political stability and economic prosperity for the interstate system. 
 
An unspoken assumption was the maintenance of a doctrine of sovereignty that saw 
sovereignty as integral: a state was sovereign or it was not. Any breach of sovereignty was 
a threat to sovereignty itself. The international community was concerned with those 
outside their own country. Internally displaced people in Europe and elsewhere were the 
concern of their own government. Likewise, UN agencies entered countries only with 
permission or under Security Council authority. 
 
Finally, all the initiatives focused on forced migrants who were affected by political events 
including boundary redrawing and persecution for reasons that one could not change (race, 
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nationality, membership in certain social groups, e.g., one’s family) or for reasons one 
should not be forced to change (religion, political beliefs). The definition of a refugee did 
not include those fleeing the generalised danger of war or insurrection. It did not include 
those displaced by natural disaster or government plans (whether for development or 
population relocation). The initiatives for collective international action were premised on 
an assumption of a political failure of the political structure. A state did not act like a state 
should and as a result its citizens were outside its borders without its protection or not 
wanting its protection for the good reason that they had a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted if they found themselves under that state’s control. Refugee protection and 
assistance by the international community, in other words, was premised on a breakdown of 
the political structure of the state system. The preferred solution was repatriation in safety, 
which presumed the offending state has changed its ways, if not its offending regime. 
 
2.6. The Cold War 
The original focus of UNHCR was on Europe. It did not garner great political or financial 
support, and was financially rescued by a grant from the Ford Foundation in the early 
1950s. It proved useful in a number of European problems during the 1950s. The concept 
of the High Commissioner’s “good offices” was developed to allow UNHCR to assist in 
the Algerian refugee flow, without calling the participants refugees. In 1956, the UNHCR 
assisted in the Hungarian flows, after it was determined that the displacement was traceable 
to events that predated 1951. 
 
In 1962, UNHCR opened its first office outside Europe (except for an office in the Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong) in Burundi. Under the leadership of Sadrudin Aga Khan, UNHCR 
focused on the large number of refugees in the developing world due to civil war. 
Thereafter, UNHCR became very much an agency working in the South. There developed, 
as a result, a dual refugee regime. (Keely, 2000) 
 
The Southern refugee regime developed around UNHCR providing protection and 
assistance in ways similar to earlier European behaviour. Refugees were put in camps or 
lived among the populace in an asylum country and were registered with UNHCR. The 
preferred objective touted like a mantra was still repatriation. Assistance was seen as an 
emergency measure. When people stayed in camps or registered as refugees for long 
periods, efforts were made to address ways to assist refugees to become self-sufficient. 
There developed what has become the perennial gap between relief and development. 
Problems with “too much” assistance to refugees to the detriment of local populations were 
addressed. But inclusion of refugee populations in development plans carried a political 
liability for national leaders and in effect meant that repatriation was a meaningless goal. 
Further, problems of coordination, mandate, and “turf” among UN agencies inhibited 
successful integration of assistance and development programs. For insiders, friction 
between UNDP and UNHCR in the early 1980s approached the scandalous, if not the 
ridiculous. 
 
Many of the wars and revolutions that UNHCR programs got caught up in were proxy 
conflicts of the Cold War. Indochina, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, and so on up through 
Afghanistan, frequently had an element of East-West rivalry. Clients were aided, often just 
enough to keep the conflict going but never rising to the level of risking a direct 
confrontation between superpowers.  
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Meanwhile, after the DP camps were emptied and with the strong rebound of economic 
growth in Europe, there developed a Northern refugee regime, also caught up in the Cold 
War. In Europe states developed and ran an asylum regime, with little help from an 
atrophied UNHCR European office, that welcomed and resettled those escaping form the 
East. These numbers were not inconsiderable in Central Europe, especially into Germany 
before the Berlin Wall in 1960. After that, the system bent over backward to give asylum to 
those from the East. Living under communism was persecution enough. Generous benefits 
were provided during settlement. There was no thought of repatriation. The Soviet 
hegemonic system would be with us indefinitely. With the Wall the flows were small, with 
periodic pulses, like the Czech Spring.  
 
In North America and Australia, with the United States taking the lead, a system of 
resettlement of those from communist governments was developed. A share of Hungarians, 
Cubans, Indochinese, and occasional defectors were all given permanent settlement. 
 
This system had a very different logic from the Southern system and earlier League and UN 
efforts in Europe. This regime was not organized to deal with a failure of the state system 
that resulted in unwanted migration of people without state protection. The Northern 
system was meant to encourage migration, although an important factor that made the 
system viable in the West was that the numbers would be limited by totalitarian 
governments’ policies of no exit. Repatriation was not the preferred solution. The goal was 
not to bring stability back to a system where citizens fled their government but to induce 
instability or at least embarrassment and encourage migration. The refugee flows had the 
domestic political function in Western countries of reinforcing anti-communist containment 
policy. The costs of resettlement were a small price to maintain political support for a 
cornerstone foreign policy. 
 
In 1984, the Northern system began to show strains. The number of asylum seekers started 
to rise precipitously and they were now coming from places other than the European East. 
Iranians coming through Turkey were among the first to garner notice. Thus began what is 
now a two-decade old discussion in Europe about asylum policy. Increases in asylum 
seekers from the South spread to North America and Australia sparking political 
discussions in those regions. 
 
One reaction was the creation of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, 
Refugees, and Migration in Europe, North America, and Australia; more typically referred 
to in its earlier days as “The Informal Consultations” and more recently the 
Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC). (Russell, Keely, and Christian, 2001) It was within 
the IGC and related forums in the EU and Schengen that ideas like safe third countries, safe 
areas, carrier sanctions, targeted development to address the root causes of migration, and 
so on were discussed and allowed to mature before appearing in many guises in national 
and regional policies. One result was a general push by governments to retire the Cold War 
asylum and resettlement systems and emphasise a Convention-based asylum system. In 
effect, governments wanted to contain migration flows in their region of origin (giving new 
meaning to a policy of containment), to deter false asylum claims, to require individual 
proof of meeting the Convention definition, and to re-emphasise repatriation as the 
preferred solution. While many constituents agreed, many did not. It is safe to say that 
asylum policy remains contentious and unsettled. 
 
One of the anomalies of the dual refugee regimes during the Cold War was that the 
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Northern nations, who often championed the idea of country of first asylum and 
repatriation, generally either had no legal basis or did not act as countries of first asylum. 
They generally accepted for permanent settlement, not for the provision of safe haven with 
an eye to eventual repatriation. Only with the large flows from former Yugoslavia did some 
countries develop programs of first asylum and repatriation. Some European countries and 
the United States gave permanent status even to those admitted form former Yugoslavia, 
many of whom have returned anyway.  
 
2.7. The 1990s: New Dimensions to Forced Migration 
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of developments have widened the scope of 
forced migration policy discussions.2 As of January 2002, the UNHCR estimated that 20 
million persons were under its mandate, about 12 million of whom were refugees and the 
rest other categories of forced migrant, including about 6 million IDPs. The Norwegian 
Refugee Council’s Global IDP Project estimates that there are about 25 million IDPs 
worldwide. (Martin et al, forthcoming) The 12 million refugees represents a decline from 
prior high levels, but now the attention to the destabilising effects and need for international 
attention to IDPs leavens any positive reaction to refugee decline. In numerical terms alone, 
IDPs represent the greater challenge. In terms of doctrine, policy, and programs of 
protection and assistance, the international community flounders, leaving people without 
protection and assistance and contributing to international tensions and instability.  
 
The refugee decline has been accomplished partially by large-scale returns in Africa, 
notably Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
and Somalia. Elsewhere in the world notable repatriations took place to Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
Some natural disasters, environmental degradation, and development projects produce 
forced migrant moving inside and outside their countries. Not all such forced migrants are 
of concern to the international community, especially requiring a need for state-like 
protection, when their own state has procedures, programs, and capacities to respond. 
Sometimes what is needed is assistance with materiel and logistics in an overwhelming 
crisis, but state capacity kicks in to appropriately address protection and assistance needs of 
citizens. In other cases, however, states are not capable of carrying out responsibilities 
toward internally and externally displaced citizens or are unwilling to assist because of 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion. These situations may differ little from 
politically-induced forced migration in their results. 
 
The 1990s has witnessed a rise in virulent forms of nationalism, perhaps as a reaction to 
globalising tendencies. One also sees states splitting into component national groupings 
(Czech and Slovak) and then negotiating entrance into larger regional groupings such as the 
EU and NATO. 
 
The concept of sovereignty, so central to the UNHCR-centred refugee regime as it emerged 
after World War II and developed in the Cold War, has been questioned in the form of 
humanitarian interventions from food drops by air to military force, with mixed results, in 
Sudan, Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan. The willingness 
of states under UN and other auspices to intervene on behalf of war-affected populations, 
                                                 
2. This section draws heavily from Martin et al. (forthcoming), Chapter 1.  
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including the internally displaced, is a major development. Behaviour by states that could 
result in mass flight is recognised as a threat to international security. The UN is rethinking 
its role, in the words of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan: “...not only at keeping the 
peace but also protecting civilian populations, monitoring human rights violations, 
facilitating delivery of needed humanitarian assistance, and promoting lasting solutions that 
include reintegration, development, and transitions to democracy.” (Martin et al., 
forthcoming) 
 
2.8. Forced Migration, Development, and Security: The Liberal Peace 
Meanwhile, these changes in perception and action concerning forced migration are also 
part of a larger picture affecting concepts and programs aimed at development and at 
building a new international political order to replace the Cold War bipolar framework. 
John Ikenberry in his book, After Victory, has analysed the process by which victors 
develop a new international order after major international struggles, such as the Congress 
of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, and the post world war treaties in the 20th century 
with their quite different approaches to building a new international political order. 
Currently, the state system is engaged in a prolonged process of redefinition. 
 
One result has been the linking of development to security in a new and quite up front 
fashion. There is no security without development and no development without security. 
Mark Duffield has dubbed this the liberal peace, characterised by a model of development 
that posits the objective of developing states that are democratic, have liberal, market-based 
economies, adopt human rights in the Enlightenment mode, and are organized politically to 
embrace pluralism and tolerance, giving no privilege to one nation, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group, or, conversely, excluding for those reasons. A more conservative analyst 
and commentator, Michael Mandelbaum has written about The Ideas that Changed the 
World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets laying out the need for a program similar to 
that which Duffield says currently dominates development thinking. 
 
Within this neoliberal paradigm, there should be a reduction of forced migration, and 
especially politically motivated forced migration. States struggling to develop a democratic, 
market-based, society with a rule of law squarely incorporating human rights and a pluralist 
tolerance by definition do not produce refugees. People may migrate and even leave but 
they are economic migrants seeking brighter horizons. The role of international 
development assistance is to encourage the institution building that will allow sustained 
economic growth in a society where all citizens can pursue a better life. Any state that 
refuses to pursue the model of the state proposed will be isolated. Refugees should not be 
encouraged to leave but stay in place as a moderate opposition to allow political change 
(such as in Nicaragua). There may still be occasional small groups of political elites 
accepted as refugees, but there numbers should be minimal. 
 
The neoliberal policies related to development dovetail well with current regionalizing 
objectives of Western forced migration policies. The attempts to reduce asylum seeking and 
the reductions in third country resettlement in developed countries are complemented by 
strategies to reproduce a neoliberal conception of what a developed state should be. The 
current attempts to regionalize refugees by keeping them close to their source countries fit 
in with these development and forced migration resettlement policies. Countries and even 
the UNHCR have developed policies and initiatives that emphasise keeping people in their 
region of origin. 
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The difficulty with the neoliberal model of development is the disconnect with facts on the 
ground. The recent rise of violent nationalism raises the question of whether democratic, 
pluralist societies, embracing Enlightenment notions of human rights with their heavy 
emphasis on individual rights trumping group rights just may not be embraced by many 
societies. Large segments (the bulk) of many economies are dominated by grey or black 
markets outside the regulation of commercial law. Such economic activity is not 
characterised by competition so much as by a tendency toward monopoly, eliminating 
competition (sometimes violently) and fixing prices. As Amy Chua (2004) has pointed out, 
small ethnic minorities, such as the Chinese in her native Philippines, dominate many 
developing economies. Economic restructuring would require spread of ownership. Current 
state policy in Zimbabwe is an example of distribution of ownership by force to a wider 
group of the citizenry from a racially/ethnically different ownership group. 
 
In short, elements of the economic, social, and political goals of the current dominant 
model of development may prove impractical for the foreseeable future, however beneficial 
they have been in the developed world and many parts of the developing world. The result 
will most probably be continued forced migration for political reasons enumerated in the 
Refugee Convention and for other politically related reasons not covered by international 
refugee law. Forced migrants of all stripes, most notably IDPs, will continue to appear with 
regularity on the world scene.  
 
The next section provides an overview of the major actors in the current regime dealing 
with forced migrants. The following section will present a set of conclusions and proposals 
to address failures in the regime and the thinking that under girds current policy on forced 





3.1. The UNHCR 
The UNHCR was established by a 1950 Statute passed by the General Assembly. The 
Statute, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees established 
UNHCR’s mandate. UNHCR is tasked with protection of refugees, coordinating and 
facilitating assistance, and working toward durable solutions to refugee situations. The 
High Commissioner is elected by the General Assembly and reports annually through the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Office has an Executive Committee 
(EXCOM) numbering 58 states. The EXCOM is not a governing body but oversees and 
advises on the work program and budget, finances and administration and the exercise of 
the High Commissioner’s protection function. 
 
The concept of good offices, alluded to above, was formalised by the General Assembly in 
a 1959 Resolution (G.A. Res. 1388 (XIV) 841st plenary Mtg. 1959). This allows the 
UNHCR, with General Assembly approval, to deal with non-Convention refugees. The fact 
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that 6 of the estimated 25 or so million internally displaced are of concern to the UNHCR 
currently indicates the ad hoc nature of the mandated power. UNHCR has worked inside 
countries to deal specifically with internally displaced, such as in Sudan in the 1970s and in 
Cyprus acting as the Secretary General’s Special Representative. The March 2000 position 
paper of the office indicated an interest and some level of responsibility to advocate and 
mobilize support for IDPs and even take a lead to protect and assist in certain situations 
(when told to do so by the Secretary General or UN body and with funding). The High 
Commissioner did not take operational responsibility and set out six requirements for 
involvement. (Martin et al., forthcoming) UNHCR has collaborated with other UN agencies 
such as UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on IDP issues. This is because such agencies do not have a 
protection mandate and lack expertise. UNHCR seems to have taken the position that it will 
not take the initiative on taking up IDP issues but will do so only if given a mandate and the 
funding. One could envision a leadership position to “push the envelope” and pressure the 
international community by taking action when possible on IDP issues, possibly 
encouraging an implicit or explicit widening of its protection mandate. Agency culture, the 
issue of funding, and capacity concerns seems to have militated against such a policy 
stance. 
 
UNHCR has also emphasised prevention activities under the prior High Commissioner, 
Sagato Ogata. These are mostly confined to educational programs to combat xenophobia, to 
promote tolerance, respect human rights, advance the rule of law and legal capacity 
building, and strengthening civil society. UNHCR generally outsources funds to 
cooperating partners but in some cases it declares it has no option but to deliver assistance. 
 
3.2. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Founded in 1863, ICRC describes itself as an impartial, neutral, and independent 
organization with a humanitarian mission to protect and assist victims of war and internal 
violence. It directs and coordinates assistance in conflict situations and promotes the 
adherence to international humanitarian law. The ICRC derives its current authority from 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocols. It serves as a neutral arbiter in negotiations to 
promote cease-fires and to end hostilities. Since many conflicts today are civil wars or 
insurrections within states, Article 3 common to all four of the Geneva Conventions places 
ICRC in an important humanitarian position acting on behalf of the international 
community. The Conventions and the mandate of the ICRC refer to all civilians affected by 
violent conflict, not only those forced to move. The Geneva Conventions apply to armed 
conflicts. They do not apply, and the ICRC’s mandate does not extend to civil strife or 
repression that do not rise to the level of armed conflict. 
 
3.3. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
IOM is involved in many aspects of complex emergencies, including technical expertise in 
health, transportation and other services. IOM has played a prominent role in post-conflict 
situations, not only in resettlement but also in institution building and strengthening to 
reconstruct and develop an atmosphere of return to normalcy and peace. Their 
programming covers a wide range of activities from assistance to vulnerable returnees, 
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IOM’s mandate is not defined in an international convention and it, like every other 
international organization in the forced migration field with the exception of UNHCR, does 
not have a direct protection mandate. It frequently happens that states need assistance with 
migration related issues, including forced migration issues. IOM has been called upon to 
carry out a wide variety of specific tasks. The organization also has had leadership that has 
been on the look out for missions to provide continuity and legitimacy for the organization, 
whose roots trace back to resettlement of European DPs after World War II. There are 
times when IOM comes in for criticism for some of its activities, such as doing screening in 
Haiti for refugee visas and recently assisting Australia in its “Pacific Solution”  to asylum 
seeking. 
 
3.4. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
OCHA was established in 1997 to replace the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) 
and the Coordinator is an Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). As ERC, the Coordinator chairs the Interagency 
Standing Committee (IASC) that brings together all the humanitarian, development and 
human rights groups. The Coordinator is the Secretary General’s principal advisor on 
humanitarian affairs. As such he is the Convener of the Executive Committee for 
Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), as well as chairing the IASC. ECHA allows the 
humanitarian community and the peace keeping and political departments to discuss 
humanitarian issues and crises. Resident in-country humanitarian coordinators report to the 
ERC. (One job involves five roles: Under-Secretary, Coordinator, Chair, Principal Advisor, 
and Convener. Coordination issues will loom large in the analysis below.) 
 
OCHA is supposed to monitor so that humanitarian issues do not slip through cracks in 
mandates. A particular focus has been on IDPs. An IDP unit was developed in OCHA but 
was generally seen as not having the “clout” to carry out a coordinating mandate. The unit 
was upgraded to a Division in July 2004, under the leadership of Dennis McNamara, highly 
regarded as a strong civil servant in regard to protection matters. Perhaps the leadership can 
produce useful results. The change is too recent to tell. However, the fact remains that the 
IDP Division still lacks the authority to compel other agencies to carry out tasks. Without 
new authorities the structure is still one of collaboration with all the weaknesses of a 
mandate without authority or control over resources to compel activity and cooperation. 
 
OCHA since 1998 has helped develop the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 
individual and regional emergencies. Almost all the appeals affect countries in conflict or 
the immediate post conflict stages of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation. 
Many beneficiaries are IDPs. 
 
3.5. Other United Nations Agencies 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is a recent addition to the roster of 
UN agencies concerned with forced migrants. Through monitoring and its field offices, it 
promotes the rights and safety of refugees and IDPs. It supports the Secretary General’s 
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons and Special Rapporteurs on issues like 
population transfers, freedom of movement, and forced evictions. The Office has sponsored 
a number of workshops in countries to introduce and discuss the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, a compilation of existing international human rights and 
humanitarian law, to get recognition of the framework as a means to protect IDPs. 
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The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has assisted forced migrants and affirmed its 
commitment to provide emergency assistance to refugee and displaced women and 
children. Its mandate is grounded in Conventions on the Rights of the Child and on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
 
UN Development Program (UNDP) claims the roles of prevention, coping and recovery 
regarding forced migrations. It attempts to sustain development in crises and reinforce 
development activities as soon as possible in the post conflict situation. Donor funding 
strategies and other issues continue to foster gaps in transitions from relief to development. 
The UNDP representative is often the coordinator of efforts on behalf of IDPs. As 
mentioned, UNHCR is sometimes called in to assist with expert help in protection matters 
because UNDP is not a protection agency.  
 
The World Food Program (WFP) emphasised adequate food as a basic human right. It 
seeks to provide food and build food self reliance. WFP analyses situations of vulnerability, 
plans for appropriate inputs in emergency situations, and tries to improve management for 
delivery, including decentralised operations. 
 
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at times helps protect forced 
migrants (e.g., Rwanda and former Yugoslavia) and protect the assistance activities of UN 
and other agencies (e.g., Somalia and former Yugoslavia). Some operations, such as 
UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, have provided humanitarian assistance. Mine clearance is 
another vital activity performed by peacekeepers. 
 
3.6. Regional Organizations 
A variety of regional organizations have played important roles in law and programs 
affecting forced migrants. The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU, now the African Union, 
AU) adopted its own convention that broadened the definition of refugee to include those 
displaced by war or internal strife. Thus, those displaced outside their country by the 
general devastation and dangers of war were to be included in the refugee category for 
signatory states.  
 
Sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS have been involved in disputes in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rapporteur 
on IDPs. In 2002, the Council of Europe also appointed a special rapporteur on internal 
displacement in Europe. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has had 
a number of activities on displacement in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has distributed the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
 
3.7. International Financial Agencies 
The World Bank has taken initiatives to address development-induced forced migration, 
stemming from its own lending for such projects. The Bank has developed a wide-ranging 
protocol about induced forced migration, including a human rights audit to make sure 
minorities are not targeted for undue burdens from development projects.  
 
The Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also pooled funding in some cases on 
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development projects that include the Bank’s focus on addressing the effects of 
development induced forced migration. 
 
3.8. Other Actors 
Note should be taken of states as actors. States have the principal obligation to protect all 
their citizens and residents. States have obligations regarding granting asylum under 
international law. States can offer important services to returning citizens forced to migrate 
abroad or within the country. 
 
States, of course, are the largest donors to the forced migration regime, multilaterally, 
bilaterally, or both. 
 
Regional donors that represent state members such as Humanitarian Aid Office of the 
European Commission (ECHO) are also major funders of CAP appeals. Like states, they 
respond to the appeals. A criticism has been that the time it takes money pledged to flow is 
inordinately long. This complaint deserves analysis and addressing to determine the reasons 
for delay, if true, and to develop means to quicken response time from pledge to flow of 
funds. 
 
There is a huge array of non-governmental organizations that do the lion’s share of 
assistance activities in cooperation with UN and bilateral donors on behalf of forced 
migrants. These assistance activities cover both emergency and more development-oriented 
activities in post conflict situations. As with UN agencies and donors in the humanitarian 
assistance and development fields, NGOs also bring a variety of viewpoints, funding 
strategies, and objectives.  
 
Finally, forced migrants themselves are in the mix. Often they are not best perceived as 
victims but as partners in righting a situation in which they find themselves immersed. 
Nevertheless, despite repeating this truism, forced migrants are generally excluded from 
inter-agency coordination at all levels and in all sectors, donor groups, international 
organizations, NGOs, etc. 
 
 
4. CURRENT TENSIONS 
 
There are six areas of tension in the current international forced migration regime that make 
it inadequate to address contemporary forced migration flows. The inadequacies run the 
gamut from the political determinants of forced migration, through addressing the 
humanitarian needs of the migrants, to dealing with the consequences of the flows. The 
inadequacies exist on many levels from conceptualisation, to agency structure, 
coordination, legal definitions, funding, insecurity, and access issues for migrants and 
humanitarian and development agencies. 
 
The six specific tension areas are:  
1. lack of coordination among humanitarian agencies and a persistence of what seems 
by now to be the perennial gap between emergency assistance and development; 
2. inadequate legal definitions and mandates to cover the range of forced migrants of 
interest to the international community because of their threat to stability and peace; 
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3. inconsistencies in responses to different categories of forced migrants in different 
regions that impede efforts to comprehensive responses to humanitarian 
emergencies; 
4. under funding and maldistribution of funding due to conceptualisation of mandates 
and donor preferences that harm efforts to address forced migration and its 
consequences; 
5. prolonged insecurity that endangers migrants and assistance agencies and lack of 
access to forced migrants in need of assistance; and 
6. failure to reach durable solutions that prevents return and reintegration. 
 
4.1. Coordination 
The coordination issues exist on two levels: coordination among humanitarian 
organizations in emergency situations and coordination between relief and development 
efforts. 
 
The often slow responses of the UN to emergencies and their ad hoc nature have lead to a 
number of efforts to coordinate reactions. These include appointment of a lead agency, 
regional coordination approaches, and systemic arrangements to facilitate coordination. 
 
In the case of Bangladesh, two lead agencies operated, the UNHCR as the focal point for 
refugees and UN East Pakistan Relief Operation for IDPs. In the Thai-Cambodian border 
case, a number of ad hoc organizing mechanisms to work in Thailand and inside Cambodia 
developed eventually into the UN Border Relief Operation (UMBRO) which ran the camps 
and UNHCR took the lead in repatriation of the border population. This arrangement was 
due to deep political divisions in the international community about the Cambodian regime, 
the rebels, and UNHCR’s capacity and willingness to carry out donor wishes. In Bosnia, 
UNHCR was the lead agency, coordinating up to 250 organizations and agencies, with 
ICRC the only major agency operating independently of UNHCR. 
 
Regionally based efforts at coordination have included the Office of Emergency Operation 
in Africa (OEOA), the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Southeast Asia, the 
Conference on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Returnees in Central America 
(CIREFCA), and the CIS Conference for the former Soviet Union. Some of the plans 
addressed forced migration after years of migration, exile and internal displacement. The 
CIS Conference was meant to prevent migration or allow early and quick response to mass 
movements.  
 
In 1990 the Secretary General engaged Jacques Cuenod, a senior civil servant with long 
experience in UNHCR to prepare a report on coordination. The Cuenod report 
recommended a permanent coordinating mechanism. The result was the Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs created by the General Assembly. The same resolution (G.A. Res. 
46/182 in 1991) established the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). DHA’s 
performance was not up to expectations and even received scathing criticism. The Secretary 
general proposed reinvigorating the DHA system and established OCHA, with a major 
activity being the Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP).  
 
This mere listing of approaches at coordination with no single approach or a set of criteria 
to indicate what might be an appropriate method under different circumstances points to the 
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fairly universal conclusion that coordination seems an elusive goal, sometimes better 
accomplished than at other times. Part of the blame lies at the feet of donors, especially 
bilateral donors, each with their regional and sometimes sectoral interests driving their 
funding strategies. Those strategies may or may not align with humanitarian or 
development needs as outlined in the CAP. 
 
As discussed below, this also leads to inconsistencies in funding and treatment of forced 
migrants in different regions and in different categories having more to do with foreign 
policies, funding strategies, and agency interests than humanitarian need or strategic efforts 
to create or maintain stability and peace. 
 
The second dimension of coordination refers to the perennial problem of the gap between 
relief and development. (Keely, 1981) One of the fundamental problems in this regard is 
conceptual.  
 
The UNHCR Draft Paper on Targeting Assistance of June 2004 confidently states on page 
5, paragraph 17:  
 
“Relief and development therefore are different processes. This helps to explain 
much of the ‘gap’ between humanitarian and development aid ...”  
 
Are they? Does it? The same document state on page 6, paragraph 19: 
 
“Not only donors but also the UN system and NGOs tend to see humanitarian and 
development as two distinct processes, planning and implementing humanitarian and 
development operations in isolation. The Framework for Durable Solutions 
advocated integration planning by all stakeholders - the UNCTs, the World Bank, 
NGOs, bilateral agencies and governments - from the outset of an operation 
providing exit and entry strategies for humanitarian and development actors 
respectively.” (UNHCR, 2004)  
 
Perhaps the two processes have more in common that conventional wisdom allows. In 
some respects, humanitarian and development assistance do the same thing and the 
conceptual, funding, and operational separation owe more to history and tradition than 
reality on the ground. 
 
To make such a suggestion is not to spell out possible convergences and similarities, with 
their implications for conceptual analysis, planning, programming, and funding. Because 
the “gap” is by this time perennial and not about to disappear, perhaps a radical rethinking 
is necessary. This idea is not entirely new. (Keely, 1981) But its acceptance and testing 
would be novel. What does it mean to make forced migration assistance a development-
oriented task? 
 
One aspect would be to rethink the issue of migration and development generally. Most 
development theory and more so practice deals with migration as a form of deviance that 
gets in the way of planning, especially a planning process that is linear. Some programming 
even has attempted development schemes to keep people from moving. Some thinking on 
the part of governments to address the root causes of international migration and especially 
abusive asylum seeking has focused on projects to head off potential migrants. Very 
infrequently has the idea been built into development planning that development will bring 
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about economic changes that will induce migration, requiring at least some feed back into 
plans. Economic change and social mobility are very often mirrored in geographical 
mobility. It is by now generally accepted from experience that economic development will 
lead to increased migration in the short to medium term and a reduction occurs only 
eventually when opportunities at home and the costs of migration make staying put or 
moving within one’s own country more attractive. Poverty reduction increases migration in 
development settings. 
 
If persons have been refugees or IDPs, is it surprising that many will not end up back at 
their old home on return? Many may not want to return “home”, may have been introduced 
to new ideas, skills, and so on. Since most refugees and IDPs do not live in camps, they 
have lived often in urban areas, observing new and different ways, perhaps participating in 
an urban, non-agricultural economy, perhaps for the first time. 
 
The gap between relief and development may be an artefact of conceptualisation. And the 
role of migration in development may be underappreciated and misanalysed. Migration 
rather than being an inhibitor of development may be an indicator of it. The issue is not to 
stop it but to harness it in ways that increase access to wealth, contribute to sustainable 
growth, and increase income and wealth equality among all sectors of a society. 
 
4.2. Legal Definitions 
Although this paper has not engaged in a detailed legal analysis on international refugee 
and humanitarian law, it is clear that current laws and mandates affecting the international 
regime for forced migration do not cover all groups that contribute to instability and cover 
some groups in a spotty and inconsistent way. The Convention definition does not cover 
those fleeing the general devastation of war. The OAU Convention does, as does the 
Cartagena Declaration in the Western Hemisphere, a non-binding document nevertheless 
invoked to request international help for assistance and protection of forced migrants. The 
good offices of UNHCR are permissive and invoked for a variety of reasons. Internally 
displaced are of concern to UNHCR to some degree under Security Council or General 
Assembly mandates or as lead agency in some situations. The number under UNHCR 
protection is a fourth of the total estimated in the world today. Environmental, disaster, and 
developmental forced migrants fit nowhere in the international system specifically, 
although, as the Guidelines on Displaced Persons makes clear, their own governments have 
considerable responsibilities. As discussed below, the Protection Plus initiative does not 
address this issue adequately. Further, this is not merely a matter of reassembling UN 
agencies. It touches fundamental doctrines like sovereignty and balancing sovereignty as a 
meaningful concept while not making it a shield of impunity regardless of violation of 
basic values and endangering stability of the state system by rogue regimes. 
 
4.3. Inconsistencies in the Treatment of Forced Migrants 
In the 1990s, awareness emerged that threats to individuals who do not receive 
international protection, but are in similar situations to Convention refugees may be a threat 
to the international system. Halting steps at remedies have resulted. Different sorts of 
forced migrants receive inconsistent treatment, not because they are in meaningfully 
different categories of need or systemic threat, but because of past practices and legal 
norms. Some of the inconsistency is due merely to which region of the world they live in. 
Sometimes it is the result of the foreign policy interests of a powerful state or set of states.  
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Rethinking forced migration is a threatening activity. It conjures up images of tinkering 
with the Convention and UNHCR Statute. It threatens set ways of thinking and doing 
things in some agencies and threatens others who may think that another agency will get 
more “turf” and funding if their mandate is widened. The current inadequacies of the forced 
migration regime are palpable. But change is costly. 
 
One way to rethink forced migration regimes, although not palatable to all, especially those 
concerned primarily with human rights, is to analyse the potential for destabilisation of the 
international system of the different sorts of forced migrants. If one recognises that the 
refugee regime was developed and supported for reasons of state stability (Keely, 1996), 
then it makes sense to start an analysis there. This is not incompatible with human rights 
reasons for addressing new groups of forced migrants by the international community, but 
such rethinking is not primarily motivated or guided by human rights concerns or doctrines. 
“Addressing” need not mean changing the Convention or a race to the bottom. International 
action may or may not be justified on humanitarian grounds but it should certainly be 
justified on the basis of the reasons states have to garner international support for the 
extension of law and programs to address contemporary threats to stability by forced 
migrants beyond traditional refugee flows. 
 
4.4. Funding Issues 
Complaints about underfunding are usual in analyses of humanitarian assistance and 
development. Staying with a problem and being in for the long haul are commonplace 
recommendations. Academics’ repeating of them has no particular effect because these are 
political issues solved by political processes in donor countries. 
 
What perhaps can be changed, at least marginally, are the conceptualisation of relief as a 
separate process from development and the persistence of independence in funding 
strategies among donors. Coordinated funding through the European Union helps decrease 
the separateness, but introduces another strong player. Various countries and their separate 
agencies sometimes adopt differing objectives, not necessarily contradictory but not 
necessarily reinforcing either. While ultimately such issues are political, there is perhaps 
more room for expert suggestion and planning to influence policy or to allow room for 
wider initiative by senior civil servants. Realistically, however, one should expect a large 
measure of pluralism in approaches, regional interests, sectoral preferences, and so on from 
different governments and perhaps change in country priorities as governments change. 
 
Because budget priorities change for all sorts of reasons, and funding issues are never 
“solved” once and for all. They require a thick skin, but constant honest attention to do 
better when possible. 
 
4.5. Security in Relief Operations 
Security issues have emerged in the last decade as a major concern of humanitarian relief 
workers and development workers by extension. Humanitarian relief personnel have been 
expressly targeted, such as the ICRC medical personnel in Chechnya. Combatants 
deliberately fired on UN relief workers in the former Yugoslavia. Insurgents blew up UN 
headquarters in Iraq killing the head of the UN mission and many colleagues and visitors. 
Security extends far beyond fear of a convoy ambush by a rogue insurgent group not under 
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proper control. 
 
A change has taken place in contemporary war so that it is difficult to take an impartial and 
neutral stance to do humanitarian work. Part of the reason is that combatants do not accept 
the idea that any help to opponents is impartial or neutral. To help my enemy is to become 
my enemy. Therefore, targeting relief workers and no longer respecting red crosses or 
crescents or UN insignia are commonplace. Agencies also face a dilemma that may feed 
into the questioning of neutrality. Should humanitarian agencies denounce egregious 
human rights violations? Should they remain impartial when combatants commit war 
crimes or crimes against humanity? 
 
Further, there is decreasing practical ability to gain access to populations in need because of 
war or insurrection. Forced migrants are often in isolated places difficult to access or 
controlled by militias of some sort. This makes access difficult or possible only at the price 
of “taxes” that support further violence. 
 
One small step may be to encourage the civil society sector, especially religious groups, to 
examine their traditions about the right of access to help those in need. Small steps like 
days of tranquillity to allow vaccination of children may reinforce ideas about right of 
access and a rebuilding of norms about the legitimacy of humanitarian assistance. 
 
Regardless, rethinking security in relief operations perhaps should not turn too quickly to 
assembling more guards and more guns. That will only reinforce convictions that 
humanitarian assistance is only war by another name and that nobody with guns is impartial 
or neutral. 
 
The word security also rears up in other areas of concern, notably state security and 
security of forced migrants. This section has focused on the new challenge of the security 
of relief operations themselves because it questions and perhaps undermines the possibility 
and in some minds the legitimacy of neutral humanitarian assistance. This strikes at the root 
of relief work in complex humanitarian emergencies. A renewed consensus that influences 
behaviour of parties to such conflicts needs to be reinvigorated. The very enterprise’s 
legitimacy is currently under attack and responses to date are inadequate. 
 
4.6. Durable Solutions 
The Cold War proxy wars led to the so-called long stayers among refugee groups. They 
were refugees for years and decades. Generations were born refugees. In addition, many 
refugee groups harboured or were controlled by military combatants, often with the 
collusion and support of the major power backers. Afghans in Pakistan are but one 
example.  
 
The past follows us, aided by fundamentalist nationalism and religious interpretations. The 
Dayton Accords envisioned returns that would not reinforce ethnic cleansing but that has 
not happened for the most part. Ethnic unmixing as ethnic cleansing or internationally 
sanctioned population transfers may be a permanent feature of the nation state system, 
however much decried in current political discourse. 
 
Therefore, repatriation and settlement in first asylum countries may be inhibited for 
ethnic/political reasons, as well as economic/developmental reasons. Resettlement 
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countries of the North have moved away from third country resettlement and there seem to 
be no indicators that it will revive to former levels. While there will continue to be 
settlement of some asylum seekers and third country resettlement of some under UN 
protection, the drift is definitely toward regional containment. Regardless of trends in 
resettlement policy, the world’s refugees, much less all forced migrants, could not by any 
stretch of the imagination be accommodated by a third country resettlement policy. 
 
 
5. AGENDA FOR PROTECTION 
 
The UNHCR Excom approved the Agenda for Protection in June 2002. It has six goals:  
1. strengthening implementation of the Convention and Protocol;  
2. protecting refugees within wider migration;  
3. burden sharing and increasing capacity to be first asylum countries;  
4. security issues; 
5. durable solutions; and  
6. women and children. 
 
5.1. Strengthening the Implementation of the Convention and Protocol 
The first goal covers twelve individual objectives. They are generally stated and many 
focus on better operational outcomes for current practice. In general, they propose doing 
better what is now done. 
 
The fundamental question of addressing forced migration in a way that is consistent across 
groups that threaten stability and that resemble Convention refugees except for being still 
within their own country is not addressed.  
 
5.2. Protecting Refugees within Broader Migration 
This goal has seven objectives, again with an emphasis on better carrying out current 
activities. Two goals are notable. The first call for actions that would reinforce the tendency 
to regionally contain asylum seekers and refugees by reducing irregular migration to other 
countries beyond one in which protection has been granted. The second calls for improved 
performance on return policy of those rejected for asylum or refugee status. The document 
supports some of the policy thrusts on refugees of the developed states related to 
containment and methods to reduce asylum-seeking abuses. The language reflects discourse 
and interests particularly of European states. These goals, however, are not placed in 
context of a wider and franker discussion of the role of refugee protection, the re-emphasis 
on repatriation, or the policy of regional containment. These all result from events related 
to asylum seeking and refugee flows of the last quarter century. They have important 
domestic political implications, as mentioned above. While one should not realistically 
expect such an official document to be so transparent about context, a policy analysis 
should. The goals listed reflect shifts in policy emphases without spelling out further 
implications. 
 
There is no mention of protection and assistance to forced migrants beyond refugees or 
recognition of such needs. While this may be expected in a document of this sort from 
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UNHCR, it underscores the inadequacy of the current regime. 
 
5.3. Burden Sharing and Building Capacity to be First Asylum Countries 
The goal complements the previous one by emphasising the obligations of first asylum and 
urging developed countries to help developing countries perform this obligation. A notable 
feature is the call for integrating refugee assistance and protection into development plans 
and a call for development programming in areas or regions of first asylum countries that 
host refugees. The objective does not make clear whether this development effort is meant 
to be a prelude to permanent resettlement or whether it is assumed that such programming 
will not be affected whether the refugees are repatriated or not.  
 
5.4. Security 
The objective under the security goals do not acknowledge the major changes in security 
concerns for humanitarian assistance such as direct targeting of humanitarian personnel and 
targeting UN assets, such as the attack on UN mission headquarters in Iraq. Nor is there 
discussion of the establishment of an international policing capacity to protect humanitarian 
personnel in appropriate circumstances or of the mandates of peace keepers. (A bullet 
under objective one may refer to peace-keeper mandates but in language so guarded as to 
require casuistry kills of a high order.) 
 
5.5. Redoubling Effort at Durable Solutions 
The title of this goal indicates that it calls for due attention to each of the durable solutions 
and doing them better. The final objective, however, calls on states, UNHCR, and 
development agencies to plan to help in the development of areas impacted by departed 
refugees. This, of course, assumes that development aid to such areas was scarce or 
nonexistent while refugees were present or that even if it were there, was not adequate to 
reduce the negative impacts of the refugees’ presence. The objective is laudable but its 
inclusion, especially after the call for development aid to areas with refugees being given 
asylum, underscores the lack of consistent planning or action to date on this issue and a 
lack of clarity about objectives of development aid to refugee-impacted areas while they are 
there.  
 
5.6. Protection Needs of Women and Children 
Recent evaluations of the impact of policies to integrate the needs of women and children 
into UNHCR operations concluded that they left much to be desired. There are complaints 
that, as the list of items to be mainstreamed grows, the interest and capacity to change 
wanes. There is no doubt that women and children have needs different from adult men. 
Care should be taken to address women’s and children’s needs, especially when they 
expose them to additional harm and danger beyond being forced to migrate. 
 
5.7. Discussion 
The Agenda for Protection is a document with a narrow perspective, focused on UNHCR 
operations to a large extent. It is not a document that discusses the contemporary challenges 
of forced migration. It does not provide a vision or a framework to discuss changes in 
operations, mandates, structures, or legal norms to address new realities and challenges. 
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The Agenda has useful suggestions in interpretation of the Convention and in technical 
matters related to process to reach goals for improvement. It does not tackle the 
fundamental sources for the inadequacy of the forced migration regime. Discussion and 
proposals to make improvements along the lines suggested by the objectives listed under 
the six goals can be valuable. However, they are interim steps necessary perhaps while the 
larger and more fundamental questions are addressed. Doing business pretty much as usual, 
even if better, is not adequate in the current forced migration environment around the 
world. 
 
The Agenda provides a framework for UNHCR to report its activities and something of a 
yardstick against which to measure its year’s work. In the 2003 “Update on the 
Implementation of the Agenda for Protection” and the 2004 “Note on International 
Protection,” each presented to the Executive Committee of UNHCR in their respective 
years, there is an impressive array of activities and accomplishments listed under each of 
the six goals. The Agenda and these reports are not intended to provide bold new thinking 
to address new challenges, changes in geopolitical facts on the ground since the end of the 
Cold War, or even the new face of war, including terror tactics and a general disregard for 
the Geneva Conventions by many combatants. And so they do not. The conclusion is not 
that UNHCR or the Agenda are failures. They are not on their own terms. 
 
UNHCR, the only agency with a mandate for protection of certain forced migrants, focuses 
primarily on refugees. They are an important group but not the current major challenge to 
the international community. It is the global refugee regime that has not been able to step 
up to the new challenge, and that is internally displaced people. If refugees were the sole 
forced migration issue, one could say that UNHCR and collaborators have been doing a 
reasonably good job, better in some instances and even very good at times. Always with 
room for improvement, the issue would not be called a crisis but a continuing challenge. 
That is not the rhetoric or the state of play. 
 
It would be surprising if the Agenda or the UNHCR were the source of the bold political 
initiatives and probably path-breaking initiatives that are needed to address not only IDPs 
and other forced migrant issues, but the complex problems of sorting through old mandates, 
habits and relationships that developed in the past but are now in place and perhaps less 
than functional. One might more reasonably look in the direction of states and non 
governmental organizations for both fresh thinking and the ability to take the lead in novel 
directions and garner the support of key followers to fashion adequate responses to 




6. CONVENTION PLUS 
 
6.1. Migration and Development 
As discussed above, migration has been inadequately addressed in development thinking. 
Migration is inherent to development, not an anomaly. Further, forced migration, even if a 
kind of deviancy from the point of view of political doctrine about how states should work, 
nevertheless seems a permanent aspect of the nation state system. (Keely, 1996, 2000) 
 
Further, the conceptual, planning, funding, and programmatic separation of development 
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and forced migration relief assistance needs rethinking. If forced migration in the form of 
refugees, IDPs, environmental and development project migrants are going to be with us, 
along with voluntary migrants thrown up by economic changes in the development process, 
then migratory behaviour needs to be integrated into development planning. Migration 
presents opportunities. Examples include remittance flows into countries from émigrés 
including in many instances from refugees and asylum seekers, and the circulation of skills 
within countries as those adjusting to economic changes seek new work opportunities. To 
be sure migration presents problems in the form of rapid urban growth, overcrowding, 
service provision, and so on. Migration, however, is integral to development and has its 
positive aspects. 
 
6.2. Reaction to Convention Plus by US Government 
The US government, and particularly the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration in 
the State Department and USAID are in accord with the goals of Convention Plus and 
supportive. However, Convention Plus is seen as a document and initiative that speaks to a 
European framing of issues and that region’s concerns. This is not at all surprising given 
UNHCR’s headquarters’ location and staffing. There is less resonance in the US with the 
idea that migration and development linkages will have much impact on migration 
pressures. Neither agency seems to think that Convention Plus heralds any major 
development. 
 
6.3. Poverty Reduction 
A major objective of many actors in economic development funding and activities 
(including DFID) is poverty reduction. The reduction of absolute levels of poverty is not 
adequate if development is meant to address economic root causes of forced migration. 
Income and wealth distribution must also take place to narrow gaps with a population. 
Relative poverty, in the form of wide disparities in income and wealth between the majority 
of a population and small elites are perhaps more destabilising that absolute poverty itself. 
Extremes of relative inequality are multiplied in their destabilising capacity when they 
align along other fault lines in a society, such as race, nationality, and religion.  
 
6.4. Relief and Development 
The issue of relief and development has been discussed above. It is rementioned here 
because of its prominence in the Convention Plus documents. The point is underscored that 
the accepted wisdom of relief and development being separate processes, even with 
interacting effects and some temporal overlap, needs to be rethought. The processes have 
much in common in attempts to develop new “normalcies” in response to economic, 
environmental, and other changes. Even repatriation is not a return to a status quo. The 
economic, social, and political situations after forced migration are not the same as 
previously. New institutions, technologies, networks, and other elements of a normal social 
life that is satisfying and sustainable are required. In this regard much that is done in 
development is similar, although not exactly the same as in complex emergencies. This 
paper is not meant to lay out a more integrated view in detail. The first hurdle is to question 
received truth. 
 
6.5. Aid to Poor Performers 
A dominant guide to funding recently is to provide aid to good performers. In the area of 
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relief and development aid, perhaps poor performers need some attention. Poor performers 
in this context may be the very countries that will produce forced migrants unless given 
particular attention at improving performance. The point, of course, is not to reward the 
recalcitrant but to assist those who try but fail. That failure in economic or other 
performance due to weak institutions or other systemic causes may deserve more rather 
than less assistance and attention. Poor performers may be the most likely source of forced 
migrants when there exists the right mix of ethnic, religious or other characteristics 
conducive to violent political conflict. Instability in the form of forced migrants in and from 
poor performers may be more threatening to stability and more costly than not neglecting 
them in favour of good performers.  
 
 
7. STANDING COMMITTEE WORK PROGRAM 
 
7.1. Right of Access 
An addition to the work program of the Standing Committee should be the issue of right of 
access of humanitarian personnel. This issue can be taken up at the highest levels of the UN 
and among states. Practical methods to increase access and provide security to make access 
real in practice need attention. 
 
The issue of access is intimately tied to the issue of security of forced migrants and relief 
assistance personnel. The security issue is in need of fundamental rethinking and creative 
programming in the new circumstances of contemporary war. Reaffirmation of the 
principle of right of access to deliver humanitarian relief is a key component to the 
realization of an adequate security agenda. 
 
 
8. GLOBAL COMMISSION ON MIGRATION 
 
8.1. The Work Scope of the Global Commission 
The Independent Global Commission on Migration was formally begun in January of 2004 
and is to make its report to the Secretary General at the end of June 2005. Although not an 
organ of the UN and begun and funded to a large extent by Switzerland and Sweden, the 
Commission will report to the Secretary General in order to highlight the importance of its 
deliberations. 
 
The Commission was developed with the idea of introducing new language and a more 
positive framework for discussing migration, a sort of win-win discourse. Initiators and 
supporting governments saw the discussion deteriorating to the point where migrants were 
seen only as threats and problems. The benefits and even need of migration for a variety of 
economic and social needs was underplayed. A high-level group could introduce a 
discussion less laden with security and negative images. 
 
The Commission is still discussing scope and activities. It is too early in the process to 
provide concrete outcomes. Speculation at this point can only be uninformed given the 
early stages of the work. 
 
Forced migration is not the focus of the Commission. However, there are aspects of 
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migration generally that would inevitably impinge on forced migration issues. The issue of 
sovereignty as it affects migration policy is one example. Think of negotiations about trade 
in services and limits they might introduce on state behaviour regarding immigration and 
integration of non citizens. The concern of the Secretary General about internally displaced 
and the fact that the Commission will report its finding and recommendations to him could 
lead them to give some attention to forced migration issues.  
 
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1. Concluding Remarks 
This paper began with the observation that the global refugee regime is not up to the task. 
The regime is the creation of states. It would be unlikely that the regime actors could bring 
about deep change without the states agreeing wholeheartedly. The hesitancy of states is 
probably most vividly exemplified by the EU experience. The goals of the Treaty of Rome 
about the free movement of people are unmet. The Single European Act’s goals of 
harmonised policy by 1982 were unmet. The Amsterdam Treaty’s schedule for movement 
of migration to the first pillar by 1 May 2004 was not met. States retain control over much 
of migration policy and notably much of asylum policy. There are differences among states 
and deep differences among constituencies within states about immigration, integration, 
asylum granting and many other facets of international migration policy. 
 
The discourse in the political arena, in civil society, and in academic literature reflects both 
division and confusion. For example, as often as the point has been made the refugees are 
the result of political causes (see, e.g., Crawley’s paper for this conference; Hatton and 
Williamson, 2004; and Keely, 1996), nevertheless one routinely encounters references to 
poverty and inequality as the root causes of refugee production and calls for poverty 
reduction as a means to reduce refugee flows. Political salience seems to disappear.  
 
Further, there seems to be almost a talking past one another at times. Those speaking from 
a state perspective, while making references to foundational documents such as the UN 
Convention, seem more bent on protecting the state than refugees. Policy makers, however, 
ought to be expected to make decisions on the basis of welfare considerations for their state 
and its citizens. The myopia here seems to be not to consider that rigorous protection of 
citizens of another state may be a boon to state security rather than a burden or 
humanitarian gesture. As mentioned above, human rights violations, and addressing them 
by protection, assistance, and helping with solutions to stop violations may be a higher 
order security issue in today’s world than has hitherto been the case. 
 
Supporters of refugees and other forced migrants, for their part also speak past their 
interlocutors. They often do not acknowledge the claims and obligations of states to 
security. They sometimes exaggerate the requirements states assume by acceding to 
international instruments. Of course, every proposal by a state that may technically be legal 
may not be a good policy. For example, international instruments require a safe return, not 
always a voluntary return. A strict norm of voluntary would mean that the refugee has the 
ultimate decision about return and whether it is safe. No state has or would agree to have a 
non-citizen have absolute veto about removal. 
 
Migration issues are matters of high politics at this point. The issues, however, present 
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quite thorny problems. IDPs, while a threat to international stability, are not easily 
addressed in terms of international law and practice or by international agencies designed to 
protect, assist, or help develop. States see the outcomes of forced migrations and of the 
issues surrounding them related to doctrine, policy, and programs as quite important for 
domestic political reasons, for the character of their societies, and for the shape of the 
geopolitical system. These are not the most immediately worrisome concerns of political 
leadership, to be sure. But they are hardly trivial. They are hard fought, have high-stakes 
political implications for democracies and elections, and have been a major stumbling 
block for international cooperation. 
 
Major changes in international migration policies require decision making at the highest 
levels of states. The vision, the supporting arguments to garner political support, and the 
will to move ahead, which inevitably includes some risk taking, are not present. 
 
There are signs of movement on some fronts. The ideas and proposals of the UN Secretary 
General about IDPs and remarks about sovereignty indicate a certain boldness to look 
afresh at issues and to acknowledge incapacities of current thinking and political 
arrangements. 
 
Therefore, expectations about ability to change or adequately address issues from less 
powerful or independent bases ought to be modest.  
 
9.2. Recommendations 
The gap between assistance and development has been a perennial issue. There are 
experiences that have been cited as giving at least some hope and insights. CIREFCA is 
one example. Currently, there are situations where governments and NGOs use different 
pots of money from donors to link their assistance and development work. In other cases 
funding does not allow such “natural experiments.” DFID could develop and fund 
research on current experiences in which operatives on the ground fuse assistance and 
development projects. Best practices may be able to be developed and funding made to 
cover proposals that span the assistance and development areas. It may also be worthwhile 
for some research and think pieces about the similarities and continuities between 
assistance and development activities that would spur and undergird new thinking for 
funding strategies. 
 
The Global Commission will provide an opportunity to urge a high-powered group with 
staff and many collaborators to attack issues afresh. DFID should itself or through other 
organs of the UK Government use their access and influence to have the Commission 
take up some of the issues related to forced migration and development and migration 
generally. Some issues have been alluded to already. One is sovereignty and prevention of 
forced migration. A second is what can be expected from greater coordination or 
harmonisation of international migration and refugee policy. (Hatton and Williamson, 
2004) 
 
DFID may want to review the experience of success and failures of the Consolidated 
Appeals Process (CAPs) and the extent to which donor behaviour contributes to 
successes or failures. The point here is not just an accounting exercise but to assess to 
what extent countries or their agencies react favourably to an appeal or take a pass. DFID 
might also usefully urge inquiry into whether donors to CAPs have had funds begin to 
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flow in a timely manner and how to reduce unwarranted delays that exist.  
 
DFID and perhaps other donors should support evaluations of OCHA and the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in the area of forced migration. Obviously donors 
and other agencies involved in forced migration issues form opinions constantly from 
interaction and participation with these UN agencies. What is called for here is whether 
there is improvement, by what criteria, by what measures from prior UN arrangements. The 
fundamental issue is, of course, how to address IDP issues and integrate all forced 
migration that requires international protection into an integrated forced migration regime. 
The refugee regime is inadequate and preserving it may even be counter productive. 
 
Finally, the new nature of warfare and the challenges to humanitarian assistance need 
analysis. There are many donors who might underwrite such analysis. While DFID is not 
specifically recommended to support this work, because there may be other more suitable 
donors within whose mandate such support clearly falls, the results could be of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This paper examines UK and EU policy and practice relating to forced migration, 
including current debates on possible changes in this area. The paper briefly examines 
the causes of refugee displacements and asylum flows to Europe, focusing on the effects 
of conflict, political upheaval and economic incentives to migrate. The causes of forced 
migration are complex and multifaceted but it is clear that indicators of conflict are far 
more significant than indicators of development as explanatory factors for flows of 
asylum seekers to the countries of the EU. The paper is therefore underpinned by an 
assumption that in order to address issues of refugee and asylum seeker flows to the UK 
and EU it is necessary to develop policies that not only react to these flows but also 
tackle the underlying causes of forced migration in countries of origin and in 
neighbouring regions and countries to which the vast majority of people are forced to 
move. 
 
The recent history of UK policy in relation to asylum and forced migration has been 
dominated by an overwhelming focus on tackling actual and perceived abuses of the 
asylum system and is reflected in significant legislative and policy changes over the past 
decade. The overwhelming majority of recent policy changes have been orientated 
towards restricting or controlling entry. Tough measures have been introduced to 
prevent asylum seekers and refugees from entering the UK. This approach is driven 
principally by the Home Office in response to actual and perceived abuses of the asylum 
system and a commitment to reducing the number of asylum applications in the UK. 
 
In Europe the past decade has seen the emergence of a raft of policies that reflect the 
harmonization process that has been underway since the early 1990s but was accelerated 
considerably in 1999. This period has also seen the emergence of the so-called ‘external 
dimension’ or ‘preventative approach’ in EU co-operation aimed at limiting asylum 
flows into the EU. The European Union has long recognised that it needs a 
comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and 
development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires 
combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing 
conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights. 
However, the High Level Working Group has been largely ineffective as a mechanism 
for developing and implementing policies which address the root causes of forced 
migration in any meaningful way. As a result much of the focus has continued to be on 
European-wide border controls and attempts to manage migration through co-operation 
with migration sending or transit countries including through the linking of 
development assistance to the return of illegal entrants and failed asylum seekers.  
 
Early in 2003, the European Council received two proposals, one from the UK 
Government and one from the UNHCR, each mapping out their ideas for a future 
European Asylum System. Although not entirely new, the UK proposals provided the 
catalyst for an intense debate within and outside the EU about the future of the 
international protection regime. This debate and the subsequent European Commission 
proposal for new approaches in handling EU asylum claims suggests that a fundamental 
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The paper also considers the role of UNHCR in shaping the overall context of UK and 
European asylum policy and in contributing specifically to recent debates about 
alternative approaches. UNHCR have for many years undertaken efforts to link 
humanitarian assistance with the development process in less prosperous regions of the 
world and the organisation has welcomed the EU’s efforts to develop a more 
comprehensive approach to refugee-producing situations. Most recently UNHCR has 
attempted to establish a comprehensive framework for refugee protection and to address 
the root causes of forced migration through its Global Consultations on International 
Protection, and subsequent Agenda for Protection and ‘Convention Plus’ initiative 
which focuses on the strategic use of resettlement, measures to address irregular 
secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers, and the targeting of development 
assistance to achieve durable solutions. UNHCR has also attempted to engage directly 
with the UK and other EU Member States’ concerns about the working of the current 
system of international protection though a ‘three-pronged’ proposal based on 
multilateral co-operation and the equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities but 
focused specifically on the European context. The so-called ‘EU prong’ proposes 
separating out the groups that are clearly misusing the system, and sending them to one 
or more reception centres somewhere within the EU, where their claims would be 
rapidly examined by joint EU teams.  
 
In the context of policy development within the UK, Europe and UNHCR over recent 
years, the paper assesses the extent to which policies in the area of forced migration, 
asylum, development, trade and foreign policy currently are, or have the potential to be, 
‘joined-up’. The paper is critical of the seeming failure of proposed new approaches to 
take a genuinely long-term view of forced migration issues and argues that the most 
effective and durable solution to the international refugee crisis is to address the root 
causes of the initial flight. It is also critical of the policy ‘gaps’– institutional, financial 
and conceptual – that have obstructed efforts in this area for the past 50 years. There is 
still a long way to go in ‘joining-up’ the different areas of policy that have the potential 
not to deal simply with the consequences of forced migration but prevent it from 
happening in the first place. This is due partly to lack of resources, but more importantly 
to differences in policy objectives and targets, where for instance powerful economic 
interests stand to lose if human rights and poverty reduction policies are given priority.  
 
Although ‘joined-up’ policy making in the area of forced migration has proved elusive 
to date, there is unused potential in mutually supportive polices i.e. in a constructive use 
of activities and interventions that are common to the migration and development fields 
and may have positive effects on poverty reduction, development, prevention of violent 
conflicts, and international mobility. The European Union has a great comparative 
advantage deriving from its presence in numerous geographical locations, sectors and 
policy fields and is well positioned to take a lead in the migration-development field.  
 
It is easy to be despondent about the direction of policies relating to forced migration in 
the UK and EU over recent years but there is also some room for optimism. There is 
clearly a growing recognition of the connections between the two and of the underlying 
root causes of forced migration. Recent years have seen an increasing interest from 
donor states in de-compartmentalising humanitarian and development aid and in 
incorporating refugee needs in development aid policies. This is reflected in efforts to 
establish resettlement programmes and to target development assistance, examples of 
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to a wish by many donor states to have a ‘whole-of-government’ approach comprising a 
joint strategic vision shared by different government departments like foreign affairs, 
justice and home affairs, defence and development co-operation. This change of 
approach is welcome and should be encouraged.   
 
Achieving ‘joined-up’ policy on forced migration is not impossible but it will take a 
significant step-change in thinking and considerably more political will than currently 
exists. There is a real opportunity on the horizon for the UK, which holds the EU 
Presidency in 2005, to shift thinking at the EU level about the root causes of forced 
migration and to develop long-term policy approaches which deliver this step-change in 
practice. The paper proposes that such a step-change should be based on the following 
thematic policy approaches: 
• Measures to reduce the causes of migration and forced displacement; 
• Promoting the reception of refugees in regions of origin; and  
• Resettlement schemes to compliment improved in-country asylum processing. 
 
Within this broad framework, specific recommendations are set out in relation to the 
potential role of the Department for International Development (DFID) in influencing 
current debates and policy development in this area: 
• DFID should promote understanding of the causes of forced migration and 
demonstrate political leadership on this issue; 
• DFID should play a more significant role in ‘joining-up’ policy at UK and EU 
levels; 
• DFID should support proposals for resettlement from countries and regions of 
origin; 
• DFID should establish effective and meaningful mechanisms for engaging with 
civil society (including NGOs and diaspora) in the area of forced migration; and 
• DFID should extend its capacity building function to situations where there is a 
risk of forced migration flows and/or internal displacement even where this is 
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1.1. Aims and Objectives of the Paper 
The aim of this paper is to examine UK and EU policy and practice relating to forced 
migration, including current debates on possible changes in this area. The main body of 
the paper begins with a brief examination of the causes of refugee displacements and 
asylum flows to Europe, focusing on the effects of conflict, political upheaval and 
economic incentives to migrate and based in significant part on the analysis presented 
by Castles, Crawley and Loughna in States of Conflict: Causes and patterns of forced 
migration to the EU and policy responses (2003). The paper then examines the 
evolution of policies towards asylum seekers in the UK and the EU, and also outlines 
external responses to these policy developments, most notably by the UNHCR through 
its Global Consultation, Agenda for Protection, ‘Convention Plus’ and the so-called 
‘EU-prong’. The paper looks briefly at the policy positions of other so-called ‘refugee-
receiving’ states in relation to the key policy themes which have emerged over recent 
years, including EU donor states, Canada and Japan. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that the analysis in this paper is underpinned by the an 
assumption that in order to address issues of refugee and asylum seeker flows to the UK 
and EU it is necessary to develop policies that not only react to these flows but also 
tackle the underlying causes of forced migration in countries of origin and in 
neighbouring regions and countries to which the vast majority of people are forced to 
move. Given the strength of the evidence base relating to the role of conflict in 
generating forced migration flows, as well as the role of other policies which generate 
or ameliorate conflict, it follows that it is important to examine other areas of policy 
which might have an impact on forced migration. As argued by Loescher and Milner 
(2003: 596): 
 
“[I]t is important to begin to understand how related areas, such as resettlement 
programmes, international development, foreign policy and asylum policy, can 
and should be rooted in a common understanding of the scope and nature of the 
refugee problem in the sources of refugee origin. It is the way that Western asylum 
countries, including the UK, may best be able to address the challenge of 
providing international protection to victims of persecution and respond to their 
own concerns about asylum.” 
 
Reflecting this broad approach, the paper includes an overall assessment of the extent to 
which policies within the UK, within the EU and in relation to one another currently 
are, or have the potential to be, ‘joined-up’ and, in the light of recent policy 
developments, concludes by addressing the question of whether greater co-ordination 
between government (national and EU) departments with responsibility for different 
areas of policy and improved international coordination could produce better outcomes 
for refugee-receiving countries and for the refugees themselves. Specific 
recommendations are set out in relation to the potential role of the Department for 
International Development (DFID) in influencing current debates and policy 
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1.2. Overall Policy Context: A Shifting Paradigm? 
Whilst policies in relation to forced migration have always been contentious and 
politically sensitive, the debate relating to the rights of migrants and the forcibly 
displaced has become increasingly high profile, controversial and polarized over recent 
years. Much of this, though not all, can be attributed to the post-Cold War dynamic 
where geo-political and strategic interests in protecting the rights of nationals of other 
countries, in particular refugees, have shifted, diminished or, in extreme cases, 
evaporated. In addition, the past decade has seen the emergence of a raft of policies that 
reflect the harmonization process that has been underway in Europe since the early 
1990s but was considerably accelerated in 1999. At the same time there have been 
fundamental changes in UK policy and practice arising from two White Papers on 
asylum and immigration policy reform and four significant pieces of legislation in less 
than ten years, three of which have been introduced in the last five years. All of this has 
been set in the context of increasing flows of refugees and IDPs, of increasing 
globalisation and inter-linkages across policy areas and, most recently, increasing 
concerns about international security1. Responding to this changing international 
context, UNHCR launched its Global Consultations on International Protection in 1999 
and itself contributed to the on-going international debate about the protection 
framework provided through the 1951 Refugee Convention and the need or otherwise 
for reform. 
  
The sheer quantity and complexity of policies in relation to forced migration emanating 
from the UK, Europe and external organisations such as UNHCR can render it very 
difficult to ascertain the key events in the emergence of this international debate and the 
role of the different institutional bodies in shaping the current agenda. Figure 1 provides 
a brief chronology of significant developments in the period 1997 – 2004. This 
chronology is by no means definitive but identifies the key legislative, policy and 
contextual events in order that the reader be able to more easily ascertain how these 
relate to one another. Most significantly for the purposes of this paper it should be noted 
that early in 2003, the European Council received two proposals, one from the UK 
Government and one from the UNHCR, each mapping out their ideas for a future 
European Asylum System. The UK Government’s scheme concentrated on extra-
territorial processing of asylum claims and proposed that asylum seekers arriving in the 
EU would be transferred to a Regional Protection Area outside the EU (in a transit 
country or in the region of origin) where their refugee status would be determined (UK 
Government, 2003). The UNHCR’s proposal, which has received a more favorable 
reception, was presented as the ‘EU prong’ of its wider so-called ‘Convention Plus’ 
initiative (UNHCR, 2003).  
 
The UK proposals provided the catalyst for an intense debate within and outside the EU 
about the future of the international protection regime. This debate and the subsequent 
European Commission proposal for new approaches in handling EU asylum claims has 
led some to conclude that a fundamental (negative) shift is taking place in approaches to 
international refugee protection and that the very concept is at a critical turning point. 
Others suggest that it is simply another phase in the overall process of burden-shifting 
 
1 The impact of concerns about terrorism and threats to security in shaping UK and EU policy in relation 
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or, more positively, that any change in policy approach which begins to take into 
account the protection needs of the vast majority of refugees and IDPs who remain in 
countries and regions of origin should be welcomed. 
 
Figure 1 Chronology of key events 1997 – 2004 
 
1997 
June   Amsterdam Summit 
 
1998 
July  Publication of UK White Paper Fairer, Faster and Firmer 
December Vienna Action Plan adopted 
 
1999 
February First reading of UK Asylum and Immigration Act 
  High Level Working Group (HLWG) established 
May  Amsterdam Treaty enters into force 
October  European Council meeting in Tampere, Finland  
November UK Asylum and Immigration Act receives Royal Assent 
 
2000 
November Commission publish Communication Towards a Common Asylum Procedure  
December Nice Summit and signing of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 UNHCR launches Global Consultations on International Protection  
2001 
July  ‘Temporary Protection Directive’ adopted 
August  Tampa crisis in Australia and development of the ‘Pacific Solution’ 
September Terrorist events in New York 
October  UK Home Secretary announces a substantial package of measures to fundamentally   
overhaul the Government's immigration and asylum policy. 
November  UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill introduced  
December Declaration by all states of commitment to 1951 Refugee Convention 
 Laeken Summit conclusions 
 
2002 
February  Publication of the UK White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill introduced into Parliament. 
June Seville Summit conclusions 
 UNHCR endorses the Agenda for Protection which emerged from the Global 
Consultations. 
September  UNHCR’s ‘Convention Plus’ is announced 
November  The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 receives Royal Assent 
 
2003 
January European ‘Reception Directive’ formally adopted   
February UK Prime Minister’s commitment to reduce number of asylum applications by half 
 UK ‘New Vision’ proposal leaked and reported in British press 
March European Commission adopted a Communication on the common asylum policy and the 
Agenda for Protection, which resolves to implement the Agenda for Protection 
March  UNHCR proposals for an ‘EU prong’ presented to the European Commission 
June European Commission publishes its Communication Towards more accessible, 
equitable and managed asylum systems 
September Dublin II regulation comes into force 
 
2004 
April ‘Qualification Directive’ adopted and ‘general approach’ to ‘Procedures Directive’ 
agreed 
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2. THE CAUSES AND SCALE OF FLOWS TO THE UK AND EUROPE 
 
2.1. The Scale of Flows 
The global refugee population grew from 2.4 million in 1975 to 10.5 million in 1985 
and 14.9 million in 1990. A peak was reached after the end of the Cold War with 18.2 
million in 1993. By 2000, the global refugee population had declined to 12.1 million 
(Castles et al., 2003). Both historically and at the current time, the overwhelming 
majority of these refugees are located in the developing world, close to their countries 
of origin. There is a strong correlation between the number of refugees that originated in 
a region and the number who are located within that region (Hatton and Williamson 
2004).2  
 
In the European context, the number of forced migrants closely reflects the outflows 
and (subsequent return) of large numbers of people from the former Yugoslavia as well 
as policy changes in different Member States.3 After a peak in 1992 of 670,000 
applications there were falls in asylum applications following changes in refugee law in 
Germany (438,200 applications in 1992, but only 127,900 in 1995) and Sweden (84,000 
in 1992, 9,000 in 1995). Applications were at a low of 226,000 in 1996, but then 
increased again, reaching about 450,000 by 2000. The UK had relatively few asylum 
seekers in the early 1990s, with 32,300 in 1992, but numbers increased at the end of the 
decade to 55,000 in 1998 and 97,900 in 2000 (Castles et al. 2003). The number of 
asylum seekers in both the UK and across Europe as a whole had fallen in recent years, 
principally as a result of increasingly restrictive policies to prevent access to procedures 
for refugee status determination.  
 
It should be noted that a relatively small number of nationalities account for the 
majority of asylum applicants in the EU. Castles et al. (2003) analysed data on flows of 
asylum seekers to Europe over the period 1990 – 2000 and found that that asylum 
seekers from just ten countries – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Romania, 
Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – constituted 59% of all arrivals to the 14 EU 
states over a period of 11 years. Similar conclusions have been reached by Loescher and 
Milner (2003).  
 
2.2. Causes of Forced Migration to the UK and EU 
The causes of forced migration are complex and multifaceted. Although the literature on 
the causes of migration usually distinguishes between refugee flows and voluntary 
economic migration, in practice such a distinction is often difficult to sustain (Martin 
2000). The factors triggering migration usually comprise a complex mix of political, 
social and economic conditions, as well as individual psychological factors, and in 
many cases it makes little sense to ask if movement is voluntary or coerced. Moreover, 
 
2 In 2001 49 percent of refugees originated somewhere in Asia or the Middle East and 46 percent were 
located there, while Africa was the source of a further 30 percent and the host to 27 percent. Eastern 
Europe was the source of 11 percent of refugees in 2001 and host to 6 percent, some of whom were 
refugees from outside the region. In 2001 Western Europe hosted 1.7 million refugees from other regions 
(14 percent of the worldwide total) while a further 646,000 (5 percent) were located in North America. 
3 It should be noted that these figures relate to EU pre-enlargement i.e. 15 Member States as opposed to 
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some of those who leave for predominantly economic reasons may attempt to secure 
residence in destination countries through applying for asylum, producing what has 
been coined ‘asylum migration’ – a phenomenon which further complicates the 
distinction between forced and voluntary movement (Boswell and Crisp, 2003). 
 
Nonetheless, when analysing ‘push’ factors in countries and regions of origin it is 
possible to distinguish between those related to political and security conditions – 
including human rights violations, persecution of minority groups, armed conflict and 
generalised violence - and those related to socio-economic conditions, including 
poverty, lack of employment opportunities, inadequate welfare support, education or 
social services, environmental degradation, or demographic growth creating a surplus of 
labour. Whilst there are difficulties in generalising country conditions across a ten-year 
period, the evidence presented by Castles et al. (2003) suggests that indicators of 
conflict are far more significant than indicators of development as explanatory factors 
for flows of asylum seekers to the countries of the EU. Similar conclusions are reached 
by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Loescher and Milner (2003). More recently still, 
Hatton and Williamson (2004) also examine the causes of refugee displacements and 
asylum flows, focusing on the effects of conflict, political upheaval and economic 
incentives to migrate. Looking at the situation in 20 countries of origin of asylum flows 
to the EU over the period 1999-2001 and analyzing the data from a quantitative 
perspective using regression analysis, the authors reach virtually identical conclusions 
to those drawn by Castles et al. (2003). A recently published report using updated 
Home Office data finds that of the just under 50,000 people who applied for asylum in 
the UK in 2003 (excluding dependents), three-quarters were from countries where 
conflict is ongoing (Refugee Week Partnership 2004). 
 
2.3. Forced Migration and Development 
Underdevelopment in itself does not appear to be a major push factor for forced 
migration. Low income is to be found in only about half the top ten refugee producing 
countries, while high population density exists in only one. Low life expectancy is only 
to be found in three of the top ten countries of origin (Castles et al. 2003). This 
undermines the commonly held assumption that the main causal factors behind 
increased asylum seeking in Europe are economic. However because political 
upheavals, economic difficulties and conflicts often occur simultaneously, many 
migrants have multiple motivations for moving. Most importantly for the purposes of 
this paper, underdevelopment may be a crucial factor in precipitating conflict, which 
may in turn lead to forced migration. This is in part because underdevelopment is often 
associated with corrupt and/or undemocratic regimes which are in turn associated with 
human rights abuses and repression of particular ethnic, religious, political or social 
groups (Castles et al. 2003). This paper does not explore in any detail the complex 
relationship between migration and development but many analysts agree that there are 
close links between underdevelopment and conflict, and hence between economic and 
forced migration4. It is clear that this ‘migration-asylum nexus’ constitutes a major 
analytical and policy challenge and one which is considerably complicated by a growing 
body of evidence that indicates that the relationship between conflict, poverty and 
forced migration is not necessarily straightforward or inevitable (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 
 
4 It is understood that a separate thematic paper specifically addresses the relationships between 
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2002). For example, poverty may be associated with conflict over resources but also 
simultaneously can inhibit the capacity of people without resources to move.  
 
 
3. RECENT UK POLICY IN RELATION TO ASYLUM AND FORCED 
MIGRATION 
 
The recent history of UK policy in relation to asylum and forced migration has been 
dominated by an overwhelming focus on tackling actual and perceived abuses of the 
asylum system and is reflected in significant legislative and policy changes over the past 
seven years (see Figure 1). This section outlines UK policy changes in relation to 
securing borders and processing asylum claims and examines the overall aims and 
objectives behind the recent controversial ‘new vision’ proposals presented to the 
European Presidency early in 2003.   
 
3.1. Securing Borders and Processing Asylum Claims 
Broadly speaking, policies for dealing with asylum seeking in the UK and EU fall into 
two main categories: policies designed to restrict or control entry into EU countries; and 
policies designed to prevent forced migration by addressing causes in the countries and 
regions from which asylum seekers and refugees originate (Castles et al. 2003). In the 
foreword to the 2002 Home Office White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, the Home 
Secretary David Blunkett acknowledged that: 
 
“There is nothing more controversial, and yet more natural, than men and women 
from across the world seeking a better life for themselves and their families. Ease 
of communication and of transportation have transformed the time it takes to 
move across the globe. This ease of movement has broken down traditional 
boundaries. Yet the historic causes of homelessness, hunger or fear – conflict, war 
and persecution – have not disappeared. That is why economic migration and the 
seeking of asylum are as prevalent today as they have been at times of historic 
trauma” (emphasis added). 
 
The White Paper also explicitly recognised the need to support the efforts of developing 
countries to promote economic growth and social development, eliminate poverty, 
improve governance and reduce conflict. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of 
recent policy changes have been orientated towards restricting or controlling entry to the 
UK. It is interesting to note for example that whilst ‘prevention’ is mentioned seven 
times in the White Paper, this is only in relation to preventing abuse of the asylum 
system or preventing people smuggling and trafficking in countries of origin. ‘War’ is 
mentioned in the Home Secretary’s foreword but not in the text of the document other 
than in relation to war crimes and war criminals. ‘Countries of origin’ are mentioned 
only twice – once in relation to organised immigration crime and once in relation to 
people smuggling and trafficking.  
 
Reflecting this, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 and Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act, which received Royal Assent in July 
2004, aim principally to establish speedy and effective asylum processes which will, 
according to the Home Office, deter unfounded asylum applications, strengthen borders 
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risk, and tackle illegal working, people trafficking and fraud. Tough measures have 
been introduced to prevent asylum seekers and refugees from entering the UK including 
the use of airline liaison officers, fines for carries who bring would-be asylum seekers 
into the UK, and increased use of technology to detect illegal immigrants or potential 
asylum seekers using false documents5.  
 
This approach to asylum policy-making is driven principally by the Home Office and by 
a perceived need to respond to what has been described as ‘the continuing and 
increasingly sophisticated abuse of the system’, and the political difficulties and 
financial costs associated with increasing numbers of asylum applications. In February 
2003 the Prime Minster publicly committed himself to reducing the number of asylum 
applications by 50% despite instability in the Middle East and a pending war in Iraq. 
The subsequent decline in applications has been widely reported as a success but does 
not necessarily reflect a concomitant improvement in world stability or significant 
reduction in refugee-producing conflicts and human rights abuse leading to forced 
migration. Although political changes in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to an 
overall reduction of around 14% in the number of asylum applicants in Europe, this 
does not account for the far more substantial fall in the UK. Meanwhile there is 
evidence that a significant proportion of initial decisions are incorrect, often due to 
inaccurate information on the countries from which people originate and an 
unsophisticated understanding of the complexity of factors contributing to forced 
migration and shaping the individual migration experience. Around 20% of all initial 
decisions are subsequently overturned on appeal. This figure is even higher for 
applications from some other conflict-affected countries including the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Colombia, and rises to 38% of appeals from Somali and 
Sudanese nationals (Refugee Week Partnership 2004). 
 
3.2. Proposals for Extra-Territorial Processing 
At the end of 2002 and early in 2003 the Cabinet Office and Home Office developed 
proposals for a 'new vision' of refugee protection, one which is ‘fit for the 21st century’. 
It was against the background of record levels of asylum applications in the UK and the 
commitment to reduce applications by 50% that in March 2003 the Prime Minister 
circulated a ‘concept paper’ entitled New international approaches to asylum 
processing and protection to his European Council colleagues6. The premise underlying 
the proposals was that the current global asylum system is failing because:  
• Support for refugees is badly distributed between asylum seekers in Europe and 
the refugees and other ‘persons of concern’ around the world supported by 
UNHCR;  
• Between half and three quarters of those claiming asylum in Europe do not meet 
the criteria of Convention refugees; 
• Individual countries experience rapidly fluctuating and unmanaged intakes of 
asylum seekers and refugees, often resulting in poorly resourced responses; and  
 
5 See for example the press release of 15th June 2004 on proposed use of IRIS technology at 
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsID=412  
6 An earlier draft of the ‘new vision’ paper was leaked to NGOs and the press earlier in the year. The final 
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• Public support for asylum is falling across the developed world.  
 
The paper proposed a strategy for improving regional management of the asylum 
process that would, in the UK Government’s view, prevent the conditions which cause 
population movement, ensure better protection and resources in regions, develop 
managed resettlement arrangements from source regions to Europe on a quota basis and 
raise awareness and acceptance of State responsibility to accept returns.  
 
In part two of the UK paper, two new approaches are presented. The first of these 
proposes that Regional Protection Areas (RPAs) should be established in regions of 
origin. Asylum seekers from certain countries could then be returned to their home 
regions where ‘effective protection’ could be offered to them, and where they would be 
processed with a view to managed resettlement in their home regions or, for some, 
access to resettlement schemes in Europe. According to the paper, increased processing 
of applications in the regions would need to be developed in a way which avoided 
creating a ‘pull factor’ or attracting people to the camps as an easy way to get to Europe. 
 
In addition to improving protection in regions of origin, the UK paper proposed short-
medium term action aimed at deterring those who enter the EU illegally and make 
unfounded applications. One possibility suggested in the paper is to establish protected 
zones in third countries, described as Transit Processing Centres (TPCs) along major 
transit routes into the EU, close to EU borders, to which those asylum seekers arriving 
spontaneously in the UK or another EU member state would be removed and their 
claims processed. Those given refugee status could then be resettled in participating 
Member States whilst others would be returned to their country of origin. According to 
the UK paper, this approach could act as a deterrent to abuse of the asylum system, 
while preserving the right to protection for those who are genuinely entitled to it. It was 
proposed that the centres, which would be located outside the EU, could be managed by 
the International Organization for Migration with a screening regime approved by 
UNHCR. 
 
The European Council invited the European Commission to explore the issues raised in 
the paper and in June 2003, the Commission published a Communication entitled 
Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems (European 
Commission, 2003a). Although the Commission broadly endorsed the UK paper's 
analysis of the deficiencies of the current asylum system and acknowledged the 
‘growing malaise in public opinion’, it concluded that the UK proposals as presented 
were not workable because unresolved questions remained about whether the TPCs 
would be located within or outside the EU, whether processing in centres would be 
compatible with existing EU institutions and legislation, what the concept of ‘effective 
protection’ in regions of origin consisted of and whether RPAs and TPCs were intended 
to be complementary to the existing European  system or to entirely replace it. The 
Commission’s own proposals for a way forward and the parallel development of 
UNHCR’s proposals for an ‘EU prong’ are described in detail in sections 4 and 5 
respectively. 
 
The European Union Committee in the House of Lords has recently examined the UK 
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2004b)7. Its report warns against EU asylum processing centres and concludes that plans 
to establish off-shore centres to process asylum applications could create ‘formidable 
difficulties’ because of uncertainty about which state would be responsible for the 
asylum decision. It also warns there would be uncertainty about what legal procedures 
would apply and concludes there will be practical difficulties of transferring people 
forcibly to the centres. As an alternative, the report calls for action to improve and 
accelerate domestic asylum determination procedures.  
 
The concerns expressed by the House of Lords are echoed by both academics and 
voluntary sector organisations (Amnesty International, 2003; Baldaccini, 2003; ECRE, 
2003; Hatton and Williamson, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Levy, 2004; Loescher 
and Milner, 2003; Noll, 2003; Refugee Council, 2003). Whilst many of these 
commentators have welcomed the Government’s recognition of the need to address root 
causes of forced displacement, the value of working with other States and international 
institutions, and its commitment to resettlement programmes (see below), they are 
concerned that the proposals fail to address the problems identified, are unworkable and 
will only serve to throw the system into chaos, further endangering the lives of people 
fleeing persecution. Experience shows that large-scale refugee camps, wherever they are 
located, often have their own internal difficulties in terms of both service provision and 
security, and in some cases lead to instability in the surrounding area. Moreover whilst 
it is true that the estimated $10 billion spent each year by the industrialised states on 
their asylum systems is substantially greater than the $800 million that UNHCR spends 
on the 19 million refugees and displaced persons in less prosperous countries around the 
world (Loescher and Milner 2003)8, any new system is likely to be very expensive, 
particularly if developed in parallel with systems for spontaneous arrivals. These 
resources could arguably be devoted to more effectively addressing the underlying 
causes of forced migration. 
 
Perhaps most significantly however, there are concerns that the concept of extra-
territorial processing undermines the principles of international protection itself and 
would spell the end of any meaningful refugee protection in the UK and EU (Hayes, 
2004). According to Amnesty International (2003), the ‘new vision’ proposal ‘bears 
striking similarities to the highly controversial Australian ‘Pacific Solution’, under 
which the Australian government persuaded Nauru and Papua New Guinea to permit 
the establishment of Australian funded detention centres where asylum-seekers were 
held, pending determination of their status. It is notable that in welcoming the proposal, 
the current Australian Immigration Minister herself recognised the ‘remarkable 
similarity’ between the UK proposal and the Australian scheme9. It has been argued by 
some (for example, Levy, 2004) that the UK proposal is more radical even than the 
'Pacific Solution', since it argues for the deportation of asylum seekers already within 
 
7 The report can be downloaded at 
 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/74/74.pdf  
8 $10 billion is likely to be a considerable underestimate. In the UK alone around £2 billion (i.e. nearly $4 
billion) is spent each year processing asylum and immigration casework , running determination 
procedures, funding legal challenges, running detention facilities and providing support and welfare to 
asylum seekers whilst they await a decision. Although this estimate includes the processing of non-
asylum cases this is a relatively small proportion of the overall total. 
9 See Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Media Release, UK Asylum 
Proposals Worth Consideration, MPS 21/2003, 3 April 2003 available at 
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the territory of the EU to the TPCs. By contrast the Australian policy is designed 
precisely to prevent asylum seekers from touching Australian soil and thereby forcing 
their claims to be heard in country. Moreover given the recent and on-going 
developments in formulating a common European asylum policy (outlined in section 4) 
and parallel UNHCR proposals including the Agenda for Protection and Convention 
Plus (outlined in section 5) it is not clear why this additional set of proposals was 
needed nor whether the process and chain of events that this then set in motion (the 
UNHCR counter-proposals and subsequent Commission Communication) has been 
particularly helpful in taking forward the long-standing commitment in the EU (in 
theory at least) to addressing the underlying causes of forced migration. 
 
Despite rejection of its proposals at the European level, the Home Office has continued 
discussions ‘behind the scenes’ with a number of EU countries (most notably the 
Netherlands and Denmark) in an attempt to establish a ‘coalition of the willing’. In 
April 2004 the Home Office confirmed that it has now moved away from the idea of 
zones of protection and is looking to develop ‘migration partnerships’ with third 
countries in the region of origin. According to a Home Office statement to the European 
Standing Committee, the aim of such partnerships would be to reduce the pressure on 
the asylum system while facilitating UK assistance with refugee caseloads in the partner 
country10. This work is still very much in the development stage, but will compliment 
other initiatives (such as UNHCR’s ‘Convention Plus’). Tanzania is the only country 
with which the Home Office has moved forward but the Government is also involved in 
projects with the UN which also involve the Netherlands and other countries. These 
projects involve working on problems in relation to Tanzania, Kenya and two other 
countries (as yet unnamed), and there is another project on issues relating to Somalia. It 
has been reported that these proposals may involve repackaged plans to process asylum 
seekers in their own region of origin in a scheme possibly linked to extra development 
aid and assistance, but it is not yet clear what any plan might consist of and how it 
might be implemented. 
 
3.3. Resettlement11
Although UK asylum policy has focused primarily on securing borders and processing 
applications quickly, the Home Office accepts that that it is often very difficult for those 
who have a well-founded fear of persecution to arrive in the UK legally to seek help. In 
June 2000, Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, outlined his own vision for the future 
of EU asylum policy at a European summit in Lisbon and proposed an EU-wide 
resettlement programme, large enough in scale to have an impact on the number of 
asylum seekers making their own way to Europe. David Blunkett echoed this 
commitment in October 2001, and a UK quota resettlement programme of 500 places 
was established in October 2003. This resettlement programme operates in addition to 
 
10 Available at 
 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/eurob/st040421/40421s01.htm  
11 Resettlement is the selection and transfer of refugees from a country in which they have sought refuge 
to a safe host country, which has agreed to admit them. Resettled refugees are accorded permanent 
protection guarantees, including legal residence, allowing them to integrate in the national community. 
Resettlement is one of three durable solutions to the plight of refugees, the other two being voluntary 
repatriation to the country of origin, in conditions of safety and dignity, and local integration in the host 
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current asylum determination procedures, and reflects the ‘Government's commitment 
to help develop an effective international protection system’ given that ‘there will 
always be some refugees for whom the only durable solution is resettlement in a third 
country’12.  
 
As is discussed later in this paper, resettlement schemes represent an important strategy 
in ensuring international protection and have been widely developed in other countries 
both inside and outside the EU. It should be noted however that there are some concerns 
about the current UK approach to resettlement. Most notable among these are the scale 
of the programme (currently insufficient to represent a substantial sharing of the global 
refugee ‘burden’), the selection criteria adopted by the Home Office (which explicitly 
exclude those refugees with severe health needs and who are arguably the most 
vulnerable)13, and the danger that resettlement schemes will become linked in the 
political and public debate to other initiatives (such as the ‘new vision’ proposals 
described above) and in turn undermine the principle of providing a parallel 
determination process for asylum seekers who arrive in the UK independently. There 
are concerns that the development of a resettlement programme might be used to justify 
a political discourse – and ultimately change in policy approach – which distinguishes 
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ modes of entry to the UK and implies that there 
is no longer a necessity for asylum seekers to enter illegally or under false pretences 
because of the existence of an alternative ‘gateway’, although in reality this is very 
small and selective. These concerns are based in part on the development of a two-tier 
system in Australia where those who arrive in an ‘unauthorised’ manner are detained in 
remote centres and even if they are eventually granted asylum, are only granted 
temporary status. In other words, even if a person is recognised as a refugee, they can 




4. DEVELOPMENTS IN EU ASYLUM POLICY  
 
In the context of this paper it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of the 
evolution of European policy in relation to forced migration. Such analysis is widely 
available elsewhere14, including in a comprehensive evaluation of the development of 
minimum standards for refugee protection since Tampere published recently by the 
 
12 See press release of October 2003 at  
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=327&SectionId=3  
13 According to the Home Office, resettlement should not be offered when, in the opinion of the medical 
examiner, the individual has a disease or illness, which, for the individual's own health, or for public 
health reasons, currently precludes travel, or requires treatment before travel. Resettlement should not be 
offered to applicants, or dependants, with HIV/AIDS, Multi-Drug-Resistant-TB, or established renal 
failure. Further information on the quota resettlement programme and criteria can be found in the Home 
Office’s Asylum Policy Instruction (APIs) Available at 
  http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.asp?PageId=4448  
14 An excellent factual overview the development of European policies in relation to forced migration as 
well as the role of all the various EU institutions and external actors is provided in the UNHCR’s Tool 
Box on EU Asylum Matters, available at www.unhcr.ch . A further Tool Box (2) available at 
 http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/+3wwBmemkZEewxwwwwqwwwwwwwhFqhT0yfEtFqnp1xcAFqhT0yfEcFqyBddc
axdLadDa0uaw5Oc1MaMwBBnG5Dzmxwwwwwww/opendoc.pdf provides access to all the EU 
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European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE, 2004)15. Reflecting the overall aims 
of this paper as outlined in section 1.1, this section examines the emergence of the so-
called ‘external dimension’ or ‘preventative approach’ in EU co-operation aimed at 
limiting asylum flows into the EU. This approach is reflected in European-wide border 
controls and attempts to manage migration through co-operation with migration-sending 
or transit countries in the integration of migration issues into the EU’s external policies 
and in the Commission’s response to the UK’s proposals to develop policy mechanisms 
for extra-territorial processing. Boswell (2003) suggests that policies that externalise 
asylum procedures have prevailed to the detriment of longer-term strategies of 
migration management, refugee protection and relations with third countries. This is not 
because this approach has the greatest potential to meet long-term migration policy 
goals but because of the institutional context in which policy-making takes place and 
domestic political electoral pressures16.  
 
4.1. The Harmonisation Process 
The adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty by the 15 Member States of the European Union 
in 1997 marked the beginning of a new era for asylum policy-making in Europe by 
establishing that EU-wide binding minimum rules on asylum and immigration should be 
developed. This was envisaged as a process with an initial five-year period, beginning 
in 1999 and ending on 1st May 2004, during which time legislation setting out minimum 
standards for processing, protection and reception would be adopted (ECRE, 2004). 
Following the Amsterdam Treaty's entry into force in May 1999, the EU’s Heads of 
State or Government held a summit in Tampere, Finland, on 15-16 October 1999, and 
adopted the political guidelines that constituted the framework in which the EU’s 
policies and legislation on asylum and immigration were to be developed. In building a 
common asylum system, the Tampere Conclusions adopted a two-staged approach. In 
the short term, common minimum standards would be adopted, while in the long term, 
Community rules would go beyond minimum levels of harmonisations and aim for a 
common asylum procedure and a uniform refugee status valid throughout the Union. 
Not only did the Tampere Conclusions commit the EU to the obligations of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, they also noted the need to develop, as a matter of urgency, a 
comprehensive approach to migration that provides for greater coherence between the 
Union’s internal and external policies. Underpinning such an approach would be the 
EU’s work towards addressing political, human rights and development issues in 
countries and regions of origin: 
 
“The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing 
political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin 
and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job 
opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and 
ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and 
 
15 See also Hatton and Williamson (2004), Hayes (2004), Levy (2004), Refugee Council (2004) and UK 
House of Lords (2004), all of which are available online. 
16 Boswell’s conclusions are based on a recent in-depth project entitled ‘Towards a Comprehensive 
Strategy on Forced Displacement: Integrating the Refugee Dimension into EU External Relations’, details 
of which can be found at http://www.core-hamburg.de/english/research/refugee. The project assessed how 
far, and with what success, the EU has integrated preventive goals into its relations with third countries. It 
examined in detail the cases of Kosovo and Morocco, where the European Commission, European 
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children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are united to contribute, 
within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of 
internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with Third Countries 
concerned will be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to 
promoting co-development.” 17
 
In the period since Tampere, the EU has embarked on a long, and often painful, process 
of policy harmonisation that has resulted in the adoption or partial adoption of a number 
of Directives, which seek to deliver these objectives18. Along the way there have been 
complex negotiations and changing contexts that have shaped the process and 
determined its focus. Perhaps most important among these were the Seville Summit 
Conclusions of June 2002 which called for the process of implementing the Tampere 
Conclusions to be speeded up and, in the context of growing anxieties among Member 
States (particularly the UK) about increasing numbers of asylum applications, re-
emphasised the need to focus efforts on combating illegal immigration in part through 
the integration of migration issues into relations with third countries who could then be 
persuaded through other policy levers (such as development aid) to take back illegal 
entrants and failed asylum applicants.  
 
The establishment of an Area of Freedom, Justice and Security (AJFS) including a 
common European asylum and migration policy has been at the top of the EU’s political 
agenda since 1999. Following Tampere, the Commission, at the request of the European 
Council, drew up a scoreboard to review progress in implementing the political and 
legislative agenda that had been established19. The achievements of the Tampere 
programme over the period 1999 to 2004 are described in the final six-monthly report 
that was adopted on 2 June 200420. The European Council of Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) has also produced an assessment of the harmonisation process which has taken 
place over recent years. Its conclusions are damming: 
 
“The promise of protection delivered by the EU Heads of State at the Tampere 
Summit in 1999 left many of us full of hope that harmonisation would bring better 
protection for persons fleeing persecution and better solutions to the problems 
faced by governments. What we went on to witness was five years of difficult 
negotiations not driven by the spirit of Tampere, but driven by most European 
governments’ aim to keep the number of asylum seekers arriving as low as 
possible and by their concerns to tackle perceived abuses of their asylum systems. 
Countries showed little sense of solidarity and pursued their narrow national 
agendas at great cost to refugees and to the building of a fair and efficient 
European protection system. This took place in a generally deteriorating public 
 
17 Tampere European Council 15/16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 4. 
18 The Council of Ministers has adopted four directives which establish minimum standards for refugees 
and asylum seekers in the EU Member States. These cover temporary protection (2001/55/EC), reception 
(2003/9/EC),  family reunification (2003/86/EC) and qualification (agreed text in 7944/04). A fifth 
directive on minimum standards for procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee 
status – arguably the most important of them all – has yet to be adopted although the ‘general  approach’ 
has been agreed. In addition to these directives the Dublin II regulation establishes the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member States responsible for examining an asylum applications lodged 
in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
19 This so-called Scoreboard was introduced by the Commission for the first time in March 2000 and has 
since been updated bi-annually. 
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climate of growing hostility towards asylum seekers and refugees, and widespread 
irresponsible media reporting compounded by a lack of political leadership at 
national level” (ECRE, 2004, 3). 
 
The ECRE and others (see for example, Hayes, 2004) are particularly critical of the 
development of common procedures for determining asylum claims which, they claim, 
have ‘totally undermined’ the absolute right to seek asylum as enshrined in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and fail to ensure that asylum seekers have access to fair and 
efficient asylum procedures. They maintain that the Amsterdam decision-making 
process has allowed for the worst practices of individual States to be transposed into EU 
legislation, thus allowing their export to other EU Member States rather than fostering 
the sharing of best practice. But they are also critical of the EU’s attempts to deal with 
the underlying causes of forced migration and to ensure ‘responsibility-sharing’ with 
countries and regions of the world which are significantly poorer and in many cases 
political unstable yet host to the vast majority of the world’s refugees and internally 
displaced. Moreover ECRE (2004) argue that the EU’s prioritisation of measures to 
fight illegal immigration over fighting the root causes of refugee flight and improving 
refugee protection in third countries has led to a considerable lack of coherence between 
the EU’s measures to integrate migration issues into external policies and its human 
rights and development co-operation policies and objectives. 
 
4.2. European Border Controls and Approaches to Illegal Migration 
EU asylum policy and practice has to be seen in the wider context of increasing 
measures to prevent unauthorized, undocumented, irregular and ‘illegal migration’ into 
the EU (Hayes, 2004; Levy, 2004). There is considerable evidence that the fight against 
illegal migration to the Member States rather than measures to address the causes of 
forced migration has been the principle focus of attention and concrete action at the 
European level. In contrast with the laborious approach to developing asylum 
legislation, Member States have been prolific in the development of joint ‘migration 
management’ tools, such as the strengthening of external border controls and other 
immigration controls. Many of these measures are binding and have a potentially huge 
impact on those seeking asylum in Europe. 
 
This focus on illegal migration began at Laeken in December 2001 when the European 
Council asked the Commission to develop an Action Plan based on the Commission’s 
Communication on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration. At the subsequent Seville 
Summit the main focus of discussion was on barriers to preventing illegal migration to 
the EU via measures to increase the security of visas, exchange of information on illegal 
migration, coordination between migration liaison officers, and improving the 
effectiveness of border controls, including establishing a common EU border police 
force. The Summit underlined the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to 
tackle the root causes of illegal immigration (as opposed to forced migration), which, in 
order to be effective, should make more extensive use of development assistance, trade 
relations and conflict prevention measures in close co-operation with countries of origin 
and transit.  
 
In their concern to step up the fight against illegal immigration, Member States also 
decided at the Seville Summit that all future agreements with third countries should 
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admission of illegal immigrants, with a failure to co-operate hampering closer relations 
of that country with the EU. This was articulated in the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Integrating Migration 
Issues in the EU’s relations with Third Countries (European Commission, 2002b). 
Although the Communication recognised the rights of refugees to seek asylum and have 
their asylum application examined, subsequent policy making by the Council of 
Ministers has prioritised the channelling of financial assistance towards the 
development of interception measures in third countries over the support to develop 
their asylum systems and at establishing re-admission agreements to enable failed 
asylum seekers to be returned. From the viewpoint of refugee protection this is 
problematic. For example, despite considerable concerns about the political and human 
rights situation in countries such as Libya and Syria (which are notably not signatories 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention), the EU has sought intensified co-operation with 
them, having negotiated a ‘re-admission clause’ with Syria which compels it to take in 
illegal immigrants (which could include persons fleeing persecution) who have travelled 
through its territory before arriving in the EU. 
 
The conclusions of the Seville European Council meeting thus focussed almost entirely 
on combating illegal immigration and on the re-admission agreements (see below) 
despite the more comprehensive approach laid down at Tampere in 1999. There was no 
substantive mention of tackling root causes, such as lack of socio-economic 
development, repression of human rights and armed conflict. Indeed in the ‘Road Map’ 
for the follow-up to the Conclusion of the European Council meeting at Seville (a 
concrete action plan which provides deadlines for the immediate tasks to be taken and 
delegates the various responsibilities precisely), there is not one measure among the 
twenty-four outlined which addresses the root causes of forced migration to the EU21. 
 
4.3. Integration of Forced Migration Issues in External Policies 
Since the early 1990s there has been an awareness within the EU of the need to pay 
attention to the root causes of migration, including forced migration. In December 1992, 
the Edinburgh European Council called for measures to address the causes of migration, 
including preservation of peace and end to armed conflicts, respect for human rights, the 
creation of democratic societies and adequate social conditions, and liberal trade 
policies which could improve economic conditions. It was recognised that this would 
require coordination in the fields of foreign policy, economic co-operation and 
immigration and asylum policy by the Community and its Member States. This 
recognition of the links between economic and political causes of migration, and hence 
between economic and forced migration, was reinforced in subsequent years by the 
experience of influxes of people fleeing the wars in Former Yugoslavia. The efforts of 
the EU and its Member States to bring about conflict resolution and reconstruction in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were motivated by a range of considerations, but 
limiting the extent of migration and asylum to EU Member States was certainly an 
important element (Castles et al., 2003). 
 
 
21 Roadmap for the follow-up to the Conclusion of the European Council at Seville – Asylum, 
Immigration and Border Control, Council of the European Union, July 2002 10525/1/02 rev 1. A report 
will be submitted to the European Council meeting in June 2003 on the practical implementation of the 
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As was noted above, Tampere underlined the need for a comprehensive approach to 
asylum and migration, addressing political, human rights and development issues in 
countries and regions of origin and transit. It also called for greater coherence between 
the Union’s internal and external policies, and stressed the need for more efficient 
management of migration flows at all their stages, in which the partnership with 
countries of origin and transit would be a key element for the success of such a policy. 
Reflecting this, Tampere renewed the mandate of the High Level Working Group on 
Migration and Asylum (HLWG). The HLWG comprises not only Justice and Home 
Affairs experts, but also experts in the fields of foreign policy, security, development 
and economic policies, and came about at a vital moment in time in the progress 
towards integration in the fields of asylum and immigration (van Selm 2002a, 2002b). 
The HLWG’s responsibility is to develop a ‘cross-pillar’ common strategy and over-all 
framework approach to asylum and migration policy in order to improve the EU 
approach to migration flows from selected countries of origin and transit. It was tasked 
with drawing up a number of Action Plans for the joint analyses of migratory flows 
from or through selected countries, and proposals to address the causes of these flows, 
enhance reception capacities in the region, promote human rights actions, foster 
political dialogue, and with exploring possibilities for re-admission and return to the 
country or region of origin. 
 
Although the HLWG is the EU’s most ambitious attempt to coordinate measures across 
all relevant policy areas and to involve Member States in implementation, its impact has 
been disappointing. The HLWG has drawn up Action Plans for five countries of origin 
and transit of forced migrants coming to the EU – Afghanistan, Morocco, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka and Iraq (this was the original report which led the HLWG to be established). An 
interim report has been produced for Albania and the surrounding region and was 
approved in June 2000. In the context of the discussion in this paper its is notable that 
the Action Plans only cover four of the top ten source countries of asylum seekers for 
the EU. Morocco and Albania are mainly sources of economic rather than forced 
migration. Moreover although the Action Plans are intended to address the need for co-
operation with the countries concerned in three integrated areas – foreign policy, 
development and economic assistance as well as migration and asylum – they have been 
criticised for dealing only cursorily with preventive measures such as conflict 
resolution, development and poverty reduction in refugees’ countries of origin, and for 
their primary focus on exporting migration control, such as airline liaison officers, anti-
immigration information campaigns, and re-admission arrangements to the source 
countries.  
 
It should also be noted that despite the principle of co-operation with countries of 
origin, the Action Plans produced by the group appear to have been prepared without 
full prior consultation, with the result that some sending country governments see them 
as unilateral measures to be imposed by the EU. A further problem has been the absence 
of internationally recognised governments in three of the Action Plan countries: 
Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq. The criticism of a lack of co-operation with 
governments in countries of origin can be extended to the lack of joint working with 
NGOs both in countries of origin and in the countries of the EU. Although there has 
been good co-operation with the major international organisations (UNHCR, IOM and 
the Red Cross) this has not extended sufficiently to smaller NGOs and policy institutes 
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Perhaps the most significant criticism however of the Action Plans produced by the 
HLWG is that they lack new ideas and specific proposals for action. The Action Plans 
are for the most part a description of country conditions and a list of policy objectives 
which have almost all already been developed and enshrined in EU and European 
Commission work, particularly in the areas of trade, external relations and development 
(van Selm, 2002a & 2002b). Any proposals or recommendations for action that are 
made are so vague and non-specific as to be virtually meaningless. As a result the 
Action Plans do not amount to implementable programmes or policies that would, for 
example, effectively prevent human rights violations, or combat the root causes of 
forced migration. There are far more detailed and specific proposals in relation to the 
immigration control aspects of the Plans, for example stationing Airline Liaison 
Officers in countries of origin or neighbouring regions. This has led some to conclude 
that the migration control imperative has dominated over concerns about sustainable 
development, human rights and refugee protection (House of Commons, 2004).  
 
Following the report to review progress on the creation of an area of ‘freedom, security 
and justice’ in the European Union of May 2002, the HLWG’s mandate was expanded 
in order to allow for a more flexible approach and a better geographical balance in its 
actions, including provision for regional approaches, an increased emphasis on 
analysing the relationship between the Union’s migration management and trade, aid 
policy and foreign relations, and a stronger emphasis on partnership with third countries 
in joint migration management.  Most recently this approach has been given a 
revitalised role and extended budget through the development of the AENEAS 
programme. 
 
Since 2001 the work of the HLWG and preparatory actions to implement the Action 
Plans and increase co-operation with third countries in the area of migration have been 
financed by the EC B7-667 budget line. In 2001 and 2002, the budget of B7-667 was 
determined at €10 and €12.5 million respectively. For 2003 the budget was determined 
at €20 million but €7 million of this was earmarked specifically to implement the EU’s 
Plan for Return to Afghanistan which was developed in response to events after 11th 
September 2001 which had rendered the original HLWG Action Plan considerably 
outdated. In March 2004 B7-667 was replaced by a multi-annual programme called 
AENEAS which will run from 2004 to 2008 and which aims to give specific and 
complementary financial and technical aid to third countries in order to support their 
efforts to improve the management of migration flows in all their dimensions. AENEAS 
builds on earlier preparatory actions carried out in partnership with third countries and 
regions in connection with issues of migration and asylum but is designed to provide a 
specific additional response to the needs of third countries in their efforts to manage 
more effectively all aspects of migratory flows, and in particular to stimulate third 
countries’ readiness to conclude re-admission agreements, and to assist them in coping 
with the consequences of such agreements. AENEAS represents a considerably 
expanded commitment by the EU to addressing migration issues in external policies. 
For the period 2004-2008, the programme has a budget of €250 million, of which €120 
million has been allocated for the period until 31 December 2006. In terms of thematic 
coverage, five objectives have been identified for AENEAS: 
• The development of immigration policies: 
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• The development of legislation and national practices as regards international 
protection; 
• Combating illegal immigration, including trafficking in human beings; and 
• Re-admission and sustainable reintegration of returnees in their countries of 
origin. 
 
The overall objective of the AENEAS programme is to promote, within the framework 
of a comprehensive approach to migration, a more efficient management of migration 
flows in close co-operation with third countries concerned. The considerably increased 
budget reflects the growing recognition that this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or impact of the action, be 
better achieved at community level. In order to implement the programme, the 
Commission will be producing an Annual Work Programme. The Work Programme for 
2004 will be published in September 2004 and will call for proposals in the following 
month, with a deadline for submission likely to be December 2004. Among the kinds of 
actions which may be supported by the programme to achieve the objectives of 
AENEAS are information campaigns and the provision of legal advice, development of 
actions aimed at maintaining links between countries of origin and host countries, 
facilitation of dialogue and exchange of information, support for capacity building to 
draft and implement national legislation, introduction of systems for data collection and 
support for targeted socio-economic reintegration of returnees22. 
 
4.4. Linking Forced Migration and Development Aid 
For the purposes of this paper it is also worth noting that in the run-up to the Seville 
Summit, proposals were made by the Spanish and the British Prime Ministers to link re-
admission agreements to aid and other co-operation arrangements with countries of 
origin. This would have made it possible to put economic pressure on countries 
unwilling to re-admit nationals deported from the EU. The Conclusion adopted at 
Seville stopped short of imposing economic sanctions on countries of origin unwilling 
to re-admit illegal immigrants, including failed asylum seekers but it did define re-
admission agreements as vital instruments and retaliation measures that could be taken 
under Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and other EU policies in case of 
‘persistent and unjustified denial of such co-operation’. This represented a significant 
shift of emphasis in the way in which proposals to address the causes of forced 
migration were framed, most significantly in the appearance of a new way of linking 
migration and development objectives through the concept of evaluating relationships 
between the EU and third countries according to their willingness to cooperate in the 
management of migration flows, particularly where this would relate to the re-
admission of refugees who have transited through those countries.  
 
Although the explicit policy proposal of linking development aid to co-operation on 
migration was defeated at Seville, the European Council did agree that each future 
association of co-operation agreement which the European Union or the European 
Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of 
migration flows and on compulsory re-admission in the event of illegal immigration. In 
November 2002 it was agreed that the HLWG would draft a clause on joint 
 
22 For further information see 
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management of migration flows and re-admission, to be included in any future co-
operation, association or equivalent agreement which the EU concludes with any 
country. This has led the House of Commons International Development Committee, 
among others, to conclude that the linking of development aid and policies in relation to 
forced migration remains a dangerous possibility which should be avoided:   
 
“It is sensible to support governments which are moving in the right direction, 
improving governance and fighting poverty, but it would be a mistake to make aid 
conditional on measures which aim to limit out-migration. Withdrawing aid to 
countries which fail to limit out-migration would simply plunge them further into 
poverty; threatening such a withdrawal would force developing countries to spend 
scarce resources on border controls rather than poverty reduction, would 
undermine any notion of partnership, and would simply succeed in pushing more 
migrants into the arms of smugglers and traffickers. Development assistance or the 
threat of its withdrawal must never be used as a tool for migration management” 
(House of Commons, 2004). 
 
4.5. Extra-Territorial Processing 
The externalisation of the European Union's policy in relation to forced migrants was 
joined to proposals for extra-territorial processing that found their roots in the 1990s, 
but were given fresh impetus by the British (with considerable assistance from the 
Austrians, Danish and Dutch) from 2000 to 2004 (Noll, 2003). The UK’s ‘new vision’ 
proposals early in 2003 (outlined in detail in section 3 of this paper) were an important 
part of this process. According to Levy (2004), the proposals represent a serious threat 
to the principles of the international refugee regime because unlike earlier proposals for 
‘safe areas’ and camps associated with the Yugoslav conflict and the need to provide 
temporary protection in situations of mass influx, the various British and Danish plans 
of the last few years would see processing outside of the EU and has the potential to 
result in a system where there is no potential for the individual applications for asylum 
to be examined in European countries. Whilst the UK and Denmark have indicated that 
this is not their intention, there remains concern about the potential for ‘policy creep’ in 
this area. 
 
The UK ‘new vision’ proposals were not the first time that the principles of the 1951 
Convention had been brought into question. In the spring of 2000, at the European 
Conference on Asylum in Lisbon, the then UK Home Secretary, Jack Straw, called for a 
redrafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention suggested an international quota system 
under which European countries would share asylum seekers from countries recognised 
as violators of human rights. Since that time the UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection and resulting Agenda for Protection had – prior to the UK 
proposals - formed the basis of international discussions about the future of the 
international refugee regime. Ironically, at virtually the same time that the Commission 
published its Communication on the Common Asylum Policy and the Agenda for 
Protection (2003b) reaffirming the EUs commitment to the new strategies proposed by 
UNHCR (most notably through the ‘Convention Plus’ initiative), the UK proposals 
made their way into the public domain. Anxious about the UK proposals undermining 
the Agenda for Protection and about being seen as unresponsive to the political and 
policy concerns of EU Member States, UNHCR issued a counter-proposal (outlined in 
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Communication Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems 
(European Commission, 2003a) was a response to both these proposals. Although it 
distanced itself from the UK position, the Communication set out the Commission’s 
views on the basic premises of and objectives for a possible new approach in which 
asylum processes might be better managed with a view to improving access to 
protection for those in need, reducing the impetus to secondary movements of asylum-
seekers and refugees, and limiting abuse of asylum systems.  
 
A significantly more cautious document than both the UK and UNHCR proposals, the 
Communication recognises a number of the legal, practical and financial obstacles to 
the implementation of such an initiative. Instead it proposes a gradual approach which 
complements the stage-by-stage approach adopted at Tampere and which builds on and 
enhances the minimum standards established through the harmonisation process. The 
new approach should aim to enhance international protection rather than shift 
responsibility for it elsewhere, and should be underpinned by ten key principles 
including the need to fully respect international legal obligations of Member States, the 
need to improve the quality of asylum decision making in Europe, and a recognition that 
the most effective way of addressing the refugee issue is by reducing the need for 
refugee movements. The Commission’s own proposals for establishing more accessible, 
equitable and managed asylum systems are based on three specific but complimentary 
policy objectives, namely: 
• The orderly and managed arrival of persons in need of international protection in 
the EU from the region of origin through resettlement and Protected Entry 
Procedures; 
• Burden- and responsibility sharing within the EU as well as with regions of 
origin enabling them to provide effective protection as soon as possible and as 
closely as possible to the needs of persons in need of international protection; 
and 
• The development of an integrated approach to efficient and enforceable asylum 
decision-making and return procedures. 
 
In many respects the proposals from the European Commission are better than they 
might have been, not least because they provided an opportunity to establish a policy 
process for establishing an EU-wide resettlement scheme which will enable refugees to 
travel legally to the EU to access protection and durable solutions. It is important to 
recognise that the Commission was effectively forced into making a statement on the 
issue of extra-territorial processing because of the UK proposals, and worth noting that 
it might have been able to simply reiterate the approach set out in its communication on 
taking forward the Agenda for Protection had it not been for the fact that the UNHCR’s 
counter proposals for a ‘EU prong’ signaled that the UNHCR was open to the idea of 
alternative approaches to protection in Europe.  
 
In this respect the Communication is a somewhat inconsistent document which suggests 
that the Commission remains open to exploring further the feasibility of locating TPCs 
outside the EU through pilot projects, which may be its downfall. In trying to keep 
everyone happy the door has been left open, casting a shadow over the strength of the 
commitment of the EU Communication to give sufficient consideration and weight to 
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4.6. Resettlement 
In total, 16 countries worldwide offer refugee resettlement programmes in partnership 
with UNHCR. Six of these are EU Member States – Ireland, Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden23. Norway also has a resettlement 
programme. Although the size of resettlement programmes in Europe is currently small 
– approximately 3,500 per year across the EU compared with between 70,000 and 
132,000 each year in the US and 12,000 in Canada - resettlement is being considered 
more widely both in individual countries within Europe and in the European 
Commission, who see a potential for resettlement to be strategically used to manage a 
greater number of legal arrivals to the EU Member States than is currently the case. The 
approach to the use of resettlement is not consistent across Europe. Van Selm (2003) 
notes that in the current discussion, some policy-makers posit that resettlement can 
replace asylum systems altogether, while others assert that resettlement could very well 
co-exist with asylum but could not be a total alternative. Similarly, some suggest that 
resettlement of refugees could help end smuggling and trafficking – while others 
contend that both refugees and economic migrants would continue to use smugglers and 
be exploited by traffickers. The Commission has maintained throughout the EU 
discussion on the subject that any resettlement programme must be compatible with the 
long term objectives of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and support 
efforts to improve the management of forced migration movements, facilitating legal 
access to international protection by those justifiably seeking such protection. 
Meanwhile building on its earlier Communications (discussed above), the European 
Commission recently commissioned a study on the feasibility of introducing an EU-
wide resettlement scheme by July 2005. 
 
Ultimately the extent to which an EU-wide resettlement scheme is developed will 
depend on whether there is political will among a larger number of Member States to 
engage in resettlement. Traditionally the political will amongst EU Member States to 
engage in resettlement has been based purely on humanitarianism or reflected national 
priorities such as foreign policy goals or domestic politics Before beginning any type of 
resettlement programme, the EU must be fully aware of the necessary level of resource 
commitment and the need to bring in or create partners that would allow the programme 
to function optimally. To this extent it is worth noting that the EU’s European Refugee 
Fund has recently agreed to fund work in this area. Launched in Helsinki in January 
2004, the MORE Project (Modelling of National Resettlement Process and 
Implementation of Emergency Measures) is working with the Ministry of Labour, 
Finland, and the Reception and Integration Agency, Ireland, along with UNHCR, the 
IOM and ECRE to develop comprehensive models for the resettlement of refugees, 
which can be used by European Union Member States and other countries. The overall 
objective of the project is to improve both the quality and speed of the integration of 
resettled refugees but the outcome of its work will almost certainly influence future 




23 Non-EU Member States which offer resettlement programmes are: Australia, Benin, Brazil, Burkina 
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5. THE EVOLVING UNHCR APPROACH 
 
5.1. Background 
In early 1990, UNHCR established a liaison function in its Brussels office to monitor 
developments and provide inputs into the EU harmonisation process in the areas of 
asylum and migration. As a result, UNHCR has direct contact with the Presidency and 
with the European Commission and the European Parliament. In July 2000 the 
Commission Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs (DG JHA) and UNHCR 
signed an exchange of letter in order to reinforce co-operation in asylum and refugee 
matters. This stipulates that UNHCR must be consulted by the EU institutions in 
matters pertaining to asylum. In addition to ad hoc day-to-day contact, formal strategic 
consultations are held between the Commission and UNHCR every 6 months. UNHCR 
branch offices in the Members States are also responsible for lobbying to influence 
Member States’ positions during negotiations in Council. 
 
The role of UNHCR in shaping the overall context of UK and European asylum policy 
and in specifically contributing to recent debates about alternative approaches has 
already been touched upon in this paper. Ever since the Commission and Council 
started to develop the external dimension of EU asylum policy aimed at improved co-
operation in the joint management of migratory flows, UNHCR has monitored the 
process closely and has provided expertise and policy inputs as regards EU co-operation 
with third countries in asylum and migration matters. UNHCR have for many years 
undertaken efforts to link humanitarian assistance with the development process in less 
prosperous regions of the world (Crisp, 2001), although not all of those within the 
organisation agree with this approach.  UNHCR has welcomed the EU’s efforts to 
develop a more comprehensive approach to refugee producing situations as pioneered 
by the High Level Working Group. But it recognises that the process of developing 
common asylum and migration policy is simultaneously an opportunity for, and a 
danger to, the preservation and strengthening of the international protection regime. 
Reflecting this, UNHCR has raised concern about the pervasive danger that the politics 
of asylum policy and practice in the EU may mean that the harmonisation process 
looses sight of the refugees’ need for protection.  
 
5.2. Global Consultations on International Protection and the Agenda for 
Protection 
In an attempt to solidify the international protection regime and reaffirm commitment to 
this regime and UNHCR’s role within it, the organisation has undertaken its own policy 
initiatives that both reflect and feed into UK and EU policy processes. In 2000, UNHCR 
launched the Global Consultations on International Protection, triggered by what it 
perceived as an ongoing crisis of international protection and intended to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In December 2001, in a Declaration of 
States Parties to the Refugee Convention, Ministers reaffirmed their government’s 
commitment to implement their obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention ‘fully 
and effectively’ and in accordance with the ‘object and purpose’ of these instruments24. 
 
24 See Report of the Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/MMSP/2001/10, available on the Global Consultations page of 
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In 2002, the Executive Committee of the Programme of the UNHCR (UNHCR’s 
governing body) endorsed the Agenda for Protection that emerged from the Global 
Consultations. As was noted in the previous section, a European Commission endorsing 
the Agenda for Protection was adopted in March 2003 (European Commission 2003b). 
 
According to UNHCR, the Agenda for Protection reflects a wide cross-section of 
concerns and recommendations of states, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, as 
well as refugees themselves. The Agenda focuses on suggested activities that would 
strengthen international protection of asylum-seekers and refugees and improve 
implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the Agenda for Protection recognises that 
prevention is the best way to avoid refugee situations: 
 
“Resolute responses to the root causes of refugee movements, more effective and 
predictable responses to mass influx situations, improved reception policies and an 
environment generally more conducive to refugee protection would contribute to 
better implementation of the refugee protection regime” (UNHCR 2003a: 31) 
 
As part of the overall objective (in Goal 1) of strengthening implementation of the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, the Agenda for Protection requires States to: 
• Give greater priority to dealing with root causes, including armed conflict, and 
to ensure relevant intergovernmental agendas reflect this priority; 
• Use appropriate means at their disposal, in the context of their foreign, security, 
trade, development and investment policies, to influence developments in 
refugee-producing countries in the direction of greater respect for human rights, 
democratic values and good governance; and  
• Support the work of the UN in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict-
resolution, peace-keeping and peace-building in war torn States (UNHCR 
2003a). 
 
The paper draws on the Agenda for Protection which calls on “States to consider 
allocating development funds, possibly a percentage thereof, to programmes 
simultaneously benefiting refugees and the local population in host countries” and “… 
to consider including refugee-hosting areas in their national development plans, and 
UNHCR to encourage multilateral and bilateral development partners to extend tangible 
support for such initiatives…”. 
 
In addition, international and regional human rights bodies, as well as development 
actors, are encouraged to examine how they can make a more direct impact on refugee 
situations generated by human rights violations and inter-group disputes, in particular 
by extending financial and/or technical support to countries of origin willing to establish 
national human rights commissions, and to put in place measures to improve the 
functioning of the judiciary and police forces. As part of the overall objective (in Goal 
3) of sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and of building capacities to 
receive and protect refugees, the Agenda for Protection calls for refugee issues to be 
anchored within national, regional and multilateral development agendas including 
through the allocation of development funds, possibly a percentage thereof, to 
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Although the Agenda for Protection is not binding and represents good intentions rather 
than concrete plans for multilateral action, it has arguably spurred new thinking to 
tackle these underlying causes of forced migration, including through the development 
of special agreements in the context of the High Commissioner’s ‘Convention Plus’ 
initiative (Hatton and Williamson, 2004).   
 
5.3. The ‘Convention Plus’ Initiative 
‘Convention Plus’ is an initiative announced by the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, in September 2002, following the conclusion of UNHCR’s 
Global Consultations on International Protection. Its basic premise is that given the 
changes that have taken place in the world over the past 50 years the 1951 Refugee 
Convention ‘does not alone suffice’. In terms of content, Convention Plus seeks to 
develop comprehensive plans of action to ensure more effective and predictable 
responses to mass influx, to secure development assistance as a way of addressing 
burden-sharing arrangements, to bring about multilateral commitments for resettlement, 
and to find clarity in the roles and responsibilities of states in the context of irregular 
and secondary movements (UNHCR 2003b). Convention Plus does not seek to revise 
the 1951 Refugee Convention but to build on it through the adoption of non-binding 
agreements between states and by establishing multilateral agreements and broad-based 
partnerships between government, humanitarian and aid agencies which are able to 
provide durable solutions.  
 
The Convention Plus work programme was launched at the beginning of 2003 with the 
first meeting of High Commissioner’s Forum held in June of the same year. Convention 
Plus has three inter-linked strands: 
• The strategic use of resettlement; 
• Addressing irregular secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers; and 
• Targeting development assistance to achieve durable solutions 
To ensure a well-coordinated approach to the Convention Plus initiative, a dedicated 
Convention Plus Unit (CPU) was established at UNHCR Headquarters in the latter half 
of 2003. It is responsible for working with States and other partners on each of the three 
strands of Convention Plus, as well as for providing advice and assistance within 
UNHCR on the formulation of situation-specific initiatives. In December 2003, the 
CPU published Convention Plus at a Glance, which provides information on the 
Convention Plus initiative for use not only by UNHCR staff at headquarters and in the 
field, but also by States and other partners25. A Core Group of policy makers and 
experts representing individual countries and international organisations supports work 
around each theme. 
 
The themes addressed in the Convention Plus initiative and the conclusions coming out 
of the Core Group discussions clearly have implications for the policy approaches 
addressed in this paper. Most notable are efforts to target development assistance to 
achieve durable solutions. In May 2003 UNHCR issued its Framework for Durable 
Solutions,
 
which provides a number of methodological models that are intended to 
 
25 The publication, which includes in annex a regular update on developments with respect to the three 
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facilitate the proper targeting of development assistance. These include the promotion of 
self-reliance through development assistance for refugees (DAR); development through 
local integration (DLI) schemes; strategies for sustainable repatriation, reintegration, 
reconciliation and reconstruction (the ‘4Rs’) which aim to enlist the active participation 
of humanitarian and development agencies and the World Bank and encourage good 
local governance, protection of the rights of returnees, improved social services and 
infrastructure, economic revival and livelihood creation, and improved access to 
services; and multilateral commitments for the resettlement of refugees. UNHCR 
believes that the targeting of development assistance for refugees is relevant in both 
refugee situations and post-conflict situations. Refugees are often hosted in 
communities in remote areas where a high level of poverty prevails. Hosting refugees 
for protracted periods of time has a long-term economic and social impact which, if not 
adequately addressed, can create tensions, conflict and insecurity. UNHCR believes that 
in this situation, the targeting of development aid through DAR and DLI will enhance 
burden-sharing with poor refugee hosting countries and communities, and allow 
refugees to become self-reliant, equipping them for one of the three durable solutions: 
voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. In post-conflict situations the 
reintegration of returnees poses a considerable challenge. The targeting of returnees in 
the allocation of development assistance in post-conflict situations through 4R 
programmes is intended to prevent the back-flows that are often encountered, so as to 
ensure that reintegration is sustainable and allows development actors to come in at an 
earlier stage, narrowing down or closing the gap between humanitarian assistance and 
development aid. In both situations UNHCR believes that the targeting of development 
assistance will ultimately contribute to the attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). 
 
Following the publication of a discussion paper produced by Denmark and Japan on 
existing experiences of targeting development assistance to achieve durable solutions 
for refugees, UNHCR published a draft Convention Plus Issues Paper on the Targeting 
of Development Assistance Policies in June 200426. The purpose of the paper is to: 
• Identify the issues involved in the granting of development assistance by the 
donor community and in the spending of development assistance on the 
development of refugee hosting countries and countries of return; 
• Outline and explore challenges to targeting development assistance to find 
solutions for refugees in refugee situations as well as returnees in post-conflict 
situations; 
• Identify donor policies conducive to targeting development assistance to find 
solutions for refugees; and  
• Outline possible elements for a special agreement on the targeting of 
development assistance. 
 
The draft paper sets out the objectives and methodologies of development assistance – 
including the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the 
importance of working in partnership  - and outlines the challenges in targeting 
development aid to support durable solutions for refugees. The paper proposes that a 
generic special agreement on the targeting of development assistance should be 
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developed. Any such agreement would have obligations for donor countries, countries 
of asylum and countries of origin as well as the UN and its partners.  
 
It is clear that this draft paper and the initiatives being developed by UNHCR as part of 
Convention Plus approach reflect a growing interest in integrating humanitarian and 
development efforts and funds and targeting development assistance to find solutions to 
refugee situation. In order to implement the Framework for Durable Solutions and 
strengthen the linkages with other parts of the United Nations system, UNHCR joined 
the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in 2003. A working group was 
established in early 2004 to develop guidelines on durable solutions for refugees, 
returnees and IDPs for inclusion in UN transition policies in post-conflict situations and 
in the revision of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development 
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) guidelines. It should be noted however that some 
NGOs and others have expressed concern about the potential for the Convention Plus 
initiative to be hijacked for the purpose of limiting asylum seeking in the UK and 
Europe or in order to shift responsibility for these issues elsewhere. These concerns 
have been further exacerbated by UNHCR’s proposal for a so-called ‘EU prong’. 
 
5.4. The ‘Three-Pronged’ Proposal and ‘EU Prong’ 
In parallel with these initiatives, UNHCR has been developing a ‘three-pronged’ 
proposal based on multilateral co-operation and the equitable sharing of burdens and 
responsibilities but focused specifically on the European context. The proposal consists 
of a ‘regional prong’ designed to improve access to solutions in regions of origin and 
addressed in large part by the Convention Plus initiative, ‘a domestic prong’ focusing 
on improving asylum determination procedures, and an ‘EU prong’ designed to 
encourage EU Member States to address the phenomenon of mixed movements of 
asylum-seekers and economic migrants by processing jointly presumed manifestly-
unfounded asylum claims from selected non-refugee producing countries of origin 
(Figure 2). It is the so-called ‘EU prong’ that is most relevant to this paper, a version of 
which was presented to the European Commission in March 2003 as a ‘counter-
proposal’ to the UK’s ‘new vision’, and is reproduced as Figure 3.  
 
Although the specifics of the ‘EU prong’ have been revised over the last year or so, in 
essence UNHCR proposes that the processing of certain categories of asylum claims – 
described as ‘manifestly unfounded’ and probably based on the country of origin -  
would be considered in EU-based processing centres. According to a statement by Rudd 
Lubbers, under the ‘EU prong’, UNHCR proposes separating out the groups that are 
clearly misusing the system, namely asylum seekers from countries that produce hardly 
any genuine refugees27. These asylum seekers would automatically be sent to one or 
more reception centres somewhere within the EU, where their claims would be rapidly 
examined by joint EU teams. Those judged not to have any sort of refugee claim would 
then be sent straight home. The limited number of recognised refugees among them 
would be shared between the EU states. There must be a strict time limit for the entire 
process. Re-admission agreements between the EU and the rejected asylum seekers’ 
home countries have to be reached in advance, so that people are not detained for 
months or years simply because they cannot be deported. A second component to the 
approach would involve new joint initiatives within Europe itself. These could include 
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the pooling of EU processing and reception resources in a European Asylum Agency 
which would carry out the registration and pre-screening of asylum seekers, provide 
training and expert advice to Member States on information about countries of origin, 
and undertake decision on the asylum claims of nationals of countries that do not 
normally produce refugees (House of Lords 2004b). 
 
Figure 2 
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As was noted earlier in this paper, the rather rushed production of proposals for an ‘EU 
prong’ appear on the face of it to represent an attempt by UNHCR to rescue refugee 
protection from the clutches of the UK proposal. Despite this, some of the proposals 
were reflected in the Commission’s Communication Towards More Accessible, 
Equitable and Managed Asylum Systems: 
 
“While it is important to further investigate the exact legal modalities and the 
practical and financial consequences of implementing the proposals made by 
UNHCR, the Commission is of the opinion that in particular the EU-based 
mechanism as suggested by UNHCR is worthwhile giving further consideration” 
(European Commission, 2003a: 9). 
 
As a result, many commentators believe that by making this proposal UNHCR has itself 
undermined some fundamental protection principles, notably in accepting that, at least 
within the EU, some classes of asylum-seekers might be transferred out of the state 
where they requested asylum for determination of their claims, detained in closed 
reception centres, and subject to diminished procedural safeguards (see, for example, 
Amnesty International, 2003; Loescher and Milner, 2003). Moreover the plethora of 
different approaches emanating from the UK, the EU and UNHCR and the evolving – 
and often symbiotic – relationship between these has caused considerable confusion and 
misunderstanding about who is proposing what and why. Arguably rather than 
proposing a new approach in response to the UK’s ‘new vision’, UNHCR could have 
simply restated its commitment to delivering the Agenda for Protection and the need to 
ensure that policy and practice at the EU or Member State level reflected the themes of 
the Convention Plus initiative. Instead UNHCR is in the process of further developing a 
number of the elements included in the Commission’s Communication. A revised 
version of the proposals was published in December 2003 and formed the basis of a 
presentation by the High Commissioner Rudd Lubbers to the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in January 2004. According to a statement by UNHCR delivered in June 2004 
outlining UNHCR’s views on asylum procedures in the newly-enlarged Europe, these 
ideas remain on the table but the outcome has yet to be seen. 
 
 
6. POLICY POSITIONS AND PRACTICES OF OTHER STATES 
 
6.1. Border Control 
It is not possible to map out the complexity of current policy positions in relation to 
border controls across the other EU Member States in this section. Suffice to say, the 
general themes that dominate the UK and EU policy-making scene are generally 
prevalent across Europe as a whole. This is not surprising given the context of 
harmonisation and EU legislation designed to establish minimum standards. The 
immigration and asylum policies of EU Member States are increasingly characterised 
by measures designed to prevent people without adequate documentation from entering. 
Many governments now employ Airline Liaison Officers and immigration officials in 
origin and transit countries to prevent undocumented or inadequately documented 
passengers from exiting the country. There is an increasing emphasis on identifying 
‘safe third countries’ to which asylum seekers can be returned before a decision is made 
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been written into trade and co-operation agreements to ensure that failed asylum seekers 
can be returned to their countries of origin. Policies aimed at restricting access are not 
unique to the EU but have been introduced in most developed countries including the 
USA and Australia (although not so far in Canada). These policies – rather than real 
improvements in human rights – appear to be the main reason why the number of 
Convention refugees worldwide has fallen since 1995 (Castles et al., 2003). 
 
6.2. Extra-Territorial Processing 
The Dutch and Danish governments have shown particular interest in the UK’s proposal 
for extra-territorial processing, both governments having put forward similar agendas in 
1986, 1993 and 2001 (Amnesty International, 2003). As Noll (2003) notes, as far back 
as 1986, Denmark had proposed a draft resolution in the UN General Assembly, which 
suggested the establishment of regional UN processing centres administering 
resettlement. A 1993 Dutch proposal for regional processing of asylum claims was 
considered by the IGC in 1994, and in 2001, the Danish government revisited the issue. 
Another state to have taken an interest in the UK proposal is believed to be Austria, 
with Germany, France and Sweden believed to be strenuously resistant to the proposals. 
Noll (2003) also suggests that the Danish and British memoranda and joint meetings of 
the Danes, Dutch and British in 2002 and 2003 were strongly influenced by the 
influence of what had taken place in Australia when the government refused to land 
more than 400 mostly Afghan asylum-seekers rescued off the Australian coast by the 
MV Tampa, a Norwegian freighter. The resultant, and highly controversial ‘Pacific 
Solution’ scheme, set the scene for a new phase in state responses to the demands of 
their voluntarily assumed international legal obligations. Noll’s conclusions are 
supported by Levy (2004) who also cites the influence of US policy and practice 




There is more comparative evidence and analysis available in relation to the 
resettlement policies of other EU Member States and other countries outside Europe 
than any other area of interest to this paper. This is in large part because resettlement is 
a discrete and specific policy approach. Its existence is easily identified and there is 
reasonably coherent analytical material available to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of the various resettlement programmes that exist.  
 
According to van Selm (2003) the US has the largest resettlement programme, with an 
annual ceiling of between 70,000 and 132,000 each year over the past decade, and a 
total admission of 807,008 refugees through resettlement between 1993 and 2002. It 
also received 822,224 asylum applications between 1993 and 2002. Canada has a target 
of some 12,000 refugees for resettlement across three types of resettlement programme, 
and currently receives between 30,000 and 40,000 asylum applications annually. 
Australia aims to receive 12,000 refugees per year, with precise resettlement numbers 
dependent on the number of asylum applications receiving a positive determination, and 
thereby qualifying them as among the 12,000. Four EU Member States (Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands) are traditional countries of resettlement and one 
more (Ireland) has been on UNHCR’s list of ‘emerging resettlement countries’ since 
1999.
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do not have formal programmes to resettle refugees on the basis of a fixed quota, but 
have responded positively to UNHCR’s urgent appeals to accept refugees for 
resettlement, as well as honouring other international commitments. For example, 
between April and June 1999, 1,426 Kosovo Albanians were transferred to Spain under 
UNHCR’s Humanitarian Evacuation Programme. The Spanish Commission for Refugee 
Aid (CEAR) is one of the primary NGO implementing partners working with UNHCR 
in Spain. CEAR has been advocating with the Spanish Government for a stronger 
commitment to resettlement and the establishment of annual resettlement quotas. 
 
It is likely that the use of resettlement will emerge as a strong theme in the international 
refugee regime over coming years given that it has been identified by UNHCR as one of 
the key strands of its Convention Plus initiative. It is also likely that the nature of 
resettlement will change. Canada along with some other resettlement countries is 
considering the value of a group processing approach to resettlement and the 
Resettlement Section of the UNHCR is developing a ‘group methodology’ that could be 
useful in this regard.  
 
It should be noted that no country that carries out resettlement in significant numbers 
has seen spontaneous arrivals of asylum seekers disappear, or dwindle as a result of 
resettlement. Resettlement should therefore be viewed as a tool for protection rather 
than as a mechanism for reducing flows of forced migrants. 
 
6.4. Targeting Development Assistance 
There is limited evidence available regarding the existence of policies specifically 
aimed at targeting development assistance to address the root causes of forced 
migration. The notable exception to this is in relation to the policies of Denmark and 
Japan, both of whom are responsible for facilitating the strand of the Convention Plus 
initiative which examines the targeting of developing assistance (see section 5 above). 
As part of this process, Denmark and Japan prepared a Discussion Paper on Targeting 
Development Assistance to Achieve Durable Solutions for Refugees 28.  This paper 
outlines the Danish and Japanese strategies and experiences on incorporating refugee 
needs and those of host communities in their respective development aid policies, 
describing where and how this has been practiced.  
 
In 2002 the Danish Government launched a new initiative in support of refugees and 
refugee-hosting communities and in May 2003 a strategy for activities in refugees’ 
regions of origin was adopted. It aims to promote durable solutions for refugees by 
integrating refugees in development programmes through a combination of multilateral 
and bilateral activities in close co-operation with the governments of the host countries. 
The strategy should also be seen as an element of the Danish Government’s ongoing 
efforts to support conflict prevention. In the multilateral field, the strategy emphasizes 
strengthening the link between humanitarian and development agencies within the 
United Nations family, for example, through the ‘4Rs’ approach in post-conflict 
situations with returnees, and by increasing self-reliance (DAR) for refugees in 
protracted refugee situations pending durable solutions. In the bilateral field, activities 
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will build on existing development programmes and will, in accordance with Denmark's 
general poverty reduction focus, target refugee-hosting areas, which tend to be the 
poorest border areas of the concerned developing countries. While the Danish embassies 
will be responsible for the bilateral activities, a high degree of local ownership will be 
encouraged. 
 
In the 2003 budget of the Danish Foreign Ministry a new multi-annual budget line was 
established to support these activities. The budget line draws on development assistance 
funds separate from the continuing humanitarian budget lines. The first allocation from 
the new budget line amounts to some US$ 35 million for the 3-year period from 2003 to 
2005 and focuses on Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia and Sri Lanka, 
without excluding other possibilities.  
 
Japan, with Denmark, strongly supports the UNHCR’s approach to the strategic use of 
development assistance as an important element of multilateral burden-sharing 
arrangements aimed at addressing refugee situations comprehensively, including 
primarily those of a protracted nature. The Japanese Government revised its ODA 
Charter in August 2003. Priority issues set out in the Charter include poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth, addressing global issues and peacekeeping. Japanese policy also 
aims to assist returnees by bridging the gaps between humanitarian relief and 
rehabilitation efforts, in the context of peace building in post-conflict situations. 
Assisting returnees in the initial reintegration phase is regarded as being of particular 
importance, in order to consolidate peace in the regions of origin as well as to prevent 
returnees from being displaced once again. Japan has provided assistance, for example, 
for the 4Rs programme in Afghanistan under the ‘Ogata Initiative’. Japan has also 
supported the reintegration of Angolan returnees through the Grant Aid for Conflict 
Prevention and Peace Building. 
 
In 2002 Norway established a Transition Budget Line aimed at bridging the gap 
between short-term relief and long-term development aid in post-conflict situations. The 
funds are risk-friendly, allowing Norway to allocate funds for activities in countries 
with weak government capacity lacking democratic processes. Funds from the 
Transitional Budget Line are mainly intended for countries which are not recipients of 
bilateral aid. As from 2004, UNHCR will receive a grant earmarked for 4R activities. 
 
It is the 4R process therefore that currently appears to be the focus of efforts to target 
development assistance in situations of actual or potential forced migration.  The 4Rs 
programmes to which Japan, Norway and Denmark have contributed are currently being 
piloted in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Eritrea. According to UNHCR, 
these programmes are based on a bottom-up approach which allows flexibility as to how 
they are implemented in each of the different countries and they have so far yielded 
promising results with the host governments, with both Resident Coordinators and 
country teams expressing positive experiences with the programme.  
 
In Sri Lanka a transition group is taking forward the 4R process in an attempt to bridge 
the gap between humanitarian relief and sustainable development. UNHCR report that 
the pilot process is working particularly well in Sri Lanka, where the integrated 
planning process involves humanitarian NGOs, the Asian Development Bank, the 
World Bank as well as UNDP, UNHCR and eight bilateral donors. As the programme 
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strength of the integrated process has apparently been the ability of UNHCR to facilitate 
co-operation between development organisations like the World Bank and UNDP, and 
the Afghan government. UNHCR say that before the implementation of the integrated 
process, the relationship between the development groups and the Afghan government 
was marked by tension and disagreement. 
 
In Sierra Leone similarly, the World Bank is working through the 4R process with 
UNHCR. A National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
(NCRRR) was set up with support from partners as early as 1998 when IDPs and 
returnees were beginning to resettle. Since early 2002, following on from the formal end 
of the war, the Government in partnership with UNHCR and others have been 
implementing a 4Rs-type approach in a more systematic way through the National 
Recovery Committee (NRC). In May 2003, an interagency team comprising UNHCR, 
UNDP, UNICEF and ILO conducted a review of the 4Rs approach in UNHCR together 
with the World Bank, OCHA, FAO, WFP and the EU as a result of which a Transition 
Support Team has been established to consolidate strategies and initiatives at the 
operational level.  
 
Although these examples are illustrative of the targeting of development assistance in 
practice, it should be noted that each is at a relatively early stage of development and 
that there have been few if any independent evaluations of their success in reducing 
forced migration. It is also clear that attempts to ensure co-ordination between the 
different agencies involved in relief and development activities are often easier to 
describe on paper than to implement in practice. 
 
 
7. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. Limits to the Current Policy Approach 
This paper has examined recent and emerging policies in the UK and EU for dealing 
with the realities of forced migration in the 21st century. There is currently a lively and 
expanding debate on possible ‘third ways’, including promoting the reception of 
refugees in regions of origin, measures to reduce the causes of migration and forced 
displacement, or resettlement schemes as a possible replacement to in-country asylum 
processing. All of these have inherent problems and it is clear that there is no ‘quick fix’ 
to the tensions between the numbers of those in need of protection or seeking a better 
life, and public concerns about their impact on receiving societies (Boswell and Crisp, 
2003).  
 
The analysis presented in this paper however suggests that a very significant part of the 
reason why the proposed new approaches are problematic is because they are motivated 
less by a genuine desire to address the underlying factors that cause people to move in 
the first place and far more by the desire (and political necessity) of keeping asylum 
seekers out of Europe. There are many different reasons for this. Perhaps the most basic 
yet fundamental of these is the failure to accept that people are forced to migrate at all. 
Despite overwhelming evidence that the majority of asylum seekers arriving in Europe 
over the last 20 years have come from countries where there is conflict and violence, 
policy makers and politicians remain convinced that the vast majority of asylum seekers 
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pass immigration controls designed to prevent the free movement of labour.  The reason 
why policy-makers and politicians continue to believe this in spite of all the evidence to 
the contrary is that their assessment of whether an individual is in need of protection is 
based, in very significant part, on the high refusal rates across EU Member States 
resulting from a narrow and legally contested interpreted of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. High rates of refusal are interpreted as indicating high rates of abuse when 
in reality sometimes all they represent is poor quality decision-making and a mean-
spirited application of the concept of ‘effective protection’. 
 
The consequence of this circular and self-perpetuating process is that a huge array of 
policy measures - as well as massive financial resources and political effort - have been 
thrown at tackling assumed abuses of the system rather than at addressing the 
underlying causes of forced migration. Not surprisingly, despite all of this effort, 
millions remain displaced globally and flows of asylum seekers to the UK and Europe 
continue. These flows may rise and fall depending on the latest policy measures and the 
ability of desperate people to work their way around them, but they never stop or even 
decline to the point of being politically acceptable. And a significant increase in 
numbers is inevitable when the next conflict breaks out or an existing one escalates. 
 
The reality is that the most effective and durable solution to the international refugee 
crisis is to address the root causes of the initial flight and in many cases addressing root 
causes means engaging in the question of failed and failing states (Loescher and Milner, 
2003: 615): 
 
“It is important for Western states to understand the importance, cost effectiveness 
and significance of dealing with the root causes of refugee movements, especially 
armed conflict. To promote repatriation and indeed to prevent future refugee 
movements, states, individually and collectively, should consider in greater detail 
not only the extent to which their foreign, development, security and financial 
policies may contribute to refugee-producing conflict, but also how these policies 
can be brought to bear on the root causes of refugee movements.” 
 
It is evident even from the brief overview that is provided in this paper that there has 
been plethora of policy initiatives at the UK and EU levels as well as by external 
organisations such as UNHCR. In addition to policies directly addressing asylum and 
refugee protection issues, there is also a huge, and sometimes incomprehensible, array 
of policies in the areas of foreign policy, development aid, conflict prevention, trade and 
humanitarian assistance which it has not been possible to analyse within the confines of 
this paper but which are clearly critical to future policy thinking and development to 
address root causes. What is most concerning about any review of the existing policy 
‘map’ is that so much money and so much effort, some of it well intended, can have so 
little impact on the factors that create forced migration flows. This stems in significant 
part from ‘policy gaps’ in the different strands of thinking and respective strategies for 
delivery. 
 
Discourse on the issue of humanitarian assistance and the development process has long 
been dominated by references to the different gaps – institutional, financial and 
conceptual – that have obstructed efforts in this area for the past 50 years (Crisp, 2001). 
These gaps remain today and in some ways have become even more apparent as the 
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that the international community has not attempted to address these long-standing gap 
issues. As Crisp (2001) suggests, refugee-hosting countries in the developing world 
have contributed significantly to the international response as countries of first asylum. 
Donor countries have, to some extent, developed new strategies for transitional 
assistance, including more flexible funding mechanisms. At the multilateral level, 
humanitarian and development organizations have intensified discussions on how to 
improve planning, coordination and co-operation aimed at increasing the effectiveness 
of assistance to refugees and returnees. Despite these efforts however the evidence 
presented in this paper indicates that there is still a long way to go in ‘joining-up’ the 
different areas of policy that have the potential not to simply deal with the consequences 
of forced migration but prevent it from happening in the first place. This is due partly to 
lack of resources, but more importantly to differences in policy objectives and targets, 
where for instance powerful economic interests stand to lose if human rights and 
poverty reduction policies are given priority. Resources for some of the policies needed 
to tackle root causes will most likely come from development funds,29 yet according to 
van Selm (2002a, 2002b) development ministries and their staff, as well as development 
officials in the European Commission, have put up stiff resistance to working with the 
HLWG on the basis that development funds, limited as these already are, should be 
ring-fenced for poverty reduction policies and certainly not be used to prevent people 
from exercising their human rights, including their right to seek asylum. In addition, 
tying development assistance to any aspect of migration is inherently controversial and 
a minefield of ethical dilemmas, as illustrated at Seville. Foreign policy meanwhile 
remains squarely in the realm of inter-governmental co-operation, giving rise to the 
possibility of multiple ‘turf wars’ between those representing asylum and immigration 
policies and those representing foreign affairs and development issues (Castles et al., 
2003). There is also evidence that different EU countries and different government 
departments within each country sometimes pursue conflicting policies.  
 
The result is that while much effort has gone into strengthening the linkages between 
the EU’s immigration and external policies this has not always led to greater coherence. 
Indeed the EU’s prioritization of measures to fight illegal immigration over fighting the 
root causes of refugee flight and improving refugee protection in third countries has led 
to increasing incoherence in relation to the EU’s human rights and development co-
operation policies and objectives (ECRE 2004). The JHA itself recognises that there 
have been some difficulties in the extent to which co-operation in the field of justice and 
home affairs have been consistent with other Community policies, which involve the 
institutions of the European Union intervening differently by means of separate 
instruments (such as regulations and directives). This is partly because of the current 
ineffectiveness of the HLWG as a mechanism for bringing together a range of policy 
areas to produce specific plans and proposals. However this in turn reflects a lack of 
consistency across policy areas and indeed potential conflicts of interest between the 
different policy areas relevant to the issue of forced migration (Castles et al., 2003). 
 
 
29 Although the activities of the High Level Working Group are supported by a specific budget line for 
co-operation with third countries in the area of migration of around 12.5 million Euro for 2002, this is 
clearly not sufficient nor intended to support the specific measures required to address the root causes of 
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7.2. What is the Potential for Long-Term, ‘Joined-Up’ Policy on Forced 
Migration? 
If, as Loescher and Milner (2003) suggest, the ‘missing link’ that would respond both to 
the concerns of states and to the protection needs of refugees is more comprehensive 
engagement in regions of origin, the next question is how best this can be achieved and 
the identification of any risks that might accompany the considerable benefits that such 
an approach would bring. 
 
It is conceivable that the reason why the existing approaches have failed to date is 
because it is not possible to tie together areas that are fundamentally incompatible at 
some level. Moreover given the problems that can arise when attempts are made to tie 
policies together – for example through the withholding of development assistance 
which will in turn create or exacerbate conflict – it is tempting and possibly easier in the 
short-term at least to avoid any efforts to do so. Yet given the overwhelming  evidence 
that the current separate (and often conflicting) policies on poverty reduction, 
globalisation, security, refugees and migration are costly and counterproductive, it is at 
best unambitious, at worst dangerous, to do so. More importantly, as is suggested by 
Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002), there is unused potential in mutually supportive polices 
i.e. in a constructive use of activities and interventions that are common to the migration 
and development fields and may have positive effects on poverty reduction, 
development, prevention of violent conflicts, and international mobility. The European 
Union has a great comparative advantage deriving from its presence in numerous 
geographical locations, sectors and policy fields and is well positioned to take a lead in 
the migration-development field. There can be no doubt that it is it is currently hitting 
below its weight in addressing the causes of forced migration, a fact acknowledged by 
the Commission itself: 
 
“The marginalisation of many economies, the increase in poverty in the work, the 
need to manage better environmental interdependencies, the destabilising effects 
of migration, and the consequences of armed conflicts are major concerns for 
everyone and Europe’s citizen’s understandably expect effective EU action in 
tackling them. Given the finances at its disposal and political weight the EU can 
make an impact” (European Commission 2001: 27). 
 
Reflecting this, it is arguable that if even a small proportion of the resources and 
political effort currently expended on border controls were spent on tackling the 
underlying causes of forced migration, the number of asylum seekers in the EU and UK 
would fall of its own accord. Refugee and other migrant flows will never disappear 
completely but they could become politically and practically manageable. The ultimate 
beneficiaries would not only be European states desperate to be seen to be ‘managing’ 
the number of asylum application but forced migrants themselves who will no longer be 
required to fight so hard for so little. 
 
It is easy to be despondent about the direction of policies relating to forced migration in 
the UK and EU over recent years but there is also some room for optimism. As the 
House of Commons International Select Committee (2004) has recently suggested, the 
debate on migration and development is at a similar position to that of the debate on 
trade and development ten years ago. There is a growing recognition of the connections 
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have seen an increasing interest from donor States in de-compartmentalising 
humanitarian and development aid and in incorporating refugee needs in development 
aid policies. This development can be attributed, among other factors, to a wish by 
many donor states to have a ‘whole-of-government’ approach comprising a joint 
strategic vision shared by different government departments like foreign affairs, justice 
and home affairs, defence and development co-operation. In this context, pooled 
financing has the potential to serve as an efficient way of creating greater coherence and 
an integrated policy-making. In addition, it is acknowledged that development 
assistance has a greater, and sometimes unused, potential to prevent conflicts and 
refugee outflows. This change of approach is welcome and should be encouraged.   
 
As has been suggested throughout this paper, the direction and content of EU policies 
relating to forced migration are both determined and implemented by individual 
Member States. As has been noted by the House of Commons International 
Development Committee (2004), the Danish Presidency of 2002 played an important 
role in stimulating policy discussion on migration and development. The Presidency of 
the European Union in 2005 will provide the UK with an opportunity to promote a 
positive agenda on forced migration which takes account of the links between 
development assistance and forced migration in a way which addresses root causes and 
avoids linking the two in a way that might contribute in the long term to the factors that 
lead people to leave their countries of origin. Although, for the reasons discussed in 
some detail in this paper, the interests and objectives of DFID are unlikely to be the 
same as those of the Home Office and other departments with an interest in migration, 
the Government as a whole must ensure that it works effectively in pursuit of an overall 
objective of reducing the root causes of forced migration to the UK and EU as a whole. 
  
Achieving ‘joined-up’ policy on forced migration is not impossible but it will take a 
significant step-change in thinking and considerably more political will than currently 
exists. There is a real opportunity on the horizon for the UK to shift thinking at the EU 
level about the root causes of forced migration and to develop long term policy 
approaches which deliver this step-change in practice. Such a step-change should be 
based on the following thematic policy approaches: 
 
¾ Measures to reduce the causes of migration and forced displacement 
 
Although improving the conditions in source countries is the best policy option of them 
all, it is the least well worked out and is difficult to implement in practice (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2004). For example, although most developed states are concerned about 
forced migration few have the political will to intervene in another state’s affairs to the 
extent necessary to prevent refugee-producing situations, and whether they should be 
encouraged to do so is questionable (Gent, 2002). Whilst inadequate development aid, 
private investment and debt relief have tended to produce the general environment for 
conflict, including for those countries in post-conflict situations, simply reducing 
overall levels of poverty will not necessarily result in less out-migration and indeed may 
lead to an increase (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). In order to deliver this policy 
objective it will be necessary to establish coherence across the UK and EU’s policies in 
the areas of conflict prevention, Common Foreign and Security Policy, trade, 
humanitarian and development aid policy, and Common Agricultural Policy. It will also 
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of law in regions of origin and to establish a step-by-step approach for long-term 
investment in capacity and institution building. 
 
¾ Promoting the reception of refugees in regions of origin 
 
A comprehensive set of measures is needed to realise effective protection in the regions 
(European Commission, 2003a). Enhanced protection capacity in the regions will also 
involve long-term investment, including capacity and institution building, requiring 
long-term financial and political commitment, as well as the involvement of countries or 
origin, first asylum and destination. Any additional financial assistance to promote the 
reception of refugees in regions of origin needs to be framed within the current legal, 
political and financial frameworks (such as the Cotonou agreement process) and 
development programmes applicable to the various countries likely to be considered. As 
a result this is arguably an area of policy development in which DFID has a particularly 
important role to play. UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative may provide an appropriate 
mechanism for taking work in this area forward. 
 
¾ Resettlement schemes to compliment improved in-country asylum processing 
 
Resettlement has increasingly been recognised as a valuable tool for protecting 
individual refugees, as a potential durable solution for groups of refugees and as a 
tangible expression of international solidarity and the principle of responsibility-sharing 
(Loescher and Milner, 2003; van Selm, 2003). In any refugee crisis, there are some 
refugees who can return home in the short- to medium-term; there are some who can 
integrate locally in their country of initial protection and there are others who need 
protection further away. Resettlement should target the latter group, but can most 
effectively be used as part of a comprehensive package that includes pragmatic and 
supportive measures for voluntary return and for local integration where the individuals 
and states concerned would most benefit from those solutions.  
 
The UK has introduced a small-scale resettlement scheme and is currently in the process 
of evaluating the outcomes for individual resettled refugees and the communities to 
which they have been relocated. The European Commission has already identified an 
EU-wide resettlement scheme as one aspect of ensuring more accessible, equitable and 
managed asylum systems and has commissioned a study on the feasibility of setting up 
resettlement schemes in EU Member States or at EU level. Any resettlement schemes 
which are developed will need to be much more substantial than existing ones if they 
are to have anything other than a negligible impact (an annual European quota of 
100,000 is the emerging consensus), must be treated as a complement to, rather than as 
a substitute for, the right to seek asylum spontaneously and should not be a substitute 
for the legally binding rights that attach to a refugee who has directly engaged the 
protection obligations of a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. This means that 
failure to access such procedures should never be used as a reason to deny an asylum-
seeker access to a procedure, or to draw adverse inferences about the genuineness of his 
other claim for protection. Much of the thinking on the strategic use of resettlement is 
already underway. As noted in section 4 of this paper, resettlement is a key priority for 
the Convention Plus initiative and as part of this process UNHCR has established a 
Working Group on Resettlement composed of UNHCR, resettlement countries, 
emerging resettlement countries and IOM. At the same time there is a need to improve 
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package of Directives under the Amsterdam Treaty should be considered as a starting 
point for new initiatives aimed at deepening and expanding the harmonisation process. 
The potential of Protected Entry Procedures should also be pursued. These are 
examined in considerable detail by Noll and Fagerlund (2002).  
 
7.3. Specific Recommendations for DFID 
The recommendations presented below are specifically orientated towards identifying 
the role that DFID might play in helping to shape UK and EU policies on forced 
migration. These recommendations should be interpreted in the context of the broad 
policy options outlined above: 
 
¾ DFID should promote understanding of the causes of forced migration and 
demonstrate political leadership on this issue 
 
There is a pressing need, and a duty, on the part of governments and politicians to 
demonstrate leadership to their publics and political constituencies and, with the support 
of both the UNHCR and the European Commission, to raise awareness of the rights that 
refugees have and should enjoy and the obligations that states have to protect them. As 
noted earlier in this paper, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers often come from 
countries wracked by armed conflict and/or human rights abuses. This fact is not widely 
known among the general public of the UK or most other EU countries because political 
and media messages are always framed in terms of control, illegality and abuse of the 
asylum system. The Home Office finds it very difficult to exhibit leadership of this kind 
because has to be seen to be in control and has based much of its policy in recent years 
on the premise that the majority of asylum seekers are not genuinely in need of 
protection. DFID occupies a different political and policy space. The Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Aid has shown a willingness to show political 
leadership at the European level. DFID should follow suit.  
 
¾ DFID should play a more significant role in ‘joining-up’ policy at UK and EU 
levels 
 
Given DFID’s significant expertise and understanding of the factors contributing to 
forced migration, the Department has an important contribution to make in improving 
understanding across other government departments including the Home Office. Three 
specific proposals are recommended. Firstly, DFID should commission in-depth and 
systematic research on one specific country or region from which forced migrations to 
UK originate. This research should map out all of the different areas of UK and EU 
policy that have impacted on the current situation in order to understand better the 
interconnection between different policy objectives and outcomes. Second, DFID’s 
Migration Policy Team should engage with the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM) in thinking through the linkages between different policy areas. It is 
also important to ensure that the impacts of the (mis) use of development policy, for 
example aid tied to re-admission agreements, are understood, including in terms of the 
potentially negative impact on development and conflict in the countries from which 
refugees and migrants originate. In addition, DFID, together with other UK government 
departments including the Home Office, should explore whether there is potential for 
the HLWG to be a more transparent mechanism focused less on re-admission 
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to establish a more effective mechanism for bringing together different strands of policy 
at the EU. The lead Directorate General should not necessarily be the JHA. 
 
¾ DFID should support proposals for resettlement from countries and regions 
of origin 
 
All EU Member States, whether separately or collectively, should establish resettlement 
programmes. These could be small, in the first instance, and only provide emergency 
resettlement for urgent protection cases, at the call of UNHCR. Over time attention 
should turn to selection criteria that permit more widespread resettlement, offering a 
durable solution to refugees and as a matter of burden sharing with states in the region 
of origin. As a matter of strategy, EU Member States should view resettlement as part of 
a comprehensive approach to protection, which includes other durable solutions and is 
linked to the EU’s external relations. This will require DFID’s expertise and support. 
 
¾ DFID should establish effective and meaningful mechanisms for engaging 
with civil society (including NGOs and diaspora) in the area of forced 
migration 
 
Those parts of UK and EU government that are responsible for immigration control 
have typically not been very good at engaging with civil society because their interests 
and priorities lie elsewhere. DFID already has good relations with many NGOs, 
including those working outside the asylum area with knowledge and expertise on the 
causes of forced migration that is not normally tapped into. DFID should establish 
dialogue and communication with civil society in countries and regions of origin with a 
view to both learning more about situations on the ground and understanding the factors 
that contribute to forced migration and the reasons why people chose to move at 
particular times and go to particular places (i.e. motivations and experiences) and to 
establishing partnerships and effective working relationships to help deliver policy 
aimed at alleviating situations leading to forced migration. In the UK and EU contexts, 
it is also important to develop a dialogue with existing NGOs with expertise in 
protection issues. As a start-point for this process, ECRE (2004) has stated that the 
community of refugee-assisting organisations in Europe (which it represents) is 
committed to increased and constructive dialogue with European governments, 
institutions and policy-makers. In the near future ECRE will be putting forward a set of 
comprehensive proposals on how Europe can more effectively achieve concrete 
improvements in refugee protection. It is recommended that DFID and other parts of the 
UK policymaking apparatus engage with these and build on them.  
 
¾ DFID should extend its capacity-building function to situations where there is 
a risk of forced migration flows and/or internal displacement even where this 
is not directly related to poverty reduction objectives 
 
Investment in capacity building is important not only to ensure better protection in the 
regions where refugees are forced to flee but also because it potentially plays a role in 
reducing the number of people who are compelled to leave their countries of origin in 
the first place. As is noted by Loescher and Milner (2003: 607), ‘enhancing capacity in 
the regions of origin should be viewed as being in the best interests of European states 
anxious to reduce the number of applicants for asylum’. DFID should encourage and 




DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Thematic Paper II: The UK, the EU and Forced Migration 
 
 
of refugee origin, and to participate in personnel exchanges, joint training programmes 
and resource development. DFID should continue its support for UNHCR but 
encourage an approach to refugee protection that focuses on capacity building in 
countries and regions of origin rather than investing in new initiatives such as the 
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I. Development, Conflict and Forced Migration 
This paper looks at the relationships between development, conflict and forced 
migration with the purpose of investigating how humanitarian, refugee and development 
assistance policies can help developing countries resolve or prevent violent conflicts. By 
pursuing aid policies conducive to conflict prevention and resolution, aid agencies 
contribute to the quest of finding durable solutions to forced migration movements. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sets out three types of 
durable solutions to forced migration movements: local integration, resettlement in third 
countries, and repatriation. Of these, repatriation is seen as the preferred solution, both 
for the forced migrants themselves, most of whom would rather return home if only 
they could, and for host states and resettlement countries, who prefer to host as few 
refugees as possible for economic, political and, sometimes, security reasons.  
 
Repatriation is often also the most difficult solution. In most cases, voluntary 
repatriation requires that the conflict from which people flee is resolved. Furthermore, 
for repatriation to be durable, peace and stability must be solidified through concerted 
and sustained efforts to promote reintegration (of forced migrants as well as former 
combatants), reconciliation and reconstruction.  
 
Once forced migrants have returned and the emergency phase of the forced migration 
situation is over, overseas assistance is usually diverted from relief to development 
programmes (while overall funding levels often go down). Once the reconstruction 
effort is underway, development assistance should not only be seen as part of the effort 
to rebuild the country economically after a devastating conflict, it should also be geared 
towards ensuring that violence does not re-erupt and the country does not return to the 
cycle of conflict and forced migration. This leads us to the aim of prevention. In the 
early 1990s, the goal of prevention was heralded by the UNHCR as the most promising 
new solution to the forced migration problem. In the optimistic days just after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, UNHCR was not alone in the belief that the post-Cold War 
international system offered an unprecedented opportunity to deal with the root causes 
of flight – that is, to resolve the conflicts that force people to flee in the first place. 
 
Several seemingly intransigent wars and violent conflicts were indeed resolved in the 
early 1990s, including in Mozambique, South Africa, Cambodia and Guatemala. 
However, a surge of political conflicts divided along ethnic, religious or tribal lines lead 
to civil war in the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union; state collapse in 
Somalia and Zaire/Congo; and genocide in Rwanda (to mention some of the worst 
conflict-induced humanitarian emergencies in the 1990s). The murderousness of these 
conflicts and the rapid increase in the global number of forced migrants,1 soon 
dampened the belief in prevention. The fate of the deceivingly named ‘safe areas’ in 
Bosnia, and in particular the massacre of 7-8000 men in Srebrenica in 1995, made the 
                                                 
 
1The global number of refugees rose from 14,9 million in 1989 to 18,1 million in 1992, but has since 
decreased steadily to 11,5 million in 1998, 11.7 million in 1999, and 9.7 million in 2003. The number of 
‘others of concern to the UNHCR increased in the 1990s as refugee numbers went down. However, in 
recent years it has also dropped, from 10 million in 1998, to 6.8 million in 2002, and 5.3 million in 2003. 
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notions of prevention and in-country protection unpalatable from a refugee protection 
point of view (Hammerstad, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, prevention – understood as finding remedies to the root causes of flight 
rather than preventing people from fleeing violence – remains the ideal solution to the 
forced migration problem despite the difficulties entailed in pursuing this solution in 
practice. The period since the end of the Cold War has seen an increasingly 
sophisticated debate on the causes and consequences of forced migration and on the role 
of humanitarian and development agencies in responding to forced migration 
movements. The impact of humanitarian operations has been increasingly 
problematised. (De Waal, 1997). 
 
Taking into account the lessons that have been learnt (at least in theory, if not yet in 
practice) over the last ten to 15 years, this paper will discuss the root causes of forced 
migration movements, with particular emphasis on underlying causes of violent conflict. 
The paper focuses particularly on the vicious cycle of underdevelopment, conflict and 
forced migration. This leads us to concentrate on the problem of weak and failing states 
in the developing world.  
 
The first part of the paper looks at the causes and consequences of violent conflict and 
forced migration. It discusses the role of economic factors in causing conflict and forced 
migration. Conversely, it also investigates the negative impact on development, poverty 
and economic growth caused by violent conflict and forced migration. Together these 
complex links of cause and effect can be described as the conflict and forced migration 
cycle, where underdevelopment and weak state institutions make a country vulnerable 
to violent conflict and mass forced migration movements, while conflict and flight again 
undermine efforts to strengthen the state’s political and economic governance.  
 
Part Two of the paper looks at how this vicious cycle can be broken, with particular 
emphasis on how developmental and humanitarian aid can be honed to strengthen the 
prospects for peace and security. The donor community has a better understanding of 
the potential detrimental impact of development and humanitarian assistance on the 
long-term peace and prosperity of aid recipient countries today than it had in the early 
1990s. Several initiatives have been launched to breach the relief-development gap and 
to introduce development policies that are context-sensitive and conducive to conflict 
prevention and resolution. The paper provides recommendations on how to build further 
on these initiatives.  
 
The paper concludes by pointing to factors outside the remit of aid policies that have a 
strong impact on the conflict and forced migration cycle. These include foreign policy, 
trade, investment, military intervention, and governance issues. In the longer term, 
getting these issues right would provide a stronger contribution to development, peace 
and security in developing countries than we can ever hope to achieve through aid.  
 
II. Defining Key Terms 
Before discussing the relationship between poverty, development, conflict and forced 
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II.a.  Forced Migration 
According to the UN Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who, ‘owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fears, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country’.2 Since persecution is only one of many coercive causes of flight, it is common 
to include as refugees people who flee across an international border from war, 
aggression, political violence, break-down of public order, massive human rights 
violations or other serious threats to life, limb, and subsistence caused by human 
actions. This report adheres to this wider understanding of the term ‘refugee’. 
 
Forced migration includes refugees, as defined above, as well as people who have been 
internally displaced for the same man-made reasons. The term forced migration is used 
to underline that internally displaced persons (IDPs) flee for the same reasons and have 
the same needs for protection and assistance as refugees do. There is of course a legal 
difference between refugees who fall under the UN Convention, and other categories of 
forced migrants. The paper makes a distinction between Convention refugees, IDPs and 
other categories of forced migrants when necessary, but generally uses the term forced 
migration to describe mass movements of people fleeing violence, war and insecurity.  
 
II.b. Conflict 
Political conflicts exist in every community and are not necessarily a problem for peace 
and stability. One of the greatest successes of mature democracies has been their ability 
to take domestic conflicts over the distribution of goods and competition for control of 
the state out of the realm of security and into the realm of ordinary politics. This paper 
is not concerned with internal conflict as such, but only with what happens when 
conflict turns into large scale violence.  
 
II.c. Poverty and Development 
There are many different ways in which to define poverty. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) distinguishes between human poverty and income 
poverty, the former definition including such issues as education and health, while the 
latter is the more commonly used one of stipulating a certain level of income as below 
the poverty line. This report defines poverty in line with the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG), which aim to halve by 2015 the proportion of people living on less than 
US$1 a day and those who suffer from hunger. This measures extreme poverty, and 
would exclude people living under the National Poverty Line in most western countries. 
According to the MDG targets, more than a billion people still live on less than a dollar 
a day in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and parts of Europe and Central Asia.  
 
Development has long been understood as more than just economic growth. It is 
common to attach the adjective human in order to emphasise that development must 
include betterment of the conditions of living for most people within a country, not just 
an elite few. Poverty alleviation and the redistribution of goods through healthcare, 
education, infrastructure development and job creation – to mention some – are 
therefore necessary parts of a developmental agenda. Furthermore, economic growth 
and poverty alleviation must be sustainable over time. Short-term profitable extraction 
of natural resources, often of an environmentally hazardous nature, where profits go into 
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off-shore bank accounts rather than being reinvested and redistributed, may create GDP 
growth for a while, but is unlikely to create development. Due to this caveat of 
sustainability, this paper would argue that no adjectives are necessary: only 
development of the human kind will lead to sustained and significant economic growth. 
 
An important explanation for the lack of development in some developing countries 
since independence must be found in the phenomenon of weak states, with an insecure 
political elite presiding over poorly developed and unstable political institutions. It has 
become commonplace to talk about economic and political good governance as a 
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1. DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION  
 
1.1. Introduction 
This first part of the study will analyse the problem at hand: What is the relationship 
between conflict and forced migration? How important are underdevelopment, poverty 
and economic inequality when it comes to creating the sorts of conflicts that lead to 
forced migration?  
  
Perceptions of the nature of the refugee problem and how to deal with it have changed 
dramatically over the last twenty years. This change in perception accelerated in the 
period around the end of the Cold War (Hammerstad, 2003). Before then, actions to 
deal with refugees were seldom viewed in connection with action to resolve violent 
conflicts and wars. The actors involved in the two areas would usually be separate and 
have limited knowledge of each other’s work. 
 
Today the forced migration problem is seen as much as a political and security problem 
– how to solve the root causes of flight and how to deal with the detrimental effects of 
refugee influxes – as a humanitarian and human rights problem – how to protect the 
rights and needs of forced migrants after flight has taken place. The underlying 
assumption of this post-Cold War holistic discourse is that development and relief aid 
must go hand in hand with economic, political and even military interventions to get rid 
of the conditions that cause conflicts and forced migration. The ensuing discussion will 
focus on the root causes of flight.  
 
1.2. The Impact of Development on Conflict 
According to the World Bank, civil war is both a problem for development and a 
problem of development (Collier et al., 2003: ix). The first point is straightforward and 
well understood: civil war undermines or destroys development initiatives, curbs 
economic growth and increases poverty. The ways in which conflicts undermine 
development will be discussed later on in this report. The second part of the claim is 
based on a statistical fact: developing countries have a higher risk of becoming 
embroiled in civil war than more developed ones do. This is a more recent discovery 
and also a more complex issue to understand. This section will look at the potential role 
of poverty, economic inequality and natural resources in increasing the risk of armed 
conflict.  
 
1.2.1. Poverty and Conflict 
According to the United Nations Development Programme, only 14 percent of the states 
in the top half of the Human Development Index had experienced armed conflict in the 
period 1992-2001, while 45 percent of the states in the bottom half had been at war in 
the same period (UNDP, 2002). Sub-Saharan Africa seems to provide particularly 
strong proof of the thesis that poverty leads to conflict. However, this correlation 
between poverty and conflict does not suffice as a tool for understanding when a 
particular country is at risk of violent conflict. After all, if 45 percent of poor countries 
had experienced war in the last decade, 55 percent had not. Since far from all poor 
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creates the conditions for violent conflict. While there is a statistical relationship 
between poverty and war, then, it cannot be said that there is a direct causal link 
between the two. 
 
Having said this, poverty can certainly be a contributing factor in spurring a country 
towards civil war. Most of the literature on the causes of conflict agrees that sharply 
deteriorating economic conditions (rather than poverty as such) signals a high risk that 
the country will descend into conflict. It is in countries like Zimbabwe, rather than its 
poorer neighbour Malawi, that the donor community should be particularly cautious 
about how aid and other interventions affect the likelihood of conflict. The former 
Yugoslavia and some of the CIS countries are examples of economies in turmoil and 
decline that descended into political violence. 
 
In Zimbabwe, real GDP contracted by about 40 percent between 1999 and 2003, and 
even though the decline is slowing down, negative growth is expected to continue in 
2005 (EIU, 2004). These economic woes must be understood in a political perspective. 
The prospect of ZANU, the country’s liberation party, losing power to the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change in democratic elections led to a combination of 
repressive political actions and a land-grab programme phrased in terms of anti-
colonialism and race. As the economy has spiralled into decline, freedoms of speech 
and assembly have been heavily circumscribed. While the country is not in a situation 
of civil war, communal violence has been on the increase, as has ethnic divisions 
between Shona and Ndebele and geographical divisions between town and countryside. 
This said, the level of political violence and repression in recent years is far lower than 
in the early 1980s, when the Shona dominated Zanu destroyed the Matabele opposition 
of ZAPU through massacres of 20,000 people in Matabeleland.  
 
1.2.2. Inequality and Conflict 
Poverty has halved since 1981 globally, but this statistic hides severe differences within 
and between countries and regions. While East Asia and the Pacific reduced the number 
of people living on US$1, a day from 55.6 percent of the population to 15.5 percent – 
mainly due to improvements in India and China – the share of people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa living on one dollar a day increased in the same period, from 41.6 to 46.5 percent 
(World Bank, 2004). Most experts, regardless of the methods used to measure 
inequality, agree that global inequality has increased over the past twenty years (Wade, 
2003: 35-36). In many developing countries inequality within society has increased in 
the same period. 
 
High economic inequality may contribute to instability and the eruption of violent 
conflict. However, not all highly unequal countries are prone to violent conflict. Brazil 
and South Africa, two of the countries with the most unequal distribution of wealth in 
the world3, are relatively stable, powerful and prosperous compared to their neighbours. 
 
It might be more fruitful to look at the combination of poverty and inequality. However, 
when comparing the gini coefficient of countries that are ranked as ‘low human 
development’ by UNDP and have experienced armed conflict in the last decade, no 
clear picture emerges. Sierra Leone seems to confirm the hypothesis that poverty and 
                                                 
3 South Africa had 59.3 and Brazil 60.7 on the Gini Index, with 0 being perfect equality and 100 perfect 
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inequality is an explosive combination: the country is last on the UNDP’s human 
development index, has a high gini coefficient of 62.9 and has only recently emerged 
from a devastating and cruel civil war. But Malawi and Zambia also rank high on the 
gini index without showing signs of political instability. Rwanda is an opposite 
example, where genocide took place in a poor, but economically egalitarian society with 
a gini coefficient of 28.9 – only slightly higher than the 25.8 of Norway, ranked as 
number one on the Human Development Index, and much lower than the United States 
with 40.8 (UNDP, 2004: 282-85).  
 
Despite these counter examples, poor societies with high inequality between a small 
elite and a population living in poverty are more at risk from civil war than richer and 
more egalitarian ones. There is a growing consensus among economists that economic 
growth, when only benefiting a small elite, is harder to sustain over time and less likely 
to transform a developing country into a developed one. While there is no agreement on 
how egalitarian a country should be for sustained and broad development to take place, 
there is consensus that countries like South Africa, Brazil and Angola face a huge 
challenge of development despite their economic growth.  
 
While highly unequal developing countries struggle to achieve poverty alleviation and 
development, opinions differ on whether this increases the likelihood of violent conflict. 
The risk seems to increase the weaker the state structures and the poorer the unequal 
country is overall. Thus Brazil and South Africa cope relatively well, although their 
exceptionally high crime rates are strongly linked to their social and economic 
inequality. Angola and Sierra Leone, on the other hand, are civil war prone. It should be 
noted that the causal relationship also goes the other way. Civil war makes most people 
poor, while a small political elite can enrich itself, often through illegal means, in an 
opaque war economy.  
 
2.2.3. The Impact of Natural Resources on Conflict 
Although natural resources like gold, diamonds, timber and oil have often been labelled 
a curse rather than a blessing for developing countries, Botswana has profited greatly 
from its diamonds and enjoyed peace and stability since independence. Ghana, after 
political instability in the 1970s and 1980s, has emerged over the last decade as another 
of the most successful African states. Through democratisation, sound macro-economic 
management and a relatively good record of political and economic governance, the 
country has been able to put its resource wealth – gold and cocoa – to good economic 
use without spurring political instability.  
 
Quantitative scientists disagree widely over the exact relationship between natural 
resources and civil war. Researchers such as Collier et al. (2003) have painted a bleak 
picture of ‘the resource curse’. This picture has been nuanced by more recent research. 
Most researchers now agree that oil and diamonds increase the risk of armed conflict, 
while they have moved away from asserting a similar link between agricultural 
resources and civil war (Ross, 2004). If oil and diamond wealth is found in weak or 
collapsed states, the risk of conflict increases further (Reno, 2000).  
 
Usually political grievances and divisions must be added if natural resources are to lead 
to serious conflict. This is especially the case if we concentrate on the sort of conflict 
that creates mass movements of forced migrants, in contrast to palace coups that may 
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An example of the latter took place most recently after oil was struck in the tiny island 
state of Sao Tomé in 2003. The government was fortunately quickly reinstated after 
resolute intervention from the African Union, South Africa and Nigeria.  
 
Natural riches may be particularly ‘dangerous’ if they are found in only one region of 
the country and if this region is inhabited by one particular minority group. In such 
cases, separatist tendencies can be fuelled by the newfound wealth. The Biafra war was 
an example of such a combination of disaffected minority groups and oil. Nigeria’s oil 
regions are still volatile, not least because very little of the oil revenue returns to the 
areas from where the oil is pumped. The Niger Delta, the source of most of Nigeria’s 
oil, is one of the country’s most impoverished regions (Hammerstad, 2004).  
 
There is also evidence of conflicts being sustained by the existence of coveted 
resources, especially if these are easily extractable – or ‘lootable’ – without the need for 
heavy infrastructure investments (Ross, 2004). The control of diamond territory can 
enable rebel groups to finance their fighting year after year. Angola’s riverbed 
diamonds are a case in point. Sometimes the illicit business networks created around the 
illegal sale of timber, diamonds, cobalt and other minerals are so lucrative that they 
become a reason of their own to continue fighting. The transformation from political 
ideology to business logic could be seen in Angola’s and Sierra Leone’s civil wars. 
 
Collier et al. (2003: 75-79) argue that natural resources may also make the initial resort 
to arms easier for rebel groups, since they know that as long as they can hold on to 
resource rich parts of the country they will be able to buy the arms and equipment they 
need to become a serious threat to government forces. However, others, such as Ross 
(2004) do not find robust data to back up this claim.  
 
The contrast between Angola and Mozambique, two former Portuguese colonies in 
Southern Africa, provides an interesting lesson on the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict. Both suffered devastating civil war for decades after 
independence. In both countries the rebel groups were supported by powerful external 
actors: the United States and South Africa funded and supported the Angolan UNITA, 
while Rhodesia and then South Africa supported RENAMO in Mozambique. In 
Mozambique, the war ended in 1992, soon after the end of the Cold War and the 
beginning of democratic transition in South Africa – two events that left RENAMO 
without external supporters. In Angola, after a short lull, the conflict carried on for 
another ten years with heavy loss of life (particularly among civilians), despite the 
withdrawal of US and South African support for UNITA. An important reason for this 
was UNITA’s access to diamonds, which made continued fighting both possible and 
lucrative for the organisation’s autocratic leader, Jonas Savimbi. Angola’s civil war did 
not end until UNITA was beaten militarily and Savimbi killed in 2002.  
 
1.2.4. Conclusion: A Complex Link Between Economics and Conflict 
Poverty, underdevelopment and inequality contribute to conflicts in the developing 
world. However, such economic issues must be understood as underlying or enabling 
factors in the context of the more immediate political causes of conflict. In many cases 
weak and predatory regimes combine political repression with economic 
mismanagement and self-enrichment, steering the country into deepening political and 
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More disturbingly for advocates of democracy and good governance in the developing 
world, positive changes such as democratisation and rapid economic growth also 
increase the risk of violent conflict. Most analysts agree that neither democratic nor 
authoritarian societies are particularly war-prone. Instead, the political situation most at 
risk of deteriorating into violent conflict is that of transition from one political system 
to another. While democracy lessens the risk of conflict and forced migration, 
democratisation may heighten it (Melander and Öberg, 2004). 
 
Examples of transition-induced conflict and forced migration abound. Historically some 
of the most tragic and deadly conflicts leading to massive forced migration have not 
taken place in the poorest countries of the world. Instead they often have in common 
that they took place in periods of groundbreaking and dramatic political changes in the 
international system and on the domestic arena. Among such crises should be included 
the final months of World War Two, when Eastern European countries and former 
German territories expelled around 11 million ethnic Germans at a great loss of life. 
Another example is the population exchange of millions of people between India and 
Pakistan in 1947 after independence from the British Empire (Weiner, 1993: 150-161). 
Removing any hope there might have been that such scenes would disappear from the 
world stage after the end of the Cold War, the ethnic cleansing in the Former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s is another example of mass forced migration that cannot be 
explained from a developmental perspective. These terrible events are better explained 
by referring to the struggle for political control over territory in a period of upheaval 
and changing power constellations both domestically and internationally (the end of 
World War Two, the end of colonialism, and the end of the Cold War, respectively). In 
these periods of fluidity and upheaval, economic and political disputes were 
transformed into deadly conflict by political elites who resorted to a vitriolic form of 
ethnic or religious based nationalism in order to further their quest for political power. 
 
This caution aside, a look at most of the conflict-induced forced migration movements 
in the last few years shows that almost all new mass forced migration movements have 
been from desperately poor and often highly unequal countries. Of the six countries that 
produced more than 10,000 refugees in 2003, all were among the poorest countries in 
the world. The six are Sudan, Liberia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia (UNHCR, 2004a: 4).4 To understand 
why these countries have descended into the sort of conflict that induces mass forced 
migration, pointing at their troubled economies is not enough. It is more important to 
recognise that these states can all be characterised as severely weakened or failed. They 
are riddled by political divisions, repression, mismanagement and human rights abuses, 
and their weak or non-existing (Somalia) central governments only control parts of the 
country’s territory. At first glance, Côte d’Ivoire may look like an exception to this rule. 
However, although the country looked like a haven of tranquillity next to its neighbours 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea in the 1990s, the north-south divisions within that 
country had existed for a long time.  
 
                                                 
4 The same trend can be found in 2001, when the largest refugee flows occurred from Afghanistan 
(200,000), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (93,000), Angola (45,000), Sudan (35,000), DR 
Congo (33,000), Central African Republic (27,000), Somalia (21,000), Burundi (16,000), Liberia 
(12,000). Apart from FYR Macedonia, these are all among the poorest countries in the world (UNHCR, 
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“Contrary to common belief, there is no clear correlation between poverty (or 
economic inequality) and social conflict. (...) [M]ore recent research has shown 
that, to cause civil strife, economic crisis must be severe, persistent, and 
pervasive enough to erode the legitimacy or moral authority of the dominant 
social order and system of governance. System legitimacy is therefore a critical 
intervening variable between rising poverty and civil conflict” (Homer-Dixon, 
1994: 26).  
 
Côte d’Ivoire is a good example of another central characteristic of these six refugee 
creating countries: they are all found in regions of the world – West Africa, Central 
Africa and the Horn of Africa – where over decades forced migration has contributed to 
spread the contagion of conflict and instability. Poverty and inequality must be 
understood as part of a complex web of domestic and regional factors that can hurl a 
country into civil war.  
 
Creating and sustaining economic growth and alleviating poverty are powerful ways of 
strengthening system legitimacy in weak states. But weak states are often incapable of 
putting in place the necessary policies to create a successful economy, not least because 
they often have a history of social division and violent conflict. Most donor states have 
recognised that conflict, weak states and underdevelopment go hand in hand, and have 
made institution building, good governance and the fostering of national cohesion a key 
aim of development assistance efforts. While appropriate, this slow and difficult task is 
faced with two serious threats: First, as mentioned above, countries in the throes of deep 
political, social and economic transition – even when towards democracy and 
development – are even more at risk of violent conflict than communities that are 
‘merely’ poor, unequal or authoritarian. Second, many weak and underdeveloped states 
have only recently emerged from civil war and are often at risk of descending back into 
violence. The next section will look at this issue of the impact of conflict on 
development efforts. 
 
1.3. The Impact of Conflict on Development 
While the impact of poverty and inequality on violent conflict is a complex subject, the 
relationship the other way around is neither complex nor disputed: instability and war 
always hinders and usually reverses development and exacerbates poverty in developing 
countries.5 It does so in two ways. First, government spending is diverted from the 
civilian sector to the military, thus weakening crucial public services such as healthcare 
and education. Second, warfare itself is destructive of infrastructure, lives and 
livelihoods.  
 
While some individuals and groups can stand to gain from war, this is not the case for 
the country as a whole or for the majority of the population. Sadly, the people who start 
or perpetuate civil wars are often insulated from their economic effects – in some cases 
using the lawless environment created by war to enrich themselves. The consequences 
are felt by ordinary people, and particularly by the most vulnerable members of society. 
This divide between those who fight and those who are affected by the fighting 
contributes to making it difficult for outside actors to get the warring parties to come to 
                                                 
5 According to Collier et al. (2003: 84), a country in civil war loses on average 2.2 percentage points off 
its normal annual growth rate. For an average lasting civil war of seven years, per capita income is 15 
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an agreement. Those with the highest stake in peace are often not given a seat at the 
negotiation table. 
 
Civil wars damage not only economic institutions but also political ones. Corruption 
tends to spread while public accountability is sacrificed in the name of national security. 
Independent institutions like the judiciary, parliament and the media are weakened and 
authority relies increasingly on strongmen in government and the military rather than on 
political institutions and the rule of law. These are setbacks that are not easily remedied. 
Internal conflict therefore increases the risk of perpetuating weak states and bad 
governance. Add to that the economic cost of fighting, and a country emerging from 
civil war will have the odds stacked against it for achieving sustainable development 
and political stability.  
 
1.4. The Impact of Conflict on Forced Migration 
Violent conflict and civil war is the most common cause of forced migration. Most wars 
after the end of the Cold War have had much higher casualty rates among civilians than 
among combatants. This can be due to the indiscriminate nature of the violence and the 
lack of respect for human rights and the laws of war among ill-disciplined militias. But 
it has also resulted from the direct targeting of non-combatants, to get rid of ‘enemy 
populations’ who harbour guerrilla fighters or to attempt to permanently cleanse a 
territory of other ethnic groups. The most serious conflict-induced forced migration 
movement in 2004 was a result of such ethnic cleansing: aerial bombardment followed 
by raids by pro-government Arab militias led to around one million of the black 
population of the Sudanese province of Darfur to become internally displaced and 
another 170,000 to flee to eastern Chad (UNHCR, 2004b).  
 
Civilians are often forced to flee internal conflict even when they are not directly 
targeted. The military strategy of living off the land is widely pursued by government 
and rebel forces alike in civil wars in developing countries. For civilians, a violent death 
is often less of a threat than starvation and disease. The often-quoted figure of three 
million conflict-related deaths in the DRC since the outbreak of war in 1996 includes 
mostly people dying from starvation, malnutrition and disease after being forced by 
fighting away from their homes.  
 
Not everyone – usually not even the majority – of forced migrants fleeing civil war 
become bona fide refugees. Many trek into urban areas, where there is a greater variety 
of means of survival – ranging from finding paid jobs to begging and criminal activities. 
Capitals of war-torn countries like Luanda and Maputo tend to swell massively during 
the war, and most of the wartime influx will not return to the countryside once the 
fighting subsides. Conflict, then, is often a means of forced but lasting urbanisation. 
Others move to parts of the country untouched by the war, and some move across the 
border into neighbouring states where they usually end up relying on humanitarian relief 
in refugee camps.  
 
1.5. The Impact of Forced Migration on Conflict 
This section looks at forced migration as a potential factor in increasing the risk of 
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thorough account of the security dimensions of refugee movements can be found in a 
separate report (Loescher and Milner, 2004). 
 
1.5.1. Forced Migrants and Conflicts in Sending States 
The tactic of ethnic cleansing has been much used in the post-Cold War period, most 
recently in Darfur. Although warring parties may see this as an effective way of 
achieving their war objectives, it seldom leads to the end of conflict. More often, it leads 
to stronger links between armed rebels inside the country’s borders and enemy forces – 
diasporas, refugee warriors and hostile neighbouring states – on the outside. In addition, 
the creation of a large refugee population often contributes to the resilience of conflicts 
(Ogata, 1996: 3). In the Middle East, generations of stateless Palestinians growing up in 
refugee camps constitute a serious obstacle to peace in that region. In the Great Lakes, 
the génocidaires who have taken refuge in the woods of eastern DRC, are seen as a 
constant threat to Rwanda’s security. 
 
1.5.2. Forced Migrants and Conflict in Host States 
It has been argued convincingly that mass influxes of forced migrants can in some cases 
be seen as a form of non-military invasion that can have huge economic and political 
consequences, and can sometimes even destabilise the host region or country (Dowty 
and Loescher, 1996). However, when discussing the potential threats posed by refugees 
to their host state, it is necessary to distinguish between weak and strong states. Weak 
states are, as the name suggests, already prone to instability and conflict. They are 
characterised by poorly developed economies and polities; a lack of social and political 
cohesion often manifested through religious or ethnic divisions; and their governments 
and state institutions often struggle with low legitimacy (Ayoob, 1995; and Azar and 
Moon,1988).  
 
When arriving in weak states, large refugee movements may contribute to instability by 
exacerbating or triggering pre-existing internal tensions. Mass refugee influxes can 
upset a fragile internal balance between political contenders and accelerate existing 
internal conflict in their host state (Loescher, 1992: 14). The presence of disgruntled 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was a crucial factor in that country’s descent into civil 
war. The endemic instability in parts of the African Great Lakes region is to some extent 
the result of a long tradition among refugee warriors of allying themselves with various 
political factions – government or opposition – in their host states and becoming 
entangled in that state’s internal politics.  
 
For instance, Uganda’s dictator Obote decided to use the Rwandan Tutsi refugees 
together with his country’s own Tutsi population, as scapegoats for all Uganda’s ills in 
his struggle to retain power. Up to 60,000 Rwandans were estimated to have been killed 
during the 1980 civil war in Uganda. Rwandan refugees then rallied against Obote and 
contributed 3000 out of the 14,000 men of Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
(NRA) who overthrew the dictator in 1986 (Van der Meeren, 1996: 261). 
  
1.5.3. Forced Migrants, the Environment, Development and Conflict 
Forced migrant flows and environmental strain are often closely linked in the 
developing world. Enormous refugee camps with tens of thousands inhabitants can 
easily upset a delicate ecological balance, particularly in areas such as the Horn of 
Africa that already suffer from environmental problems, scarce resources and poverty 
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consumed 3,758 hectares of forest during the first three weeks after their arrival in 
Zaire.  
 
There is a close link between environmental and economic problems in developing 
countries. In poor, overwhelmingly agrarian societies, environmental degradation and 
the depletion of scarce resources may have profound effects on the local economy. 
Large refugee influxes may lead to food scarcity, rapid inflation, unemployment and the 
crumbling of the economy (Jacobsen, 1993: 215).  
 
Such refugee induced environmental and economic problems may lead to increased 
conflict in host states. When the competition for scarce resources intensifies, so does 
hostility to the newcomers. This can lead to clashes between refugees and locals, as well 
as to increased animosity towards central authorities, since they are seen as unable or 
unwilling to cope with the refugee influx in a manner that does not jeopardise the 
livelihood of their own citizens. 
 
However, refugee flows can also have a positive effect on economic development. 
Remittances sent home by refugees can be a source of much needed foreign currency 
for their sending state. In Eritrea, remittances constituted 16.7 percent of the country’s 
Gross National Income in 1999 (IOM, 2003). Refugee hosts may also benefit: local 
communities can experience a surge in trading activities, as humanitarian assistance is 
bartered on the market place. Both locals and refugees may benefit from the 
humanitarian and development assistance that often arrives in the wake of refugee 
influxes. One study of Malawian villagers found that they were in general satisfied with 
the presence of a Mozambican refugee camp in their neighbourhood: 
 
“The primary reasons for their feelings regarding the camp were first that they 
had ‘more money’ than before and second that they had access to a market-
place, a hospital, good roads, etc. A comment widely heard, indeed, was that the 
area was finally developing” (Callamard, 1994: 53-54). 
 
1.5.4. Conclusion: Forced Migrants and Weak States 
To conclude, forced migrants are most at risk of increasing the likelihood of conflict in 
their host states when several social, economic, environmental and political factors 
coincide. These factors are most likely to coincide and interact in developing states that 
are riddled by ethnic and communal rivalry, weak and illegitimate central government, 
and harsh competition for scarce resources. Refugees can be directly involved in armed 
conflict when they as refugee warriors take part in interstate or intra-state armed 
conflict, and they can constitute indirect threats to stability when their influx triggers an 
already explosive mix of economic, social, environmental and political problems in 
their host state or region.  
 
1.6. Forced Migrants and the Contagion of Conflict 
The examples above of the many different ways in which forced migration flows may 
heighten the risk of conflict, or exacerbate existing ones, show how human flight can 
contribute to spreading instability from one country to another in a region. Some of the 
clearest recent examples of such regional forced migration and conflict dynamics can be 
found in West Africa, between Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, and in 
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One reason for this contagion of conflict is the nature of many refugee camps. Even 
when not armed, refugees living in camps close to unstable borders are often considered 
as suspicious: if not refugee warriors themselves, they are often, voluntarily or not, 
harbouring and feeding armed elements. NGOs’ or UNHCR’s management of refugee 
camps can have important strategic significance in conflicts in the developing world, 
where the control of and access to food and health supplies are often crucial elements of 
warfare (MacFarlane, 1999; Loescher, 1992: 52).  
 
Refugee camps are also potential recruiting grounds for soldiers. The bored and 
frustrated young male camp population is an easy target for recruiters, as could be seen, 
for instance, in the Liberian refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire when civil war broke out in 
that country. Once recruited, the soldiers would return to the camp now and then to visit 
family and to rest. As a result, the Liberian refugee population, which until then had 
integrated well into the local Ivorian society and economy, became drawn into the 
conflict and treated as an enemy population by the locals (UNHCR, 2003a).  
 
However, as the chiefly peaceful existence of over 900,000 Mozambican refugees in 
Malawi in the 1980s reminds us (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998), large camp populations do 
not automatically cause security problems for their hosts. Tanzania has also hosted large 
numbers of refugees over the last several decades without tangible increases in internal 
divisions. Both countries have long histories of solving disputes peacefully and do not 
harbour minority ethnic groups with strong grievances against the politically dominant 
group.6 Mass forced migration movements, it seems, only pose a heightened risk of 
spreading contagion when their presence fuels pre-existing or latent conflict dynamics.  
 
The remainder of the discussion of the conflict and forced migration cycle will be used 
to study the particular case of the role of forced migrants in the Great Lakes of Africa. 
This case study illustrates many of the points made above and shows the complexity of 
this vicious cycle.  
 
1.7. Refugees and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region7  
It is impossible to understand the dynamic of post-colonial conflict in the Great Lakes 
region without taking into account the role of forced migration in fuelling this dynamic. 
Without putting an end to the refugee cycle in the region, lasting stability will remain a 
remote goal. This case study focuses on the role of refugees in and from Rwanda and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (previously Zaire). It looks at the history of forced 
migration movements between these countries and the role of refugee groups both as 
cause and effect of violent conflict.  
 
1.7.1. A History of War and Displacement 
While the two million Rwandans fleeing the aftermath of the 1994 genocide brought the 
refugee problem in the Great Lakes region to the world’s attention, refugee flows have 
ebbed and waned in the area for decades. After the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 
1959 and independence in 1962, a Hutu dominated government was installed in 
Rwanda, while around 120,000 Tutsi refugees fled to neighbouring countries. In the 
                                                 
6 Zanzibari separatists notwithstanding. 
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1960s, the militarised Tutsi refugee communities in Burundi and Uganda staged 
numerous armed raids into Rwandan territory – actions that led to retaliations against 
the local Tutsi population in Rwanda, triggering in turn more refugee flight. Thus 
Rwanda’s vicious spiral of ethnic animosity and displacement was continually 
reinforced by the actions and reactions of the Tutsi refugee community and the Hutu-
dominated authorities. 
 
In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an exiled Tutsi army based in 
Uganda and with strong ties to the Ugandan government, invaded Rwanda. A peace 
agreement, the Arusha Accord, was signed in August 1993, proposing power sharing 
and the deployment of UN peacekeepers. However, Hutu hard-liners in the government, 
police and army had little interest in power sharing. They depicted the Tutsi not as a 
national minority, but as an ‘alien race’ thirsting for the subjugation of all Hutus. On 7 
April 1994, after a period of detailed planning and relentless anti-Tutsi propaganda 
spewed out by local radio stations, Hutu extremists launched genocide against Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus. Around 800,000 people were killed, most of them within the first 
four weeks of the genocide.  
 
Many ordinary Hutus joined in the killing. Among the most willing helpers of the 
génocidaires were members of the 200,000 strong Burundian Hutu refugee community 
who had fled to Rwanda in 1993 after a Tutsi-led coup and massacres in their country. 
The refugees brought with them their bitterness against Tutsis and were responsible for 
some of the most gruesome acts during the genocide (Mamdani, 2001: 205), providing 
another example of how ethnic animosity spread and deepened in the region through 
forced displacement, perpetuating the violence/displacement nexus in the Great Lakes 
by making the fleeing victims of yesterday into the killers of today.  
 
1.7.2. Spreading the Conflict to Zaire 
The Rwandan genocide was stopped not by international intervention, but by conquest. 
The rapidly advancing RPF forces took control of the country in mid-July 1994, setting 
in motion a new phase of the Great Lakes refugee cycle when the perpetrators of the 
genocide fled to neighbouring countries, together with around two million civilian 
Hutus fearing reprisals from the RPF. In four days, over one million refugees flooded 
into eastern Zaire, in the biggest sudden influx in UNHCR’s history.  
 
Overwhelmed humanitarian personnel were not able to stop the génocidaires from 
quickly seizing control of the refugee camps and using them as bases from which to 
rearm and prepare for an offensive against the new rulers in Kigali. They paid for their 
militant activities mainly by diverting and smuggling aid resources (Halvorsen, 1999: 
312). The militarised Rwandan refugee camps played a crucial part in plunging Zaire 
into civil war in late 1996. Eastern Zaire was left increasingly in the power of the 
génocidaires, a situation that was intolerable to the new, Tutsi-led, regime in Kigali. It 
repeatedly warned Zaire and the international community that if the camps were not 
demilitarised and the refugees repatriated, Rwanda would do this itself (UNHCR, 2000: 
262). 
 
Kigali was right to argue that the refugee camps were indispensable for the génocidaires 
if they were to regain power in Rwanda. Control over the camps guaranteed their grip 
on power over the Hutu civilian population, and humanitarian aid was the means with 
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increasingly bold in their military raids and massacres, both against Tutsis across the 
border in Rwanda and against Zaire’s own Tutsi population, the Banyamulenge.  
 
In late 1996, a rebellion against Mobutu’s regime began in eastern Zaire. The aggrieved 
Banyamulenge made up a strong section of the anti-Mobutu coalition. While the aim of 
the coalition’s leader, Laurent Kabila, was to seize power over the whole of the country, 
the immediate aim of the Banyamulenge and their Rwandan backers was to destroy the 
refugee camps. In the ensuing chaos, hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees fled in 
panic back across the border to Rwanda, while an unknown number of refugees moved 
into the interior of Zaire, sometimes forced in that direction by the génocidaires. To this 
day, the estimates of how many refugees were killed in the forests of eastern Zaire vary 
widely, but thousands certainly perished (UNHCR, 2000: 268-271). 
 
The refugee situation in eastern Zaire was not the only cause of the demise of the 
Mobutu regime in 1997. The country was already on the brink of political and economic 
collapse, and Mobutu’s own health was failing together with that of his country. 
However, without the resentment created by the refugee camps, the rebellion would not 
have taken place so quickly or, arguably, been so effective, since Kabila benefited 
greatly from the military skills of his Rwandan backers.  
 
With a history of persecution and forced displacement in eastern DRC, the conditions 
were ripe for turning the Hutu refugee influx in 1994 into a regional powder keg. In the 
words of Mamdani (2001: 234): ‘Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu has it that 
Kivu Province in eastern Congo is where losers in Rwanda traditionally end up; and it is 
from Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda’. But conditions within the 
eastern DRC itself are equally to blame. The region’s ethnic Tutsi population have for 
decades lived a precarious existence, at best merely tolerated and at worst persecuted 
and stripped of their citizenship. This insecurity has led Banyamulenge to become key 
figures in several of the DRC’s numerous political and military crises. 
 
Regardless of the ongoing peace process, the conditions of uncertain citizenship, ethnic 
tension and forced migration that were important ingredients in causing the rebellion in 
1996 still exist in the eastern DRC. A triggering factor like that of the influx of one 
million refugees is not on the horizon, but the continuing instability in the region, 
especially in neighbouring Burundi, means that there is no room for complacency if the 
vicious cycle of violence and forced migration is to be broken. The next part of this 
paper will look at policies and actions with which the donor community can contribute 
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2. DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID FOR CONFLICT 
PREVENTION 
 
2.1. Introduction  
Part Two discusses how the donor community can help remedy the problems set out in 
Part One. To what degree and in what ways can aid from organisations like DFID 
contribute to breaking the conflict and forced migration cycle? What are the links 
between humanitarian and forced migration policies on the one hand, and development 
policies on the other? Can development aid be used to achieve political aims of 
democratisation and institution building? How can the much discussed ‘gap’ between 
humanitarian assistance and development assistance (‘the relief-development gap’) be 
addressed?  
 
Finally, humanitarian and development aid cannot be conducted in a political vacuum. 
Aid organisations, whether state or non-governmental, must take into due consideration 
how their activities relate to local, regional, and international politics and economics. 
The last section of this paper will therefore look at broader dimensions of international 
relations in which aid activities take place, including trade, foreign direct investment, 
foreign affairs, and military peacekeeping and peace enforcement action. 
 
2.2. The Importance of Repatriation as a Durable Solution to Forced Migration 
Part One showed that violent conflicts are the main cause of forced migration and are 
also highly detrimental to human development, social cohesion and state institution 
building. It further argued that forced migration itself may have detrimental effects on 
development and political stability. Conflict resolution and the ensuing repatriation of 
forced migrants are therefore crucial for achieving sustainable development, both in 
refugee sending states and in host countries. Development, when understood not only in 
economic terms but defined to include political and economic governance and the 
strengthening of political institutions and the rule of law, increases the likelihood of a 
post-conflict society breaking out of the conflict cycle. 
 
Conflict resolution and voluntary repatriation are therefore the most desirable type of 
durable solution to forced migration. They are admittedly very difficult to achieve, but 
when successful, they also have the most positive impact on global forced migration 
figures. It is not in today’s political climate feasible to offer local integration or 
resettlement to large numbers of refugees. When it comes to local integration, most host 
countries prefer to keep refugees in camps, separate from the local population, and with 
limited opportunity to integrate into local life – both socially and economically. This is 
especially the case with large refugee groups, who can be seen as a threat to political 
stability, economic growth and even to the cultural identity of host communities.  
 
During the Cold War period, resettlement was used for certain refugee groups of high 
ideological or political significance, such as the Vietnamese ‘boat people’ and dissidents 
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Indochinese refugees after the end of the Vietnam War,8 resettlement has not been used 
for large groups of refugees. The Kosovo Albanians who were airlifted out of 
Macedonia in 1999 were not offered a lasting solution, but given leave to stay with their 
European hosts on humanitarian grounds for one year. 
 
After the end of the Cold War, repatriation has become even more than before the most 
feasible solution for large refugee populations.9 The UNHCR’s refugee statistics for 
2003 showed how important it is to deal with the root causes of flight if the number of 
forced migrants is to be significantly reduced. The number of ‘people of concern’ to the 
UNHCR decreased from the end of 2002 to the end of 2003 with 18 percent, from 20.8 
million to 17.1 million people. A significant part of this decrease was made up by the 
repatriation of 644,917 Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran; 132,964 Angolan 
refugees from Zambia, the DRC, Namibia and Congo-Brazzaville; 82,067 Burundian 
refugees from Tanzania and the DRC; and smaller groups of returnees to Iraq, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and several other countries (UNHCR, 2004a: 86, 
table 16). Altogether almost 1,1 million refugees returned voluntarily in 2003. In 
comparison, 26,468 refugees were resettled from countries of first asylum in the same 
period (UNHCR, 2004a: 87, table 17).  
 
Afghani refugees constitute the world’s largest – and one of the world’s most protracted 
– refugee problems. Even after the repatriation wave of 2002-2003, 2,1 million refugees 
remained in camps in Pakistan and Iran at the end of 2003. The relative stability that has 
enabled forced migrants to return to Afghanistan and the two other main countries of 
repatriation, Angola and Burundi, is fragile and can easily be reversed. This leads us to 
the core question for humanitarian and development actors: how can they contribute to 
create conditions for peace and stability and ensure that repatriation is voluntary, well 
informed and durable? Hasty repatriation to insecurity does nothing for conflict 
resolution. On the contrary, it often leads to further forced migration in the future. 
Recommendations 
In order to be durable, repatriation of large populations of forced migrants must entail, 
first, conflict resolution, and second, post-conflict reconstruction, in the refugee sending 
country. Conflict resolution and prevention should therefore be at the top of donor 
countries’ list if they want to significantly reduce the global forced migration problem. 
Repatriation is only valuable for conflict resolution and peace building if it is 
sustainable. Secondary flows are harmful not only to the security of the forced migrants 
themselves, but also to development and conflict resolution initiatives. Aid agencies 
involved in refugee repatriation should ensure that returns are voluntary and based on 
accurate and honest information of the situation back home (information often difficult 
to come by in the refugee camps). This will increase the likelihood that repatriation is 
durable.  
 
                                                 
8 Almost two million Indo-Chinese refugees were resettled in the period between 1975 and 1997 
(Robinson, 1998: 295). 
9 Although from the point of view of individual protection, there will always be in situations of mass 
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2.3. Aid, Conflict and Forced Migration 
Considering the findings of Part One of the paper, and the discussion above of the 
importance of repatriation as the most desirable and politically feasible solution to 
forced migration flows, the focus of the following discussion is on how aid can 
contribute to resolving the root causes of flight and thereby ensure the durability of 
repatriation.  
 
The discussion is divided into four sections. The first section is concerned with the 
potential harmful effects of aid on the conflict and forced migration cycle. Following 
from that, the second section highlights the importance of concentrating long-term aid 
programmes on post-conflict societies to ensure that repatriation is durable and conflict 
does not reignite. The third section emphasises the importance of understanding 
economic development aid and humanitarian relief aid in the context of the political 
conditions in which aid programmes are pursued. Finally, the fourth section goes more 
into detail on what sort of aid is most conducive to conflict resolution and prevention 
and looks at the problem of coordination between different development and 
humanitarian relief actors. This discussion is based on the UNHCR’s recent Convention 
Plus initiatives.  
 
The question of coordination then leads us to the final discussion of this paper: the 
impact of non-aid factors on resolving the problems of violent conflicts, forced 
migration, weak states, poverty and inequality in the developing world.  
 
2.3.1. Principle Number One: Avoiding Harmful Effects of Aid 
The age of innocence for aid agencies has been over for a while. The idea that good 
intensions would by necessity lead to good results and that humanitarianism could 
somehow take place in a political vacuum have been abandoned. This is at least the case 
in theory – in academic articles and in humanitarian organisations’ own evaluation and 
research reports. In practice the same mistakes seem often to be repeated. There are 
good reasons for this: the situation on the ground is always more complex and fraught 
with ethical and political dilemmas than what research papers like this one are able to 
convey. In the case of humanitarian operations, decisions of life and death are often 
taken in a hurry and with limited information available to decision makers and strong 
pressure from the media and public to ‘do something’. In the case of development aid, 
the times when aid was donated with few strings attached to repressive regimes on the 
‘right’ side of the Cold War divide are fortunately over. However, development aid can 
still be controversial. For instance, decisions on where and when to spend aid funds can 
be made based on the donor’s previous investment of time and effort in a country 
instead of on the actual impact that an aid project has today.  
 
This section will look at a few cases where humanitarian and development aid has had 
harmful unintended consequences. The cases are discussed from the perspective of 
conflict resolution: if instead taking a purely humanitarian (saving lives of individuals) 
or developmental (alleviating poverty, inducing growth) perspective, the conclusions 
may well be different. This goes to show that incorporating conflict resolution and 
peace building as core objectives of humanitarian and developmental aid involves 
making some uncomfortable choices between humanitarian action (the achievement of 
which is easily measured, for instance in the number of mouths fed) and conflict 
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Case one: when aid contributes to starting war. Probably never in history has 
humanitarian aid been so directly involved in triggering war than in the case of the relief 
operation for Rwandan Hutu refugees in Zaire from 1994 to 1996.10 The failure lay in a 
combination of the refusal of political actors, particularly the Security Council 
permanent members and the Zairean government, to demilitarise the camps through the 
deployment of troops, and the humanitarian actors’ inability to take the political 
consequences of this inaction and withdraw from the militarised refugee camps. The 
UNHCR continued to fund the camps in the name of saving lives, instead of facing up 
to the fact that by not withdrawing it condemned civilian refugees to be virtual hostages 
of the militants and allowed humanitarian aid to be diverted to fund the rearming of the 
génocidaires.  
 
Lives were indeed saved in the short term, but the conditions were created for worse 
suffering in the future as the camps were (not surprisingly) overrun by Rwandan forces 
and Zairean rebels, and Zaire descended into civil war. The blame for this failure was as 
much at the feet of the Security Council and the Zairean government as it was on the 
humanitarian actors. However, it was a spectacular example of how bad a situation can 
turn when humanitarian action is not subsumed within a conflict prevention and 
resolution perspective. 
 
Case two: when aid fuels war. The Sudanese civil war is an example of aid fuelling war 
and doing so by providing support to one side of the conflict. Humanitarian 
organisations, particularly from the US and especially church based ones, have 
channelled aid into the territories held by the Southern Sudanese rebel organisations. 
Much of this aid has been siphoned off by rebel forces. Thus, while alleviating the 
humanitarian situation in southern Sudan, aid also became a significant factor in the war 
between the Christian, animist and black south against the Muslim north. Whether it is 
right or wrong to support the southern forces in their military struggle against the north, 
to do so in a veiled way, through the use of humanitarian resources, has had a negative 
impact on the perception of aid workers as impartial actors. This makes humanitarian 
work more dangerous, a trend that has been clear since the end of the Cold War 
(UNHCR, 1997: para 2).  
 
Case three: aid propping up weak, repressive and anti-developmental regimes. Food aid 
– feeding a country’s population when its own government is unable or unwilling to do 
so – can be problematic from the point of view of the longer term aims of strengthening 
state legitimacy and capacity, conflict resolution and peace building. Two examples of 
food aid contributing to propping up repressive regimes that pursue anti-developmental 
policies can be found in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. In the case of Ethiopia food aid has 
allowed the regime to continue spending significant amounts of its budget on the 
military, in its horrendously deadly conflict with Eritrea over dusty border towns. In 
Zimbabwe, deliberate government policies of rapid and chaotic displacement of 
commercial farmers and farm workers from the land, combined with bad rains, led to 
severe food shortages in a country that used to be able to feed its neighbours as well as 
itself. Massive food relief from the World Food Programme prevented starvation, but in 
the process it also insulated an increasingly undemocratic and repressive government 
from the consequences of its policies. To what degree the food aid has supported the 
government against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change is hard to 
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quantify, but it has certainly been a factor in keeping the regime in power despite its 
catastrophic economic policies.  
 
These two cases constitute moral dilemmas. After all it is not the fault of ordinary 
Ethiopians and Zimbabweans that their governments pursue policies that do not take the 
suffering of their own populations into due consideration. Should the international 
community punish them for their governments’ faults? However, from the longer term 
perspective of breaking the cycle of bad governance, repression, under-development, 
food crisis and forced migration, the answer may in some cases be that it is better for the 
donor community not to provide aid on conditions set by dysfunctional regimes.  
 
Recommendations
Recognise the need to make hard choices: The three cases above show that 
humanitarian and development actors often find themselves in situations of moral 
dilemmas. Too often they have hidden behind mantras of humanitarianism – the non-
political pursuit of saving as many lives as possible – instead of facing up to the 
political consequences of aid policies.  
 
Dare to choose the least bad option: the right decision is often no more than the least 
evil decision. And the least evil decision is not necessarily to continue development or 
humanitarian programmes. 
 
To delay a decision is to make a decision. The UNHCR’s hand wringing in the eastern 
DRC in 1994-96 is a case in point. 
 
Think long-term when making humanitarian relief decisions. This means taking into 
consideration the implications of aid on the political and security situation in the 
country. Is saving lives today leading to the prolongation of fighting in the long run? If 
so, what can be done to change this? 
 
Overall: development and relief aid are always political as well as humanitarian actions. 
If aid is to have the greatest possible impact on conflict prevention and resolution 
(rather than focusing solely on feeding the hungry), more responsibility and pressure 
must be placed on aid recipients to take care of their own population.  
 
2.3.2. Principle Number Two: Focus on Post-Conflict Societies in a Long-Term 
Perspective 
The discussion above of how the first priority of aid policies must be to avoid harmful 
side effects touched on the necessity for emergency relief agencies to look beyond the 
immediate needs of a recipient population to the longer-term political effects of 
humanitarian aid. It is equally necessary for development actors to think long-term. The 
effect of sustained development efforts is particularly significant in societies emerging 
from the destruction of war. No country is as much at risk of descending into civil war 
as one that has recently emerged from one (Collier, 2003: 83). Research shows that aid 
can be crucial for breaking the conflict cycle if sustained over the first ten years after the 
end of fighting. More importantly, while capacity to absorb aid is weak in the first 
couple of years, it increases thereafter, making the potential positive impact of aid on 
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In contrast to these findings, in practice aid levels tend to diminish as the humanitarian 
crisis is over and the situation becomes one of ‘development policies as usual’. In other 
words, just at the time when aid could be the most effective in preventing conflict, it is 
reduced. This is not a problem of understanding, since the importance of sustained post-
conflict reconstruction is by now generally accepted. It is instead a question of political 
will among donors: to withstand the pressure of leaping from one high-profile 
emergency to another and in so doing forgetting the less spectacular post-conflict 
reconstruction phase. The propensity towards short-term humanitarianism instead of 
longer-term development may pose a serious challenge for conflict prevention and 
refugee return in Afghanistan. A combination of diplomatic and political pressure, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reintegration and reconstruction policies are 
necessary to keep the country on track to political stability and economic growth – thus 
enabling returnees to stay and refugees and IDPs to return home and contribute to 
building the country.  
 
Political and economic governance are usually in bad shape when a country emerges 
from widespread communal violence or civil war. While weak states and illegitimate 
governments are often a cause for internal conflict, fighting exacerbates the conditions 
that made conflict likely in the first place. In order to break the conflict cycle, 
development aid must therefore be geared towards strengthening state institutions and 
capacity, not just poverty alleviation and economic development. The next section will 
show that this is easier said than done. Furthermore, other policies, such as diplomatic 
efforts, trade and investment from foreign countries and the economic policies and 
political conduct of the aid recipient government itself, will always be more important 
than aid in ensuring stability and prosperity. But humanitarian and development aid 
plays an important part, especially when working to bolstering positive trends and 
alleviating conditions that threaten to reignite old grievances and disaffection. 
Recommendations: 
If development aid is to promote not just economic growth but also peace building and 
conflict resolution: 
 
Pay particular attention to post-conflict countries when deciding on aid allocations. 
Ensure that aid levels are sustained at least through the first decade of post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
Ensure that aid is geared towards good governance, institution building and political 
reform. How this can be done leads us to the next section of the relationship between 
politics and economics and in particular the use of aid conditionalities to promote 
political reform.  
 
2.3.3. Principle Number Three: The Link Between Economic Development and 
Political Reform 
Despite billions of dollars of aid money allocated over the past decades11, many 
developing countries, particularly on the African continent, have fallen behind the rest 
                                                 
11 Net flows of Official Development Assistance to developing countries from the Development 
Assistance Committee members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) constituted over US$ 52 billion in 2001. US$ 13.9 billion of this went to sub-Saharan Africa. 
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of the world in terms of economic growth. In some African countries living standards 
have decreased since independence. Some of the countries that received the most aid are 
still among the world’s poorest today. This has led to a debate in the last ten to fifteen 
years on the efficacy of aid in creating development. One aspect of this debate has been 
the role of political factors in creating the conditions for development. Part One of this 
paper showed how economic factors alone cannot explain why violent conflict breaks 
out. Instead, poverty and lack of economic growth work together with social divisions 
and weak, inefficient and often corrupt political institutions to create ripe conditions for 
violence. Conflict, again, steeps the country further in underdevelopment. A clearer 
understanding of this vicious cycle has led governments of developing countries and 
donor states alike to sign up to the argument that development aid should not only be 
spent on economic development, but should also fund measures to improve governance, 
social cohesion and state institution building in weak and troubled aid recipient 
countries. 
 
But is development aid the best way in which to pursue liberal democratic political 
reform (which is what the ‘good governance’ agenda is all about)? Can donor money 
have an impact on the complex political processes of democratisation? Or is democracy 
aid so difficult that the money is better spent on more traditional goals such as education 
and health care?  
 
One problem with democratisation aid is that it is hard to measure the impact of projects 
aimed at supporting democratic institutions and practices, particularly in the short term. 
These projects fit badly into the mould that donor states have created in recent years, 
where strong emphasis is placed on aid effectiveness and efficiency, and where specific 
targets and continuous evaluation is incorporated into development programmes. An 
annual review of whether, say, ‘the judiciary has become more independent’ in 
Mozambique, would probably not yield much result. This is even more the case with 
donor funds, particularly from the EU, spent on promoting governance through regional 
institutions such as the African Union or the Southern African Development 
Community. Regionalism is a particularly slow-moving and difficult process. Does this 
mean that aid money to regional organisations is a waste because the result over the 
short-term is negligible?  
 
An important part of democratisation is to strengthen civil society, labour unions, the 
media, opposition parties, and other non-state actors, in order to increase political 
pluralism and establish checks on unlimited government power. A lot of the donor funds 
for democratisation and political governance projects have hence circumvented 
government ministries and focused on non-state actors. This concentration on 
strengthening ‘civil society’ often hides the fact that in many developing states, the 
problem of economic development and political stability is not that the state is too 
strong, but that it is too weak. It is true that many governments of developing countries 
are too strong, in the sense that they dominate the field of politics and that political and 
economic favours are doled out on the basis of political loyalties. However, a bigger 
problem, compounding that of governments being too strong, is the fact that the state 
institutions over which these governments preside are too weak and frail. In the least 
developed countries, the state has little capacity for policy development; often a very 
weak tax basis and ineffective tax collection system; and sometimes its authority stops 
not many kilometres outside the capital. Local government usually has even less 




DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Thematic Paper III: The Relationship Between Underdevelopment, Conflict and Forced Migration 
 
 
The weakness of political institutions – the structures of the state – such as the 
bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the legislature – is what allows governments to become 
too dominant. Seen from this perspective, donors’ emphases on ‘supporting civil 
society’; laying the basis for multi-party politics; bettering the conditions for opposition 
parties, funding an independent media; and generally focusing on strengthening the non-
state sectors of society; are easily perceived by governments in developing countries as 
attempting to undermine the authority of the state. This perception is compounded by 
the fact that the relationship between civil society groups and the state in many 
developing countries is weak and often fraught with mutual suspicion. In Southern 
Africa, for instance, many civil society organisations are accused by governments of 
pursuing the agendas of foreign powers, because they are funded almost exclusively by 
overseas donors. Democratisation aid, then, is a sensitive issue, fraught with questions 
of sovereignty and non-interference.  
 
The political and economic governance record of recipient countries has become 
increasingly important for how donors allocate aid. For instance, the European Union 
and the United States have suspended bilateral aid arrangements with the Zimbabwean 
government. Denmark has gone the furthest in imposing conditionalities and – more 
importantly – following them up by withdrawing aid if the conditions are not met. 
DANIDA withdrew the status of core co-operating partner not only from Zimbabwe, 
but also from Malawi, in 2002. Zambia, another of DANIDA’s programme countries, 
received warning that its political situation would be followed closely after the 
contested 2001 election, while three other African programme countries have had their 
aid levels reduced due to Danish disapproval of certain policies or developments.12
 
While the utmost should be done to ensure that aid money is well spent, there are 
problems with making political governance a conditionality of aid. One problem is 
excessive rigidity when setting the standards for development partners. Democratisation 
is a long and difficult process, which sometimes stops and starts and where it is possible 
to enjoy great progress in some areas and setbacks in others. Mozambique, for instance, 
is doing very well in some fields of democratisation, such as the holding of substantially 
free and fair elections and the adherence to term limits for heads of state and 
government. But the country is struggling in fields such as corruption among state 
officials and organised crime. Should donors ‘punish’ Mozambique for this failure or 
encourage it for the things that it does right? If Mozambique were to be punished, would 
this not weaken the democratisation process rather than strengthen it?  
 
 A second, and politically sensitive, problem is the danger of arbitrariness when a donor 
decides which countries are ‘worthy’ of aid and which ones are not. Too much room is 
allowed for political expediency to determine the fate of a development partner. Why 
should Malawi be taken off the list of Denmark’s ‘programme countries’ while 
Bangladesh, the world’s most corrupt country, according to the 2003 Transparency 
International corruption perception index, is not punished? The determination of aid 
policy out of political consideration has not disappeared with the Cold War. This is best 
seen in some of the United States’ decisions after 11 September 2001. The lifting of 
sanctions and increase of aid to Pakistan had little to do with improvements in that 
                                                 
12 Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Development Policy: Bilateral Assistance’, from the 
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country’s governance standards and much more to do with its assistance in the US ‘War 
on Terror’. 
Recommendations 
For development aid to promote good governance, the respect for human rights and 
conflict prevention, the following recommendations are made: 
The virtue of modesty and patience: The fact that the effect of democracy aid is difficult 
to assess is not an argument against providing aid to bolster democracy. However, 
expectations must be placed at the right, modest level and projects must be sustained 
over time if they are to have any effect. 
 
Transaction costs: Since evaluating democratisation aid is difficult, ways must be found 
to administer such programmes in a sensible way. Otherwise the transaction costs for 
the recipients of these funds, in the form of reporting, evaluating and attempting to 
measure impact, become excessively high and the money might be better spent in other 
sectors such as healthcare. 
 
Ownership: Developing countries rather than donors should drive the development 
agenda. Today, many developing countries in their eagerness to receive donor money 
pursue a disconnected and ad hoc development agenda, by unquestioningly taking 
aboard aid projects hatched in a variety of donor countries.  
 
Capacity building: Due to point three above as well as in the general interest of 
strengthening state institutions, aid money is well spent on capacity building. Training 
civil servants in areas such as project management and policy research, and promoting 
more efficient governance through, for instance, helping set in place robust systems for 
tax collection, makes developing states more able to help themselves. Equally 
important, they become better equipped to formulate a proactive development agenda, 
where donors are asked to contribute to realising a comprehensive and cohesive 
development plan.  
 
Donor coordination: Part of developing countries’ problem of putting in place coherent, 
long-term development plans into which donors can opt is that different donor countries 
do not coordinate their actions and plans well enough.  
 
Sensitivity: Because of the political intrusiveness and the infringements on national 
sovereignty involved in focusing development aid on democracy, human rights and 
political governance, donors needs to show strong sensitivity in the way they disperse 
this aid – both when it comes to whom it is given to and how it is given.  
 
Use conditionalities with care. In principle, good governance conditionality is good, but 
it must be used with discretion and political understanding. Setting up rigid criteria and 
benchmarks is counterproductive. Monitoring a country’s adherence to good 
governance standards should be about assessing a process rather than taking a snapshot. 
The question the donor should ask itself when determining aid levels to a particular 
country, is not whether points A, B and C on the list of conditions are met, according to 
some quantifiable measure, but whether the country is in general moving in the right 
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clearly and with a great sense of purpose and will, moving in the wrong direction, then 
reducing aid is the right thing to do.  
 
Avoid the wrong kind of conditionalities: A type of conditionality that is conducive 
neither to economic development nor peace building is that of tied aid. Aid given on 
condition that, for instance, certain contractors from the donor country are used, or that 
involves the dumping of agricultural surpluses, does more for the development of the 
donor country than of the aid recipient. It creates dependency rather than reinforcing 
local coping mechanisms, building local capacities, and supporting the aid recipients 
own national agenda for development. 
 
2.3.4. Principle Number Four: Coordination and Bridging the Relief-Development 
Gap 
The three previous principles concern a general framework for harnessing development 
and humanitarian aid to the aim of strengthening governance and resolving conflicts in 
the developing world. This section looks at the particulars of aid policies within this 
framework. The main question in this regard is how to coordinate and overlap the 
different stages of aid as a situation moves from humanitarian emergency through 
repatriation, reintegration, reconstruction, and finally, development as usual. The 
discussion focuses on the UNHCR’s Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees 
and Persons of Concern, developed in 2003 in support of the agency’s Agenda for 
Protection and Convention Plus initiatives. These initiatives came out of the Global 
Consultations started by the then new High Commissioner, Ruud Lubbers, in 2001, on 
the fiftieth anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The aim of the Global 
Consultations was to get states to recommit to the principles of the Refugee Convention 
while ensuring that these principles were interpreted in ways conducive to the 
conditions of the 21st century. In an environment of increasing hostility to refugees and 
asylum seekers in the western world, an important incentive behind the development of 
new initiatives for durable solutions was to find ways of curbing asylum flows to the 
West and containing forced migration movements in their regions of origin.  
 
The Framework for Durable Solutions is UNHCR’s main attempt at adapting the 
Convention’s three tools for solutions – local integration, resettlement and repatriation – 
to today’s conditions. However, it mostly ignores resettlement and concentrates on 
repatriation. It is particularly concerned with bridging the relief-development divide. 
The framework has three components: 1) Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR); 
2) Development through Local Integration (DLI); and Repatriation, Reintegration, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs). They have in common the aim of ‘redoubling 
the search for durable solutions’ through sharing burdens and building capacity between 
countries and between humanitarian actors (UNHCR, 2004). They are called 
‘Convention Plus’ activities because they are meant to ‘top up’ existing protection and 
solution tools set out in the 1951 Convention.  
 
Unlike the Convention, the Framework for Durable Solutions explicitly recognises the 
relationship between forced migration, development and conflict: ‘Hosting refugee 
populations for protracted periods have long-term economic and social impact that, if 
not adequately addressed, can create conflictual situations and insecurity’ (UNHCR, 
2003: 4). It also acknowledges the importance of post-conflict reconstruction as a 
precondition for durable repatriation and recognises the challenges in this regard of the 
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incorporated into transition and recovery plans of governments and humanitarian 
agencies, thus heightening the risk of ‘back flows’ of recently returned refugees back 
into exile. 
 
Thus, the Convention Plus framework takes into consideration many of the problems 
and challenges discussed in this paper. It constitutes an important step forward in the 
quest for holistic approaches to dealing with the root causes of flight and breaking the 
conflict and forced migration cycle. And UNHCR is not alone in attempting to clarify 
responsibilities, increase coordination, foster seamless transitions from emergency to 
development aid, and work to ensure that both humanitarian and development aid work 
towards the overall goal of conflict resolution and peace building (see e.g. Wood, 2001). 
This has been an overall concern of the UN family as a whole, including the UNDP, the 
World Bank and OCHA.13 Bilateral donors are also working out similar frameworks, 
such as the EU’s ‘Linking Relief, rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). In 2003, 
UNHCR became member of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in order 
to strengthen co-operation between humanitarian, refugee and development agencies 
within the United Nations family. 
 
This section will concentrate on the efforts of the UNHCR. It describes briefly the three 
components of the Framework for Durable Solutions and comes up with 
recommendations for how this framework can be followed up – although it is too early 
to make bombastic conclusions on how well the Framework will work in practice. 
Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) 
The aim of DAR is to provide development assistance in refugee hosting regions for the 
following aims: to improve burden sharing for countries hosting large numbers of 
refugees; and to promote a better quality of life and self-reliance for refugees and host 
population alike pending durable solutions to the refugee situation (UNHCR, 2003). 
DAR is not a durable solution to refugee flight, but is linked to the quest discussed 
earlier in this paper of tackling the negative impact of forced migration on development 
and conflict. It does this in two ways. First, by targeting development aid to refugee 
hosting areas, it lessens the risk that mass movements of refugees lead to environmental 
destruction, economic crisis and political tension.14 This is especially important in the 
cases of forced migration movements where the prospects for voluntary and safe 
repatriation in the short to medium term are slim. DAR should thus help limit the 
contagion of instability that forced migration movements sometimes bring. Second, 
DAR is also important for the success of repatriation, local integration or resettlement: 
A refugee who has led a productive and meaningful life in exile is much more likely to 
have the resourcefulness, capacity and confidence necessary to successfully embark on 
a new stage of life. DAR thus helps ensure that forced migration solutions are durable.  
 
The approach for DAR projects is to build broad partnerships between governments, 
humanitarian agencies and multilateral and bilateral development organisations. The co-
operation and commitment of host governments are crucial for DAR to succeed. 
Incentives from donors to host governments are particularly important in this regard. 
                                                 
13 E.g. UNDP is in the process of creating a tool for ‘Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA)’ in 
order to review its existing programmes in terms of their potential to inadvertently fuel social and 
economic inequalities and to develop new programmes that can directly contribute to conflict prevention.  
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Host governments seldom prioritise refugee hosting areas, since refugees are not voters 
and the places where they settle are often remotely located. Without the necessary 
enthusiasm and commitment from host governments DAR is unlikely to work. UNHCR 
therefore emphasises the need for host government leadership and ownership of the 
process. 
 
The envisioned execution of DAR relies heavily on co-operation and coordination 
between a variety of actors. The stages of DAR include: 
 
• Consensus building through consultative process led by government; 
• Setting up an Operational Information Management system to map who is 
doing what where, and what the existing coping mechanisms of refugees are; 
• Jointly plan an integrated strategy, coordinated by government; 
• Agree on resource mobilisation strategy, led by government, to fund the 
DAR programme; 
• Systematically promote refugees on the development agenda and place DAR 
within the existing development framework for the country.  
Development through Local Integration (DLI) 
DLI builds on DAR, and is considered an option – when host governments and host 
communities concur – for facilitating the local integration of refugees as a durable 
solution. The components of DLI are very similar to DAR, with the addition that they 
include changing the legal status of refugees, gradually granting them the same rights 
and entitlements as the local population with the ultimate aim of acquiring citizenship. 
Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs) 
The 4Rs programme framework is, simply stated, a framework for bridging the relief-
development gap in post-conflict situations through structured collaboration between 
government, UN and bilateral development and humanitarian agencies. It focuses 
particularly on ensuring the sustainability of the repatriation of forced migrants. The 
aim is to achieve the necessary levels of development and good governance to ensure 
that conflict does not re-erupt and renewed flight takes place. As in the case with DAR, 
the need for integrated planning between all actors involved is stressed. According to 
the UNHCR, the critical factors for 4Rs projects to succeed are: 
 
• ownership by host governments of the processes which the 4Rs concept 
embodies; 
• integrated planning process at the country level by the UN Country Team; 
• strong institutional cooperation and commitment to support punctually and 
at decisive moments, the needs and efforts of country teams to bridge 
essential gaps in transition strategies; and 
• participation of the plethora of actors who form part of the development 
community – UN agencies bilateral and multilateral institutions (UNHCR, 
2003: 18). 
 
The idea is to plan 4Rs as a package, so that UNHCR does not embark on repatriation 
(the first R) before the other parts of the package are also planned. The responsibilities 
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process. UNHCR would be involved in activities around the first, and partly the second, 
R (repatriation and reintegration). Development agencies would gradually phase in from 
the second R onwards. Pilot 4Rs projects are currently underway in Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, the first having started in 2002. 
Recommendations 
The UNHCR Framework for Durable Solutions is an important step in the right 
direction and should be supported by DFID. 
 
While the emphasis on coordination and integration efforts in the 4Rs, DAR and DLI 
frameworks is right and necessary, the challenge remains to find the political will and 
the practical means with which to realise this ideal. Coordination between UN agencies, 
other aid organisations, bilateral donors, refugee hosts, and repatriation states is crucial 
for aid to constitute a significant factor in breaking the conflict and forced migration 
cycle. Despite this, inter-agency rivalry remains rampant on the ground, as the response 
to the complex humanitarian emergency in Darfur has shown. Rather than creating more 
such frameworks for co-operation and coordination, then, emphasis in the next years 
should be on making them work. 
 
Generally, DFID-sponsored development programmes in post-conflict societies must 
take refugees and returnees into consideration in their planning, and DFID-sponsored 
emergency operations for forced migrants should be executed with the long-term 
development of the refugee hosting and refugee sending region in mind. 
 
The desirability of refugee self-reliance. DFID should encourage the development of aid 
projects that enable host countries to allow refugees to become useful economic actors 
rather than a drain on the economy and a burden for social and political cohesion. This 
in particular means to discourage the creation of large refugee camps as holding centres 
with no opportunity for educational or vocational activities and provide incentives for 
host states to integrate refugees closer into the local economy and society. This is 
important both for development and stability in host regions and, when that time comes, 
for the durability of solutions.  
 
While repatriation is the preferred solutions, this should not be taken as an excuse not to 
deal with the political, social and economic problems in areas hosting long-term refugee 
populations. Refugee hosting areas of a country are often the poorest, most remote parts 
of the country. Development programmes should take these areas into particular 
consideration in their planning.  
 
Adding to this, while resettlement cannot be the main solution to mass movements of 
forced migrants, the option of the strategic use of resettlement should be kept open in 
the name of burden sharing and decreasing instability in refugee hosting areas. It is 
difficult for western government aid agencies like DFID to promote local integration 
and repatriation in developing countries, if their own country is reluctant to take in 
refugees themselves.  
  
Transitional periods are volatile and unpredictable, and each post-conflict situation is 
unique. Donor funding should be correspondingly flexible to enable humanitarian and 
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Following from point (7) above, tempo is equally important to flexibility. The many 
different actors involved in the task of sustaining the cessation of violence and building 
lasting peace are not always in sufficient hurry to stay on top of a fast-moving ball. 
Often well-intended initiatives are implemented too late for them to have a positive 
impact – events have passed them by (Richards, 2004). 
 
2.4. Non-Aid Factors Contributing to Resolving Forced Migration and Violent 
Conflicts 
Development aid alone will not create the high economic growth and poverty alleviation 
necessary to escape the quagmire of underdevelopment. Good governance, fairer terms 
of trade and increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment have a considerably stronger 
influence on economic performance. Diplomatic pressure, and even military 
intervention, as recently exemplified by actions in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, can 
have an enormous impact on conflict resolution and the possibility for forced migrants 
to return – although the risk of such interventions going awry is high. 
 
2.4.1. Trade and Subsidies  
If economic development is indeed the long-term key to achieving peace and stability, 
development aid is not the main tool with which to achieve this. According to the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (2003), ‘abolishing OECD agricultural subsidies 
would provide developing countries with potential export revenues worth three times 
their current ODA receipts.’ The Cancun round of World Trade Organisation 
negotiations highlighted the plight of cotton producers in the developing world, 
producing high quality cotton at a lower cost than the US, but being beaten in the 
market place due to American government subsidies. As discussed earlier in this paper, 
development aid may have a significant impact on the prospects for lasting peace and 
the durable repatriation of forced migrants in the transitional period of post-conflict 
reconstruction. But the general idea of preventing conflicts and forced migration in the 
longer term through development and poverty alleviation forces us to think holistically: 
Responsible and responsive government in developing countries combined with fairer 
trade policies and more investment from the rich world will go much further in creating 
the necessary growth. 
 
The issue of terms of trade brings us back to the question of building partnerships 
between donor countries and aid recipient countries. Many developing countries object 
that aid is more like a one-way stream of paternalistic charitability, thinly camouflaging 
the self-interested economic policies of donor countries and doing more for the ‘feel 
good factor’ among the public in rich countries than for poverty alleviation in poor 
ones. India has decided not to accept development aid at all. This image could be 
remedied if the developed world focused less on aid, and more on other factors that 
promote development – particularly trade, but also migration. While bad governance is 
a hindrance to economic growth, it is also the case that economic sluggishness is a 
hindrance to democracy and good governance. The Economist (2003) wrote that: 
 
“A new analysis by the World Bank, published in its Global Economic 
Prospects on September 3rd, suggests that an ambitious, though achievable, 
reduction of trade barriers in the Doha round could boost global income by 
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would go to poor countries. By 2015, the World Bank reckons, a successful 
Doha round could lift 144m people out of poverty.” 
 
Some of these trade barriers are between developing countries, and it is up to these 
countries themselves, through regional agreements, to get rid of them. But if Europe and 
North America were to get rid of agricultural subsidies, which do not only hurt African 
producers, but are also costly to Western consumers, this would show that donor 
countries (not just their aid organisations) are serious about growth and poverty 
alleviation in the developing world. 
 
The African development plan, NEPAD, is a case in point. While NEPAD and other 
documents guiding Africa’s relationships with the West such as the Cairo Declaration 
(OAU/EU, 2000) stress the importance of trade and investment, the North has chosen to 
focus mainly on the political governance elements of these documents. In other words, 
the North is focusing on issues within its African partnerships that are the responsibility 
of African states to do something about, while largely ignoring issues such as 
agricultural subsidies that it is their own responsibility to do something about. Clearly it 
is much harder for Northern countries to agree on the issue of agricultural subsidies than 
the benefits of good political governance, but the focus on the internal affairs of African 
states rather than on the obligations that the North itself has entered into, nevertheless 
creates bad feelings among African states.  
Recommendations 
DFID must work together, not at cross-purposes, with the Department of Trade and 
Industry.  
 
DFID should be a champion of trade liberalisation, the abolition of agricultural 
subsidies in the EU and fairer terms of trade. Britain should build alliances with like-
minded countries within the EU who are ready to challenge the community’s 
agricultural lobbies. 
 
DFID should encourage and fund capacity building programmes which train 
Departments of Trade and Industry in developing countries to negotiate in complex fora 
like the WTO’s Doha round. 
 
 2.4.2. Military Intervention: Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping and Policing 
This paper has so far ignored one of the most important tools for resolving conflicts: 
military action. Such action can take the form of military observers, peacekeepers, 
peace enforces, or outright invasion in order to oust a repressive and refugee creating 
regime. This is not the place for a detailed account of the pros and cons of military 
humanitarian intervention. However, in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Liberia, the DRC, and Burundi, military action by outsiders in one form or another has 
been a crucial part in resolving, containing or preventing refugee producing conflicts in 
recent years. Furthermore, the lack of military action to demilitarise the refugee camps 
in eastern Zaire in the mid-1990s turned out to be disastrous.  
 
Military intervention of a coercive, Chapter Seven, kind, is highly contentious, not least 
after the troubled aftermath of the US-British invasion of Iraq in 2003. Chapter Six type 
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sent, are less controversial, but often struggle to fulfil their mandates effectively. Such 
peacekeeping missions often struggle with badly trained soldiers, lack of equipment, or 
mandates ill-suited to conditions on the ground. Often the UN Security Council 
authorises Chapter Six or Chapter Seven action only for long delays to set in as member 
countries are reluctant to come up with the necessary troops, equipment and funding for 
the operation to be launched.  
 
One recent answer to this problem has been to look towards regional organisations to 
take on some of the peace and security role of the UN in their own back yards. Some 
donors have developed programmes to strengthen developing countries’ capacity to 
launch their own military peacekeeping and peace building operations, rather than 
having to rely on the armed forces of their former colonial mother countries. Denmark’s 
Africa Programme for Peace (DANIDA, 2004) is an interesting effort to support the 
military conflict prevention and resolution capacity of African regional organisations, 
mainly the African Union. In June, the G8 promised to train as many as 75,000 
peacekeepers from the developing world (Economist, 2004). While these efforts are 
commendable and should be continued, it is unlikely that war-ridden regions in Africa 
can manage without the help of Western military powers for at least the next ten to 
fifteen years. 
Recommendations 
Support the building of regional peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building 
capacity in conflict-prone regions, but do not use this as an excuse for Britain not to 
take part in such operations itself, if occasions should occur such as the one in Sierra 
Leone. 
 
In the least developed countries, civil war is usually a low-tech affair with ill-trained 
and ill-disciplined soldiers. Western military powers can make a big difference with few 
means, usually in the role of peacekeepers but sometimes even as peace enforcers. 
While each case must be judged on its own merit and a UN Security Council mandate 
should be sought, DFID should consider advocating Western peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement action in situations where: one, neighbours in the developing world are 
unable or unwilling to act; two, when they can support interventions by regional 
organisations; three, when innumerable lives can be solved; or, four, when conflicts can 
be contained or re-eruption of conflicts can be stifled through relatively small but timely 
arrivals of elite forces.  
 
 
3. CONCLUSION  
 
This study has investigated the links between conflict and forced migration, and the 
relationship between the two and poverty, underdevelopment, economic inequality, and 
weak and illegitimate polities. It further looked at how development and relief aid 
programmes impact on the conditions that cause conflict and forced migration, focusing 
on both positive and negative consequences of aid. The discussion included 
recommendations for donors such as DFID as to how emergency aid, reconstruction aid 
and development aid can be used to deal with the causes of forced migration. The paper 
concluded by warning that overseas development aid alone is unlikely to have a 
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peacekeeping, peace enforcement, trade and investment policies are equally, and often 
more, important than aid when it comes to dealing with the vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment, economic inequality, violent conflict and forced migration.  
 
Development and humanitarian assistance should therefore not only be made more 
sensitive to conflict situations but should also be seen as a complement to donors’ 
foreign, economic and trade policies, as well as be used to promote good economic 
practices and strong and responsive state institutions within the recipient country. The 
aim, then, is for forced migration and development assistance to be viewed as a truly 
holistic endeavour: It is not enough to view different types of assistance in relation to 
each other and to be sensitive to the relief-development gap. It is equally important to 
take an inter-departmental holistic view of the interconnectedness of aid, trade, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper examines the relationship between forced migration and the security of host 
states and regions. Forced migration has always had security implications. From the 
emergence of the early forced migration regime following the First World War, to its 
codification after the Second World War, through the Cold War, and into the post-Cold 
War era, the forced displacement of persons has always resulted in security concerns for 
receiving states. As such, the paper argues that policy responses have traditionally been 
motivated primarily by such security concerns, with legal, humanitarian and 
development considerations coming second. 
 
Such policy responses have, in turn, been shaped by the prevailing international political 
climate. During the Cold War, forced migration constituted one of the central foreign 
policy concerns of US and Western foreign policies. So-called “refugee warriors” 
received generous support from patron governments as part of the logic of proxy wars. 
The end of the Cold War has brought new salience to the issue, as the changing nature 
of conflict, the expanding number of displaced persons and the changing priorities of 
Western states affected the response to the security implications of forced migrations. 
This new operational and political environment directly affected UNHCR’s response to 
such situations, expanding its activities to a wider array of beneficiaries and in a new 
range of contexts previously understood to be beyond its mandate. 
 
Protection failures in such operations as Rwanda and Bosnia, however, led to 
disillusionment with these new responses. New conceptualisations of and responses to 
the security implications of forced migration were proposed, including the notion of 
‘human security’ and the ‘ladder of options’ approach. On-going multilateral 
discussions on the topic highlight the enduring dissatisfaction with the new approaches, 
and the continued need for an effective and comprehensive understanding of insecurity 
resulting from refugee movements and other forms of forced migration. 
 
A review of the literature on forced migration and security over the past decade reveals 
similar shortcomings. Early literature in the area had a limited understanding of the 
nature of security, while more recent literature remains preoccupied with the concerns 
and responses of Western states and the security dimensions of mass influx situations.  
 
In contrast, this paper argues that the security implications of forced migration are best 
understood – and addressed – in the context of protracted refugee situations, the reality 
for the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugees. Such situations result in both 
direct security concerns – stemming from the spill-over of violence and the 
militarization of refugee populations – and indirect concerns – stemming from local 
grievances towards assisted refugee populations and the perception of the presence of 
refugees as an unending burden on the host state and community. The paper concludes 
by detailing elements of a necessary response to these concerns, including the 
separation of armed elements, targeted assistance to address local grievances, the 
development of local capacity to ensure protection and durable solutions and the 
formulation of comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO DFID 
 
• DFID should be especially concerned with the security implications of forced 
migration as it has a direct impact on well-being for both displaced persons and 
host communities. 
 
• DFID’s response to the security implications of forced migration must be 
mindful of the causes of nature of displacement, the mixed character of refugee 
camp populations, the political and military abuse of camps, the location of 
refugee camps in insecure border regions, the weak rule of law in refugee camps 
and the negative economic and security impact of these camps on local 
communities. 
 
• DFID should understand that recent proposals to ‘regionalise’ asylum, through 
the establishment of ‘zones of protection’, will increase the burdens borne by 
host states in regions of refugee origin, compound their security concerns, and 
lead to increased reluctance to host refugees. As such, DFID should engage in 
cross-departmental dialogue to ensure that its understanding of conditions in 
host countries are fully communicated to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
the Home Office and the Cabinet Office. 
 
• DFID needs to work towards a strengthened multilateral regime which has the 
mandate, capacity and resources to meet current unmet refugee needs in a more 
impartial and effective manner. 
 
• DFID’s policy approach to refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs must include a 
thorough consideration of protracted refugee situations, as such situations are 
no less dangerous sources of instability and no less greater threat to well-being 
than more conventional security threats at a local and national level. 
 
• In the short term, DFID’s programmes in host countries should include a 
consideration of how directed assistance to refugee populated areas can 
alleviate local feelings of grievance towards refugee populations, thereby 
fostering greater local security and well-being.  
 
• DFID should examine the Firewood Project in Kenya and the range of Special 
Programmes in Refugee Affected Areas in Tanzania and in other host countries 
to assess what elements of these programmes may be mainstreamed into 
DFID’s country programmes and replicated in other host countries. 
 
• Such analysis should recognise the double benefit of directed assistance: such 
programmes can foster an environment of greater security and protection for 
refugees and the local population, while also contributing to broader national 
development objectives and the alleviation of poverty in refugee hosting 
communities. 
 
• DFID should take leadership within the development community to formulate 
and implement such development-related projects, in partnership with UNHCR, 
but in recognition of UNHCR’s core mandate to protect refugees and find 
solutions to their plight.  
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• DFID should consider how its involvement in security sector reform should 
include training and capacity building for national security services to 
implement host-state obligations as articulated by UN Security Council 
resolution 1208 (1998) and Executive Committee (ExCom) Conclusion 94. 
 
• DFID should consider how its involvement in democratization and the 
promotion of good governance in host countries can prevent the rise of anti-
refugee sentiment present in many transition states, leading to grievance-driven 
insecurity.  
 
• In the medium term, DFID’s programmes should include initiatives to increase 
the protection capacity of host states, enhance the rule of law in refugee 
populated areas, and expand the capacity and access of national NGOs to 
refugee programmes. 
 
• To this end, DFID should ensure that its representatives in host countries are 
engaged in the refugee situation and aware of the potential contribution of 
development initiatives in addressing security concerns. 
 
• In the long term, DFID should play a leading technical and political role in the 
formulation of comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations by 
contributing to the enhancement of the three durable solutions for refugees.  
 
• To support repatriation, DFID’s activities in countries of origin should 
incorporate the preconditions for successful return and reintegration of both 
refugees and IDPs, including local and regional post conflict reconstruction 
programmes, rehabilitation of former combatants, and income generation 
programmes in support of demobilization. 
 
• To support local integration, DFID should politically engage with host states to 
consider the modalities of this solution, target development assistance to refugee 
populated areas, support the rehabilitation of former refugee camps and 
settlements, and support self-sufficiency initiatives for locally integrated 
refugees. 
 
• To support third-country resettlement, DFID should encourage the 
consolidation and future development of the UK’s fledgling refugee resettlement 
programme. 
 
• More generally, DFID should contribute its unique perspective to see how these 
three solutions can work in combination to form comprehensive solutions to 
protracted refugee situations. 
 
• DFID, along with other stakeholders in the international system, needs to 
address how the UN should respond to the problems of state incapacity, 
including protracted refugee situations, and how to empower regional bodies to 
assist in meeting this challenge. 
 
 5
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Thematic Paper IV:  Security and Forced Migration 
• DFID is particularly well-situated to foster sustained dialogue on the 
development of a cross-departmental policy agenda that extends beyond 
conventional boundaries and seeks to integrate the resolution of chronic and 
recurring regional refugee problems with economic development and security 
issues, both in host countries and countries of origin. 
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1. BACKGROUND TO FORCED MIGRATION AND SECURITY 
 
Forced migration has always had security implications. International political concern 
for refugees first emerged after World War I when mass flows from Russia and Balkan 
states heightened inter-state tensions and threatened the security of European states. 
These refugee crises became protracted affairs that surpassed the capacity of 
humanitarian agencies and individual states to resolve them on their own. Consequently, 
an international framework of institutions and agreements, a nascent international 
refugee regime, was created to deal with this contentious issue. Following the end of the 
Second World War, the current international refugee regime emerged in reaction to the 
security threat posed to the fragile European state system by some 12 million displaced 
persons. (Loescher, 2001: Chapters 2 and 3)  
 
1.1. Forced Migration and Security During the Cold War 
During the Cold War, forced migration constituted one of the central concerns of US 
and Western foreign policies. (Loescher and Scanlan, 1986; Zolberg et al., 1989) 
Refugees were seen as part of the global struggle between East and West. Refugees 
fleeing communism were portrayed as “voting with their feet”. In the interest of 
exploiting the ideological and public relations benefits of such movements, the West 
responded through generous burden sharing and resettlement schemes. During the late 
1970s and 1980s, the Indo-Chinese exodus in Southeast Asia, the flow of Afghan 
refugees into Iran and Pakistan, the exodus from Central America, and the Angolan and 
Mozambican refugee situations in Southern Africa and those in the Horn of Africa all 
had significant security dimensions. In regions of intense superpower conflict and 
competition, refugees were armed and their military struggles were supported both 
materially and ideologically. Host states did raise security concerns about refugee flows, 
especially in the context of the Indo-Chinese exodus, but these concerns were addressed 
comprehensively in their interest by the West. 
 
1.2. Forced Migration and Security After the Cold War 
The security implications of forced migration have gained new salience in recent years, 
especially since the end of the Cold War. What resulted was a period of ‘issue-
widening’, growing out of a frustration with the narrow Cold War understanding of 
security, focused on military threats external to the state. Speaking at the first summit-
level meeting at the end of the Cold War, the President of the UN Security Council 
noted that “the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian 
and ecological fields have become threats to international peace and security.” (UN 
Security Council, 1992) Throughout the 1990s, refugee movements were central 
elements of numerous UN Security Council resolutions. (Roberts, 1998) 
 
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi suppression of widespread revolt in 
northern Kurdish areas created widespread fears among the Kurds, resulting in the mass 
flight of some 2 million refugees to the Turkish border and into Iran. Civil war and 
famine in Somalia in 1992 displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and caused 
large-scale starvation and a breakdown of civil order. The break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in bitter civil wars among competing ethnic 
populations and widespread ethnic cleansing and displacement. Human rights abuses 
and repressive military rule drove large numbers of Haitians to flee the country by boat 
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throughout the 1990s, causing a serious policy problem for the United States. In most of 
these and other cases, the UN, or regional or national forces acting with UN 
authorization, directly intervened in intrastate conflicts in an attempt to tackle these 
crises which led to mass displacement. 
 
Moreover, forced displacements were also at the centre of crises in the African Great 
Lakes region, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Albania, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. In 
Kosovo, over 850,000 people were driven out of the country in 1999 in a massive and 
brutal ethnic cleansing. Later in the same year in Indonesia, gangs of armed thugs, with 
the active support of the military and the police, waged a campaign of terror against the 
East Timorese people and against UN staff who were stationed there to monitor the 
referendum that would confirm East Timor’s independence. 
 
During this period, it became clear to those engaged in the UN’s peace and security 
apparatus that refugee movements were not only a consequence of insecurity, but could 
also be a cause of insecurity, for host states, countries of origin, for regions hosting 
refugees, and even a threat to international peace and security. As such, the security 
implications of refugee movements were seen as possible justification for armed 
intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus linking the political and 
humanitarian arms of the United Nations.  
 
 
2. THE UNHCR AND THE EMERGING SECURITY DISCOURSE 
 
At the same time that refugees came to be viewed as possibly posing threats to 
international and regional security, refugees were perceived increasingly as burdens. In 
the face of growing numbers of illegal migrants and abuse of asylum systems, Western 
governments became increasingly reluctant to grant asylum and enacted severe new 
entry controls. The closure of borders to prevent unwanted refugee and migrant influxes 
became much more widespread than it had been during the Cold War. In the West, in 
place of asylum, various forms of ‘temporary protection’ were utilized to deal with 
those fleeing war and ‘ethnic cleansing’. For developing countries, the growing 
numbers of displaced people entering already precarious or failing economies presented 
problems that threatened domestic stability and governmental authority. Diminishing 
donor government support for long-term refugee assistance, coupled with declining 
levels of development assistance, and the imposition of structural adjustment programs 
on many poorer and less stable states, reinforced and contributed to the growing 
hostility towards refugees in the developing world.  
  
In response to these global developments, most governments not only became more 
restrictionist in their refugee policies but also pushed for a comprehensive international 
policy which sought to modify the causes of refugee flows through conflict resolution, 
peacemaking, and peacekeeping. These policies focused on unstable, refugee-producing 
regions, to facilitate the prevention, containment of refugee flows, or their reversal 
through repatriation. This was to be achieved through a series of international 
humanitarian operations in the 1990s that were launched by the UN Security Council 
and the UNHCR. During this period, governments felt compelled to respond to refugee 
disasters, especially those covered by the media, and therefore repeatedly tasked the 
UNHCR to provide emergency relief aid with a view towards alleviating, preventing, or 
containing refugee crises within their own country or region of origin. For the world’s 
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most powerful states, the provision of humanitarian assistance was financially and 
politically a relatively low risk option because it satisfied the demands of the media and 
public opinion for some kind of action to alleviate human suffering. But it was also used 
repeatedly by governments as an excuse for refusing to take more decisive forms of 
political and military intervention to deal with the underlying political causes of these 
population movements. 
 
For the UNHCR, these shifts in attitudes about intervention made it begin to perceive its 
own work more in terms of contributing to regional and international peace and 
security. The agency became more frequently involved in internal conflicts and in 
sharing responsibility with UN mandated military forces for assistance to displaced 
people. In an effort to take advantage of the political opportunities that the post-Cold 
War environment presented, the UNHCR also made a concerted effort to frame its 
policies in terms of interests of the major powers in resolving conflicts and refugee 
problems. It also demonstrated a greater interest in preventing refugee flows and in 
finding solutions to the political problems that created mass flight. By emphasizing the 
responsibilities of refugee sending states and by labelling the mass exodus of refugees 
as a threat to international peace and security, UNHCR sought to legitimize its own 
actions to facilitate repatriations as well as interventions by the UN and states into 
regions of refugee origin to alleviate or even solve the causes of flight. The high priority 
given to humanitarian operations and the increasing recognition of a link between 
refugees and international security meant that UNHCR played an increasingly important 
role in placing refugees on the international political agenda. (Hammerstad, 2003) From 
1992 on, the High Commissioner began to report regularly to the UN Security Council 
and to regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) on the potentially destabilizing effects of refugee and displacement 
crises.  
 
2.1. Consequences for UNHCR Activities 
The emergence of a new international security environment and a more assertive UN 
Security Council dramatically changed the way in which UNHCR operated. During the 
Cold War, in-country assistance and protection of internally displaced people and 
victims of war were perceived to violate state sovereignty and therefore were taboo for 
UN agencies. In the post-Cold War period, by contrast, the UN developed a series of 
experimental measures, including a number of humanitarian interventions, for 
responding to instances of forced displacement within internal conflicts. These 
initiatives included the offer of temporary protection rather than full refugee status, the 
establishment of safe havens, cross-border deliveries of assistance, and the use of 
military resources for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For UNHCR, the major 
change in the handling of refugee issues included an increased focus on working in 
countries of origin – even in countries at war – to reduce the likelihood of massive 
refugee flows across borders. In addition, the UNHCR was also frequently asked to take 
part in comprehensive and integrated UN peacekeeping or peacemaking operations that 
involved political and military actors of the UN.  
 
In response to these dramatic developments, the UNHCR expanded its services to a 
much wider range of people who were in need of assistance. For example, ‘war-affected 
populations’ – people who had not been uprooted but needed humanitarian assistance 
and protection – comprised a substantial proportion of UNHCR’s beneficiary population 
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during the height of the 1990’s Bosnian conflict. As a result, the numbers of displaced 
people and war-affected populations receiving UNHCR assistance increased 
dramatically. Worldwide the number of people receiving UNHCR assistance increased 
from 15 million in 1990 to a peak of 26 million in 1996. Of this total of UNHCR’s 
beneficiaries, refugees constituted only about 50 per cent. Consequently, UNHCR 
expanded from a refugee organization into the UN’s foremost humanitarian agency, 
thereby gaining a higher profile in international politics and securing more generous 
funding for its operations. 
 
2.2. Disillusionment with the New Security Initiatives 
By the mid-1990s, however, it became evident that these innovative methods of 
assistance and protection had not been derived from any clearly defined strategy but had 
been developed in an ad hoc fashion in response to immediate security crises. As 
seemingly intractable conflicts continued in the Balkans, Africa and within the former 
Soviet Union, it was apparent that states lacked the will to initiate effective enforcement 
for maintaining peace and security, for empowering human rights mechanisms, or for 
promoting sustainable development in crisis regions. The major powers had only 
minimal interest in most countries with internal conflicts and humanitarian crises, and 
international responses to refugee crises remained more often than not reactive, self-
interested, and based on ad hoc initiatives. There was no guarantee that states would 
intervene in situations where it was desperately needed as in Rwanda in 1994. Bruised 
by their failure to restore stability in Somalia, the world’s major governments and the 
UN chose to do nothing in the face of wanton mass killings in Rwanda. Similar 
concerns prevented Western governments from committing sufficient ground forces to 
Bosnia with an enforcement mission to defend the so-called “safe areas,” including 
Srebrenica. 
 
Most alarmingly, the new ad hoc initiatives also seemed to exacerbate and prolong the 
suffering in many cases of displaced people caught up in brutal conflicts. The 
UNHCR’s high-profile relief efforts in Northern Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda underlined 
dramatically the inadequacy of providing protection in humanitarian relief programs in 
the midst of on-going civil conflicts and regional security crises. In particular, the 
failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the failure to halt the militarization of 
refugee camps in Zaire in 1994-6, the failure to prevent the forced repatriation of 
Rwandan refugees in 1996, and the failure to protect and assist the Rwandan refugees 
driven into eastern Zaire from late 1996 onward vividly demonstrated for UNHCR the 
lack of commitment on the part of states to address the underlying causes of security 
crises and conflicts in order to find solutions to refugee problems. The international 
community was all too often content to encourage UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations to deal with the humanitarian consequences of conflicts rather than to 
actively engage in seeking political and security solutions in intrastate wars. It became 
clear to UNHCR that if refugee problems were to be resolved then the international 
community would have to become active well beyond the mandate of UNHCR.  
 
By the mid-1990s, the major powers, particularly the United States, perceived that the 
interventions of the early 1990s had overextended the UN and that in the future 
interventions should be much more limited and essentially restricted to the most 
strategically important areas of the world. As Kofi Annan acknowledged in his annual 
report to the UN General Assembly in 1999: “the failure to intervene was driven more 
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by the reluctance of Member States to pay the human and other costs of intervention, 
and by doubts that the use of force would be successful, than by concerns about 
sovereignty.” (Annan, 1999: 21) The use of armed force to stem refugee movements 
remains highly controversial within the international community. (Wheeler, 1999) The 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the bitter debates over Iraq in 2003 
demonstrate that there exist significant objections, particularly among the developing 
states, to the right to intervene concept and to the use of force to resolve security threats, 
much less refugee crises. 
 
2.3. “Human Security” and UNHCR 
Disillusionment with its own shortcomings and with the failure of states to take action 
in the Great Lakes and other refugee-prone regions gave rise to efforts on the part of 
UNHCR to tone down the political elements of its security discourse, to redefine 
security by giving it a more humanitarian emphasis, and to develop the concept as an 
operational tool for policy formulation and implementation. (Hammerstad, 2003) 
Building on the notion of “human security” first introduced in the UNDP’s 1994 Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 1994) and later adopted into their foreign policy agendas 
by states such as Canada, Sweden and Norway, UNHCR began to use the concept from 
the mid 1990s on as a means to establish harmony between the security concerns of 
states and the protection needs of forcibly displaced persons and the security needs of 
the staff of international humanitarian agencies.  
 
Throughout her term as High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata stressed that her most 
important challenge was how to strike a balance between the principles of refugee 
protection and the legitimate concerns of states. (Ogata, 1997a) However, the disastrous 
protection crises of the Great Lakes and other operations demonstrated for UNHCR that 
this balance could not be achieved solely through appealing to the security interests of 
states. UNHCR had overestimated the extent to which the international community was 
willing and able to intervene in sovereign states to aid refugees and displaced people. It 
also became clear that the security interests of states were narrower and more self-
interested than UNHCR anticipated and were not always compatible with the protection 
needs of refugees. Consequently, UNHCR endeavoured through advocating “human 
security” to show how the real security of states and the international community could 
only be achieved by providing security for “people”. (UNHCR, 1997; Ogata, 1997b; 
Ogata, 1999) In other words, UNHCR’s use of human security was part of the agency’s 
attempt to shape the interests of states in directions more conducive to refugee 
protection and assistance, as well as to mitigate the political and financial constraints 
imposed upon it by its environment.  
 
However, the concept of “human security” had its own limitations. While human 
security emphasized the links between human rights, physical security of individuals 
and the security of states, it was so all-encompassing a concept that it did not provide 
UNHCR with a very useful tool with which to understand and explain the nature of 
refugee problems. (Hammerstad, 2003) The concept also did not adequately address the 
disjuncture between UNHCR’s emphasis on human rights and the security concerns of 
states affected by disruptive refugee movements. In particular, human security 
underplayed or ignored the security concerns of states, especially the long-term 
consequences of hosting large numbers of refugees. It also focused on forced migration 
as a consequence of conflict, but ignored the fact that refugees can frequently be the 
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cause of conflict. Consequently, human security as defined by UNHCR had a 
questionable utility as a framework for understanding the relationship between state 
security concerns and refugee protection.  
 
2.4. The “Ladder of Options” and Demilitarizing Refugee Camps 
After the Great Lakes disaster, the international community began to debate a more 
structured response to address the security threats of hosting refugees, particularly the 
threat posed by the movement of large numbers of refugees co-mingled with combatants 
in refugee camps. (Jacobsen and Crisp, 2000) In April 2000, the UN Security Council 
(Security Council resolution 1296) requested the Secretary-General to bring to its 
attention incidents involving the militarization of refugee camps and to consider taking 
“appropriate steps to create a secure environment for civilians endangered by conflicts”. 
A year later, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized the need for a military 
force to keep armed combatants out of refugee settlements and recommended that the 
Security Council deploy “international military observers to monitor the situation in 
camps for internally displaced persons and refugees when the presence of arms, 
combatants and armed elements is suspected…(and) consider the range of options … 
(including) compelling disarmament of the combatants or armed elements.” (UN 
Security Council, 2001)  
 
The UNHCR had been particularly shocked by the lack of international assistance it 
received in Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania to separate out the 
interhamwe and other genocidaires from the civilian refugee communities. In the Great 
Lakes, UNHCR protection officers were totally ineffective in preventing the 
militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps. They had neither the mandate nor the 
training and resources to carry out demilitarization and their calls for international 
assistance went unheeded. 
 
To deal with such situations in the future, the UNHCR proposed a “ladder of options”, 
ranging from contingency planning and preventive measures through monitoring and 
policing to forceful intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as the foundation 
for a new UN policy response to the problems of insecurity in refugee camps. (UNHCR 
ExCom, 1999; UNHCR ExCom 2000) Subsequently, the UNHCR established stand-by 
arrangements with a limited number of governments for the provision of police and 
public security experts who were designated as Humanitarian Security Officers (HSO) 
to be deployed as part of UNHCR’s Emergency Response teams at the beginning of 
refugee crises and would work with public security institutions of receiving countries. 
UNHCR also enhanced its own emergency response mechanism by participating in 
numerous civil-military conferences, designing training programs for HSOs, and 
establishing a focal point with the UN Security forces (UNSECORD). Finally, UNHCR 
entered into discussions with the UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) regarding 
the possible deployment of missions to situations in which refugee-populated areas have 
become militarized or where they run the risk of falling under the control of groups 
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3. THE LITERATURE ON FORCED MIGRATION AND STATE SECURITY 
 
During the 1990s, not only did policy makers broaden the international security agenda, 
but a period of ‘issue-widening’ was also seen in the international relations literature. 
(Ulman, 1983; Matthews, 1989; Homer-Dixon, 1991) This process was partly motivated 
by a recognition that ‘security’ is an ‘essentially contested concept’ and therefore 
inherently difficult to define. (Buzan, 1991) As outlined in Hammerstad’s paper, the 
link between conflict and development rose in prominence during this period. Research 
began to highlight how factors as diverse as environmental degradation, economic 
interdependence, transnational crime and migration and refugee movements had the 
potential to influence state and regional security agendas. Consequently, a distinct 
literature on refugee movements and international security emerged. 
 
In the early 1990s, researchers and scholars began to take cognizance of the rising 
importance of security in migration and refugee studies.1 Early works aimed to provide 
a basic typology of migration flows and their related security concerns, particularly for 
sending and receiving states. Examining the question in a broad, cross-regional and 
comparative perspective, these studies sought to clarify the possible security 
implications of refugee movements and the potential concerns of host states. Particular 
reference was also made to the numerous cases of “refugee warriors” (Zolberg et al., 
1989) and the negative impact of these forces on regional and international security.  
 
3.1. Limitations of the Literature on Forced Migration and Security 
These early works, however, had certain limitations. First, the works fail to incorporate 
a comprehensive conceptualization of ‘security’ appropriate to the study of forced 
migration. Second, while attempting to bring the migration question into the mainstream 
of security studies, the nature of the security implications of migration portrayed focus 
disproportionately on the ‘high politics’ dimension of the security concerns of host-
states, focusing on external security threats of a military nature, at the necessary 
expense of the ‘low politics’ concerns, relating to domestic stability. Both works make 
reference to concerns surrounding host community receptivity and questions of ethnic 
affinity, but, as recent cases illustrate, the domestic, ‘low politics’, or indirect security 
concerns, have proven to be far more pervasive and preoccupying for host-states than 
previously thought, especially in Africa, and in light of the failures of international 
solidarity and burden sharing. 
 
Following these earlier works, from the mid-1990s on, the literature on migration and 
security focused more on the securitization of asylum in the European context and on 
                                            
 
1 Two of the earliest works were Myron Weiner’s edited volume International Migration and Security 
and Gil Loescher’s IISS Adephi Paper Refugee Movements and International Security. Both works 
attempted to raise the issue of forced migration as both a potential cause and consequence of insecurity, 
by emphasising the ‘high politics’ dimensions of the issue and by charting a cross-regional framework for 
future research in the area. Both studies had as a primary objective the raising of the profile of 
international migration in the eyes of national security and foreign policy planners and defining the issue 
for further research. Both researchers argued that it was essential to recognize that refugee problems are 
in fact intensely political. Mass migrations create domestic instability, generate interstate tension and 
threaten regional and sometimes international security. These authors argued that solutions to refugee 
problems necessitated not only humanitarian but also political solutions. 
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notions of societal motivations for casting migration in terms of security concerns. 
(Huysmans, 1995; Waever et al., 1993; Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998; Bigo, 1996; 
Bigo, 1998) The focus of the debate has been on the way that societal identity and 
societal concerns about migration and immigration translate into state action against 
migrants. The focus is predominantly on the use of security in public discourse, and 
who has the authority to turn migration into a security issue. 
 
While this literature lays an important foundation to understand the process by which 
the language of security may be applied to cases of migration by various actors within 
society for differing reasons and with various degrees of success, it is not directly 
applicable to the question of host-state security in developing countries. The arguments 
contained within the more recent literature are heavily based on the European context, 
especially the European state and European state-society relations. In fact, the nature of 
the European state is very different from the nature of the state in much of the 
developing world. (Clapham, 1996; Jackson, 1990; Herbst, 2000) The realities of the 
refugee issue in the developing world, especially Africa, are quantitatively and 
qualitatively so different that there is a clear need for a different approach for 
understanding the security concerns of host-states in the Third World. (Loescher, 1992; 
Chimni, 1998) As Jeff Crisp has noted, the list of concerns of developing countries 
differs considerably from the concerns of European states, and includes: the causes and 
nature of the displacement, the mixed character of refugee camp populations, the 
political and military abuse of camps, the location of refugee camps in border areas, the 
weak rule of law in refugee camps, and the impact of these camps on the local 
communities – all issues of concern to DFID. (Crisp, 2000c) 
 
3.2. Recent Research Priorities 
International relations researchers currently address the security implications of forced 
migration in two ways. First, and especially since September 11, 2001, there has been 
an emphasis on the potential links between migration and asylum in the West and 
transnational crime, terrorism and the identity of European political communities. (Van 
Selm, 2003; Gibney, 2002; Zolberg, 2002) As a result of these concerns, many Western 
resettlement countries and traditional asylum countries, have reconsidered their 
admissions levels and procedures. Increased security screening has resulted in long 
delays in resettlement processing, while security-motivated legislation has led to 
increased barriers to entry in Western asylum countries. There is a rising opinion on the 
part of many Western policy makers that the potential security implications of refugee 
movements can be contained in regions of refugee origin, and this approach has 
partially contributed to an increased consideration of regional processing and ‘zones of 
protection’ by Western policy makers, notably the United Kingdom. Of the many 
concerns with this new approach (Loescher and Milner, 2003), paramount to agencies 
like DFID should be that ‘regionalization’ increases the burdens borne by host states in 
regions of refugee origin, compounds their security concerns, and leads to increased 
reluctance to host refugees. 
 
Second, as outlined above, through multilateral discussions and negotiations, there has 
been a focus on the security implications of large-scale and sudden refugee movements 
in developing countries, and the particular problem of armed groups within some 
refugee communities.  
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Both of these approaches are useful, and address current policy concerns of 
governments, but there is a third, and more pressing, situation in which forced migration 
may cause security concerns on the part of host states, especially in the developing 
world. This third situation is the case of protracted refugee situations. 
 
 
4. PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS AND SECURITY 
 
Since the early 1990s, the international community has focused on refugee emergencies, 
delivering humanitarian assistance to refugees and war-affected populations, and 
encouraging large-scale repatriation programs in high profile regions such as the 
Balkans, the Great Lakes or recently Afghanistan and Iraq. (Loescher, 2001; UNHCR, 
2000) The majority of today’s almost 10 million refugees, however, are trapped in 
protracted refugee situations, unable to return home and without the prospect either of a 
solution in the country where they have sought asylum or of resettlement abroad. Such 
situations are often characterized by long periods of exile (stretching to decades for 
some groups) and can occur on most continents in a range of environments including 
camps, rural settlements and urban centres.  
 
A serious consequence of protracted refugee situations is that they can foster instability, 
insecurity and conflict and can even be prime targets for recruitment into armed units 
and terrorism. Such refugee situations may not only cause such direct security concerns 
but also have indirect security implications, through the exacerbation of pre-existing 
social and economic tensions among local populations. Thus, protracted refugee 
situations are no less dangerous sources of instability than other more conventional 
security threats and there are reasons of state and security for the international 
community to focus its attention on protracted refugee situations. As such, these refugee 
situations should be of particular concern to DFID. 
 
The long-term presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Sudanese and Somali 
refugees in Kenya, Liberian refugees in West Africa, Afghans remaining in Pakistan, 
Burmese in Thailand – all in regions where DFID is currently active – and other chronic 
refugee populations, have come to be seen by many host states as a source of insecurity. 
In response, they have enacted policies of containing refugees in isolated and insecure 
camps, have prevented the arrival of additional refugees, and have, in extreme cases, 
engaged in forcible repatriation. (Amnesty International, 1997; Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Crisp, 2000b; Rutinwa, 1999) Not 
surprisingly, these populations are also increasingly a source of insecurity for Western 
states. Refugee camps are sometimes breeding grounds international terrorism (Harman, 
2002) and armed groups in these camps engage in activities that destabilize not only 
host states but also entire regions. (Kamara, 2001) Given the transnational importance 
and significance of protracted refugee situations in today’s security environment, much 
greater attention needs to be given by DFID and other international agencies to 
understanding this pressing problem and developing appropriate policy responses. 
 
Unfortunately, until very recently, the problem of protracted refugee situations has 
largely been ignored by scholars and practitioners. A few key studies addressed this 
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issue in the 1970s and 1980s.2 More recently, a series of studies were undertaken by the 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit at UNHCR.3 While these studies provide important 
new insights into protracted refugee situations in Africa and elsewhere, the primary 
focus has been on addressing the daily security concerns of refugees and not on the 
links between local and regional security and protracted refugee situations. This work 
also largely focuses on refugees in camps and not on urban refugees or self-settled 
refugees, partly because these groups are of less direct concern to UNHCR.  
 
The rising significance of protracted refugee situations has recently been given a higher 
profile within intergovernmental settings. In December 2001, there was an African 
Ministerial Meeting on protracted refugee situations (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 2001a; 
UNHCR, Africa Bureau, 2001b; UNHCR, 2001a) and the issue has been considered at 
recent UNHCR Executive Committee sessions (Lubbers, 2002) as well as within the 
framework of the UNHCR Global Consultations on Refugee Protection. (UNHCR 
ExCom, 2002a) Following preliminary discussion on comprehensive solutions for the 
most prominent protracted refugee situations, (UNHCR 2003a; UNHCR, 2003b) 
UNHCR hosted a series of meetings in early March 2004 to generate international 
support for the future repatriation of a number of refugee populations in Africa. 
UNHCR argued that conditions in countries like Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, 
Sierra Leone and Angola were suitable for the preparation of large-scale returns in the 
coming years, pending positive developments in the relevant peace processes and in the 
ability of UNHCR and partner agencies to build the necessary capacity in the host 
countries to effectively receive and reintegrate the returning populations. UNHCR 
subsequently appealed for $8.8 million for preparatory activities in Sudan, but it has so 
far received $3 million. Likewise, it has appealed for $39.2 million to support 
operations in Liberia for the return and reintegration of both refugees and internally 
displaced persons, but it has received only $3 million. While repatriation is not 
immediately possible to these countries, investment is essential in the coming months to 
ensure that the infrastructure is in place to support repatriation in the coming years.  
 
These examples underscore the highly selective nature of most donor funding for 
refugee situations. A recent study on donor behaviour (Smillie and Minear, 2003) 
argues that funding for humanitarian programmes largely reflects the foreign and 
domestic policies of donor governments. Such behaviour does not provide a coherent or 
effective system for financing international humanitarian activities. Donor governments 
give vastly disproportionate amounts of aid to a few well-known cases and far lesser aid 
to dozens of other less well-publicized refugee caseloads. The absence of an 
autonomous and government-assessed resource base for UNHCR, for example, continue 
to limit the response to present and future refugee crises just as they have done for the 
past 50 years. While the UNHCR has recently tried to overcome these financial 
constraints by trying to access development funds to finance unmet needs, it is not yet 
                                            
2 The Refugee Policy Group in Washington, D.C. produced reports on protracted refugee settlements in 
Africa outlining many of the problems confronting long-staying refugees at that time. T. Betts, Robert 
Chambers and Art Hansen, among others, conducted research on some of these groups in Africa and 
assessed the international community’s policy responses, particularly programmes aimed to promote local 
integration. 
 
3 Individual studies conducted for the research are posted on the web-page of UNHCR’s Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis Unit: http://www.unhcr.ch/epau For a summary of the research findings, see: Crisp 2002. 
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evident that this will prove to be a successful strategy. In light of this situation, donor 
governments and agencies like DFID need to work towards a strengthened multilateral 
regime which has the mandate, capacity and resources to meet current unmet refugee 
needs in a more impartial and effective manner.  
  
4.1. The Nature of Security Concerns: Direct Threats 
In addition to the lack of donor support for these preparations, it is also of concern that 
these discussions have not been accompanied by a sufficient understanding of the 
security impact of long-staying refugee populations. Protracted refugee situations result 
in a wide range of direct and indirect security concerns for host states and states in the 
region. The direct threats faced by the host-state, posed by the spill-over of conflict 
and the presence of ‘refugee warriors’, are by far the strongest link between refugees 
and conflict. Here, there are no intervening variables between forced migration and 
violence as the migrants themselves are actively engaged in armed campaigns typically, 
but not exclusively, against the country of origin. Such campaigns have the potential of 
regionalizing the conflict and dragging the host-state into what was previously an intra-
state conflict. 
 
It is important to note that there was a time when states were willing to host refugee 
warrior communities, notwithstanding the threat they posed. In the context of the Cold 
War and the ideological struggle between East and West, the spill-over of violence 
assumed a very different meaning than it does today. At the time, “the emergence of 
armed groups of exiles, the so-called ‘refugee warriors’, symbolised for the West the 
popular rejection of communist governments and served to legitimize the resistance 
movements.” (Loescher, 1992: 11) Examples of such resistance and support are to be 
found in the anti-Soviet Mujahideen based in Pakistan, the Khmers Rouge in Thailand 
and the Nicaraguan Contras. (Loescher 2001: 201 – 246) As part of the Cold War logic 
of international security, all these groups received US and Western support, both 
military and political. (Loescher, 1992: 12)  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the logic has changed, but the relevance of refugee 
warriors remains. This relevance is especially true in Africa, as brought home with 
particular force in the maelstrom of violence that gripped the Great Lakes region of 
Central Africa between 1994 and 1996. It was this particular case that initiated 
discussions between UNHCR, regional states and the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, resulting in the formulation of the ladder of options policy. 
 
The direct causes of insecurity to both host states and regional and extra-regional actors 
stemming from chronic refugee populations are best understood within the context of 
so-called failed states, as in Somalia, and the rise of warlordism, as in the case of 
Liberia. In such situations, refugee camps are used as a base for guerrilla, insurgent or 
terrorist activities. Armed groups hide behind the humanitarian character of refugee 
camps and settlements, and use these camps as an opportunity to recruit among the 
disaffected displaced populations. In such situations, there is the risk that humanitarian 
aid, including food, medical assistance and other support mechanisms, might be 
expropriated to support armed elements. Similar security concerns may arise within 
urban refugee populations where gangs and criminal networks can emerge within 
displaced and disenfranchised populations. These groups take advantage of the 
transnational nature of refugee populations, of remittances from abroad and the 
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marginal existence of urban refugees to further their goals. In both the urban and camp 
context, refugee movements have proven to provide a cover for the illicit activities, 
ranging from prostitution and people smuggling to the trade in small arms, narcotics and 
diamonds. 
 
The security consequences of such activities for host states and regional actors are real. 
They include cross-border attacks on both host states and countries of origin, attacks on 
humanitarian personnel, refugees and civilian populations. Direct security concerns can 
also lead to serious bilateral and regional political and diplomatic tensions. Cross border 
flows are perceived by host states to impede on their national sovereignty, especially 
given the tenuous control that many central governments in the developing world have 
over their border regions. Finally, the activities of armed elements among refugee 
populations not only violate refugee protection and human rights principles, but can 
constitute threats to international peace and security. (Dowty and Loescher, 1996) 
 
4.2. The Nature of Security Concerns: Indirect Threats 
More difficult to identify, but just as potentially destabilising as direct threats, refugee 
movements may pose indirect threats to the host state. Indirect threats may arise when 
the presence of refugees exacerbates previously existing inter-communal tensions in the 
host country, shifts the balance of power between communities, or causes grievances 
among local populations. At the root of such security concerns is the failure of 
international solidarity and burden sharing with host countries. Local and national 
grievances are particularly heightened when refugees compete with local populations 
for resources, jobs and social services, including health care, education and housing. 
Refugees are also frequently scapegoats for breakdowns in law and order in refugee 
populated areas, both rural and urban.  
 
The indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees can pose to host states is a key 
concept that has been lacking in both the research and policy consideration of refugee 
movements. In these cases, refugees alone are a necessary but not a sufficient cause of 
host state insecurity. It is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the context 
within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum question 
for many states.  
 
Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now present refugee populations as 
security threats to justify actions that would not otherwise be permissible, especially 
when the state is confronted with the pressures of externally-imposed democratization 
and economic liberalization. More generally, the presence of refugees can exacerbate 
previously existing tensions (as also noted in Hammerstad’s paper) and can change the 
balance of power between groups in the country of asylum. For this reason refugees 
play a significant but indirect role in the causes of insecurity and violence, but with 
consequences potentially of the same scale as the direct threats. Given DFID’s 
involvement in democratization and good governance programmes, it should be 
especially aware of these types of concerns. 
 
This dynamic has been emphasised in recent research examining the dramatic 
restrictions on asylum that have been imposed by host states in Africa since the mid-
1990s (as outlined in Kamanga’s paper). Several researchers have pointed to the 
significance of the absence of meaningful burden sharing and the growing xenophobia 
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in many African countries as the key factors motivating restrictive asylum policies. 
(Crisp, 2000; Rutinwa, 1999) It has also been argued that these xenophobic sentiments 
“have emerged at a time when most of Africa is democratizing and governments are 
compelled to take into account public opinion in formulating various policies. The result 
has been the adoption of anti-refugee platforms by political parties which result in anti-
refugee policies and actions by governments.” (Rutinwa, 1999: 2) Just as “government 
leaders found themselves facing more and more pressures to restrict entry” as “asylum 
became part of the cut and thrust of domestic politics” in Western Europe in recent 
years, Gibney emphasises that “the rise of multiparty democracy in Africa … has 
arguably diminished the autonomy of state elites in determining the security agenda.” 
(Gibney, 2002: 7)  
 
It has been argued that the Tanzanian government’s decision to close its border with 
Burundi was closely linked to the lead-up to the 1995 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Opposition parties exploited local dissatisfaction with the government’s 
handling of the asylum question in the region, and thereby tried to create political 
opportunity by demonstrating that they had the power to restore order and stability to 
border regions by expelling unpopular refugee populations. (Runtinwa, 1996: 299) 
 
This example serves to highlight the dynamics of internal competition between the core 
and periphery of a state, and how the presence of refugee camps typically in the 
“hinterland” (Herbst, 2000: 3) of a state influences this dynamic. The presence of large 
numbers of refugees in the periphery of a state may give that region significance that it 
did not previously have. This is particularly true when the political geography of the 
African state is considered.  
 
Herbst argues that “states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined 
by their borders” and that such control is “assured by developing an infrastructure to 
broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens.” (Herbst, 2002: 3) Unlike 
European states, which have managed to broadcast this power to all sectors of the state, 
Herbst argues that African states have concentrated power in economic centres and have 
very limited control over the periphery of the state. The presence of large refugee 
populations in these ‘hinterlands’, where the regime typically does not exercise effective 
control, is a serious concern for the state. This fact, combined with an understanding 
that “rule by the centre” in many African states is so weak and that there is “space for 
challengers to form large and sophisticated rebel armies” (Herbst, 2000: 255) in the 
periphery of the state, clearly adds to an understanding of why African states are 
increasingly concerned about the security implications of large, insecure refugee camps 
and settlements in their hinterland. 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that “in countries which are divided into antagonistic 
racial, ethnic, religious or other groupings, a major influx can place precariously 
balanced multi-ethnic societies under great strain and may even threaten the political 
balance of power.” (Loescher, 1992: 42) In this way, the presence of refugees has been 
demonstrated to accelerate “existing internal conflicts in the host country.” (Weiner, 
1993: 16) For example, this concern was made most explicitly clear in Macedonia’s 
reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in March 1999, citing the concern that 




DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Thematic Paper IV:  Security and Forced Migration 
But, not all refugees are seen as threats. The question of which refugees are seen as 
threats, and why, may be partially explained by understanding the perception of 
refugees as members of the local political community or as outsiders. As Loescher 
argues, “in the Third World, the remarkable receptivity provided to millions of Afghans 
in Pakistan and Iran, to ethnic kin from Bulgaria in Turkey, to Ethiopians in the Sudan, 
to Ogadeni Ethiopians in Somalia, to southern Sudanese in Uganda, to Issaq Somali in 
Djibouti and to Mozambicans in Malawi has been facilitated by the ethnic and linguistic 
characteristics they share with their hosts.” (Loescher, 1992: 42) In this sense, the 
importance of affinity and shared group identity cannot be overstated. If a host 
community perceives the incoming refugee as ‘one of us’, then positive and generous 
conceptions of distributive justice will apply. The empirical evidence is overwhelming.  
 
Conversely, if the refugees are seen as members of an ‘out-group’, they are likely to 
receive a hostile reception. In cases where there is a division along ethnic, linguistic or 
religious lines, “a major population influx can place precariously balanced multi-ethnic 
societies under great strain and may even threaten the political balance of power.” 
(Loescher, 1992: 42)  
 
Indeed, refugees “as an out-group, can be blamed for all untoward activities.” (Maluwa, 
1995: 657) While levels of crime may rise by no more than expected with a comparable 
rise in population, refugees increasingly are seen as the cause. Maluwa also argues that 
the “presence of massive numbers of refugees” can “create feelings of resentment and 
suspicion, as the refugee population increasingly, and often wrongly, gets blamed for the 
economic conditions that may arise within the domestic population.” (Maluwa, 1995: 
657) This can lead to a point where “poverty, unemployment, scarcity of resources, and 
even crime and disease, are suddenly attributed to the presence of these refugees and 
other foreigners.” (Maluwa, 1995: 657)  
 
 
5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: ELEMENTS OF A NECESSARY 
RESPONSE TO SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
As this paper has argued, refugee movements can result in a range of security concerns 
for host states and states in the region. As the causes and consequences of these 
concerns are diverse, it is not possible to formulate a single policy response to all 
migration-related security concerns. In fact, the elements of a necessary response are 
diverse.  
 
5.1. Responding to Direct Security Concerns 
In the short term, direct security concerns must be addressed through supporting the 
separation and exclusion of armed elements within the refugee population, 
notwithstanding the highly complex nature of this undertaking. (O’Neill, 2000; 
Rutinwa, 2002)  
 
One of UNHCR’s first efforts to operationalise its new policy response to armed 
elements, ‘the ladder of options’, was its attempt to implement a “security package” in 
western Tanzania and to move Sierra Leonean refugee camps further from the border in 
Guinea to protect refugees from attacks by armed elements. While these actions helped 
create greater security for some of the refugee communities in Tanzania and Guinea, 
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they did not succeed in separating armed elements and other exiles from the civilian 
refugee populations in these countries. (Crisp, 2001) A similar effort by UNHCR and 
DPKO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in mid-2001 to separate armed 
refugees from their civilian counterparts met with greater success. (Yu, 2002) 
 
From these experiences, it is evident that the future success of the ladder of options 
depends on the practical partnerships and ‘security packages’ that UNHCR is able to 
form with the DPKO and governments. While discussions between DPKO and UNHCR 
have set the groundwork for future cooperation between the two offices, serious 
differences of approach and political and resource constrains remain. On the one hand, 
UNHCR and other humanitarian aid organizations fear that too close an association with 
the military compromises their impartiality and neutrality, and on the other, 
governments are reluctant to authorize military forces for such functions. Protection for 
refugees in militarized situations also depends critically on the willingness and ability of 
host states and countries of refugee origin to observe international humanitarian norms 
regarding the treatment of refugees and non-combatants. Such issues received 
significant attention during the recent UNHCR-sponsored Global Consultations on 
International Protection, and were highlighted for particular action in the ensuing 
Agenda for Protection. (UNHCR, 2001b; UNHCR, 2001c; UNHCR ExCom, 2002a; 
UNHCR ExCom, 2002b; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2002)  
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that refugee participation in armed conflict 
can and has led to the diffusion of small arms in host states (Small Arms Survey, 2004), 
to the forced recruitment of refugees into armed bands, the expropriation of 
humanitarian aid to support armed elements, and the rise of criminal activity in camps 
and urban settings. The development of more effective security packages can assist 
UNHCR, DPKO, regional peacekeeping units and host states to deal with the broad 
array of direct security concerns present in many regions of refugee origin.  
 
As DFID develops its policy towards refugees and forced migration, it should give 
careful consideration to the ways in which it can lend support to the development of 
more effective security packages. Focusing on the role of arms in refugee camps is an 
important first step in proposing arms control measures and other demilitarizing regimes 
aimed at reducing violence emanating from and within refugee communities. In 
particular, DFID should consider how its experience in demobilization and disarmament 
can contribute to better programmes in a refugee context. At the same time, DFID 
should encourage UNHCR and DPKO to expand its understanding of security packages 
to include support to the process of return and reintegration. Finally, DFID involvement 
in security sector reform should include training and capacity building for national 
security services to implement host-state obligations as articulated by UN Security 
Council resolution 1208 (1998) and ExCom Conclusion 94. 
 
5.2. Responding to Indirect Security Concerns 
As with responding to the direct security concerns, responding to indirect threats 
requires the engagement of a range of actors and agencies, not only UNHCR. 
Development agencies, such as DFID, have a vital partnership role to play, working 
closely with UNHCR to devise and implement appropriate programmes. UNHCR 
cannot and should not be expected to address these concerns on its own. 
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Indirect threats are best addressed in the short to medium term through development 
initiatives and targeted assistance designed to address the burdens on local communities 
related to the hosting of refugees and to ease tensions between refugees and the local 
community. In the long term, the security implications of protracted refugee situations 
are best addressed through comprehensive solutions, involving a broad range of policy 
interventions.  
 
The remainder of this paper considers how development initiatives can play a role in 
addressing the security implications of refugee movements. It draws on recent field 
research in Kenya and Tanzania to outline how targeted intervention can make a 
significant contribution to the security of not only refugee populated areas, but also to 
the security of the host state. In the long term, however, it will be argued that such 
interventions are only coping mechanisms, pending the formulation and implementation 
of comprehensive solutions to resolve protracted refugee situations. 
 
5.3. Lessons Learned: The Firewood Project in Kenya  
Kenya and Tanzania host two of the most challenging protracted refugee situations in 
Africa.4 Kenya has hosted over 135,000 Somali refugees since 1992. The overwhelming 
majority of these refugees live in three camps near the town of Dadaab, in the Northeast 
Province of Kenya, approximately 80kms from the border with Somalia. During the 
1990s, these camps were renowned as the most violent refugee camps in the world, 
where rape, murder and armed robbery were almost daily occurrences. (Crisp, 2000a) 
Violence was endemic not only in the camps but also in the areas surrounding the 
camps, as bands of shiftas, or bandits, attacked convoys of humanitarian relief, aid 
workers, and refugees collecting firewood outside the camps.  
 
A series of interventions were introduced by the UNHCR, with the support of the donor 
community, in the late 1990s, including a mobile court system to try those suspected of 
criminal offences, additional support to the Kenyan police to substantially increase their 
presence in and around the camps, and the firewood project. The firewood project was 
designed to provide refugees with 30% of their firewood needs, with the objective of 
reducing the exposure of refugee women to sexual violence by reducing the amount of 
time they would be required to spend in the insecure areas around the camps.  
 
The six years following the introduction of the firewood project in 1998 witnessed a 
dramatic decline not only in the number of reported cases of rapes in the three Dadaab 
camps, but also in murder and armed robbery. In 1998, there were over 300 reported 
cases of violent crime in the Dadaab camps, of which 104 were cases of rape. By 2003, 
that number had fallen dramatically: to 36 reported cases of violent crime, of which 15 
were cases of rape. 
 
UN and NGO partners working in Dadaab universally believe that this improvement in 
refugee security and the dramatic decline in violent crime has been overwhelmingly the 
result of the firewood project and its positive secondary benefits, namely that it has 
created jobs for the local population and has encouraged young men who would 
                                            
4 Details of the policy responses in Kenya and Tanzania were collected during field visits to Nairobi and 
Dadaab (2001 and 2004) and Dar es Salaam (1999 and 2004) and Kibondo (2004). Internal reports and 
statistics on these programmes are held on file with the authors.  
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otherwise pursue banditry as a means of livelihood to participate in the more lucrative 
trade in firewood. Under the programme, villages in a 50 - 100km radius from the 
camps are contracted by the GTZ, UNHCR’s environment programme implementing 
partner, to collect deadwood. Since 1998, the project has supplied between 8 – 10,000 
metric tones of firewood a year for the refugees, and has contributed an average of 48 
million Kenyan shillings (approximately £330,000 at the current exchange rate) to the 
local economy. It is estimated that roughly half of this amount is returned to the 
refugees as, in many cases, they are sub-contracted by the local population. 
 
The firewood project thereby mitigates the indirect security burden in Kenya in a 
number of ways. First, it reduces the strain on the scarce environmental resource of 
firewood in and around Dadaab by ensuring that the firewood is collected in a managed 
way across a wider area. Second, it ensures an income to the local population, thereby 
reducing grievances that may arise between refugees and Kenya, notwithstanding the 
ethnic similarity between the populations. Third, by providing a context within which 
the refugees and the local population can cooperate in a large scale, mutually beneficial 
project, better understanding is developed between the two groups, which serves as an 
important basis for future conflict resolution at a local level. Although a costly 
programme, the firewood project is one example of a development-related project that 
has played a significant role in addressing the security implications of the protracted 
presence of Somali refugees in northern Kenya. DFID may consider how such a 
programme may be replicated in other contexts. 
 
5.4. Lessons Learned: SPRAAs in Tanzania 
Special Programmes for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAAs) is a second example of 
possible development-related interventions. In both Kenya and Tanzania, SPRAAs have 
been implemented in recent years to directly address the grievances of the local 
population by providing services and benefits to the local population that resides near 
refugee camps. 
 
The positive effects of SPRAAs have been most striking in Kibondo, a district in 
Western Tanzania that has hosted over 100,000 mostly Burundian refugees since 1993. 
A number of direct and indirect security concerns have been expressed by local and 
national authorities in relation to the presence of Burundian refugees in Kibondo. Most 
pressing has been the allegations that armed elements from a number of Burundian rebel 
groups are based in the camps and carry-out fundraising and recruitment activities 
within the camps. These allegations have been thoroughly denied by the Tanzanian 
government, and steps have been taken, along with UNHCR, to increase the security 
presence in the camps and the ability of the local security forces to screen for armed 
elements among the refugees, as outlined above.  
 
But the protracted presence of the refugee population in Western Tanzania has also 
resulted in the rise in significant grievances against the refugees and a common belief 
that their presence has resulted in a rise in banditry, crime, disease and environmental 
degradation, in addition to placing a significant strain on the local infrastructure and 
public services. As a result, relations between refugees and local authorities have 
deteriorated, and a sense of insecurity now prevails.  
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In an attempt to reverse this trend, UNHCR and its implementing partners have 
undertaken a wide range of programmes to directly benefit the local population and 
counter the negative affects of the presence of such a large refugee population. Over 
US$1.25 million has been spent in recent years in a range of programmes, including the 
rehabilitation of roads used by aid convoys, the improvement of water supply to local 
communities, development of local communication infrastructure, the building of local 
schools and health centres and the planting of trees. In 2003 alone, over 1.65 million 
tree seedlings were planted in the areas surrounding refugee camps in Western 
Tanzania.  
 
A recent report by the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration at the University of Dar 
es Salaam (2003) comprehensively reviewed the allegations made by Tanzanian 
officials, both locally and nationally, that the presence of refugees in districts like 
Kibondo are a burden to the host state, and constitute a threat to Tanzanian security. In 
assessing the cost of hosting refugees against the benefits that have accrued to the local 
population, both directly through the SPRAAs and indirectly through the creation of 
employment and larger markets, the report concludes that the hosting of refugees has 
been a benefit to Tanzania. Indeed, local community and business leaders at the local 
level recognize the efforts that have been made to ensure that the presence of refugees 
benefits local development, and have worked closely with UNHCR in the formulation 
of SPRAAs.  
 
Activities such as SPRAAs and the firewood project contribute to an improved security 
and protection environment by reducing competition between refugees and the local 
population over scarce resources and by reducing local grievances towards refugees. At 
the same time, however, it has been argued that such programmes, and more generally 
the presence of refugees and refugee programmes, could, if effectively managed, 
significantly contribute to longer-term local and national development. (Jacobsen, 2002) 
There is, therefore, a double benefit in the short to medium term: development-related 
projects targeting refugee populated areas can foster an environment of greater security 
and protection for refugees and the local population, while also contributing to broader 
national development objectives. DFID has a vital role to play in understanding the 
successes of past programmes and identifying new areas where similar approaches can 
be applied. 
 
The implications of SPRAAs for DFID’s poverty reduction policies are obvious. 
Protracted refugee situations, such as Burundians in Tanzania, not only pose indirect 
security burdens for host countries but also perpetuate poverty and social and political 
deprivation. As observed in the UNHCR June 2004 Standing Committee paper on 
protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2004): “The World Bank notes three dimensions 
of poverty: lack of income and assets; voicelessness and powerlessness in the 
institutions of state and society; and vulnerability to adverse shocks, linked to an 
inability to cope with them.” UNHCR notes that refugees suffer from all three 
conditions and not only lack national protection, but are also desperately poor. We have 
argued above that poverty can also lead refugees to a range of negative survival tactics, 
many of which affect local host populations, such as the degradation of the 
environment, prostitution, petty theft and child labour. DFID can play a key role in 
addressing some of these indirect security burdens, particularly providing safety nets 
that prevent refugees from having to resort to negative coping mechanisms. DFID 
should consider ways to provide prospects for refugees to lift themselves out of poverty 
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by building both local and refugee capacities through loans and income generating 
projects. As argued in the UNHCR Standing Committee paper:  
 
“Evidence suggests that focusing on the condition of the refugee, and removing 
obstacles in the way of that person’s productivity, are the most effective means 
of dealing with refugee situations, in the absence of a durable solution. For 
example, Liberian refugees who are free to cultivate land in Cote d’Ivoire, have 
turned swamps into rice fields. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees made such a 
contribution in the carpet and transport sectors that their mass repatriation 
impacted negatively on Peshawar’s economy. And in Malawi in the 1980s, 
Mozambican refugee farmers sold surplus produce to locals, and bequeathed 
functioning farms upon their repatriation.” (UNHCR, 2004) 
 
5.5. Towards a Full Response: Comprehensive Solutions to Protracted Refugee 
Situations 
Such directed interventions do not, however, provide a full response for the security 
implications of refugee movements or protracted refugee situations. These interventions 
can only help manage the situation until a resolution can be found; they cannot be a 
substitute for a solution. In the long term, the security implications of forced migration 
can only be fully addressed through the formulation and implementation of 
comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee situations. Such a response would 
employ the full range of possible solutions for refugees – repatriation and reintegration, 
local integration in the host country, and resettlement to a third country.  
 
DFID could play a significant role in each of these three solutions. For example, it could 
support return and reintegration through local and regional post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes, rehabilitation of former combatants, and incoming generation programmes 
in support of demobilization. It could support local integration by politically engaging 
host states to consider the options, by targeting assistance to refugee populated areas, 
and by supporting self-sufficiency initiatives for locally integrated refugees. Finally, 
DFID should encourage the consolidation and future development of the UK’s fledgling 
refugee resettlement programme. 
 
In the past, comprehensive approaches and greater external engagement in regions of 
refugee origin have proven to be the most effective way of resolving not only long-
standing refugee problems but sources of regional instability. The US and the 
international community employed a broad range of policies to resolve refugee 
situations of a protracted and seemingly insoluble nature in Europe in the 1960s for 
displaced persons still in camps in Europe nearly 20 years after the Second World War 
and from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s in Southeast Asia to deal with the protracted 
Vietnamese refugee problem. (Loescher, 2001: Chapters 4 and 8; UNHCR, 2000) It is 
likely that the potential benefits of a comprehensive approach applies with equal force 
to the protracted refugee problems and conflicts in many regions of the world today. 
(Loescher and Milner, 2003: 609 – 616)  
 
There have been a number of recent policy initiatives by UNHCR, the EU and the UK 
that attempt to address issues of forced migration, including protracted refugee 
situations in a comprehensive manner. As Heaven Crawley’s paper examines the UK’s 
proposals for in-region processing and the European Commission’s initiatives on the 
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management of asylum and on durable solutions, we will focus on UNHCR’s 
Convention Plus and recent UK initiatives to address security concerns in Africa and 
elsewhere. 
 
Protracted refugee situations have been the principle targets of several major UNHCR 
initiatives, such as Conventions Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions. 
Convention Plus provides the framework to implement special agreements, including 
comprehensive plans of action (CPAs) that bring together a mix of durable solutions to 
resolve complex refugee situations, including those that have significant security 
implications such as protracted refugee situations. The Framework for Durable 
Solutions also works to resolve long standing refugee problems and to unblock 
impediments to responding to protracted refugee situations. It brings together three 
initiatives developed in recent years: DAR (Development Assistance for Refugees), the 
4Rs (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction) and DLI 
(Development through Local Integration). DAR and DLI emphasize refugee self-
reliance. 
 
A good example of Convention Plus initiative to resolve and on-going protracted 
refugee situation, including some of its security dimensions, is effort underway to try to 
establish a CPA for Somali refugees. This initiative includes most (but not all) of the 
major stakeholders including the Mogadishu government, host governments in the 
region, the European Commission, UNHCR and the cosponsors of the CPA, Denmark, 
Netherlands and the UK. The steering group does not include Somaliland or Puntland. 
With seed funding from the European Commission, the steering group intends to 
develop a plan of action that it can eventually present to a special inter-governmental 
meeting for approval and funding.  
 
The effort to create a Somali refugee CPA is seen as a test case for Convention Plus. Its 
objectives are to identify appropriate durable solutions for Somali refugees living in the 
region’s host countries. At present, given the continuing instability in southern and 
central Somalia, the focus of the CPA is repatriation to Somaliland and Puntland where 
conditions for returnees are more secure. In order for returns to be sustained there needs 
to be increased emphasis on reintegration and post-conflict recovery. A focus of 
Convention Plus is to open up possibilities for tapping into development funds to 
provide stability in areas of return. However, funds for reintegration are limited and 
donor appeals for Somali returns have been seriously under-subscribed. For example, 
less than half of the $200 million for the Somalia repatriation appeal has been pledged 
so far.  
 
The second objective of the CPA is to examine how effective protection can be 
achieved in host countries. A number of studies will be undertaken by local experts in 
the region to determine the protection and assistance gaps that need to be addressed in 
any future projects within the CPA. Finally, the European co-sponsors, Denmark, 
Netherlands and the UK, are particularly interested in examining ways to mitigate 
irregular movements of Somalis to the West.  
 
While the plans to establish a Somali refugee CPA is a commendable effort to try to 
engage the international community on a particularly difficult and complex protracted 
refugee situation, it does not adequately link humanitarian, economic and political 
approaches. Finding a solution for resolving the Somali protracted refugee situation 
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requires the restoration of a degree of stability and normality in southern and central 
Somalia where the security situation has been unstable for more than the past decade. 
The collapse of the central government in Mogadishu has provided opportunities for 
radical Islam in the region. Numerous efforts to create a new, more stable government 
there have failed and donor governments have come to perceive Somalia as a security 
black hole.  
 
The Somali refugee CPA underscores the need for a joined-up policy on the part of the 
international community to address the long-standing security implications of protracted 
refugee situations and humanitarian emergencies. The principal weakness of the Somali 
refugee CPA is that it is not hitched to the on-going Somali peace negotiations that are 
currently taking place in Nairobi. Past successful CPAs such as those in Indochina and 
Central America in the 1980s and early 1990s relied on political initiatives that 
preceded and laid the foundations for humanitarian and development programmes. 
Without strong political support and successful peace negotiations there is little 
immediate prospect of resolving protracted refugee situations such as the Somali 
situation. Somalia needs a stable central government—one which requires some 
external support in order for new political roots to take hold. This necessitates not only 
inputs of humanitarian assistance but also security and peace keeping assistance aimed 
at such activities as training and capacitating a new independent police force and army.  
 
Such broad range responses also require the cooperation of a range of agencies and 
states, and a range of actors within a state to address the security, development and 
diplomatic aspects of comprehensive solutions. Despite the need for a multifaceted 
approach to protracted refugee situations, however, the overall response of policy 
makers remains compartmentalised with security, development and humanitarian issues 
mostly being discussed in different forums, each with their own theoretical frameworks, 
institutional arrangements, and independent policy approaches. (Castles et al., 2003) 
There exists little or no strategic integration of approaches and little effective 
coordination in the field.  
 
One notable exception at the UK level is the joint DFID, FCO, Cabinet Office and MoD 
Conflict Prevention Pools initiative. This programme was established by the UK to 
integrate the policy making and programme delivery of these departments in order to 
reduce both the number of conflicts around the world and the number of people affected 
by war. A recent evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools (Austen, 2004) found that 
this mechanism has led to increased inter-departmental collaboration and consensus on 
conflict prevention policy in a number of regions. While this is a welcome development, 
it should be noted that this effort does not specifically address the security implications 
of protracted refugee situations nor does it address the considerable negative impact of 
chronic and long-standing refugee populations on host state and regional security.  
 
Another important initiative in which the UK government has been involved is recent 
efforts to increase the capacity of African peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in 
West Africa. Building up regional peacekeeping capabilities is an important part of the 
Conflict Prevention Pools and DFID should continue to give priority to this. Conflict 
prevention goes hand in hand with development initiatives to help restore stability in 
war torn regions. 
 
 27
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Thematic Paper IV:  Security and Forced Migration 
There also has been a dramatic increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations 
in Africa during the last year and a half. The UN Security Council has authorised new 
missions in Liberia and Burundi and has strengthened existing ones in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. It is likely to authorise a large-scale mission to Sudan later this 
year to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace accord designed to end 
the twenty years long civil war there. These missions are overwhelmingly staffed by 
troops from developing countries. All these missions are also so-called complex 
peacekeeping operations, involving multiple tasks and combining military and civilian 
components. (Berdal, 2004) Indeed, in May 2004, Kofi Annan outlined for the Security 
Council the multidimensional tasks of today’s peacekeeping missions: “Peacekeeping 
today has become increasingly multidimensional. The missions you mandate are 
implementing peace agreements, helping manage political transition, building 
institutions, supporting economic reconstruction, organizing the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, assisting humanitarian aid programmes, supervising or 
even organizing elections, monitoring human rights, clearing minefields, disarming and 
demobilizing militias, and reintegrating their members into the civilian economy.” (UN 
Secretary General, 2004)  
 
Neither the DPKO nor the under-resourced peacekeeping forces from developing 
countries have adequate capacity (especially in logistics) to sustain this level of multiple 
operations effectively. Therefore there is an urgent need for DFID along with other 
stakeholders in the international system to address how the UN should respond to the 
problems of state incapacity, including protracted refugee situations, and how to 
empower regional bodies to assist in meeting this challenge.  
 
Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, neither the UN nor governments have adequately 
integrated the resolution of recurring regional refugee problems with economic and 
security issues. International involvement in nation-building, reconstruction, and 
rehabilitation in war-torn regions is still piecemeal and under-resourced. Consequently, 
there is a pressing need to develop a policy agenda that extends beyond conventional 
boundaries and seeks to integrate the resolution of chronic and recurring regional 
refugee problems with economic development and security issues. It is clear that DFID 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Drawing principally on evaluation reports and other lesson learning materials produced 
by a variety of humanitarian and donor agencies, the task of this paper is to discuss the 
experience of in-country responses to conflict, humanitarian need and forced migration 
with a view to informing DFID’s policies on behalf of refugees and displaced persons, 
particularly at the country level. Despite continuing shortcomings in the evaluation and 
accountability of humanitarian action, evaluations have now become a central and 
invaluable component of the international humanitarian system, and should provide an 
important source for informing DFID policies on forced migration.  
 
Yet in the 2002 annual review of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)1 it was noted that only seven (of the 55) 
evaluation reports received by the network that year covered support to refugees, and 
despite some common threads, these reports assessed very different interventions, 
‘which limits the possibility of synthesising findings’ (ALNAP, 2002: 122). Moreover, 
given that protection is at the heart of action to address the needs of refugees, asylum-
seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs), a persistent gap in the evaluation of 
protection efforts impacts particularly on the evaluation of action on behalf of forced 
migrants. According to ALNAP, 53 of the 55 reports that they reviewed in 2003 ‘either 
did not discuss protection, or, if they did, addressed it only in a piecemeal fashion’ 
(ALNAP, 2003:104). 
 
On the other hand, a large number – perhaps a majority – of humanitarian evaluation 
reports at least touch on refugees, IDPs and displacement issues, reflecting the fact that 
displacement represents such a critically important component of most humanitarian 
emergencies around the world. Furthermore, many issues arising in respect of other or 
broader aspects of humanitarian responses – such as humanitarian access, delivery of 
food aid, co-ordination of humanitarian action, preparedness, linking relief, 
rehabilitation and development (LRRD) – are also highly relevant to action on behalf of 
forced migrants. Growing concern across the system with responses to complex 
political and humanitarian emergencies and conflict has meant growing concern with 
strategic issues connected with forced migration in these contexts, such as refugee 
return and reintegration, and humanitarian coverage (e.g. across displaced and ‘host’ 
populations). 
 
This paper therefore draws on a relatively wide range of evaluation reports, reviews and 
other synthesis and lesson learning materials produced by a variety of humanitarian and 
donor agencies since the mid-1990s, the majority relating to specific emergency 
situations. A few institutions – particularly UNHCR, WFP and ECHO – stand out as 
sources of a comparatively comprehensive set of evaluation and lesson learning 
materials in this area which are easily accessible in the public realm. It has not been 
possible to draw on much material relating specifically to CHAD/DFID’s interventions 
                                                 
1 ALNAP was established in 1997 as an international interagency forum concerned with working to 
improve learning and accountability and quality across the humanitarian sector. It has 51 full members 
and 370 observers, with the membership encompassing all types of organizations that make up the 
international humanitarian system, including bilateral and multilateral donors, UN agencies, NGOs, the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and independent consultants, academics and 
research institutes. ALNAP’s Annual Review series draws on ALNAP’s online Evaluative Reports 
Database. 
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on behalf of forced migrants, since, with the exception of two recent reports by the 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2000; NAO, 2003), little of DFID’s own humanitarian 
policies or activity have been formally evaluated over the past ten years, and certainly 
very little that relates specifically to forced migrants; the emphasis within DFID has 
been on informal internal lesson learning reviews of its own action, with formal 
evaluations limited largely to the performance and accountability of specific partner 
agencies (NAO, 2003: 4-5, 7, 20; Macrae et al., 2002). 
 
The main themes discussed below broadly reflect the principal issues highlighted in the 
evaluations reviewed for this paper. Section 2 focuses on the need for improved 
assessment, monitoring and analysis, particularly social and political analysis, to 
support humanitarian action at all levels, including action on behalf of forced migrants. 
As discussed in the Section 3, linked to the general need for improved contextual 
analysis is the need to ‘join up’ analysis and strategy more effectively across 
Government to enable greater coherence between (particularly) DFID, FCO, MoD, 
Home Office and Cabinet Office policies and actions concerned with refugees, IDPs 
and asylum-seekers. Also critically important for informing and improving all aspects 
of assistance and protection for refugees and other displaced populations is the need for 
increased involvement and consultation of forced migrants and other primary 
stakeholders in the planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of 
humanitarian responses, including protection activities. As discussed in Section 4, 
despite a growing consensus on the need for more participatory and rights-based 
approaches, practice in this regard remains patchy at best. 
 
While the dominant paradigm defining international humanitarian assistance is to 
provide assistance on the basis of humanitarian need regardless of pre-conceived group 
categories (such as displacement status), international protection efforts on behalf of 
forced migrants are shaped to a great extent by the categorization of particular 
individuals or groups in terms of their displacement status (such as internally versus 
externally displaced, non-displaced ‘host’ populations, etc.). Section 5 explores the 
tensions between needs-based and group-based humanitarian action in efforts to achieve 
effective humanitarian coverage in situations of forced migration. Section 6 examines 
the importance of addressing the specific needs of particular vulnerable groups (e.g. 
women, children, the elderly) among displaced and host populations in the context of 
both needs and/or group-based assistance and protection efforts.  
 
While on-the-ground humanitarian coverage is a recurrent theme examined in the 
evaluations reviewed for this paper, there is very little attention in the evaluations 
material to broader political or strategic issues affecting humanitarian coverage at the 
macro level, particularly the impact of uneven donor funding across different 
humanitarian crises. Nor do most evaluations tackle issues connected with the rights 
(rather than simply humanitarian needs) of forced migrants and other populations 
affected by humanitarian crises, as reflected in the overall lack of attention to protection 
issues. The small number of evaluations concerned with the protection and assistance of 
particular vulnerable groups, reviewed in Section 6, represent an exception in this 
regard, by examining explicitly whether humanitarian agencies are addressing the rights 
and specific protection needs of women, children, urban refugees, IDPs and other 
groups, and by advocating concrete measures to strengthen agencies’ rights- and 
protection-based programming on behalf of these groups. 
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Section 7, looking at support for refugee and IDP livelihoods, draws on the increasing 
body of evaluations material concerned with humanitarian action in protracted conflicts 
and humanitarian crises, and reflects a growing interest across both the humanitarian 
and development sectors in the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable groups, including 
those of forced migrants. Concern with refugee and IDP livelihoods has developed 
against the backdrop of costly and often seemingly unsustainable ‘care and 
maintenance’ programmes in long-term refugee and IDP camps, in which there are 
often few opportunities and little support for refugee / IDP integration and little scope 
for those displaced to create sustainable livelihoods for themselves. While prevailing 
political conditions often militate against efforts to secure more effective local 
integration for displaced populations, the failure to achieve more in this regard is 
increasingly seen as a human rights issue within the humanitarian system, and is 
frequently raised as a central question where evaluations are concerned with assessing 
the overall impacts and sustainability of what so often turn out to be effectively long-
term assistance programmes on behalf of forced migrants. The question of refugee and 
IDP livelihoods begs the perennially problematic question of the linkages between 
emergency humanitarian assistance and longer-term development-oriented 
interventions. An apparent lack of attention to displacement issues in DFID’s new 
Country Assistance Plans (CAPs) suggests that more could be done to bring 
displacement issues into the mainstream of analysis and policy supporting DFID’s 
development assistance efforts in countries affected by forced migration. 
 
The preferred ‘durable solution’ for forced migrants within the international refugee 
regime has long been their safe and sustainable return to their place or country of origin, 
and is now pursued actively alongside broader efforts to resolve many long-standing 
conflicts around the world. This is often referred to as the ‘4Rs’ framework in the 
context of efforts to achieve ‘transition’ to peace and stability in situations of conflict 
and displacement: repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. While, in 
theory, ‘transition’ is often presented as a linear process towards peace, the reality is 
usually one of uncertain and often faltering peace processes and uncertain and often 
highly insecure conditions for the ‘4Rs’. As noted in Section 8, key recommendations 
from recent evaluations of refugee repatriation and return programmes include for 
donors and agencies to adopt a ‘multi-scenario planning approach’ to refugee 
repatriation and reintegration with contingency plans for a range of different situations 
that might arise, and for humanitarian actors to develop and adopt strengthened 
technical and protection standards to govern the conduct and monitoring of return 
programmes. 
 
The concluding section summarises the main policy recommendations for DFID 
emerging directly or indirectly from the review of evaluations and other lesson learning 
materials. Inevitably, this paper is prone to gaps and shortcomings in the evaluations 
themselves – such as with regard to issues of protection and rights-based programming. 
Nevertheless, a number of important recommendations can be made on the basis of 
what is a relatively substantial body of evaluations material, which, it is hoped, can 
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2. THE NEED FOR IMPROVED ASSESSMENT, MONITORING AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
The poor or inconsistent quality of needs assessment and impact monitoring has now 
been a recurring theme of humanitarian evaluations for a number of years (cf. ALNAP, 
2002; ALNAP 2003), as clearly illustrated in two recent evaluations of WFP Protracted 
Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) addressing the food needs of refugees, 
including repatriating refugees. In the case of food assistance and support for the 
repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees in Iran (1999-2002), there was: 
  
‘no baseline data, no data on food security … and … no monitoring of the 
impact of food assistance or the exclusion of certain refugees from assistance … 
[and] no monitoring of potentially marginalized groups’ (WFP, 2002a: 20). 
 
Similarly, in Ethiopia (2000 – 2001): 
 
‘Knowledge of the degree of self-sufficiency among the target refugee 
population [was] … limited and the mission could not find indicators that the 
nutritional requirements of the refugees have been analysed in a systematic way 
following UNHCR/WFP guidelines’ (WFP, 2001a: 9). 
 
Several evaluations reviewed by ALNAP in 2003 suggested that the data is often not 
available to ensure appropriate targeting of food aid, and that many vulnerable groups, 
particularly those outside refugee camps, may be bypassed by food aid (ALNAP, 2003: 
119). According to a recent evaluation of ECHO’s humanitarian programme in 
Afghanistan, some NGOs have made decisions about beneficiary selection without the 
use of stringent criteria and participatory approaches; closer monitoring is 
recommended to identify these anomalies and allow them to be addressed (ECHO, 
2004a: 36). Capacity problems and overload among agency staff almost certainly 
contribute to the tendency not to prioritise monitoring, and thus it is important to think 
strategically about the specific types of assessment and monitoring that need most 
improvement in the field. ALNAP observes that quantitative monitoring is usually 
stronger than qualitative monitoring (e.g. who actually benefits from food aid), and this 
is reflected in the fact that there is often a lot of data generated in the course of 
assessment and monitoring activities, but insufficient analysis. 
 
The need for improved analysis is repeated across a large number of evaluations 
concerned with all levels of humanitarian assistance and/or action on behalf of refugees 
and IDPs. According to UNHCR’s 2002 evaluation of the protection of refugee 
children: 
 
 ‘the current programme cycle of Country Operations Plans and Annual 
Protection Reports seems to be used as a matter of obligation rather than as a 
tool to analyze the situation and needs of refugees. Situation analysis is different 
to needs assessment in that it analyses risks, opportunities and potential 
resources’ (UNHCR, 2002a: 6). 
 
A number of reports and evaluations draw specific attention to the weakness of social 
and political analysis in a great deal of humanitarian programming. The 1999 evaluation 
of Danida’s programme in Sudan notes that attempts to monitor and improve 
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understanding of vulnerability generally relied upon nutritional and socio-economic 
indicators and paid less attention to the inherently political nature of vulnerability: ‘[t]he 
displacement process has been economically and politically manipulated by government 
in the north … [but] agencies have paid less attention to wider and underlying political 
issues’ (Danida, 1999b: Executive Summary).  
 
The importance of strong social and political analysis is particularly important in 
respect of efforts on behalf of forced migrants, since the causes, dynamics, implications 
of, and solutions to, forced displacement are so inherently political in most cases. The 
potential implications of failing to link the planning of humanitarian interventions with 
a the political process in terms of compromising protection efforts and the sustainability 
of assistance interventions by are illustrated by the case of UNHCR’s repatriation 
efforts in Angola following the 1994 Lusaka Protocol: 
 
‘UNHCR engaged in heroic efforts … to repatriate some of the large numbers of 
refugees in neighbouring countries. Vehicles were purchased, provincial 
infrastructure was rehabilitated, schools, health posts and hospitals put in place. 
Many refugees did return but, when fighting was renewed in May 1998, they 
could not be protected and even more refugees fled’ (Danida, 1999a: Executive 
Summary). 
 
In their study of internally displaced populations in Kismaayo, Somalia, Narbeth and 
McLean note underline the importance of protection and assistance programmes and 
strategies to, as they put it, ‘think multi-clan’ at all levels: 
 
‘In Kismaayo, aid resources are likely to be a source of dispute, destabilizing an 
already-fragile environment and reinforcing the existing socio-economic 
divisions and patterns of power. This raises a number of issues (and 
challenges)…. International assistance must be sensitive to the multi-clan 
topography of Kismaayo and the Lower Juba in general’ (Narbeth and McLean, 
2003: 14). 
 
In the light of inter-clan dynamics, they recommend, for example, ‘mobile resources’ 
such as mobile health clinics operating a multi-location and multi-clan itinerary, as 
potentially preferable to ‘fixed’ facilities (ibid: 15). 
 
ALNAP recommends that significant efforts be made to strengthen social science skills 
within agencies, noting that qualitative issues encompassing social and political 
processes are only likely to be captured by skilled observers through ongoing 
communication with stakeholders:  
 
‘good monitoring depends as much on the quality of staff as it does on the 
systems themselves. The most important area for agencies to focus on over the 
short term, therefore, is strengthening field staff ability to carry out participatory 
social science analysis’ (ALNAP, 2003: 121). 
 
UNDG/ECHA Working Group reporting recently on ‘transition issues’ argues that the 
uniqueness of each (transition) situation, grounded in the particular history of the 
conflict and the consequent humanitarian crisis, must be assessed and well understood if 
the response to it is to be appropriate and effective: ‘[t]his requires, inter alia, resisting 
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the temptation to replicate wholesale what might have worked in one … context without 
first considering what is unique to each situation and then adapting lessons learned and 




Recommendation to DFID:  
To actively support effective capacity-building in the area of social science skills among 
partner agencies and NGOs to significantly improve field staff ability to carry out 
participatory social and political analysis. Stronger context analysis will support better 
understanding of the causes, dynamics and implications of forced migration, and enable 
agencies to incorporate this understanding into programming on behalf of forced 
migrants. DFID’s support in this area might include specific attention to supporting the 
ability of implementing agencies to use DFID’s Conflict Assessment Framework. Given 
the risk of information overload within humanitarian agencies, it is important for DFID 
to think strategically about the specific types of field-based assessment, monitoring and 
analysis that require the most support. 
 
 
3. ‘JOINING UP’ ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY ACROSS GOVERNMENT: 
THE NEED FOR COHERENCE 
 
It would be naïve, of course, to suggest that improved political analysis will 
automatically lead to improved programming, since in the political realm, there are 
always a host of competing political realities that will affect donor and agency 
programming decisions positively or negatively, irrespective of the quality of analysis. 
As argued in the Mid-Year Review of the 2001 CAP for Uganda:  
 
‘any exit strategy [for humanitarian actors] will be contingent upon Member 
States of the UN engaging in preventive diplomacy with all parties … to apply 
political and economic pressure to diffuse or contain the conflict and continued 
displacement. The unwillingness to deal responsibly with friendly or 
strategically important actors will perpetuate the need for humanitarian 
assistance and foreclose on alternative / transitional activities or exit strategies’ 
(UNOCHA, 2001). 
 
In a review of refugee return and reintegration, Macrae points to the possibility of 
operational agencies such as UNHCR becoming trapped between observable political 
realities on the ground and the higher-level political momentum of the formal politics of 
transition in ‘post-‘ or protracted conflict situations. In one particular case of refugee 
repatriation and reintegration, UNHCR was apparently seeing daily the effects of 
deteriorating security conditions on their operations and on their constituents; yet 
UNHCR’s ability to reorient its programme and prepare for a major collapse in the 
peace process was limited, since this would have signaled the failure of the political 
process. Macrae observes that it is this ‘constitutional inability to formulate an 
independent political analysis, and to (be seen to) act upon it’ that constitutes an 
important constraint to UNHCR’s efficacy in such situations (Macrae, 1999: 26). 
 
The need for improved coherence between humanitarian, human rights and political 
interventions and processes is widely recognized, if not widely practiced, right across 
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the international humanitarian system and by the international community more 
generally. This is reflected in the UK Government’s Conflict Reduction and Conflict 
Prevention strategy and its establishment of two joint DFID / FCO / MoD Conflict 
Prevention Pools (CPPs) in April 2001 (an Africa CPP, and a Global CPP for the rest of 
the world), providing for joint analysis, financing, coordination and strategising 
between the Departments concerned. The CPP mechanism was created to help the three 
Departments develop common approaches and strategies to achieve their joint target for 
the reduction of violent conflict. While not all conflict reduction and prevention 
activities are funded by the Pools, those that are must involve a comprehensive 
approach involving all three Departments. Despite some difficulties with 
implementation – such as varying levels of trust and understanding of different issues 
between the Departments – a recent evaluation of the CPPs involving six 
geographically- and thematically-focused case studies concludes that the CPPs are 
‘doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions 
to effective conflict prevention’, although it is too early to assess impact (DFID, 2004: 
iv). The DFID Secretary of State’s report to the Chairs of UK Parliamentary Select 
Committees in May 2002 stated that the CPPs have resulted in improved 
interdepartmental policy cooperation, better policy analysis and implementation, and a 
stronger UK contribution to international conflict prevention efforts (DFID, 2003: 33-
34).  
 
Since forced displacement represents such a central component in the causes and 
resolution of so many conflicts around the world, the CPPs could provide an important 
resource for DFID to encourage ‘joined up’ analysis and strategy across Government 
with respect to preventing forced displacement and mitigating or minimizing the worst 
impacts of forced migration in particular countries and regions. Where joint 
Departmental analysis and strategizing would add value to specific areas of policy or 
action, forced migration could be included as a distinct thematic and/or geographical 
focus of both CPPs, such as where the achievement of safe and durable solutions to 
refugee problems are a prerequisite to the reduction, prevention or resolution of 
particular conflicts. 
 
Efforts to pool analytical resources should extend beyond these three Departments, 
however, since in many areas, DFID also needs to be engaging proactively with other 
parts of Government, including the Home Office and the Cabinet Office. This is 
underlined by the recent publication by the Cabinet Office and Home Office of a ‘non-
paper’ proposing moves towards ‘extra-territorial processing’ of asylum claims and the 
establishment of ‘protection areas’ for asylum-seekers and refugees in the regions of 
origin – policies which, if implemented, could have profound implications for refugee 
protection and wider political dynamics in many of the countries where DFID works 
(Betts, 2003; Crisp, 2003a). 
 
Recommendations to DFID:  
 
(i) To use the CPPs as a key resource to support closer liaison and cooperation with 
FCO and MoD to develop more effective responses to particular conflict-related 
situations of forced migration and to develop more general commonalities of 
understanding and approach to forced migration issues between the three Departments. 
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(ii) To engage more closely with the Home Office and the Cabinet Office, with the 
emphasis on joint long-term and strategic scenario planning, e.g. to explore jointly with 
the Home Office how changes in refugee policies in the UK and other EU / OECD 
countries might impact on standards and forms of refugee protection and assistance in 
poorer countries, and what the longer-term implications of any changes in the 
international refugee regime might be worldwide. 
 
 
4. BENEFICIARY / PRIMARY STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION AND 
PARTICIPATION & RIGHTS-BASED HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
 
There is a growing consensus that understanding the causes and consequences of forced 
population displacements, assessing the needs of those displaced and of host 
populations, identifying and targeting the most vulnerable people within these 
populations, and planning and monitoring appropriate responses, will all be 
strengthened by the increased involvement of refugees and displaced persons and other 
primary stakeholders. And yet, according to the two most recent ALNAP reviews, there 
has been a wholesale failure across the humanitarian system to mainstream more 
participatory approaches and methods across the cycle of humanitarian projects and 
programmes, from design and planning, through implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. In its 2002 annual review, ALNAP stated that: 
 
‘there were no examples of good practice [re. participation of primary 
stakeholders] that could be highlighted from this year’s reports, which should 
illustrate the extent of the problem, and the urgent need for development of good 
practice’ (ALNAP, 2002: Section 4.3.6). 
 
Again, in 2003, it was observed that agencies ‘are mostly non-participatory and have 
not included primary stakeholders’ (ALNAP, 2003: 112). This complaint is echoed in 
many of the reports reviewed for this paper, such as in recent evaluations of ECHO 
programmes in Sudan (‘[b]eneficiaries have only exceptionally participated in project 
decision-making) and Afghanistan (‘[a] more concerted effort is required to move 
beneficiary / community involvement into the sphere of the project planning cycle’) and 
the 1999 evaluation of Danida’s programmes in the Great Lakes region (‘[t]here should 
… be much greater use of information of an anthropological nature, whereby the 
perceptions of the beneficiaries could be understood without putting anybody at risk’) 
(ECHO, 2004a: 63; ECHO, 2003a: 8; Danida, 1999c: Executive Summary). According 
to a recent evaluation of ECHO programmes in Afghanistan, the development of 
mechanisms to ensure community / beneficiary feedback ‘would promote more 
appropriate targeting and would promote ownership of programmes by the community’ 
(ECHO, 2004a: 63). 
 
There are considerably more constraints and risks associated with beneficiary 
consultation and participation in humanitarian emergency situations compared with 
‘normal’ development contexts, given the complexity and fast-moving nature of many 
emergencies and the need for speedy and decisive responses on the part of humanitarian 
actors. These risks and constraints do not excuse the sector from striving to increase the 
direct involvement of beneficiaries, but they do mean that particularly careful thought 
and significant resources need to be put into this aspect of programming if beneficiary 
consultation and participation are to be brought systematically into the mainstream of 
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refugee / IDP and broader humanitarian programming. Growing concern with 
beneficiary participation has generated some new initiatives among NGOs and 
operational agencies to adapt participatory methods for application in emergency and 
relief situations, and, clearly, high quality initiatives of this kind deserve concerted 
donor support.  
 
Particularly in the context of protracted displacement crises, characterized by effectively 
long-term protection and care-and-maintenance programmes, there is indeed 
considerable scope for involving both displaced and host communities and groups at 
every stage of the project or programme cycle, and to develop capacities and ownership 
within these communities. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, where many refugees have 
been enabled to settle and integrate outside camps, Kuhlman notes how: 
 
‘Decision-making has been relatively top-down and in particular has not 
sufficiently involved refugees themselves. Yet, refugees are locally quite well 
organised. It is recommended that they be taken seriously as partners, to the 
extent that they should be encouraged to develop structures at national level, 
which can be accepted as discussion partners in policy-making – together with 
UNHCR and the Ivorian government’ (Kuhlman, 2002: 6). 
 
Kaiser points to the need for more consistent use of participatory methodologies in the 
evaluation of humanitarian action. She notes that both DFID and Danida are moving 
towards participatory evaluation, but there is scant evidence that beneficiary-based 
methods are actually being used by many evaluators and organizations. With respect to 
DFID, she notes that the Evaluation Department does not generally define research 
methods in advance with evaluators, and that DFID evaluation reports usually contain 
little description of methods used. Reflecting an awareness of weaknesses in this area, 
DFID has initiated a process to expand the use of new participatory approaches (Kaiser, 
2002: 10). This should apply equally to DFID’s humanitarian programmes as to its 
development programming – including, of course, the design, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of programmes concerned directly or indirectly with refugees and IDPs. 
 
The importance of improved beneficiary participation extends to all areas of protection 
and assistance for refugee and other displaced populations, including the coverage and 
targeting of assistance interventions, and protection efforts at all levels. Beneficiary 
consultation is particularly pertinent for achieving more detailed, disaggregated needs 
assessments. A recent critique of WFP’s Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping 
(VAM), for instance, notes that ‘[t]oo much emphasis may have been placed on 
geographic targeting at the expense of targeting more distinct groups of food-insecure 
beneficiaries with specific vulnerabilities, based more on demographic criteria or 
livelihood strategies’ (WFP, 2000, Annex 2:6; ALNAP, 2002: 103). This more ‘fine-
tuned’ form of needs assessment cannot be carried out effectively without a higher level 
of beneficiary consultation. The 2001 evaluation of WFP’s food assistance for refugees 
and refugee repatriation in Ethiopia noted good practice in the use of refugee interviews 
to disaggregate primary stakeholders into categories associated with different 
repatriation and livelihood options (WFP, 2001a). And the 2001 evaluation of ECHO’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone concluded that, in the IDP camps, ‘there was a growing 
realization that a demand-driven approach through increasing people’s participation 
contributed to coverage and use more than a supply-driven approach (ECHO, 2001: 14). 
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A recent evaluation of Oxfam-GB’s humanitarian programme in Bujumbura-Rurale 
drew principally on information from community members using participatory methods. 
This evaluation found that participatory approaches had proved feasible in the context 
of Oxfam-GB’s programme, even in this context of limited access and contact, but that 
identification of needs and intervention design had nevertheless been weakened by top-
down approaches. The relatively greater vulnerability of people in the residual IDP sites 
was consequently not fully appreciated, and community views about the relative priority 
of water/sanitation and vector-borne disease were not taken into account. The evaluation 
further concluded that ‘[h]ad the project … been more participatory in the identification, 
design and monitoring phases, there would have been more opportunity to incorporate 
further gender-specific input, analyses and objectives’ (Oxfam-GB, 2002: Executive 
Summary).  
 
As regards protection, an evaluation of UNHCR’s policy on refugee women highlights 
the importance of ongoing communication and consultation with beneficiaries, 
particularly members of vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly, disabled, ethnic 
minorities, etc.) for identifying local protection problems within refugee communities, 
including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In this respect, community service 
officers appear to have performed a more significant role than protection officers, since, 
in all the sites visited, protection officers considered their primary realm of action to be 
the legal sphere (focusing on questions of access, admission, status determination, and 
repatriation) and their visits to refugee camps were often short and infrequent. With 
reductions in community service posts (due to a general reduction in donor support) and 
a concomitant reduction in ongoing consultation with women and other beneficiaries, 
the evaluators warn that the ability of UNHCR to protect refugee women and other 
vulnerable groups will be further weakened: 
 
‘This assessment found that many women and girls suffer SGBV throughout 
their refugee experience … However … in most refugee settings there is little 
awareness about the problem and few coordinated efforts to prevent abuses and 
respond when abuses occur. In the field, some UNHCR staff noted that they 
rarely received information, must less accurate information, about rape, 
domestic violence, or sexual exploitation’ (UNHCR, 2002a: 4). 
 
Similarly, in Kismaayo, Somalia, understanding and addressing the protection 
environment and identifying vulnerable groups – including weak and powerless clans – 
would require sensitive beneficiary consultation to reveal ‘subtleties of political, 
economic and social discrimination [that] remain largely hidden to outsiders’. 
According to Narbeth and McClean: 
 
‘Individuals from weak and powerless clans such as the Bantu, Bajuni and 
Galgaala (including those in IDP camps) rarely enjoy the protection afforded to 
others. These entrenched socio-ethnic divisions affect access to economic capital 
(such as employment opportunities); this in turn affects the degree of access (or 
reinforces the lack of access) to education and health facilities … When human 
rights violations take place … individuals from ‘minority’ or weak clans in 
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Recognising the marginalisation and vulnerability of particular ethnic or other social 
groups and acting to address this marginalisation and assert claims to protection on the 
basis of more participatory approaches to humanitarian programming calls for a more 
politically engaged mode of humanitarian action based on the concept of rights, rather 
than the more traditional philanthropic needs-based approach discussed below (Darcy & 
Hofmann, 2003: 22; Slim, 2001). As argued by Hugo Slim: 
 
‘this shift involves humanitarian philosophy in a move from sentimental, 
paternalistic and privileged discourse of philanthropy and charity, to the 
political, egalitarian and empowering ideology of rights and duties … political 
events in the last 10 y ears have combined with a new commitment by 
humanitarian agencies to put their core beliefs on paper since the Rwandan 
genocide and have involved humanitarians being much more explicit about their 
values in recent years’ (Slim, 2000: 3; ALNAP, 2002: 139). 
 
Yet, as noted by ALNAP in its 2002 annual review of humanitarian evaluations, if there 
has been a shift in humanitarian programming towards rights-based humanitarian 
action, it remains largely rhetorical, ‘with interventions still firmly set in the 
philanthropic mode, i.e., externally determined and driven with limited participation 
from the affected population’ (ALNAP, 2002: 139). Darcy and Hofmann argue that the 
apparent dichotomy that has developed between needs and rights is unhelpful and 
misleading, and that there is no necessary incompatibility between the two; the principal 
value of rights-based programming, they argue, lies in ‘the ability to identify more 
precisely responsibilities for humanitarian outcomes, and to bring corresponding 
influence to bear on those responsible’ (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003: 23).  
 
It is particularly important for participatory rights-based programming to be supported 
by high-quality analysis and knowledge of the social, political and economic context 
and for it to be conducted sensitively, since any active engagement by humanitarian 
agencies in the political economy of vulnerability carries risks for beneficiaries and 
other primary stakeholders, as well as for the agencies themselves (Collinson, 2003). 
Targeting certain forms of assistance specifically at vulnerable groups, for instance, 
may have negative protection implications in particular social or political contexts. This, 
again, underlines the importance of supporting high quality sociological and political 
analysis in all situations of humanitarian action. 
 
Recommendations to DFID:  
 
(i) To devote significant resources to developing effective methodologies and guidance 
for improved on-the-ground consultation and participation of refugees, IDPs and other 
primary stakeholders to support improved needs assessment, improved understanding of 
the causes and consequences of forced migration and develop appropriate responses, 
including protection activities, and to identify and target the most vulnerable people 
within beneficiary populations. 
 
(ii) To work with and actively support partner agencies and NGOs to strengthen their 
capacities to pursue effective participatory approaches. 
 
(iii) To work with implementing agencies to strengthen their protection activities on 
behalf of forced migrants and vulnerable groups within displaced and non-displaced 
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populations, including active capacity-building in the area of rights-based programming 
to enable agencies to consider more comprehensively where and how needs- and rights-
based programming can be combined to achieve improved protection outcomes. 
 
(iv) To strengthen partner agencies’ and NGOs’ accountability for more effective 
participatory and protection-focused action on behalf of forced migrants through, e.g., 





The dominant paradigm shaping the stated policies of many agencies concerned with 
providing in-country humanitarian assistance to both displaced and non-displaced 
populations is to provide assistance on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of pre-
conceived categories, albeit paying special attention to the specific needs of potentially 
vulnerable groups (including women, children, the elderly, disabled). In its response to 
the House of Commons IDC Kosovo Inquiry (1998-99), the UK Government stated that 
‘DFID has encouraged integrated projects that benefit both refugees and poor host 
communities with priority to the poorest and most vulnerable’ (International 
Development Committee, 1999: paragraph 26). A recent policy document outlining 
WFP’s approach to assisting displaced populations states that WFP: 
 
‘will target displaced populations on the basis of food insecurity rather than 
identify them as a particular group. The Programme will apply the same 
targeting criteria to displaced persons that it does to other food-insecure groups, 
while making a special effort to understand and address the particular needs of 
IDPs … In general, it is not appropriate to target IDPs per se as a group for food 
assistance, especially when there are other needy and vulnerable persons in the 
same situation. While there may be some situations in which the internally 
displaced will be specifically targeted (for example those living in transit centres 
of camp-like situations), in others, IDPs are much better assisted through 
programmes aimed at broader segments of the food-insecure population’ (WFP, 
2001b: 8). 
 
Similarly, a 2003 evaluation of ECHO’s programme in Sudan comments that: 
 
‘ECHO has funded projects based on the assessment of needs in the field, not 
using any pre-conceived categories (such as IDPs, refugees and local 
population). The rigid categorization of potential recipients of ECHO aid into 
these three categories is not contributory to carrying out the ECHO mandate in 
Southern Sudan’ (ECHO, 2003a: 7). 
 
This needs-based approach is also endorsed by the 2004 evaluation of ECHO’s 
Afghanistan programme, and the 2003 evaluation of its Angola programme (ECHO, 
2004a; ECHO, 2003b). The latter comments that vulnerability criteria are the best 
instrument of targeting, not least because, in a long-lasting emergency, displacement 
inevitably evolves into a variety of situations and degrees of vulnerability: 
 
‘those displaced long ago and effectively resettled versus those newly displaced 
and in urgent need; those displaced to nearby towns versus those who ended up 
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in other provinces; quasi-economic migrants versus those who fled combat, etc.’ 
(ECHO, 2003b: 8). 
 
Similarly, the evaluation of Oxfam-GB’s programme in Bujumbura Rurale notes that: 
 
‘The pattern of humanitarian problems in Bujumbura Rurale is no longer one of 
large-scale displacement into camps. It is more one of short-term, short-distance, 
repetitive displacement: families often have to flee their homes for a few days or 
weeks, taking shelter elsewhere in the colline, then returning to find their 
household goods stolen, and their crops destroyed, stolen, or suffering from 
neglect. Such patterns make it hard to identify and target affected people…. 
Oxfam’s humanitarian programme in Colombia seems to be a similar case, and 
perhaps there are relevant lessons from that programme’ (Oxfam-GB, 2002: 
Executive Summary). 
 
This Angola report also notes that non-displaced people in areas isolated from 
humanitarian aid are often found to be in worse condition than IDPs, and that 
discrimination based on simplistic categorization could increase tension among the 
various social groups (ibid). Narbeth and McLean observe that in Kismaayo, ‘material 
assistance has to be provided to a wider community than just the IDPs, in terms of 
neutrality and impartiality on the one hand, but also as a pragmatic means to reduce the 
potential for conflict between groups, or the targeting of aid providers’ (Narbeth and 
McLean, 2003: 17). 
 
The recent evaluation of ECHO’s Afghanistan programme goes further to argue that 
refugees, whether in countries or asylum or returning to Afghanistan, ‘do not 
necessarily represent the most vulnerable segment of the population’. The report 
observes that ‘the fact that they have been able to travel to neighbouring countries is in 
itself an indicator that they have had sufficient means to leave’. Thus, the principal 
reason for assisting this category of people is both to afford them international 
protection and to help host governments bear the impact of large refugee burdens 
(ECHO, 2004a: 57). The International Development Committee’s 2001 report on the 
humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan noted the extreme vulnerability of people referred to 
as ‘internally stranded’: ‘many people are already too weak or lack the resources to 
move from their villages – they are too weak even to become displaced’ (International 
Development Committee, 2001: para. 31-32). According to the IDC, DFID calculated 
that, in November 2001, the estimated number of internally stranded persons 
(4,150,000) was almost four times the number of IDPs (1,200,000) and over twice the 
number of refugees in Pakistan (2,000,000), and exceeded the total number of externally 
displaced Afghan refugees (3,695,000). 
 
Of course, an impartial needs-based approach to assisting both displaced and non-
displaced populations begs the very big question of the quality of the needs assessment 
underpinning the targeting of assistance. This problem is widely documented and 
discussed elsewhere (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003); suffice to say here that the many 
fundamental problems that bedevil needs assessment more generally in humanitarian 
action also apply to needs assessment among displaced communities and their ‘host’ 
populations. With specific reference to refugee populations, a 2002 WFP report on 
Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Iran analysed WFP’s coverage of different refugee 
populations inside and outside camp, between camps, and differential needs within 
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camps, and found a general lack of data on those outside camps. This report concluded 
that: 
 
‘it is generally true that the more vulnerable refugees are in camps, but in the 
absence of survey data it is not possible to be sure that this is the case or that all 
refugees outside camps are coping. The camps might have originally 
accommodated the most vulnerable, but given that the government seems to 
have more or less frozen the number of refugees in camps it is difficult to 
maintain that they continue to serve the function of accommodating those unable 
to achieve self-reliance’ (WFP, 2002a: 4-5). 
 
Meanwhile, the 2002 WFP Great Lakes evaluation notes that one indicator of a 
successful programme is that refugee populations demonstrate consistently better 
nutritional status than the host population, which begs the question of whether other 
vulnerable groups within the non-displaced population have been marginalised from 
humanitarian efforts (ALNAP, 2003: 68; and WFP, 2002b). 
 
Probably the clearest set of recommendations relating to coverage of host populations in 
any recent evaluations remain those contained within the 1996 Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). The joint evaluation noted that while 
certain groups and enterprises gained from hosting large refugee or displaced 
populations, others experienced substantial losses – and these impacts were distributed 
unevenly. There were heavy environmental and other costs imposed by the large 
refugee camps on local populations in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi, as well as on local 
populations surrounding IDP camps, and some of these costs resulted from flawed 
agency policies. Moreover, the international community was slow to provide 
compensation to those affected, and, as a consequence, host communities came 
increasingly to resent the presence of the refugees. Recommendations leading out of this 
assessment include: 
 
‘Standard operating policies and procedures should be prepared for donor 
organizations, UN agencies and NGOs that will help to minimize and mitigate 
adverse impacts of relief operations (whether refugee or IDP) on surrounding 
populations and their environment. … A quick-disbursing fund should be 
established (or alternatively allowed to draw from the existing UNHCR 
Emergency Response Fund) to provide early compensation to the host 
communities in the immediate vicinity of refugee /IDP concentrations. … [And 
strategies should be pursued] that minimize negative impact of refugee / IDP 
concentrations on host communities, such as: providing food that requires little 
or no cooking; providing fuel for cooking; extending camp infrastructure and 
services (healthcare, water supply, etc.) to surrounding local populations; and 
rehabilitating physical infrastructure (e.g. roads and airstrips) damaged in 
meeting relief needs’ (JEEAR, 1996). 
 
Despite ECHO pursuing a more explicitly impartial and needs-based policy on assisting 
displaced and non-displaced populations, a recent evaluation of ECHO’s programmes in 
Afghanistan concluded that refugees and IDPs were nonetheless being singled out for 
assistance and that certain projects had been specifically targeted to support refugees, 
IDPs and returnees as exclusive beneficiaries of return assistance and other forms of 
support. Nevertheless, the evaluators note that ECHO had made specific efforts to 
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include non-displaced vulnerable people in its projects, such as through the selection of 
beneficiaries for shelter activities on the basis of greatest need, without distinguishing 
between returnees or local populations; selection of communities in return areas for 
irrigation, WATSAN, health, skills training and income generation activities which 
benefit the whole community; winterization projects targeting the urban poor as well as 
returnees and IDPs; provision of health services in the poorest and remotest 
communities without discriminating between local and returnee populations; social 
programmes for women and children to improve livelihood skills irrespective of 
displacement status; and activities in drought-affected areas designed to benefit the local 
community as well as returning IDPs. The evaluation team concluded that this was a 
sound pragmatic approach in the circumstances in the time period evaluated 
(understaffing, large funds disbursement, need to identify large numbers of 
beneficiaries) but that a more ‘needs approach’ should become appropriate as such 
pressures moderate (ECHO, 2004a: 55-57). 
 
The need for emergency assistance to pre-conceived categories to give way eventually 
to more impartial needs-based assistance to both displaced and non-displaced 
populations is similarly emphasised in the 1999 evaluation of Danish support to UN 
agencies and international humanitarian organizations, which concluded that: 
 
‘The high financial costs of humanitarian assistance reflects the recognized need 
of refugees and others directly affected by armed conflict to special assistance 
and protection …However, a similar claim cannot be justified for returnee, or 
generally for rehabilitation and reintegration of conflict-affected persons, who, 
along with the rest of often very poor communities, are part of the development 
process … the emphasis should be to maximise self-reliance as soon as possible 
for those affected and for their communities’ (Danida, 1999d). 
 
This Danida evaluation also emphasizes the importance of ensuring that national 
authorities are made more responsible and accountable for protection and assistance, 
which is arguably more difficult to achieve if international humanitarian actors single 
out particular groups for special assistance and fail to ensure broader ownership and 
responsibility by local authorities for the assistance and protection of all vulnerable 
people. 
 
Uneven or ineffective coverage among displaced populations or between displaced and 
host populations often also results from lack of humanitarian access, which, again, is an 
issue of broad concern across the international humanitarian sector. In Angola, for 
instance, the question of coverage between displaced and non-displaced populations 
was largely obviated on a practical level in the past by the fact that until the ceasefire, 
the neediest people who were not displaced were in areas inaccessible to humanitarian 
action (ECHO, 2003b: 8). Problems with coverage have also been found to result from 
inappropriate programming decisions. The evaluation of Danida’s humanitarian 
programme during the 1990s noted that, following the 1991-1994 war in Azerbaijan, 
UNHCR (as main implementing agency in the region) put considerable effort into 
relocating families of IDPs to specially constructed sites, with over 30,000 people 
moved. This, however, was fewer than 5% of all IDPs, and only one third of those in 
serious need. The evaluators concluded that: ‘[c]oncentrating on relocating some IDPs 
and doing very little for a far greater number of vulnerable people seems inappropriate 
and obviously represents a failure in coverage’ (Danida, 1999a: chapter 5). 
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Possibly the greatest single contributor to poor humanitarian coverage among and 
between displaced and host populations is uneven donor funding, which in turn is likely 
to be linked to political decisions of host governments, donors and humanitarian 
agencies themselves (ALNAP, 2003: 67). According to the NAO evaluation of DFID’s 
response to humanitarian emergencies, DFID has calculated that, since 1997, the per 
capita level of humanitarian assistance it has provided in European emergencies has 
been five times higher than for emergencies in Africa. This difference, it concluded, 
could not be explained simply by differences in the cost of delivery and associated 
security, but raised the possibility that wider strategic considerations were important in 
determining the allocation of resources (NAO, 2003: 4). The most recent report of the 
UN Secretary-General on Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance 
observes that the pattern of funding humanitarian activities remains uneven, leaving 
some countries substantially under-financed; countries such as the Central African 
Republic received only 5% of their requirements in 2003 (UN General Assembly 
Economic and Social Council, 2004: 2). Yet there is little examination of these issues in 
evaluations of humanitarian action: as noted by ALNAP: 
 
‘[e]valuation reports tend to steer clear of wider political issues such as 
diversion of food aid from one emergency to another or donors’ refusal to fund 
particular governments’ (ALNAP, 2003: 67). 
 
Persistent donor under-funding of particular crises further undermines impartial needs-
based programming at the field level. As noted in the 1999 evaluation of Danida 
programming in Sudan, operational agencies have reduced appeals according to what 
they envisage donors will tolerate, and, as a consequence: 
 
‘some aid agencies have started to revise downwards the standards to which they 
are working – an ominous development. This was particularly significant in the 
case of WFP. Until late in 1998, they used a 1900 kcal daily requirement to 
calculate needs and to target, rather than the internationally recognized 
minimum rate of 2100 kcal per day’ (Danida, 1999a: Executive Summary). 
 
Donor coordination also represents a key issue for humanitarian coverage with respect 
to displaced and other vulnerable or conflict-affected populations. The recent ECHO 
Angola evaluation, for instance, observes that, since humanitarian need in Angola is 
strongly correlated with displacement, a comparison of ECHO’s funding with the 
number of IDPs per province raises questions with regard to coverage. While regions 
with comparatively fewer IDPs (e.g. Moxico) are receiving funding, other regions with 
much higher numbers are not. The lack of funding in some cases is likely to be due to 
coverage by other donors. The evaluators recommend that ECHO pro-actively 
determines whether humanitarian needs are being met across all areas, and, if not, and if 
no implementing partner is present, ECHO should stimulate necessary interventions 
wither by interested agencies or by informing OCHA, which could use its Emergency 
Response Fund if funds are available (ECHO, 2003b: 4). 
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Recommendations to DFID: 
 
(i) To work actively with partner agencies and NGOs to improve the quality of on-the-
ground needs assessments in situations of forced displacement to ensure more effective 
humanitarian coverage among both displaced and non-displaced populations. 
 
(ii) To clarify DFID’s own position on needs-based versus group-based assistance and 
protection in situations of forced migration, including clarification of how needs-based 
assistance efforts should or can link with more group-based protection activities, and to 
ensure that the practice of implementing agencies regarding needs versus group-based 
programming in the field is examined in evaluations of DFID-funded humanitarian 
action on behalf of forced migrants. 
 
(iii) To continue to work proactively to improve donor coordination in situations of 
complex and large-scale displacement, for example, by actively seeking to determine if 
humanitarian needs are being met in all geographic areas and among all vulnerable 
groups and taking whatever remedial action is possible where significant gaps are found 
in humanitarian coverage. 
 
(iv) To ensure that any closer cooperation with FCO, MoD or Home Office in the area 
of forced migration (e.g. through CPPs) does not result in any distortion of DFID 
funding of assistance to different refugee and IDP emergencies as a consequence of the 
particular strategic, political or defence concerns of the other Departments. 
 
(v) To review how far DFID and its partner agencies, NGOs and other donors have 
gone towards implementing the recommendations of the 1996 JEEAR, including those 
relating to coverage of displaced and host communities. 
 
 
6. ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS 
 
Alongside stated policies of impartial needs-based programming at a general level, most 
donor and operational agencies are becoming increasingly aware of – if not always 
more responsive to – the specific needs of particular vulnerable groups. As noted in a 
recent review of ECHO’s needs-based humanitarian policy, categories are widely used 
in humanitarian assistance to label groups with special needs, according to displacement 
status (e.g. refugee, IDP, returnee, ‘old’ / ‘new’ caseload, host etc.), personal attributes 
(e.g. gender, age, disability), health status (e.g. HIV), ethnic group, wealth, etc.; some 
categories are closely associated with higher levels of need and vulnerability, but these 
general characteristics are never the sole indicator (ECHO, 2004b: 4-5).  
 
This, in a sense, is what underpins the international refugee regime and associated 
instruments concerned with IDPs, since, in terms of protection needs – as opposed to 
purely humanitarian assistance needs – refugees and IDPs represent distinctly 
vulnerable groups due to their displacement status. It is this specific protection need that 
represents the foundation of UNHCR’s unique protection mandate for refugees and 
other ‘populations of concern’, including IDPs. IDPs, of course, represent a distinct and 
vulnerable category within global displaced populations, as discussed further below.  
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Among both externally and internally displaced populations (and host populations), 
there are a number of identifiable groups who may be especially vulnerable and 
therefore require special attention if their assistance and protection is to be equal to that 
of other members of the population. As noted in the conclusions of a recent evaluation 
workshop convened by the UNHCR to assess UNHCR’s operational experience of 
protecting IDPs, ‘UNHCR should ensure that all the members of an IDP population 
receive equal treatment, while also paying special attention to the special protection 
needs of children, women, ethnic monitories and other groups with particular needs’ 
(UNHCR, 2002b: 4).  
 
However, as discussed below in the context of specific groups (women, children, urban 
refugees and IDPs) success in the protection of vulnerable groups has been patchy at 
best. As noted in the 2003 ECHO evaluation in Sudan: 
 
‘There was no evidence children have been specifically targeted as a vulnerable 
group with special needs. Child protection issues have received no special 
attention. Gender issues overall, women-headed households, the elderly, the 
orphans / separated children and the handicapped have received little explicit 
attention as well’ (ECHO, 2003a: 7). 
 
As observed in its 2002 review of humanitarian evaluations, agency failure to promote 
gender equality (and that of other vulnerable groups) is linked to the fact that the 
concept is based on a rights approach, while, as noted above, most assistance remains 
centred on a needs approach (ALNAP, 2002: 139-140). Nevertheless, a number of 
recent evaluations concerned with examining whether or not particular agencies are 
achieving effective protection and assistance for particular vulnerable groups have been 
explicitly concerned with rights-based issues and, as discussed below, have resulted in 
important insights into why agencies continue to fail in this area, and in concrete 
recommendations as to how agencies can improve their ability to protect vulnerable 
groups. As noted below, an important obstacle to more effective protection activities on 
behalf of vulnerable groups appears to be the plethora of protection and other priorities 
in the field to which staff and partners are expected to respond, with the result that field 
staff are overburdened with competing priorities with little clarity or guidance on how 
or where to focus their attention (UNHCR, 2002d: 4). 
 
Recommendation to DFID: 
 
To work with partner agencies and NGOs on developing more effective mechanisms for 
communicating protection and other priorities to field staff and to better support the 
ability of field staff to balance and respond to apparently competing priorities, including 
the protection and assistance of different vulnerable groups. 
 
6.1. Women 
The special needs of displaced women include support to develop new coping 
mechanisms and livelihoods, steps to ensure socio-cultural biases that discriminate 
against women are not reinforced, protection from physical violence and sexual abuse 
and exploitation, and protection of property rights and entitlements (WFP, 2001b: 6). A 
recent assessment of UNHCR’s application of its policy on refugee women and 
guidelines on their protection, based on a five-country study, concluded that, although 
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positive examples were found of enhanced protection in accordance with the guidelines 
(such as improved capacity for gender-sensitive status determination, bringing refugee 
women into camp management, wider availability of reproductive health services, 
establishment of safe houses and counselling services, etc.), ‘positive actions tend to be 
sporadic, and they are often insufficient to provide refugee women with equitable 
protection’ (UNHCR, 2002c: 1). Thus, for example, in every site, women described 
others who exchanged sex for otherwise unavailable food and non-food items. And 
there were serious inadequacies in clothing, blankets and sanitary materials among 
camp-based refugees that impeded women’s ability to participate in education, 
employment and other activities. Similarly, an evaluation of UNHCR’s repatriation and 
reintegration efforts among Guatemalan refugees found that, although an early decision 
to involve both men and women of each family in receiving assistance had a positive 
effect (e.g. staff were able to speak directly to women and women could mention to 
staff their concerns and were accorded respect in front of their families), around more 
profound issues of gender mainstreaming (e.g. involving women in political and 
logistical negotiations and planning), UNHCR ‘often fell short of its goals’ (UNHCR, 
1999: Preface). The 2003 evaluation of ECHO’s programming in Sudan notes that: 
 
‘Gender issues overall – including the desegregation of data by gender, the 
analysis of access by gender, health educational activities for women and girls, 
the violence against women issue, the training of TBAs, reproductive health 
rights and other – … need to be focused upon more proactively in the years to 
come’ (ECHO, 2003a: 7) 
 
The evaluation of UNHCR’s policy and guidelines on refugee women notes that, to 
some extent, the continued protection problems faced by refugee women result from 
lack of access and resources that impede efforts on behalf of all refugees regardless of 
gender or age. But programmes that directly and indirectly promote women’s protection 
are often cut in a funding crisis. Lack of resources was found to be a serious barrier to 
implementation of the protection guidelines. For example, refugee women and girls are 
at increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection due to their vulnerability to sexual violence and 
exploitation, yet health budgets have not been increased for the purpose of combating 
HIV/AIDs. The report concludes that there is a need for much more systematic 
monitoring of women’s protection issues in refugee and IDP camps and settlements. 
However, ‘staff levels in the field offices and sub-offices are insufficient to identify, 
monitor and resolve protection problems’. Therefore ‘donors should continue to 
promote policies and programs that keep the principles of the Guidelines at the center of 
refugee protection and programming’, and should recognize that ‘fewer resources in the 
field will disproportionately impede the ability of UNHCR to provide protection to 
refugee women and girls’ (UNHCR, 2002c: 1-4). 
 
Recommendations to DFID:  
 
(i) To extend the work that DFID is already doing with UNHCR on strengthening the 
application and implementation of policy guidelines on refugee women to other partner 
agencies and NGOs. 
 
(ii) To work to ensure that staff levels and capacities in the field are sufficient among all 
implementing agencies to ensure the adequate protection of refugee women. 
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(iii) To ensure strengthened accountability of DFID-funded implementing agencies for 
the protection of refugee women through, e.g. partnership agreements, monitoring and 
reporting requirements, and targeted evaluations. 
 
6.2. Children 
Children are especially vulnerable in situations of displacement. Displacement exposes 
children to increased risks of malnutrition and disease, physical danger, emotional 
trauma, exploitation and abuse, poverty and destitution, and it may remove their 
chances of obtaining an education (WFP, 2001b: 6). Children represent half of the 
UNHCR’s population of concern, and yet, according to a 2002 evaluation of the 
agency’s efforts to meet the rights and protection needs of refugee children, their 
specific needs are often overlooked or considered on the sidelines of core protection and 
assistance work (UNHCR, 2002d: 3-4). The report found many positive examples of 
high quality efforts to meet the protection needs of displaced children, but found 
important gaps in the mainstreaming and operationalisation of child protection across 
the agency’s programming, with limited understanding of child rights as a framework 
for child protection in the field, lack of situation analysis, insufficient recognition of the 
social aspects of protection, and insufficient integration with community services and 
their work with community networks. As in the report on refugee women, the evaluators 
point to inadequate resources and support to ensure that child protection obligations are 
fulfilled. In particular, community services and education are inadequately supported, 
both financially and in terms of human resourcing, yet they are among the most 
important sectors to meet the protection needs of children.  
 
The report points to the importance of strengthening accountability in this area, warning 
that policy recommendations are otherwise unlikely to have the desired impact:  
 
‘For many years, the Office has designated refugee children and women as 
‘policy priorities’, but such priorities have become mechanical rather than 
conveying genuine priorities of the organisation’ (ibid: 1-4). 
 
But they also warn that there are so many priorities in the field that field staff and 
partners are overburdened as to where to focus their attention:  
 
‘There is consistent clarity that refugee women, children and the environment 
are policy priorities, but multiple issues or categories of refugees are noted as 
priorities in various documents and communications of the Office’ (ibid: 4). 
 
The report notes that the vast majority of UNHCR’s staff should not be expected to be 
child specialists, but on the other hand, the work of all staff and implementing partners 
should reflect the fact that half of the population of concern (and in many instances the 
portion of that population most at-risk) are children, and all those working in the field 
should be expected to know the key protection risks that they face. 
 
The report lists forty-three recommendations for action in this area, including the 
development of a one-page reference document on key protection issues for refugee 
children (noting that generalist staff were overwhelmed and intimidated by the sheer 
volume of materials contained in the ‘Action for the Rights of the Child’ training 
programme). It recommends that country-level annual planning should require child 
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protection situation analysis and programme planning with all partners. The report also 
recommends the widening of education programming to encompass non-formal 
education for adolescents, including life skills and sex education. 
 
The recent draft report produced by Social Development Direct for DFID on education 
for refugee and IDP children and young adults observes that there is a very mixed 
record on the quality and quantity of education provided to refugee and IDP children 
and youth globally, with IDP needs in particular being hardly met. This results in part 
from the fact that emergency education sits rather uneasily between humanitarian and 
development assistance: education has represented only 1-2% of overall CAP spending 
since 2000, and this is reflected in the fact that interventions are often ad hoc, small 
scale and too narrowly targeted. The authors develop a series of recommendations for 
DFID, including that DFID should clearly position education as a ‘first response’ in 
emergencies for both displaced and non-displaced populations. A stronger policy 
position on education in emergencies – supported by a dedicated post within CHAD or 
closer collaboration with the Education for All team – would help to bolster 
contributions to this area and reduce confusion at country programme level. They 
highlight two potentially strong partners to work with: UNHCR’s Education Unit, and 
the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), and they recommend 
support for the monitoring and action research efforts of NGOs such as Save the 
Children Alliance (Payne and Fraser, 2004). 
 
These recommendations reflect a recognition that, while adequate funding is essential, 
funding alone will not make all the difference. The UNHCR report on child protection 
notes, indeed, that many donor governments earmarked funding for child assistance and 
protection during the 1990s, but much of that funding was not accessed by field 
operations. It appears that, in some cases, field operations were not aware of the 
availability of special funds; this proved a problem with more than US$5 million 
dedicated to ‘at risk’ children by the US government in 1997. For the UNHCR, the 
‘unified budget’ system makes it all the more important that child protection is built into 
country plans and programmes from the outset, since there is to be no ‘additionality’ to 
a field operation’s budget. 
 
 
Recommendations to DFID: 
(i) To match work that DFID is currently pursuing with UNHCR on refugee women and 
the elderly with parallel work on improving the protection of refugee children. 
 
(ii) To prioritise support for refugee education and training, which is of central 
importance to the protection of children and for refugee rights and livelihoods more 
generally. 
 
(iii) To strengthen accountability in this area through partnership agreements, 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and evaluation. 
 
6.3. Urban Refugees 
Two evaluations of UNHCR’s assistance to urban refugees – one concerned with 
Afghan refugees in New Delhi (UNHCR, 2000a), and another focused on urban 
refugees in Cairo (UNHCR, 2001a) – are both highly critical of UNHCR’s policy on 
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urban refugees. This policy, according to the Cairo evaluation, contains a strong 
message to the effect that UNHCR assistance should be reduced to a minimum. Such an 
approach, the report argues: 
 
‘may be effective in reducing dependency and encouraging self-reliance as long 
as the refugees concerned have found a durable solution in a country of asylum 
where they are permitted to work and have access to governmental services on 
the same terms as nationals’ (UNHCR, 2001a: Summary of Conclusions and 
Recommendations). 
 
However, ‘[w]here this is not the case, the progressive reduction of UNHCR assistance 
will only result in worsening the marginalisation and impoverishment of the refugees’. 
Reduced allowances, for instance, has resulted in many children ceasing to go to school. 
The outcome, the evaluators suggest, ‘is entirely counterproductive as the refugees’ 
chances of securing self-reliance are in actual fact diminished’ (ibid). 
 
Similarly, in New Delhi, reduction in support and assistance from UNHCR appears to 
have reinforced Afghan refugees’ marginalisation and vulnerability. Refugees have 
found it increasingly difficult to gain access to local markets and to engage in income-
generating activities. UNHCR staff members and others report that growing numbers 
are surviving by means of illicit activities and are leaving the country in an ‘irregular’ 
manner as a response to their insecurity. The evaluators complain that the existing 
UNHCR policy on urban refugees fails to explain why refugees in urban areas are 
invariably expected to attain self-reliance, while refugees living in camps are often 
assisted indefinitely. They recommend that the policy be amended to address the 
situation of urban refugees who lack a secure legal status, who do not have any formal 
right to engage in income-generating activities, and who cannot benefit from local 
integration. They note that integration is not synonymous with socio-economic self-
reliance, since it must include the crucial element of legal and physical protection. They 
also caution against assumptions that urban refugees are necessarily the result of 
‘irregular’ movements or that they necessarily have the choice of living in a rural camp 
or settlement.  
 
The Cairo evaluation recommends further that education and training opportunities 
should be a central objective of the UNHCR’s urban refugees policy, and that the 
promotion of self-reliance should not be pursued simply on the basis of a reduction of 
UNHCR assistance, but rather as a process requiring the support, involvement and 
resources of relevant development agencies and government departments. The authors 
also point to the importance of involving and engaging refugees themselves in the 
design and implementation of policies affecting them. 
 
Recommendations to DFID: 
(i) To ensure that self-reliance among urban refugees is treated as a separate issue from 
protection. 
 
(ii) To support positive efforts to enable urban refugees to develop sustainable 
livelihoods wherever possible. 
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(iii) To actively advocate for secure legal status for urban refugees and support efforts to 




A recent lesson-learning review of UNHCR’s experience of addressing situations of 
internal displacement suggests, somewhat controversially, that the concept of ‘internally 
displaced persons’ should be the subject of critical review: 
 
‘While the concept has proven to be of considerable value for the purposes of 
advocacy, its use as an operational category is more questionable, especially in 
situations where displaced and non-displaced populations experience the same 
or similar conditions of life, and where the internally displaced do not wish to be 
described in that manner’ (UNHCR, 2002b: 7). 
 
Different agencies place different values on the concept, the report notes, with some 
regarding IDPs as a specific humanitarian category, analogous to refugees, others find 
the concept less useful. A strong defence of the concept of IDPs as a distinct 
humanitarian category is set out in a Danida evaluation of IDP programmes in Angola. 
The report insists that involuntary displacement is what defines IDP status, and not the 
continuation of whatever vulnerability flows from that displacement. Thus IDPs only 
cease being IDPs when they return to their place of origin, or when given the 
opportunity for a safe return, or when they opt to stay in another area: ‘[t]hey do not 
cease to be IDPs simply because they are able to scratch a living in their area of 
displacement’ (Danida Angola IDP Evaluation Draft Report, quoted in ECHO, 2003b: 
25). IDP status can co-exist with a range of levels of humanitarian need (ibid: 26).  
 
WFP’s policy on IDPs recognizes that IDPs’ food security and other needs are often 
indistinguishable from those of other victims of conflict or disaster who have not fled 
their homes. However, the policy recognizes that displacement itself creates particular 
vulnerabilities which may not be suffered, at least to the same extent, by the non-
displaced – through, for example, the separation from families, communities, 
livelihoods and key assets (including land), and disrupted access to education and health 
services. Hence, the distinct needs of IDP groups need to be monitored on a continuing 
basis, paying attention to how these needs change over time (WFP, 2001b: 5). 
 
As with many conflict-affected populations, the monitoring of IDP populations and 
protection and delivery assistance efforts on their behalf are significantly impeded, 
however, by a number of operational, protection-related and other problems on the 
ground, particularly in conflict situations. These include restricted humanitarian access 
and inadequate protection of beneficiaries and/or agency staff, limited capacity and/or 
willingness on the part of national or local government authorities to address IDP-
related issues, and the lack of any specific operational authority for IDP issues assigned 
to a particular agency. Effective coordination among all of the agencies and actors 
concerned (humanitarian and human rights organisations, development agencies, donor 
governments, etc.) is therefore crucial for effective IDP interventions. 
 
The UNHCR lesson-learning review notes a clear link between assistance, protection 
and durable solutions in situations of internal displacement. As in refugee situations, the 
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establishment of indefinite care-and-maintenance programmes and settlement of IDPs 
into large camps (or smaller camps in insecure areas) should be avoided if at all 
possible, and efforts made to promote self-reliance. However, IDPs cannot be expected 
to become self-reliant if they are denied basic rights. A programme continuation review 
of UNHCR’s programme for IDPs in Angola notes the difficulty of assessing protection 
activities compared to material assistance, but advises that UNHCR should focus its 
attention on protection work, such as monitoring, civil registration for IDPs, enhancing 
the agency’s response capacity, providing protection support for other actors, 
developing provincial-level capacity-building, and advocacy (UNHCR, 2002e: 4). 
Similarly, a joint Danida / UNHCR review of UNHCR’s IDP programme in Angola 
notes that: 
 
‘Although the most apparent and immediate effects of UNHCR’s activities have 
been in the material assistance sectors, UNHCR’s comparative advantage lies in 
protection, and it is this element that will have to be bolstered in the medium and 
long term’ (Danida / UNHCR, 2001: Findings). 
 
Recommendations to DFID: 
(i) To ensure clarity in understanding among staff and implementing partners of the 
specific group-based protection needs of IDPs, as a separate issue from the material 
needs of IDPs (which may or may not vary significantly from those of non-displaced 
populations); and to work to ensure that the specific protection needs of internally 
displaced populations are effectively assessed, monitored and responded to wherever 
possible. 
 
(ii) To explore and clarify what a protection focus to IDP programming means in 
practice in the field – e.g. distinct protection activities, such as monitoring, civil 
registration, action to resolve land disputes, etc. 
 
(iii) To clarify which agencies DFID prefers to work with to ensure that the protection 
needs of IDPs are met (UNHCR and/or other?) and work to develop the capacities of 
partner agencies to provide effective protection for IDPs. 
 
(iv) To clarify which agencies are best suited to take the lead in providing material 
assistance to both displaced and non-displaced populations in specific situations of 
large-scale internal displacement. 
 
(v) To actively support efforts to achieve self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods for 
internally displaced populations (with effective protection and rights-based activities), 
and, wherever possible, work to avoid the establishment of indefinite care and 
maintenance programmes and settlement of IDPs into camps. 
 
 
7. REFUGEE AND IDP LIVELIHOODS IN PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT 
SITUATIONS 
 
Kuhlman recommends that ‘it is better to plan for a protracted refugee situation than for 
a short-lived crisis’ (2002: 40). He argues that only if, during the first year, it already 
appears abundantly evident that the refugees will soon be able to return home can 
programmes aimed at a local integration be abandoned. 
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The picture for many refugees and IDPs living in long-term camp situations hardly 
looks more promising than it does for self-settled or self-reliant refugees in urban areas. 
The Mid-Year Review for the 2001 CAP for Uganda, for instance, observes bleakly that 
while the cost of maintaining IDP camps and providing for basic needs is increasing, 
donor support is steadily decreasing, ‘rendering the camps unsustainable on purely 
financial grounds’ (UNOCHA, 2001): 
 
‘Donor fatigue is becoming increasingly apparent. … Freedom of movement and 
access to land has been limited, preventing the IDPs from compensating for the 
loss of external assistance. The … UNHCR’s Self Reliance Strategy had to be 
discontinued due to lack of support. … Deteriorated infrastructure … has made 
marketing of surplus commodities unprofitable, forcing the majority of the 
population to rely upon subsistence production and charcoal-making to cover 
basic needs. The amount of time in which women spend fetching firewood and 
water and in performing domestic work is increasing, forcing girl-students to 
drop out of school at an early age in order to care for their younger siblings’ 
(ibid). 
 
But, as Crisp observes, for externally displaced populations, the proposal that refugees 
should not be confined to camps long-term but should instead be allowed to settle and 
become self-reliant, would not be politically feasible in many refugee-hosting countries. 
Indeed, such a policy would risk early refoulement and therefore run counter to 
UNHCR’s protection responsibilities. Nevertheless, he notes that in certain protracted 
refugee situations, greater potential for local integration may exist than is usually 
recognized. For instance, where refugees share the same ethnic origin as the host 
population; where they are in an area of surplus agricultural land or where other 
economic opportunities exist; where they have established sustainable livelihoods but 
their legal status and residence rights remain unresolved; or ‘residual caseload’ refugees 
with strong social and economic links to their country of asylum (Crisp, 2003b: 28).  
 
The large number of ‘spontaneously’ settled refugees in Africa suggests that there may 
be greater scope for refugee integration than is currently assumed. In a recent review of 
the community services function in refugee aid programmes, Bakewell observes how: 
 
‘In the field we heard numerous references to the need to get refugees to stop 
being so ‘dependent’, as opposed to a focus on creating appropriate conditions 
for refugee self-sufficiency. This occurs despite the fact that our findings and a 
consistent body of other evidence from other research and evaluations confirm 
that in all settings, refugees are actively engaged in every possible type of 
productive work, based on the opportunities and resources at their disposal’ 
(Bakewell, 2003: 10). 
 
Clearly, refugee dependency is in part the product of host government regulations 
limiting freedom of movement and the right to work or engage in economic activity. 
But it must be recognized that many host governments would be extremely hostile to 
the prospect of promoting self-reliance among refugee populations because of concern 
that self-reliant refugees will not want to repatriate when conditions change in their 
country of origin (Crisp, 2003b: 28). Thus, for example, ECHO’s 2002 review of WFP 
programmes in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Tanzania and Serbia found that the potential for 
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refugee integration was especially low in Tanzania, where refugees are located in camps 
and have restricted freedom to move and virtually no access to land or means of 
production for local markets (ECHO, 2002: 11). 
 
Active government hostility to the IDP or refugee populations concerned, leading 
sometimes a deliberate policy of marginalisation, often results in limited possibilities 
for displaced people to achieve sustainable livelihoods. A joint WFP/UNHCR 
evaluation in Sudan notes, for instance, that in the case of long standing refugee camps 
in South Sudan, attempts to promote sustainable agricultural solutions to chronic 
problems lasting over 30 years have proven largely unsuccessful, with an overall lack of 
appropriate land for farming plus the government actively thwarting any efforts to 
provide refugees with land to produce their own food (WFP / UNHCR, 2001; ALNAP, 
2002: Section 4.2.1). 
 
If the promotion of refugee self-reliance and integration is to be given any credence, 
there is a very important advocacy challenge for humanitarian and protection agencies 
and donors in this area, since: 
 
‘experience shows that refugees who have led a productive life in exile, receive 
an education, developed practical skills, and accumulate some resources may 
actually be better prepared and equipped to go home and contribute to the 
reconstruction of their country than those who have languished in camps for 
years, surviving on minimum levels of humanitarian assistance’ (WFP / 
UNHCR, 2001). 
 
If refugee or IDP integration is to be explored as a feasible option in any context, it is 
important to first recognise that displaced populations are never an ‘undifferentiated 
mass’ (Jamal, 2000: 32), and that individual refugees and IDPs possess a range of 
different skills and attributes that will result in varying potential for local integration in 
different situations – e.g. refugees with urban backgrounds versus those with rural 
backgrounds. An evaluation of the UNHCR programme in Kakuma, Kenya suggests 
that agencies should think in terms of essential needs rather than minimum standards:  
 
‘While at the start of an emergency essential needs may be congruent with 
minimum standards, over time essential needs will grow, as refugee lives 
become increasingly intolerable unless they are able to enjoy a wider range of 
human rights, and are enabled to develop their human functions and capabilities’ 
(UNHCR, 2000b: Executive Summary). 
 
In Kakuma camp, UNHCR has become locked into an ‘unproductive emergency 
management mode’ and a ‘debilitating cycle of reactive, minimum standard planning’, 
and so, despite good quality management of basic services, ‘the most apparent and 
prevalent mood in Kakuma camp today is a sense of despair and low self-worth’ (ibid); 
hence violence in the camp is rampant, and UNHCR’s ability to protect refugees is 
seriously compromised (Crisp, 1999).  
 
In the context of a study of Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire (Kuhlman, 2002), 
Kuhlman points out that any serious programme designed to promote the integration of 
refugees requires more money for a given year than care and maintenance. In the Côte 
d’Ivoire case, where the political environment, at least, was generally conducive to 
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refugee integration (since the government opposed the settlement of refugees in camps), 
UNHCR made the mistake of only beginning to think seriously about economic 
integration at a time when funds were already running out.  
 
Apart from support for agriculture and vocational training, UNHCR’s efforts on behalf 
of economic integration in Côte d’Ivoire have not proved very successful, partly due to 
under-funding. UNHCR’s agriculture programme in Cote d’Ivoire is an example of how 
aid can contribute both to the livelihoods of refugees and to the development of the 
refugee-affected area. The reason for its success, he suggests, was that it aimed at 
assisting in an activity which local people were already undertaking. In other projects, 
however, it was the donor who took the initiative in calling on people to submit project 
proposals, with stipulations about what kind of proposals would be entertained. The 
screening of income-generation proposals was not based sufficiently on firm economic 
and commercial criteria, and so sustainability was compromised. Overall, vocational 
training is likely to be more effective in fostering economic self-reliance than income-
generating projects. Indeed, Kuhlman suggests that the provision of aid specifically for 
income-generating projects is less necessary – and often less useful – than would appear 
at first sight. 
 
ECHO’s Afghanistan evaluation observes limited success with many livelihoods 
interventions, and points out that it was not always clear whether income-generation 
activities were based on surveys to determine whether profitable markets actually 
existed for the products of these projects. There appears to have been widespread 
confusion between the terms ‘Cash for Work’ (CFW) and ‘Income-Generating 
Activities’ (IGA). While the former have no sustainability criteria, IGAs should lead to 
sustainable economic activity. Some IGAs had not been subject to a clear pre-
examination of market possibilities but represented a simplistic assessment of what was 
considered possible on the production side: sustainable incomes, the evaluation notes, 
‘are not possible in non-existent market places’ (ECHO, 2004a: 39, 51).  
 
On the other hand, this report recommends that an area which should be highlighted for 
donor support is IDP training in camps and settlements, to provide displaced people 
with employment opportunities, both in their areas of displacement and to help them to 
reintegrate on return. Training intervention of this kind among Afghan refugees has so 
far been limited to sectors such as construction where there is the potential for trainees 
to compete with foreign workers in a buoyant market, but ‘there is scope for a broader 
range of sectors in which skills training would be highly relevant’ (ibid: 39). 
 
Careful situation and market analysis is required in such situations, however. Crisp 
(2003: 22) warns, for instance, how large-scale refugee (/IDP) presence in a situation 
where there are few income-earning possibilities can have the effect of driving down 
wages. There is always the potential for exploitative employment patterns among 
refugee populations, just as there is the potential for illegal and unsustainable farming 
and other harmful forms of land use. 
 
An adapted sustainable livelihoods (SL) framework could prove helpful to assist 
situation and market analysis to support refugee / IDP integration in situations of 
protracted crisis and displacement, particularly if it is linked to political economy 
analysis (Collinson, 2003). An evaluation of DFID’s support for post-cyclone 
livelihoods rehabilitation in Orissa found that: 
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‘the structured format of the SL framework provides an excellent tool for 
understanding how people can and do respond to a disaster. … This is partly 
because it reflects the reality and complexity of people’s lives. The poor are 
involved in multi-sectoral activities that are linked through complex 
relationships. In a disaster situation the whole of the system of people’s 
livelihoods is affected. … [It] benefits from providing a cross-cutting and 
holistic perspective … This in turn is likely to have produced a greater level of 
balance in the rehabilitation process. … To be effective in this role, however, 
requires that the [framework] … be converted into tools and language that are 
easily assimilated and used by different groups of practitioners’ (DFID, 2001: 
Executive Summary). 
 
It is important to note that livelihoods-based analysis of this kind might not only prove 
useful to underpin positive initiatives to support refugee / IDP livelihoods and 
integration, but it can also play a potentially important role in monitoring the dynamics 
and implications of ‘negative coping mechanisms’ that might themselves need to be 
addressed at one level or another, either because of negative impacts on the environment 
or host society, or because of negative protection or livelihood implications among 
displaced populations themselves. Negative coping mechanisms might include, for 
example, theft from other refugees, the host population or from humanitarian agencies 
(e.g. crops, food, cattle and other assets), the sale of vital assets, unsustainable 
collection of natural resources, or engagement in the production or exchange of assets 
connected with the local or wider war economy (Crisp, 2003b: 20; Collinson, 2003). 
 
Situation analysis and monitoring focused on the dynamics of beneficiary and host 
populations’ livelihoods and the dynamics of the local political economy should also 
help agencies to keep track of the impacts of aid inputs such as food aid. The WFP’s 
Ethiopia evaluation points out that: 
 
‘WFP staff do not systematically and consistently follow up during the post-
distribution phase to better understand the role of WFP food aid within the 
broader coping and strategies and livelihood systems of the refugees. This 
failure hinders the development of appropriate indicators for the shift towards 
more recovery-oriented activities’ (WFP, 2001a; ALNAP, 2003: 94-5). 
 
In a recent study of the protracted displacement of Guatemalan refugees, Cheng and 
Chudoba (2003) advocate the expansion of options for refugees beyond the traditional 
camp infrastructure through the establishment of a decentralized approach to service 
provision, taking the form of decentralized ‘resource and service centres’ (RSCs). 
These, they suggest, could be established in both countries of origin and asylum 
countries, and could be established as development projects in partnership with UNDP 
and/or other development partners. RSCs, they argue, would fill the current gap that 
exists for assistance to self-settled refugee communities, as well as the current gap that 
exists in transitioning and integrating returnee communities to their home countries. 
While the financial viability of these centres has not been explored, they suggest that the 
impact of RSCs (in terms of reaching large numbers of refugees) relative to probably 
low overall cost could offer better value for money than long-term and costly care-and-
maintenance programmes. Although host governments tend to favour containment of 
refugees in camps, UNHCR could advocate a more decentralized approach on the 
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grounds that they are likely to increase refugee registration rates and subsequently 
increase the flow of information to refugees about opportunities for repatriation. 
 
Apart from formal assistance efforts through UNHCR and other protection and 
assistance agencies, one of the most important assets supporting the livelihoods of 
refugees and IDPs in situations of protracted crisis and displacement is remittances sent 
to them by family members who have succeeded in moving to another part of the world 
(Crisp, 2003 b: 22). As noted by Dick in a recent report on Liberian refugees in Ghana: 
 
 ‘with limited an dwindling assistance from UNHCR, remittances have proved 
crucial in enabling refugees to survive in Ghana. Their effect is felt beyond their 
immediate recipients. Many refugees have invested remittance money into small 
businesses, thus fuelling the camp economy. And those without access to 
remittances depend on the generosity of friends and family who share their 
resources. Social networks both in the camp and in the United States enable 
many to survive’ (Dick, 2002: 6). 
 
The importance of remittances should not be underestimated, not only for sustaining 
and supporting the livelihoods of many displaced populations, but also for sustaining – 
and thus possibly preventing the displacement of – many non-displaced communities 
living in situations of protracted crisis that have generated large numbers of IDPs and 
refugees (Pain, 2001). This is one potentially important and positive spin-off of the 
‘asylum crisis’ affecting the UK and other OECD countries. Given the substantial and 
now long experience of analysis and management of international remittances and their 
impacts in the economic migration field, there is considerable scope for DFID to 
support further investigation of the significance of remittances among displaced 
populations and with a view to helping design policies at country and wider level that 
might help to maximise the positive impacts of remittances in support of livelihoods 
among refugees, IDPs and other conflict-affected populations. 
 
Recommendations to DFID: 
(i) To advocate actively with governments and local authorities concerned for the 
promotion of refugee and IDP self-reliance and integration on the basis of evidence that 
refugees and IDPs who have been able to lead a productive life, receive an education, 
develop skills and accumulate resources are usually better prepared and equipped to 
return home than those who have been confined for long periods of time in camps 
surviving only on minimum levels of humanitarian assistance. 
 
(ii) To support efforts to adapt livelihoods-based programming and analysis for 
application to protracted refugee and IDP situations, both to help track the impacts of 
aid on livelihoods and the local political economy, and to strengthen humanitarian 
programming for both displaced and non-displaced populations. 
 
(iii) To provide appropriate funding and support for high quality projects and 
programmes promoting self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods among displaced 
populations, which may require more money per capita for a given year than care and 
maintenance programmes. To work to develop agencies’ capacities in this area, 
particularly to ensure that livelihoods support projects are based on strong situation and 
market analysis. Strong supporting analysis should enable sound assessment of the 
feasibility of livelihoods support, and should help to achieve sustainability, avoid 
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adverse impacts on the local political economy, and avoid the development of 
exploitative employment or commercial patterns. 
 
(iv) To expect to have to plan for protracted displacement situations rather than for 
short-lived crises, and in the context of longer-term refugee and IDP protection and 
assistance, to support an ‘essential needs’ or ‘essential rights’ approach which 
recognizes that, following the initial humanitarian crisis that caused their displacement, 
forced migrants have a right to develop their broader human functions and capabilities 
beyond simple survival. 
 
(v) To prioritise support for IDP and refugee education and training in camps and 
settlements to help provide forced migrants with employment and other income-
generating opportunities, both in their areas of displacement and to help them to 
reintegrate on return. 
 
(vi) To support further investigation of the significance of remittances among displaced 
and other vulnerable conflict-affected populations so as to help design policies that 
might help to maximise their positive impacts in terms of supporting livelihoods among 
displaced and non-displaced populations; to consult with the Home Office and work to 
develop joint understanding and joint strategies in this area. 
 
7.1 Refugee Livelihoods and Resettlement in Developing Countries 
In the context of refugee livelihoods, it is worth mentioning briefly here the conclusions 
of a recent evaluation of two pilot refugee resettlement projects carried out in Benin and 
Burkina Faso between 1997 and 2001. The evaluation concluded categorically that the 
projects had not proved successful – as indicated by the fact that 46% of the cases 
resettled to Burkina Faso and 32% of those resettled to Benin had left the country by the 
time the evaluation was conducted. For those who remained, the most important factor 
determining their livelihoods was not whether they had found employment, but whether 
they had contacts abroad which provided them with remittances or opportunities for 
trade.  
 
Overall, the ‘adverse economic circumstances of the two countries that rank among the 
poorest in the world are … principally to blame’ for the failure of the resettlement 
programmes (UNHCR, 2004: 1). The evaluators conclude that the establishment of a 
credible resettlement programme in a poor developing country requires a degree of 
planning and a level of commitment in staffing and resources well beyond what was 
made available in the case of these pilot projects: 
 
‘resettlement programmes to developing countries should only be introduced if 
… the donor community funds the comprehensive integration programme as a 
burden sharing measure, subject to the type of multi-lateral special agreement 
envisaged under the ‘Convention Plus’ approach; and if it is supplied with a 
strong, long-term development component. … Clear criteria should be 
established to select … countries suitable for emerging resettlement, with equal 
weight given to legal protection and socio-economic factors; it should only be 
undertaken if it can attract additional donor support to enhance the integration of 
all refugees in the country concerned; it should be planned and monitored by 
administrative units professionally concerned with integration programmes; 
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must be based on detailed feasibility study; and should be incorporated into 
Poverty Reduction Strategies and designed to attract longer-term bilateral donor 
funding, with donors encouraged to provide additional input into designated 
parts of the strategy such as facilitating socio-economic integration of refugees 
in the employment sector; should be primarily negotiated in the field; and 
refugees should be directly involved in planning and implementing programmes’ 
(ibid: 4-6). 
 
Recommendation to DFID:  
 
To ensure that no resettlement of refugees to developing countries is ever encouraged 
outside the framework of a fully comprehensive and sustainable integration programme. 
 
7.2. Refugee/IDP Livelihoods, ‘Transition’ and ‘Connectedness’ of Humanitarian 
and Development Programming in Situations of Forced Migration 
As noted by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, sustained 
transition should aim at scaling down humanitarian assistance (‘exit strategy’) and 
scaling up reconstruction and recovery activities linked to longer-term development 
goals (2004: 15). At the local and country level, achieving sustainable transition 
processes depends crucially on finding durable solutions for refugees and IDPs, and 
this, in turn, depends on the development of sustainable livelihoods for these 
populations. This must involve the joint and ‘connected’ efforts of humanitarian and 
development actors, and flexible funding and operational linkages between short-term 
relief and longer-term livelihoods and development-oriented interventions. Thus, the 
scaling down of humanitarian assistance and the scaling up of reconstruction: 
 
‘need to be articulated jointly by humanitarian and development actors, within a 
single and integrated strategy that shifts the analytical perspective from 
symptoms of the crisis to its underlying causes and from short-term to medium-
term objectives, predicated upon evidence-based needs assessments and regular 
revalidation of needs and capacities’ (ibid). 
 
The need for improved connections between humanitarian and development aid in order 
to secure durable solutions, including sustainable livelihoods, for uprooted people is 
highlighted in ECHO’s Afghanistan evaluation. The ultimate solution of the IDP 
problem, the report argues, is closely linked to a synchronized approach to resolving 
land issues and reducing conflict, which in turn will depend on connecting ECHO with 
development aid: 
 
‘Solutions will depend on land reform, the improvement of conditions in the 
drought-affected areas, conflict resolution and improvements to the justice 
system and require concerted action between the Commission and other 
international donors. As with IDP situations in other countries, most of the 
solutions will take time and should be matched with the pace of development 
and improvement to livelihoods. ECHO can usefully advocate … for specific 
areas of return that would benefit from development intervention to expedite the 
return process’ (ECHOa, 2004: 54). 
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Yet, the whole concept of ‘transition’ begs the question of when and how the transition 
and the scaling down of relief / scaling up of reconstruction and development might 
begin, since it is arguably only by starting to tackle the causal dynamics of crisis and 
displacement through strategic, longer-term and connected engagement of all 
humanitarian, political and development actors that any progress might be made 
towards the resolution of conflict and the search for durable solutions to large-scale 
forced displacement. In reality, effective strategic connections between these different 
streams of international engagement are rarely achieved in such a way as to support an 
unambiguous transition to peace and durable solutions for displaced populations. The 
Uganda example, characterized by ‘donor strategy imbalance’ and a ‘split assistance 
strategy’ (UNOCHA, 2001) is illustrative of this problem: 
 
‘Large funds are disbursed for development assistance in more stable areas, 
whereas the UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal (CA) for humanitarian 
activities is critically underfunded. The poverty and instability in western, 
northern and north-eastern Uganda are largely attributable to economic, political 
and ethnic marginalisation. Donors have a tendency to consider the humanitarian 
crises in Uganda as isolated situations of socio-political instability and are 
reluctant to acknowledge their regional interdependence and chronic character. 
This makes it difficult for the UN to establish and maintain a strategic 
orientation of humanitarian programmes, beyond ad-hoc relief interventions. 
Both the Government and donor community contends that the affected districts 
are too insecure for investment. The counter argument is that only by investing 
in market and social infrastructure and in employment generation can the 
displaced be provided assets worth protecting and be able to reintegrate and 
accommodate their opponents. … Unfortunately, public and external 
development assistance remains absent from those areas where it is most 
needed’ (ibid). 
 
It should be noted that little attention is paid to relief or transitional recovery needs in 
Uganda’s National Budget and Poverty Eradication Action Plan (ibid). This reflects a 
broader and continuing problem with the pursuit of poverty reduction strategies 
(PRSPs) in many conflict-affected countries. A recent briefing by the DFID-funded 
PRSP Monitoring & Synthesis Project notes that: 
 
‘Donors urgently need to make analyses of the dynamics of the conflict so that 
they are aware of the economic interest of the contending parties, their 
incentives for war or peace, and how donor support might play into this. 
Although there is a considerable body of literature on this topic, there is little 
evidence that it is currently informing programming decisions. IFI programming 
is particularly weak in this regard. There is still limited read-across between 
ongoing analytical work on conflict countries and the general discourse around 
PRSPs’ (Evans, et al., 2003: 14). 
 
The failure of much development planning to take adequate account of conflict 
dynamics is also noted in a recent review of the UK Government’s approach to peace-
building, which observes that: 
 
‘During 1999/2000, DFID developed several Country Strategy Papers, including 
those for Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique. In setting the strategy context, 
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these papers make reference to armed conflict as profoundly damaging to 
infrastructure and livelihoods and then move on directly to a development 
agenda, in particular how the Millennium Development Goals are to be met. The 
papers read as if the job of peace-building is either over or no longer relevant for 
the UK … for Bosnia and Cambodia, this was unexpected’ (DFID, 2003: 41). 
 
Arguably, any comprehensive conflict analysis or poverty reduction assessment in a 
country affected by or emerging from conflict must include close attention to the 
patterns, dynamics and implications of forced migration caused by the conflict. It is 
therefore noteworthy that there is no mention of refugees or displaced populations in 
DFID’s new Country Assistance Plans (CAP) for Kenya and Ethiopia, only one 
historical mention of refugees (and no mention of IDPs) in the CAP for Rwanda, one 
mention of IDPs in the Interim CAP for Uganda, and no mention of refugees or IDPs in 
DFID’s Institutional Strategy Papers (ISPs) with UNDP, UNICEF, IFRC and ICRC. 
This suggests that, in the context of longer-term poverty reduction efforts, a relatively 
low priority is attached to displacement issues within DFID; and in some cases it might 
indicate a continuing disconnection between short-term humanitarian and longer-term 
development programming.  
 
Even CHAD’s own conflict assessment framework designed explicitly to inform peace-
building and humanitarian activities in conflict-affected countries places relatively little 
emphasis on forced migration and responses to displacement as a key component in the 
political economy of conflicts and of engagement in situations of conflict. Refugees or 
IDPs are mentioned only seven times in the entire 52-page document of guidance notes 
on conducting conflict assessments, with only one mention in the main text and the 
other six all within the context of illustrative tables (DFID, 2002). 
 
Recommendations to DFID:  
 
(i) To seek to ensure that programmes concerned with supporting ‘transition’ from 
emergency assistance to reconstruction and recovery activities link down effectively to 
the local level to support sustainable livelihoods for displaced populations and returning 
refugees and IDPs. 
 
(ii) To ensure that conflict analysis is incorporated as a central component of all CAP 
and other poverty reduction and development planning mechanisms, and to ensure that 
conflict analysis is not confined only to those countries designated as ‘conflict-affected’. 
 
(iii) To bring displacement issues more fully into the mainstream of DFID’s own 
conflict analysis and poverty reduction / development planning, and to support and 
encourage closer attention to displacement among institutional partners, development 
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8. REFUGEE & IDP RETURN AND REINTEGRATION: SEEKING ‘DURABLE 
SOLUTIONS’ 
 
The UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues (2004: 20-21) highlights the 
importance of establishing conditions conducive to the return and reintegration of 
refugees and IDPs for broader efforts to restore peace and stability and build local 
capacity in ‘transition’ situations. The linking of repatriation, reintegration, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction (the ‘4Rs’) underpins the UNHCR’s Framework for 
Durable Solutions involving both humanitarian and development actors – as being 
piloted in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.  
 
It is increasingly recognised by humanitarian and development actors that the transition 
from war to peace and relief-to-development is usually far from linear, but more usually 
a faltering and highly uncertain process in which there are often localized or broader 
lapses back into crisis and conflict, and an ever-present risk of the process stalling 
entirely. And yet the ‘4Rs’ framework for durable solutions to refugee problems would 
appear to rest on a continuing faith in a ‘best-case’ scenario of sustainable peace leading 
to sustainable development. With the notable exception of Mozambique, most 
experience suggests that formal processes of political transition rarely yield a 
sustainable peace, and the reality for most refugees is a return to situations of continuing 
conflict and instability (Macrae, 1999: 1). Consequently, there is a growing gulf 
‘between the idealized conditions of repatriation envisaged by the mandate and 
guidelines of the [UNHCR] … and actual conditions under which repatriation takes 
place’ (ibid: 2). 
 
The conclusions of a UNHCR workshop convened in 2001 to explore and review 
lessons learned from the repatriation experience in Liberia during the late 1990s 
highlighted very clearly how ‘best-case scenario’ planning for repatriation and 
reintegration proved inappropriate in a region as unpredictable and unstable as West 
Africa: 
 
‘planning for the Liberia [repatriation and reintegration] programme had 
generally been based on a ‘best case scenario’, in which security and the 
economy steadily improved, adequate donor funding became available, a 
growing number of other actors contributed to the reintegration process, and the 
country's borders were kept open. … [In fact], the operational environment for 
the Liberia programme was amongst the most challenging that UNHCR has ever 
encountered. Today, as in the four-year implementation period of the … 
programme, Liberia remains political unstable, insecure and subject to sporadic 
outbreaks of fighting. … The ability (and arguably the willingness) of the state 
to promote rehabilitation and development, especially at the local level, is 
minimal. … [T]he level of interest [of the international community] has waned 
significantly. … Reflecting this international trend, UNHCR has unfortunately 
devoted less resources, attention and publicity to the Liberia operation than it 
has given to … programmes elsewhere in the world … In essence, this major 
repatriation and reintegration programme has been undertaken by a regular 
branch office structure, without any of the special staffing arrangements 
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A key conclusion leading out of this workshop, therefore, is that UNHCR and other 
agencies should adopt a ‘multi-scenario planning approach’ to repatriation and 
reintegration programmes of this kind, with strategies and contingency plans drawn up 
for a range of different scenarios that might transpire in any situation. Rather than 
‘handing over’ reintegration projects at some unspecified point down the line, the report 
advises that other agencies, including development agencies, need to be closely 
involved as partners right from the start. 
 
Yet, for effective partnerships between UNHCR and other humanitarian and 
development partners to be possible, there is a need to clarify the channels through 
which aid for reintegration assistance and protection efforts are to flow; particularly (as 
is often the case) in situations of extreme political instability, weak public institutions or 
no functioning or internationally recognized state. In these cases, it is likely that aid will 
continue predominantly in the relief mode, i.e. as short-term and project-based 
assistance. This, in turn, puts the sustainability of the overall reintegration effort into 
some doubt (Macrae, 1999: 1). 
 
The processes of repatriation and reintegration also need to be underpinned by 
consistent agreed standards, both technical standards (e.g. relating to the provision and 
monitoring of basic services) and protection standards. Refugee return and reintegration 
is an intensely political process, since it represents such an integral component of state 
reconstruction and legitimacy, while at the same time usually suiting the interests of 
asylum countries keen to divulge themselves of their refugee ‘burden’. Where 
international pressure favours refugee returns in the context of state reconstruction, 
there is a danger that political considerations will overshadow any humanitarian ones. 
According to Petrin: 
 
‘The problem with promoting repatriation is that return has now become an end 
in itself … [and therefore] conducted apart from considerations as to whether it 
is in the best interest of the refugee communities and if emerging states and/or 
international donors are capable of providing enough support for the returnee 
population to be absorbed’ (2002: 15). 
 
Concerns raised by the IDC in its 2002-3 Afghanistan report highlight the potentially 
blurred line between voluntary and forced repatriations: 
 
‘DFID has stated that there is no firm evidence of people being forcibly returned 
to Afghanistan from neighbouring countries, but the evidence we heard seems to 
indicate that host countries are putting pressure on refugees to leave’ 
(International Development Committee, 2003a: paragraphs 80-81). 
 
In its response to the Committee, the Government underlines its concern to ensure that 
refugee returns are sustainable so as not to overload the fragile capacity and 
infrastructure in areas with a potentially high number of returnees, and promises to 
support agencies working with refugees and IDPs (International Development 
Committee, 2003b: para. 39). Given the enormous political pressures acting on the 
return process, it is important for humanitarian, protection and development agencies 
involved to set standards against which they can assess when and where to assist returns 
(or not) and on what basis, and design appropriate actions on behalf of refugees. DFID 
and other donors that are concerned to see that refugee returns should be stable, could 
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play an important part in helping to develop a stronger international ‘return and 
reintegration regime’ founded on clear protection criteria and standards. 
 
The IDC’s Afghanistan report notes that if refugees are to return home, they will want 
conditions to be as good as or better than those they have experienced in exile. 
Improved security, the Committee notes, is what will trigger people to return, but ‘it is 
only the creation of viable livelihoods that will keep them in Afghanistan and prevent 
them from becoming displaced’ (International Development Committee, 2003a: para. 
99). On the basis of interviews among Afghan communities in Iran, Petrin concurs that 
security remains refugees’ principal concern. Lack of security in the regions may result, 
therefore, in secondary migration to Kabul (Petrin, 2002: 8). This, in turn, will place 
additional pressure on efforts to establish sustainable livelihoods for returning refugees.  
 
As observed in ECHO’s Angola evaluation, the mass return of IDPs did not end 
Angola’s humanitarian crisis, but rather shifted it to a different form. As suggested by 
the Mozambique experience (where, significantly, a sustainable peace was secured):  
 
‘the two years of return and reintegration after a long-running conflict can be the 
most dangerous for war-affected people, and requires in many ways an 
intensification of humanitarian aid for a certain period, not a relaxation’ (ECHO, 
2003b: 48). 
 
Although increased humanitarian and development resources may be available for the 
highest profile refugee and IDP return situations such as Afghanistan, reintegration 
efforts in lower-profile ‘transition’ or protracted crisis situations are less likely to attract 
so much donor interest. Humanitarian agencies’ need to establish clear standards to 
guide and support their return and reintegration interventions is equally great in these 
lower-profile situations, particularly where lack of aid resources might prevent them 
from providing adequately for returnees’ protection and livelihood needs. 
 
According to an evaluation of UNHCR’s repatriation and reintegration programme for 
Guatemalan refugees, plans for a gradual and responsible ‘phase-out’ of UNHCR 
assistance were truncated by funding shortages, and, as a consequence, UNHCR’s 
withdrawal from some areas was somewhat abrupt. The report suggests that the early 
development of minimum indicators for returnees installation in their communities 
could have focused efforts more effectively when funding was still available. The 
impact of the sudden drop in donor funding indicates that ‘multi-scenario planning’ 
should clearly take account of the potential fluctuations in donor support. The 
programme appears to have been hampered throughout by a constant mismatch between 
rates of refugee return and the rates and timing of donor funding: ‘[t]hese ups and 
downs of returnee movements were not fully anticipated and there was a lack of 
administrative mechanisms to reserve resources for funding shortfalls’ (UNHCR, 1999: 
Preface).  
 
Given the potentially very negative impact of any sudden withdrawal of agency support 
for returning refugees and/or IDPs, DFID and other donors share a responsibility to 
support appropriate planning processes and programme changes in the field if they are 
intending to cut or reduce funding for a particular return programme. 
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Experience in Liberia (UNHCR, 2001b) and South-East Asia (Ballard, 2002) highlights 
the importance (where possible) of involving local authorities and local actors and 
refugee themselves in the planning and implementation of return programmes, with 
decisions on project identification and resource allocation to be decentralized so as to be 
taken as close as possible to the point of delivery. The lesson-learning exercise in 
Liberia noted that local authorities are easily intimidated by UNHCR and other 
international agencies, due to their operational capacity and access to resources, and 
thus, if sustainability is to be achieved, particular care needs to be taken to ensure that 
local authorities and local actors gain ownership of return programmes and develop 
their capacities, allowing international agencies to eventually withdraw.  
 
As always, beneficiary participation is signalled as a key challenge. The Liberia report 
notes that beneficiary consultation and participation can begin prior to return, to 
improve needs assessment and to help returnees gain a realistic expectation of the help 
that they will receive from different international, national and local agencies and 
authorities. And, as in other areas of refugee and IDP assistance, education and training 
need to be given a high priority. 
 
The evaluations of ECHO’s programmes in Afghanistan and Angola both note the 
importance of targeted initiatives designed to address some of the specific protection 
needs of returning refugees and IDPs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Legal Advice 
Centres have been established, with the majority of interventions resulting in a 
resolution of legal problems for refugees without recourse in host countries and civil or 
family disputes for returnees and IDPs within Afghanistan. The organizations 
supporting these centres report a high impact in terms of resolving conflicts between 
refugees and local residents. They also note additional spin-offs from the initiative, 
including capacity-building for local judges, lawyers and others within the legal 
profession, and in terms of individuals acquiring knowledge about their individual 
rights (ECHO, 2004a: 48). In Angola, family tracing and reunification efforts have 
proved significant protection activities. The evaluators note that, while not particularly 
cost-effective per case, family reunification sends an important signal as regards peace-
building and the restoration of Angolan society, and it may reduce the risk of future 
violence by supporting the reintegration and re-socialization of separated and war-
affected children (ECHO, 2003b: 7). 
 
Recommendations to DFID: 
 
(i) To avoid ‘best-case scenario planning’ and instead work with partner agencies and 
NGOs to adopt a ‘multi-scenario planning approach’ to refugee repatriation and 
reintegration programmes, leading to the development of a range of strategies and 
contingency plans for a variety of different scenarios that might transpire. 
 
(ii) To involve development agencies in the formulation of repatriation and reintegration 
programmes right from the start, and work to clarify the channels through which aid for 
reintegration assistance and protection efforts are to flow. 
 
(iii) To support the strengthening and clarification of both technical and protection 
standards to be applied by all agencies involved in any aspect of 4Rs programming, so 
as to help agencies assess when, where and how to assist refugee returns (or not) and 
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design appropriate actions, and to help to ensure that refugee returns are stable and 
sustainable. 
 
(iv) To ensure that priority is given to ensuring the protection and security of returning 
refugees 
 
(v) To ensure that DFID and other donor funding of return and reintegration 
programmes is flexible and reliable (particularly in lower-profile situations of refugee 
return) to reduce mismatch between rates of return and rates of donor funding. Where 
funding may be reduced or cut, to ensure that appropriate planning processes and 
programme changes are in place in the field. 
 
(vi) To seek to involve local authorities and local actors and refugees themselves in the 
planning and implementation of return programmes, including beneficiary consultation 
and participation prior to return to improve needs assessment and help returnees gain a 
realistic expectation of the help they will receive from different organizations and 
authorities. 
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9. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO DFID 
 
Re. the need for improved assessment, monitoring and analysis: 
 
• To actively support effective capacity-building in the area of social science skills 
among partner agencies and NGOs to significantly improve field staff ability to 
carry out participatory social and political analysis. Stronger context analysis will 
support better understanding of the causes, dynamics and implications of forced 
migration, and enable agencies to incorporate this understanding into programming 
on behalf of forced migrants. DFID’s support in this area might include specific 
attention to supporting the ability of implementing agencies to use DFID’s Conflict 
Assessment Framework. Given the risk of information overload within 
humanitarian agencies, it is important for DFID to think strategically about the 
specific types of field-based assessment, monitoring and analysis that require the 
most support. 
 
Re. the need for improved cross-Government analysis and strategy (coherence): 
 
• To use the CPPs as a key resource to support closer liaison and cooperation with 
FCO and MoD to develop more effective responses to particular conflict-related 
situations of forced migration and to develop more general commonalities of 
understanding and approach to forced migration issues between the three 
Departments. 
  
• To engage more closely with the Home Office and the Cabinet Office, with the 
emphasis on joint long-term and strategic scenario planning, e.g. to explore jointly 
with the Home Office how changes in refugee policies in the UK and other EU / 
OECD countries might impact on standards and forms of refugee protection and 
assistance in poorer countries, and what the longer-term implications of any 
changes in the international refugee regime might be worldwide. 
 
Re. the need to strengthen beneficiary / primary stakeholder consultation and 
participation and protection-focused or rights-based humanitarian action: 
 
• To devote significant resources to developing effective methodologies and guidance 
for improved on-the-ground consultation and participation of refugees, IDPs and 
other primary stakeholders to support improved needs assessment, improved 
understanding of the causes and consequences of forced migration and develop 
appropriate responses, including protection activities, and to identify and target the 
most vulnerable people within beneficiary populations. 
 
• To work with and actively support partner agencies and NGOs to strengthen their 
capacities to pursue effective participatory approaches. 
 
• To work with implementing agencies to strengthen their protection activities on 
behalf of forced migrants and vulnerable groups within displaced and non-displaced 
populations, including active capacity-building in the area of rights-based 
programming to enable agencies to consider more comprehensively where and how 
needs- and rights-based programming can be combined to achieve improved 
protection outcomes. 
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• To strengthen partner agencies’ and NGOs’ accountability for more effective 
participatory and protection-focused action on behalf of forced migrants through, 
e.g., partnership agreements, monitoring and reporting requirements, and 
evaluations. 
 
Re. humanitarian coverage in situations of forced migration, and needs-based versus 
group-based humanitarian programming: 
 
• To work actively with partner agencies and NGOs to improve the quality of on-the-
ground needs assessments in situations of forced displacement to ensure more 
effective humanitarian coverage among both displaced and non-displaced 
populations. 
 
• To clarify DFID’s own position on needs-based versus group-based assistance and 
protection in situations of forced migration, including clarification of how needs-
based assistance efforts should or can link with more group-based protection 
activities, and to ensure that the practice of implementing agencies regarding needs 
versus group-based programming in the field is examined in evaluations of DFID-
funded humanitarian action on behalf of forced migrants. 
 
• To continue to work proactively to improve donor coordination in situations of 
complex and large-scale displacement, for example, by actively seeking to 
determine if humanitarian needs are being met in all geographic areas and among 
all vulnerable groups and taking whatever remedial action is possible where 
significant gaps are found in humanitarian coverage. 
 
• To ensure that any closer cooperation with FCO, MoD or Home Office in the area 
of forced migration (e.g. through CPPs) does not result in any distortion of DFID 
funding of assistance to different refugee and IDP emergencies as a consequence of 
the particular strategic, political or defence concerns of the other Departments. 
 
• To review how far DFID and its partner agencies, NGOs and other donors have 
gone towards implementing the recommendations of the 1996 JEEAR, including 
those relating to coverage of displaced and host communities. 
 
Re. the assistance and protection of vulnerable groups: 
 
• To work with partner agencies and NGOs on developing more effective 
mechanisms for communicating protection and other priorities to field staff and to 
better support the ability of field staff to balance and respond to apparently 




• To extend the work that DFID is already doing with UNHCR on strengthening the 
application and implementation of policy guidelines on refugee women to other 
partner agencies and NGOs. 
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• To work to ensure that staff levels and capacities in the field are sufficient among 
all implementing agencies to ensure the adequate protection of refugee women. 
 
• To ensure strengthened accountability of DFID-funded implementing agencies for 
the protection of refugee women through, e.g. partnership agreements, monitoring 
and reporting requirements, and targeted evaluations. 
 
Children: 
• To match work that DFID is currently pursuing with UNHCR on refugee women 
and the elderly with parallel work on improving the protection of refugee children. 
 
• To prioritise support for refugee education and training, which is of central 
importance to the protection of children and for refugee rights and livelihoods more 
generally. 
 
• To strengthen accountability for the protection of refugee children through 
partnership agreements, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and evaluation. 
 
Urban refugees: 
• To ensure that self-reliance among urban refugees is treated as a separate issue from 
protection. 
 
• To support positive efforts to enable urban refugees to develop sustainable 
livelihoods wherever possible. 
 
• To actively advocate for secure legal status for urban refugees and support efforts to 
strengthen their protection, including the protection of vulnerable groups within 
urban refugee populations. 
 
IDPs: 
• To ensure clarity in understanding among staff and implementing partners of the 
specific group-based protection needs of IDPs, as a separate issue from the material 
needs of IDPs (which may or may not vary significantly from those of non-
displaced populations); and to work to ensure that the specific protection needs of 
internally displaced populations are effectively assessed, monitored and responded 
to wherever possible. 
 
• To explore and clarify what a protection focus to IDP programming means in 
practice in the field – e.g. distinct protection activities, such as monitoring, civil 
registration, action to resolve land disputes, etc. 
 
• To clarify which agencies DFID prefers to work with to ensure that the protection 
needs of IDPs are met (UNHCR and/or other?) and work to develop the capacities 
of partner agencies to provide effective protection for IDPs. 
 
• To clarify which agencies are best suited to take the lead in providing material 
assistance to both displaced and non-displaced populations in specific situations of 
large-scale internal displacement. 
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• To actively support efforts to achieve self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods for 
internally displaced populations (with effective protection and rights-based 
activities), and, wherever possible, work to avoid the establishment of indefinite 
care and maintenance programmes and settlement of IDPs into camps. 
 
Re. refugee and IDP livelihoods in protracted displacement situations: 
 
• To advocate actively with governments and local authorities concerned for the 
promotion of refugee and IDP self-reliance and integration on the basis of evidence 
that refugees and IDPs who have been able to lead a productive life, receive an 
education, develop skills and accumulate resources are usually better prepared and 
equipped to return home than those who have been confined for long periods of 
time in camps surviving only on minimum levels of humanitarian assistance. 
 
• To support efforts to adapt livelihoods-based programming and analysis for 
application to protracted refugee and IDP situations, both to help track the impacts 
of aid on livelihoods and the local political economy, and to strengthen 
humanitarian programming for both displaced and non-displaced populations. 
 
• To provide appropriate funding and support for high quality projects and 
programmes promoting self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods among displaced 
populations, which may require more money per capita for a given year than care 
and maintenance programmes. To work to develop agencies’ capacities in this area, 
particularly to ensure that livelihoods support projects are based on strong situation 
and market analysis. Strong supporting analysis should enable sound assessment of 
the feasibility of livelihoods support, and should help to achieve sustainability, 
avoid adverse impacts on the local political economy, and avoid the development of 
exploitative employment or commercial patterns. 
 
• To expect to have to plan for protracted displacement situations rather than for 
short-lived crises, and in the context of longer-term refugee and IDP protection and 
assistance, to support an ‘essential needs’ or ‘essential rights’ approach which 
recognizes that, following the initial humanitarian crisis that caused their 
displacement, forced migrants have a right to develop their broader human 
functions and capabilities beyond simple survival. 
 
• To prioritise support for IDP and refugee education and training in camps and 
settlements to help provide forced migrants with employment and other income-
generating opportunities, both in their areas of displacement and to help them to 
reintegrate on return. 
 
• To support further investigation of the significance of remittances among displaced 
and other vulnerable conflict-affected populations so as to help design policies that 
might help to maximise their positive impacts in terms of supporting livelihoods 
among displaced and non-displaced populations; to consult with the Home Office 
and work to develop joint understanding and joint strategies in this area. 
 
 
Re. refugee livelihoods and resettlement in developing countries: 
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• To ensure that no resettlement of refugees to developing countries is ever 
encouraged outside the framework of a fully comprehensive and sustainable 
integration programme. 
 
Re. refugee livelihoods, ‘transition’ processes and the ‘connectedness’ of humanitarian 
and development programming in situations of forced migration: 
 
• To seek to ensure that programmes concerned with supporting ‘transition’ from 
emergency assistance to reconstruction and recovery activities link down effectively 
to the local level to support sustainable livelihoods for displaced populations and 
returning refugees and IDPs. 
 
• To ensure that conflict analysis is incorporated as a central component of all CAP 
and other poverty reduction and development planning mechanisms, and to ensure 
that conflict analysis is not confined only to those countries designated as ‘conflict-
affected’. 
 
• To bring displacement issues more fully into the mainstream of DFID’s own 
conflict analysis and poverty reduction / development planning, and to support and 
encourage closer attention to displacement among institutional partners, 
development partners (e.g. in PRSP processes) and other donors. 
 
Re. refugee and IDP return and reintegration: seeking ‘durable solutions’: 
 
• To avoid ‘best-case scenario planning’ and instead work with partner agencies and 
NGOs to adopt a ‘multi-scenario planning approach’ to refugee repatriation and 
reintegration programmes, leading to the development of a range of strategies and 
contingency plans for a variety of different scenarios that might transpire. 
 
• To involve development agencies in the formulation of repatriation and 
reintegration programmes right from the start, and work to clarify the channels 
through which aid for reintegration assistance and protection efforts are to flow. 
 
• To support the strengthening and clarification of both technical and protection 
standards to be applied by all agencies involved in any aspect of 4Rs programming, 
so as to help agencies assess when, where and how to assist refugee returns (or not) 
and design appropriate actions, and to help to ensure that refugee returns are stable 
and sustainable. 
 
• To ensure that priority is given to ensuring the protection and security of returning 
refugees. 
 
• To ensure that DFID and other donor funding of return and reintegration 
programmes is flexible and reliable (particularly in lower-profile situations of 
refugee return) to reduce mismatch between rates of return and rates of donor 
funding. Where funding may be reduced or cut, to ensure that appropriate planning 
processes and programme changes are in place in the field. 
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• To seek to involve local authorities and local actors and refugees themselves in the 
planning and implementation of return programmes, including beneficiary 
consultation and participation prior to return to improve needs assessment and help 
returnees gain a realistic expectation of the help they will receive from different 
organizations and authorities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
For the purposes of this paper the term Great Lakes Region (GLR) shall be construed to 
mean the 6 Sub-Saharan countries located around Lakes Albert, Kivu, Tanganyika and 
Victoria, that is to say, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Together they account for nearly three quarters of the 
4,285,100 persons of concern to UNHCR (as at January 1st 2004). This is not surprising, 
considering that in the region are found 2 (Burundi and DRC) among the continent’s 
largest refugee generating countries and pre-eminent countries of asylum (Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda). Forced displacement has not only been of a phenomenal 
magnitude, it has been accompanied, especially in Rwanda and Burundi, by other 
numerous tragedies, including rapacious wars and genocide. It is in this regard that 
some observers prefer the expression ‘regional and global flashpoint’ since the term 
‘protracted refugee situation’ hardly captures the enormity of the problem. Attention to 
the problem of forced displacement in the region is therefore appropriate and necessary. 
 
Accordingly, the paper begins by capturing the magnitude, scope and trends of forced 
displacement before moving on to the question of causes and consequences. Close 
attention is given to the controversial issue of the correlation between forced 
displacement, on the one hand, and such variables as armed conflict, poverty and human 
agency, on the other. It then proceeds to examine the question of responses by a variety 
of actors, namely, government, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, civil society 
and academia. Under this rubric is also the issue of UN Millennium Development 
Goals. Within the question of responses some attention is given to measures, especially 
of a legislative and policy nature, taken by individual States. Taking Tanzania as an 
illustration, the paper takes a critical look at some of the considerations States advance 
in justifying what essentially has become a more restrictionist approach to refugee 
protection and assistance.  
 
The paper winds up with general observations and policy recommendations. Given the 
trends in the last four decades, it is reasonable to suggest that the problem of forced 
migration is unlikely to experience a drastic reduction in the foreseeable future so 
responses have to be formulated accordingly. The paper further points out the 
multiplicity, interlinkages and complexity of the causes of forced displacement and 
accordingly supports those initiatives that address the problem of forced displacement 
holistically. Finally is necessary to distinguish the root causes (which hold the key to a 
meaningful and durable solution to the problem) from ‘immediate’ causes or ‘triggers’. 
No doubt, refugee presence of the type and magnitude found in the GLR has an adverse 
impact on the natural environment, security, social services and local administration 
institutions. Close scrutiny however indicates that where substantial and sustained 
‘developmental’ interventions by humanitarian agencies have met with appropriate 
political good will, considerable progress has been achieved in ameliorating the 
negative impact of refugee presence. The 3 known durable solutions – local integration, 
resettlement and repatriation require revisiting. Resettlement is not available to most 
and repatriation is frustrated by the continued absence of peace in countries of origin. 
Tanzania, generally known for its extraordinary hospitality has adopted a National 
Refugee Policy which places emphasis on repatriation and sees local integration as 
being a mere tool of temporary protection. All this suggests that other, innovative 
approaches have to be devised and among those being mooted is a more proactive 
regional foreign policy (in stemming forced displacement) and bringing conflict torn 
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countries into existing economic integration systems. Burden-sharing and continued 
international cooperation are key in keeping alive the hospitality and generosity of 
countries of asylum in the region. There is a strong case in the GLR for enhancing 
development assistance and yet donor fatigue is evident and reflected in the challenges 
confronting countries as they try to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals (Goal 
1 – halving poverty; and Goal 8 – addressing the special needs of LDCs). If poor 
nations increase their exports by only 5%, it would generate USD 350 billion, which is 
more than 6 times the total Overseas Development Aid (ODA) doled out by rich nations 
to the poor annually. Generosity is to a large extent a function of economic well-being. 
The poorer countries of asylum continue to be, the more we are likely to see an erosion 





In the context of this paper, the ‘Great Lakes Region’ (GLR) of Africa is understood to 
mean those Sub-Saharan African countries located around 4 ‘great’ lakes, namely, 
Victoria, Tanganyika, Albert and Kivu. These countries are Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. This is worth 
pointing out since at times a more expansive approach is taken of the term GLR and an 
illustration is the forthcoming international conference on the GLR organised by the UN 
Security Council and to be hosted by Tanzania to which Angola, Zambia and Central 
Africa republic have also been invited.1
 
The GLR deserves attention for a host of reasons but the principal one is its status as a 
global and continental flashpoint of forced migration. Tanzania alone, had as at April 
2004, a refugee population of over 600,0002 or nearly 76% of the 4.6 million “persons 
of concern to UNHCR” in Africa or twice the total number of asylum seekers in 2000 in 
15 European Union countries. As will shortly be shown, no other geographical region 
on the continent has a forced displacement problem of the scale and magnitude seen in 
the GLR. Related to the enormity (and chronic nature) of the problem of forced 
displacement is the equally endemic, violent conflicts raging in the region, in Burundi 
and DRC, in particular. The civil war (1990-1994) and the genocide (1994) in Rwanda 
left nearly one million dead, while the ongoing conflict in Burundi has claimed more 
than 300,000 lives since 1993. And this was hardly the only genocide to have been 
visited on Rwanda.3 There have been cyclical genocides in Burundi too, even if rarely 
acknowledged. In neighbouring DRC, a civil war that began in 1996 rapidly turned into 
an internationalised non-international armed conflict4 following the direct involvement 
of, among others, the armed forces of Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and 
                                                 
1 This expansive view of the GLR is consistent with the reality on the ground, in that it captures more 
fully all the prominent countries of asylum and countries of origin in the area. In a forthcoming 
‘International Conference of Peace, Security and Development in the GLR’ (organised by the UN 
Security Council and to be hosted by Tanzania), Angola, Central African Republic, and Republic of 
Congo have been invited while Ethiopia, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe have applied to attend. 
2 Speech by the Minister for Home Affairs in Parliament, Government Printer, July 2004, p 47. 
3 For a deeply analytical and critical work see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2001. 
4 Earning the cliché of being Africa’s First World War. 
 4
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Regional Paper I: Great Lakes Region 
Zimbabwe,5 but in terms of human and natural resources, the GLR countries are among 
the most endowed despite their low ranking on the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report of 2003 Human Development Index (HDI).6  
 
The GLR is deserving of DFID’s attention also on account of the historic and other 
strategic ties most if not all GLR countries have with the United Kingdom.7  
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF VOLUME, SCOPE AND CATEGORIES OF FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT  
 
Data on forced displacement in the GLR shows considerable variation and therefore the 
figures given in this paper must be taken to be estimates. The variation is on account of 
a host of factors but the most common would seem to be the general absence of a 
system of registering residents, be they citizens or aliens, and equally, monitoring and 
quantifying intra-border movement. Possibly for political reasons, few governments 
want to acknowledge the presence of IDPs and where they do so, numbers tend to be 
played down. A case in point is the status of the IDP problem in Rwanda. While 
independent observers such as the Brookings Institute maintain that the problem 
persists, the Government’s Repatriation Commission insists that the problem of IDPs 
was definitively resolved years back. In the case of Tanzania there is the additional 
problem of what are termed ‘old case load’ refugees. Government figures on refugees 
include the 197,948 Burundi refugees inhabiting the western Regions of Tabora and 
Rukwa since the 1970s. UNHCR on its part does not recognise their status as refugees 
and therefore does not include them in its data base. Data betrays variation also because 
forced displacement is, in real life, both rapid and fluid such that a head count is 
rendered difficult. For example at the height of the genocide in Rwanda roughly 
250,000 persons crossed into Tanzania on April 24, 2004 “in what has been described 
by the UNHCR as the fastest and largest” movement in living memory.8 Finally, is the 
speed with which the status of displaced persons does change. Conceptually, it is not 
difficult to imagine today's IDPs, merely on account of crossing an international 
frontier, becoming refugees the next day, or erstwhile refugees becoming ‘returnees’ or 
even IDPs with such rapidity that databases lag behind. Data on forced migration in the 
GLR also reveals a rich variety of categories of displaced persons. While the bulk 
comprise refugees and IDPs, these are not the only groups. There are for an example, 
‘returnees’ and the so called irregular movers, that is refugees who without 
authorisation leave the country of asylum, usually in search of what they perceive to be 
a more attractive refugee regime in another country.  
 
In summary, the 6 countries of the GLR have a total population of asylum seekers, 
refugees and IDPs of between three and five million and the first major influx of refuges 
                                                 
5 For details see Mwesiga Baregu (ed.), Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes 
Books, 1999. 
6 The countries of the GLR are ranked in the following manner in the Report: Burundi (171), DRC (167), 
Kenya (146), Rwanda (158), Tanzania (160), Uganda (147). 
7 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are part of the Commonwealth. The UK is Rwanda’s (a former Belgian 
colony) largest bilateral development partner. For details see DFID, Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan, 
DFID, February 2004.  
8 Rutinwa, B., “Refugee Admission and Eligibility Procedures in Tanzania: The Law and Practice” in 
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, “Review of Refugee Related Policies and Laws, December 
2001, p 11. 
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going back to 1959, is over four decades ago. It is on account of this fact that the GLR 
is sometimes referred to as a ‘global flashpoint’ of displacement. Global flashpoint 
perhaps better describes the situation since the scale, magnitude and prolonged nature of 
forced displacement in the GLR can barely be captured by the term ‘protracted refugee 
situation’ by which is meant a situation involving over 100,000 refugees for over 12 
years.  
 
With this overview it is propitious to bring into spotlight the 6 countries comprising the 
GLR, the focus being the volume, scope and categories of displaced persons. 
 
2.1. Tanzania 
Neither a refugee producing country nor a country with an IDP population (of any 
significance), Tanzania is also a country with the longest history as a country of asylum 
and with the largest refugee population, regionally and globally. As at April 30, 2004 
Tanzania was home to 627,262 refugees9 with the following breakdown: Burundi 
(469,000), Congolese (152,180), Somalis (3,377) and a host of other nationalities 
(1,905). Of the five refugee hosting Regions (Tanga, Kagera, Kigoma, Tabora, and 
Rukwa) home to refugees in Tanzania, Kigoma continues to be host to the majority 
(346,601) with Burundi, at 276,161 constituting the single largest national group 
followed by Congolese (152,180). Given the continued politically precarious situation 
in both Burundi and the DRC, chances of a speedy, mass repatriation for the greater 
majority would appear modest such that it is fair to say that for the short to medium 
term, Tanzania is likely to continue to be a major country of asylum for Burundi and 
Congolese refugees and asylum seekers. In a subsequent section of the paper, we shall 
return to the question of policy and legislative measures the Tanzanian government has 
devised to cope with the situation.  
 
2.2. DRC 
A prominent refugee-generating country, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is, 
at the same time, a significant country of asylum and this is not surprising given the fact 
that 7 out of the 9 countries with which the DRC shares borders are eminent refugee 
generating States. Save Tanzania and Zambia, the remaining neighbouring States, 
namely, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo and 
Uganda are notable countries of origin. As at 2002 the DRC was home to 332,978 
refugees with Angolans (186,879) as the single largest national group. There are in 
addition, 2,335,000 IDPs. But another and more recent count places the number of 
refugees (along with asylum seekers) and IDPs respectively, at 241,000 and 3,400,000. 
DRC is another country with a history of violent conflict going back to 1960, when it 
gained independence from Belgium. The first wave of Congolese refugees into 
neighbouring countries of the GLR began in this early period. The current IDP and 
refugee problem was triggered by the 1996 onslaught against the regime of dictator 
Mobutu Sese Seko by the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(ADFL) led by Joseph Kabila. According to Prof. Baregu, kleptocracy, state collapse, 
disintegration of national society, fragmentation and polarisation of some ethnic 
communities had reached such proportions as to give rise to numerous political 
                                                 
9 Source: Speech by the Minister for Home Affairs, Hon. Omar Ramadhan Mapuri, in the July 2004 
session of Parliament. Note that the figure includes old case load refugees from Burundi living in 
settlements in Tabora and Rukwa Regions of western Tanzania and who total 197, 948.  
 6
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Regional Paper I: Great Lakes Region 
movements and organisations seeking to ‘liberate’ the country,10 but the alliance of 
forces that toppled Mobutu was to be short-lived. Laurent Kabila fell out with both 
Uganda and Rwanda, key partners in the execution of the war that brought Kabila into 
power. The later invaded the DRC in 1998 prompting Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
to send troops under the terms of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security 
in a conflagration with notable consequences for mass displacement. With 
procrastination, the UN Security Council did eventually (following a 2000 decision) 
deploy a modest contingent of the UN Peacekeeping Force (shortly, MONUC) and a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) was installed on the basis of the Global and 
Comprehensive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed 
in Pretoria on December 16, 2002. Despite these laudable peace-building measures, the 
north eastern part of the country remains ravaged by insecurity and violent conflict. A 
close and long observer of the crisis in the DRC, Prof Baregu notes that while the 
signals coming from the DRC are “mixed suggesting that the transition [to democracy 
and stability] is not yet irreversible,” he is particularly concerned with the fact that there 
remain “many incompatibilities between competing actors and interests”.11 This being 
the case, it is unlikely that we would soon see a repatriation of Congolese refugees on 
the dramatic scales that occurred in Rwanda, meaning that data as regards Congolese 




Along with Burundi and the DRC, Rwanda has the dubious reputation of 
simultaneously being a country of asylum and source country. As at April 30, 2004 
Rwanda hosted 33,608 refugees from the DRC in Kiziba (15,684) and Gihembe 
(17,924) camps in addition to 1,842 Burundi refugees hosted at Kigeme camp (749) and 
in Kigali urban (1,093).12 Also found in the urban areas are refugees from Angola, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya, Liberia Somali and Uganda numbering about 1,205. 
Figures on IDPs are contentious. What is indisputable is that the 1994 genocide 
displaced a total of between 2 and 2.5 million Rwandese who sought refuge mostly in 
the DRC, Tanzania and Burundi.13 The exact number then, as is the case now, of IDPs, 
varies from one source to the other. Some place it at around 150,000, others at 192,000. 
From the point of view of the Rwandese Government the problem of internal 
displacement was officially over by the end of 2000 (Global IDP Project: 2002). When 
interviewed, UNHCR stated that it was unaware and retained no statistics on IDPs.14. 
There are in addition, a total of 1,576 asylum seekers. 
 
Although not falling within the immediate subject matter of the study report it is fair to 
note the presence in Rwanda of ‘returnees’ (that is returned ex-refugees from Burundi, 
Congo Brazzaville, DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and other countries). In the last ten 
years a total of about 3.3 million ex-refugees have returned home and 1.85 million of 
                                                 
10 Baregu, M., “The DRC in the Great Lakes Conflict Formations: Challenges, Options and Dilemmas”, 
Paper presented to the National Meeting of National NGOs, Bagamoyo, Tanzania, August 30 – 31, 2004. 
11 Baregu, ibid. passim. 
12 Figures obtained from an interview with UNHCR Officials, Kigali, June 2004. 
13 Others headed for such disparate destinations as Belarus, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, 
Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. For details see Annual Repatriation Statistics of 
Rwandan Refugees by Country of Asylum for January 1994 – December 2003 issued by the Rwanda 
Repatriation Commission. 
14 Field visit to Rwanda June 27 – 30, 2004. 
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these, have done so with assistance from UNHCR. Beyond the nationality criteria, data 
is not segregated either by gender or any other equally important social indicator.  
 
The earlier figures on Rwandese refugees are testimony to a dramatic and phenomenal 
exodus of Rwandese from their country following the 1994 genocide, but equally 
spellbinding has been the return home of Rwandese refugees. Data from all countries, 
and especially those hosting large populations of Rwandese refugees, such as the DRC, 
Burundi and Tanzania, show drastic reductions. Data shows that between January 1994 
and December 2003 a total of nearly 3.3 million Rwandese refugees returned home 
(with or without UNHCR facilitation). The determining factor and nature of the return is 
however the subject of a subsequent part of this study report. 
 
2.4. Burundi 
According to the UNHCR, in Tanzania, Rwanda and DRC alone, there are a total of 
542,335 Burundi refugees. In turn, Burundi had as at May 2002, 475,500 IDPs with the 
following population distribution by province:  
 
Table I: Distribution of IDP Population by Province 
 
Province  IDP Population  
Makamba 99,558 




Bubanza  14,202 
Muyinga 8,945 
Kayanza  7,573 
Gitega  5,361 
Kirundo  5,031 
Cankuzo  4,495 
Ngozi  4,489 
Ruyigi  2,322 
Karuzi  2,042 
Mwara  182 
 Source: Global IDP Project, Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey (2nd ed), 2002 
 
As the data makes evident, one of the major sites is the capital. Nationally the problem 
is more marked in the southern provinces (Makamba, Bururi and Rutana) which 
together account for 256,040 of the national IDP population. These 3 Provinces along 
with Muyinga and Cankuzo straddle the 451 kilometre overland boundary between 
Burundi and Tanzania. 15It is also worth noting that the later provinces (along with 
Ruyigi, Cankuzo and Muyinga) border Tanzania’s western flank, which might explain 
why Tanzania continues to host the largest Burundi refugee group found anywhere. By 
                                                 
15 Tanzania’s common border with its western neighbours Burundi, DRC and Rwanda stretches for a total 
of 1,146 kilometers most of it overland. 
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December 2003 the IDP population had shot up to 545,000 (from the May 2003 figure 
of 475,500). Burundi is at the same time a country of asylum and has a refugee, and 
asylum seeker population of about 42,000, mostly from the DRC. 
 
2.5. Uganda 
Like Burundi, but unlike the rest of the GLR countries, the problem of IDPs is 
numerically more serious than that of refugees. According to UNOCHA, as at March 
2002 there were 550,000 IDPs, the greater majority of whom were in the country’s 
northern districts. Government figures released in August 2003 put the IDP population 
at 854,148 spread as follows: 
 
Table II: Distribution of IDPs by Districts 
 
District Number of Camps Total Number 
of IDPs  
Gulu 33 379,419 
Kitgum 6 108,950 
Pader 20 189,525 
Katakwi 52 104,254 
Lira * 47,000 
Soroti * 25,000 
TOTAL 111 854,148 
Source: Twesigomwe: 2003: 7.  
*Rather than camps, IDPs are hosted in such facilities as schools, churches, and as squatters 
 
By 2004 the number of IDPs had shot up to 1,239,682 while the refugee population 




Although there is consensus on the presence of IDPs in Kenya, exact figures are almost 
non-existent and not surprising because there has never been a systematic registration, 
but also, on account of two additional factors. On the one hand, is the spontaneous 
nature of return and resettlement movements, and continuing small-scale displacements 
in recent years, on the other. However, the Global IDP Project estimates that by 2001 
more than 200,000 Kenyans had fled their homes in the Rift Valley. 
 
As for refugees, one estimate is from 230,000 with the following distribution: Dadaab 
Camp (110,000) and Kakuma Camp (100,000). This figure, given by UNHCR, is 
challenged by some observers, for among other things, not taking into account 
‘unregistered’ refugees and these observers opine that a more realistic figure would be 
500,000.  
 
More recent estimates place the refugee population at 240,000 dispersed between 
Dadaab Camp (140,000), Kakuma Camp (85,000) and urban centres (15,000). Added to 
this figure are nearly 1,200 IDPs located in Kieni (Nyeri District) (1,000) and Bungoma 
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(200). No figures on asylum seekers are available, neither has it been possible to discern 
the gender composition of the displaced or isolate the most vulnerable.  
 





Tanzania 778,184 N/A 778,184 
DRC 241,000 3,400,000 3,641,000 
Uganda 198,000 854,148 1,052,148 
Kenya 240,000 1,200 241,200 
Burundi 42,000 475,000 517,000 
Rwanda 30,863 N/A 30,863 
TOTAL 1,530,047 4,730,348 6,260,395 
Source: USRC website, UNHCR website and IDP Project website 
 
 
3. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED MIGRATION 
 
3.1. Immediate and Root Causes 
In explaining the causes of forced migration, observers stress the necessity of 
distinguishing manifestations from root causes as well as from ‘triggers’ or ‘immediate’ 
causes in order that symptoms are not addressed at the expense of ‘core’ causes. In the 
context of the GLR, by and large, the immediate cause of forced migration (as opposed 
to root cause) is armed conflict and the attendant problems of insecurity and dissipation 
of governmental authority along with lawlessness. Refugee influx from Somalia (1991), 
Rwanda (1959, 1963, 1994), DRC (1960, 1996-8) and Burundi (1972, 1993) are all 
directly connected with one common ‘immediate cause’: insecurity engendered by 
armed conflict or related breakdown of law and order.  
 
And indeed in a study16 conducted by the Economic Research Bureau (ERB) of the 
University of Dar es Salaam on behalf of UNHCR in settlements inhabited by Burundi 
refugees in western Tanzania, armed conflict was cited by 99% of respondents as the 
reason for flight. The study also reveals that refugees would be ready to repatriate only 
if the following conditions are met: creation of a genuinely national army (91%), 
democratic governance (8%), presence of international peace keeping force, assistance 
from international humanitarian agencies (0.3%), and right to participate in running the 
government (0.3%). There can be little doubt that war is regarded as the largest single 
threat. 
 
3.2. ‘Tribalism’ and Conflict 
The issue of distinguishing root from immediate causes is important, but so too is the 
correct characterisation of the wars themselves. There is an increasing group of 
observers who call to question the inevitability of conflict in an ethnically 
heterogeneous community and further challenge the ‘incompatibility’ between socio-
                                                 
16 Economic Research Bureau, Study on Burundian Refugees in Settlements in Tanzania, March 2001. 
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political pluralism, and responsive governance and democratic practice. Quoting the UN 
Secretary General’s Representative for Internally Displaced Persons, and, Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku, Secretary General (then) of the Commonwealth, a Senior Adviser in UNDP’s 
Emergency Response Division, concludes that rather than wishing away the diversity 
which represents African reality, the approach should be “openness and accountability 
in the governance system…consensus among the significant component units of a 
pluralistic society”.17
 
The 1992/2002 war in Sierra Leone is for example, widely regarded as an instance of 
violent conflict driven by economic factors (specifically, attempts to control mining of 
alluvial diamonds). Research however shows that the ‘root causes’ of the war lie in 
political decay, corruption, injustice and social exclusion of young people.18 Equally, in 
Burundi, Rwanda and to some extent the DRC, forced migration is presented as a 
consequence of an ‘ethnic/tribal war’ between bahutu and batutsi. The view however of 
most renowned observers of those conflicts is that it is an oversimplification to term the 
conflicts as merely or exclusively ‘ethnic’ even if they manifest themselves as bloody 
confrontations between the ethnic groups in question.19 Rene Lemarchand is blunt: 
Tribalism as a conceptual tool for comprehending the conflicts is “useless” he argues. 
And adds that if “hutu and tutsi increasingly tend to define each other in terms of 
mutually antagonistic categories, this is not because of ancestral enmities but because 
ethnic identities have acquired a moral dimension: martyred; or threatened minority”20 
The conflict, he contends, was “accompanied or precipitated” by political factors, 
namely, a “sharp reversal of political fortunes suffered by the majority party in 
Parliament, the predominantly Hutu Front Democratique du Burundi (FRODEBU) and 
the spectacular reassertion of Tutsi supremacy under the banner of the Union du 
Progres National (UPRONA) and its allies”21  
 
The Canadian General who headed the UN Military Observer Mission (UNAMIR) in 
the heydays of the genocide in Rwanda concedes genocide did occur, but is emphatic in 
disagreeing with those who see the civil war in that country as a ‘tribal war’.22 
Similarly, Gerard Prunier, the renowned French historian and observer of Rwanda.23 
Joseph Nye provides a useful conceptual framework in understanding these so called 
‘ethnic wars’. He defines communal conflicts or ethnic wars as wars in which 
belligerents define themselves in part along cultural lines such as language, religion, or 
similar characteristic”. Invariably, he argues, ethnic wars occur where established 
                                                 
17 Amoo, S.G., “The Challenge of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Africa: The Need for a New Paradigm”, 
New York, UNDP, January 1997, p 7 . 
18 Archibald, S. and Richards, P. (2003) “Converts to Human Rights: Popular Debate About War and 
Justice in Rural Central Sierra Leone” Paper presented to International Conference on Forced Migration 
and Human Rights organised by the Social Science Research Council (New York) in Sierra Leone, 
November 4-6, 2003. 
19 It has to be acknowledged that the jurisprudence of the UN International Criminal Tribunal (ICTR) 
based in Arusha has through several judgments most notably in Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu and 
Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda, has held that genocide did occur in Rwanda. In turn, the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as: “any [act] committed 
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group …” 
20 Lemarchand, R., “Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide”, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997. 
21 Lemarchand, op cit. 
22 Dallaire, R. (Lt Gen), “Shake Hands with the Devil: How Humanity Failed Rwanda”, Toronto, Random 
House Publishers, 2003. 
23 Prunier, G., “The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide”, London, Hurst & Co, 1995. 
 11
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Regional Paper I: Great Lakes Region 
mechanisms for mediating conflicts break down following a weakening of the State 
from adverse economic conditions, loss of legitimacy, or outside intervention.  
 
3.3. Elites and Conflict 
Conflict, it is sometimes argued, is the further outcome of manipulations of radical 
“elites who incite and distort ethnic/nationalist consciousness into an instrument to 
pursue their personal ambitions”.24 This argument would suggest that ethnicity is so 
malleable as to suit any agent provocateur and, that non-elites have no sound 
conception of their own interests. All these ideas are quite contentious. What then 
should be a more acceptable conceptual framework in addressing the question of the 
role of human agency in explaining conflict? 
 
Researchers recommend a ‘human needs’ perspective to conflict. The central and novel 
thesis to their theory is that beyond biological needs of food and shelter, are other and 
equally vital needs. These relate to basic socio-psychological human needs such as, and 
in particular, identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. According to 
this school of thought, conflicts, and deep-rooted conflicts in particular, are a result of 
demands on individuals and groups to make certain unacceptable adjustments in 
behaviour. The reason for the impossibility of the adjustments lies in the fact that at 
stake are “deep value-laden motivations and needs which cannot be compromised”.25  
 
Critical to the approach is the acknowledgement that the so called ‘ethnic conflicts’ are 
in reality primarily attributable to two factors: violation of universal, basic human needs 
for group identity, security, recognition, participation and empowering autonomy, and 
secondly, the absence of appropriate policies and institutions to facilitate attainment of 
these needs. 
 
The same argument can be made with the aid of constructivism for, as the constructivist 
theory holds, ethnicity is not an immutable fact that inevitably leads to war. Ethnicity is 
“socially constructed in the sense that symbols, myths and memories can be altered over 
time”. Nye proceeds to illustrate this on Rwanda where the pre-colonial distinction 
between the aristocratic Batutsi and peasant Bahutu had become blurred through 
intermarriage and social change, but was reinforced by Belgian colonialists and 
missionaries.26 Constructivists finally argue around four assertions which constitute the 
dynamic of ethnic wars. Firstly, ethnic symbols and myths create divisions. Secondly, 
economic rivalries or the weakening of State authority create fears for group survival. 
Thirdly, elites or leaders then mobilize support by appealing to ethnic symbols; and 
finally, any number of events can trigger the violent clash.27 With this framework in 
mind it becomes much easier to comprehend the conflicts taking place in the GLR. And 
Rwanda (and for that matter, Burundi, too) is a ready illustration. While it is true that 
mass killings erupted on April 6, 1994 with the fatal attack on the jet carrying the State 
President, General Juvenal Habyarimana (and his Burundi counterpart, Cyprien 
                                                 
24 Amoo, S.G., “The Challenge of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Africa: The Need for a New Paradigm”, 
New York, UNDP. January 1997, p 10. 
25 Amoo, ibid., p 12. 
26 Nye, J., “Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History” (4th ed), New 
York, Pearson Addison Wesley, 2003, p 151 
27 For a more detailed discussion of constructivism see Scott Burchill et al. “Theories of International 
Relations” (2nd ed), New York, PALGRAVE, 2001 pp 209 - 230 
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Ntaryamira and several other high ranking Government officials), a rabid media 
campaign had been underway in which Bahutu were being exhorted to exterminate all 
inyenzi (the Kinyarwanda word for cockroaches).28
 
Amoo gives cognisance to this instrumentalist approach, that is, the role of human 
agency in triggering violent conflict by inciting and distorting ethnic/nationalist 
consciousness with the aid of the ‘instrument’ of ethnicity. And indeed, Dallaire and 
Mamdani describe in painful detail the role of extremists in stirring the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994.29 Amoo however questions this instrumentalist approach for its 
patronising premise, among other reasons. According to Amoo, instrumentalists 
incorrectly presume that “enormous masses of people” in Africa “do not have a sound 
conception of their own interests” when in reality, “non-elites are far from ignorant 
about their politics”.30 Nye makes an important observation in this respect, since he 
notes that despite allegiance to social groups not any difference with other group 
members is sufficient to compel them to kill.31 To understand how that watershed 
moment is reached we have to turn to Amoo again. He makes the pertinent observation 
that “conflicts arise out of demands on individuals and groups to make certain 
adjustments in behaviour that are unacceptable and probably beyond human tolerance 
and capabilities”.32
 
A dramatic illustration of this could be the situation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda. 
At home, the Habyarimana regime incessantly stated that the country had an acute 
shortage of land and that refugees had no right of return, effectively stripping them of 
their fundamental right to citizenship and participation in the governance of their 
country, not to mention equally important cultural rights. At the other extreme, life in 
the country of asylum was increasingly becoming unbearable. Mamdani writes for an 
example how successive regimes in Uganda, engaged in “state repression of the 
Banyarwanda”, subjected them to a “pogrom” and “expulsion” leading to 35,000 
languishing “in border camps, their future uncertain”.33 Ultimately they became the 
target of state hostility and popular suspicion. 
 
3.4. Poverty and Conflict34
Uganda’s State President is on record as saying that “our conflicts are caused by the 
poverty in which most of us labour. People feel that if their group is in power access to 
resources is easier and that is why the struggle for power is such a fierce one”.35 The 
reference to poverty as a major cause of conflicts is made on the basis that all the 
countries in violent conflict are at the same time leading nations in so far as poverty is 
                                                 
28 For details see the judgement of the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) in the so called ‘Media Cases’ 
29 See R. Dallaire, “Shaking Hands with the Devil”, Toronto, Random House Publishers, 2003, in 
particular p. 293, 324 and M. Mamdani, “When Victims Become Killers”, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 
2003 especially pp 189, 190, 191  
30 Amoo, S.G., “The Challenge of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Africa: The Need for a New Paradigm”, 
New York, UNDP, January 1997, p 9, 10, 11  
31 Nye, op cit., p153 
32 Amoo, op cit., p 12. 
33 Mamdani, op cit., pp 166, 167, 168, 169. 
34 A subsequent section will discuss measures taken within the context of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals and the nexus with the question of poverty eradication. 
35 H.E Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Address at the Opening of the Seminar on “Building Peace in Eastern 
Africa”, Entebbe, December 16, 2002. 
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concerned. Sierra Leone, until recently in a decade long carnage, ranks 174th, the lowest 
on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Burundi, Rwanda and DRC fair equally 
poorly. True and obvious as it may sound, one small but important detail is overlooked. 
It has to be accepted that not all the 38 African countries on the UNDP Index are 
engaged war or represent ‘Failed States’. Secondly, that rather than being (always) the 
cause of conflict, poverty is both “the deliberate creation and the unintended 
consequence” of conflict. Studies on armed conflict time and time again have shown 
how contemporary conflicts target and victimise “civilian objects” rather than “military 
objectives”. 
 
By wreaking havoc on agricultural activities, health services, water sources and other 
‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’ war directly threatens 
livelihoods and self-sufficiency. An overview of the impact of war on the economy of 
the DRC is revealing. Writers point to a 15% negative growth in GDP, itself the result 
of “decrease in production in almost all the sectors of the economy”. More importantly, 
they attribute the dismal condition of the economy to “destruction of resources of 
production such as physical capital and human capital and to substantiate, point to the 
2.5 million Congolese who have died and nearly 1.8 million displaced since 1998. They 
place the inflation in 2000 at 540%, considered “very high” by Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). So, rather than poverty leading to displacement, it would appear that it is 
unmitigated socio-economic disasters created by armed conflict that determine forced 
migration. 
  
3.5. Forced Displacement & the Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
In forum after forum, displaced persons and refugees in particular, are invariably 
associated with the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Interestingly, 
despite the notion’s prevalence, experts can barely find cogent proof. The indubitable 
fact is that the problem of proliferation of SALW is a common and prevalent one for the 
GLR. In the DRC, 750 out of every 1,000 deaths are imputable to war, 1.8 million 
people have been displaced, 80% of public infrastructure has been laid to waste. This is 
perhaps inevitable given the DRC’s 20% share in the global illicit trade in arms. A study 
by the Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva estimates that there are 30 
million guns in circulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Within East Africa, Tanzania and 
Uganda are believed to hold 780,000-1,280,000 and 630,000-950,000 guns respectively, 
while Kenya’s share is between 530,000-960,000. 
 
Although at third place, a closer examination reveals Kenya to be a case warranting 
special attention. Between 1995-1999 police were able to recover 3,551 firearms from 
criminals while a further 11,000 guns change hands on the black market annually. In the 
Kenyan capital alone, while Police seize between 1,800-2,000 unlicensed guns per 
month an additional 5,000 illegal weapons are in circulation, or one illegal weapon for 
every 560 Nairobi residents. Far more alarming is the situation in Northern Kenya 
where with approximately 40,000 illegal weapons, guns are as common as the walking 
stick.36
 
As is the case elsewhere, refugee presence (particularly but not confined to Somalis) in 
Kenya is seen as a ‘major contributory’ factor in the proliferation and illicit trade in 
                                                 
36 For a detailed study see E. Mogire, “Refugees and the Proliferation of SALW in Kenya”, Centre for 
Refugee Studies, Moi University (Eldoret, Kenya), Occasional Paper Series Vol 1 no 4, 2003.  
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SALW. Refugees are blamed for the illegal importation, illicit export, sale, and use of 
SALW in the commission of other offences such as homicide, cattle rustling, drug 
trafficking and car jacking.  
 
A cautious approach is warranted. If the link between refugee presence and proliferation 
of SALW has to acquire credibility then it is critical that the following factors are given 
consideration. Firstly, weapons seized in the country of asylum must bear resemblance 
with those that are stocked, or in circulation in the country of origin. Secondly, data on 
seized weapons should reveal their owner. Thirdly, even where refugee possession of 
weapons is established, thought should be given to the motives for possession. As a 
number of studies show, criminal intention is not always the reason for weapon 
acquisition. In some occasions it is to defend oneself and ones family from all manner 
of foes including bandits and involuntary conscription.  
 
Let us turn to Tanzania for a minute. A recently concluded study37 found that the link 
between refugee presence on the one hand, and insecurity owing to proliferation of 
illicit SALW, on the other, is widely held to be a fact. However closer examination of 
relevant data makes it plain that the proportion of refugees involved in criminal 
activities and in particular, murder, armed robbery and illegal possession of arms and 
ammunition (these are the more ‘serious offences’), is not as dramatically huge as is 
commonly held. The study found that the vast majority of seized illegal weapons 
constitute Tanzanian, home-made muzzle-loading guns (gobore, in the vernacular) and 
that refugees are no more likely to commit criminal offences than are members of the 
host communities since the ratio of refugee convicts to the general refugee population is 
comparable to the equivalent ratio among Tanzanian nationals. 
 
It would be misleading however, if the foregoing were to be taken as playing down the 
impact of refugee presence. Indeed there is anecdotal evidence to the effect that among 
the spontaneously settled refugees in Kigoma town from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC are 
elements engaged in illicit gun running.38 However we still must interrogate extant 
notions and data, contextualise the problem and make appropriate conclusions and 
policy recommendations. One such conclusion is that it is not in all cases that refugee 
presence is necessarily the key factor in the proliferation of SALW. 
 
 The major contributory factor lies outside, rather than inside, the areas of refugee 
settlement. One such critical factor and one that is often cited by researchers and 
practitioners alike is the fact of proximity to theatres of war. Related to this is the 
incapability of belligerent States to monitor and control the flow of weapons. Weapons 
are not only freely available. They can be procured at give away prices. In Kenya, for as 
little as $64, one is able to obtain an AK-47 assault rifle.39 In the refugee-hosting areas 
of northwestern Tanzania, the price tag for an AK-47 is between $10 to $20.40
 
 
                                                 
37 Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, “The Impact of the Presence of 
Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania”, Dar es Salaam, September 2003. 
38 Felleson, Mans, “Prolonged Exile in Relative Isolation”, Uppsala, Uppsala Universitet, 2003, p 20. 
39 Mogire, E., “Refugees and the Proliferation of Illegal SALW in Kenya”, Eldoret (Kenya), Moi 
University Press Occasional Paper Series, Vol 1 No 4, 2003, p 3. 
40 Willems, R.,  “Embedding the Refugee Experience: Forced Migration and Social Networks in Dar es 
Salaam”, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2003. 
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It was not until September 2003 that Tanzania, adopted its first ever refugee policy 
guidelines.41 The fact that throughout its 37 years of existence as an independent state 
and a country of asylum it never had a similar document raises the question of the 
determinants of the National Refugee Policy (NRP). These are variously set out in the 
NRP. Practice had come to show that government could not continue with any measure 
of consistency, coherence and effectiveness, working by relying on a multiplicity of 
impromptu oral instructions in response to the new challenges. The challenges in 
question are the impact of refugee presence in 4 areas: 
• Economic development; 
• Security; 
• Environment; and 
• Social services 
 
Beyond these rather specific challenges are concerns of a more general nature. The first 
one, relates to the desirability of providing a vision, general framework and guidelines 
to inform the law on refugees. It would appear that Government has also come to the 
realisation that its international obligations to asylum seekers and refugees are not 
always consistent with national interests and therefore the need to reconcile the two. 
Two additional concerns: The first has to do with the desire to reiterate certain 
principles of refugee law about which Government feels strongly and in that way, 
reaffirm commitment to the existing international refugee regime. Secondly, to 
enunciate (or lend support to) emerging approaches in resolving the refugee crisis as it 
affects the GLR. So, which principles does the NRP reiterate and which new durable 
solutions does it advocate? Four principles are pertinent: Firstly, is the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’; Secondly, is the principle of ‘asylum’; The third is that of ‘international 
cooperation and burden sharing’, and finally, the ‘anti-subversive’ principle originally 
articulated in the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing 
Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees. As for new approaches to solving the 
refugee crisis, several are advanced, and it is through these that a policy shift is 
particularly discernible. Take for example the mundane issue of status determination, in 
which the standard practice had been to grant status by way of the ‘group determination’ 
system. The NRP now declares that ‘Government … will work out mechanisms that 
will require all refugees to present themselves to authorised officers for 
documentation”42 We see similar deviations from established practice on the question of 
‘durable solutions’. It needs to be recalled that Tanzania in the past had won 
international accolades, including the prestigious Nansen award43 for its exemplary 
hospitality to refugees including, the mass grant of citizenship through naturalisation.44 
The NRP has the opaque declaration according to which “[a]ll rules relating to 
naturalisation shall have to be adhered to before an application by a refugee for 
                                                 
41 The National Refugee Policy, adopted by the Ministry of Home Affairs on September 15, 2003. 
42 National Refugee Policy (NRP), para 9. 
43 Awarded to Tanzania’s President (then), Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere in 1983 
44 Gasarasi, C., “Mass Naturalisation and Further Integration of Rwandese Refugees in Tanzania: Process, 
Problems and Prospects”, Vol 3 No 2 Journal of Refugee Studies, 1990, 88. 
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naturalisation can be considered by the Government”45 Two further matters are 
pertinent in showing policy shifts. Again, contrary to the established practice of offering 
‘local integration’ (as exemplified by the mass grant of citizenship mentioned earlier 
and other acts of generosity of the erstwhile open door policy) the NRP sees in “local 
settlement” merely a “temporary solution rather than a permanent one”46 and goes on to 
emphatically state that “voluntary repatriation of refugees [is] the best solution to the 
refugee problem”47 And as we will presently show, the emphasis on voluntary 
repatriation as the only acceptable solution is quite consistent. But the solution that 
clearly stands out and therefore stands out as cogent proof of a policy shift is the 
question of “safe zones” articulated severally by the NRP. But the pertinent section 
reads: “The Government of Tanzania will continue to appeal that safe zones be created 
within countries generating refugees” so as to “alleviate the burden on host countries”. 
But safe zones not only relate to anticipated cases of forced displacement but are also 
meant to absorb refugees who are currently in Tanzania. As the NRP elaborates, 
“Tanzania will admit asylum seekers and refugees for not more than one year within 
which arrangements should be made to take them back to the established safe zones in 
their countries of origin.”48  
 
Two final issues are worth our attention. These relate to refugee education and 
employment policy. Consistent with the spirit of advocating for voluntary repatriation as 
the only acceptable durable solution, the NRP is explicit in declaring the policy on 
refugee education as one meant to facilitate repatriation. Accordingly, the NRP 
advocates for a refugee school curriculum and examinations based on the system 
pertaining in the country of origin,49 but also calls for a system of education that is 
parallel to, and not an integral part of the Tanzania system.50 Pertinently, it advocates 
for an curriculum with “peace and reconciliation” as a primary focus.51 Finally, on 
employment, the NRP begins with an acknowledgement of the significance of gainful 
employment to refugee protection generally as well as its potential in improving the 
national “economy and betterment of life and living standards”. However, it quickly 
proceeds to state the underlying principle should be to provide such employment 
opportunities so as to “facilitate meaningful reintegration in their countries of origin 
when they are able to return” since the Tanzania “labour market is generally in crisis 
and faces many challenges.”52 It states in conclusion that in so far as “refugees are 
concerned, the government will allow small income generating activities to be 
undertaken within the camps.”53  
 
Many recent studies point out to the ‘securitisation’ of the refugee by which is 
understood the heightened attention and preoccupation with what are believed to be the 
‘security’ implications of refugee presence. The NRP in this respect is no different and 
perhaps serves as an ideal illustration. There are no less than five specific references to 
the problem in the NRP. In its foreword the NRP is emphatic in its faithfulness to the 
OAU Refugees Convention’s anti-subversive clause. Government, the NRP states, 
                                                 
45 NRP, para 11 
46 NRP, para 15 
47 NRP, para 14 
48 NRP, para 15 
49 NRP, para 30 
50 NRP, paras 16, 31 
51 NRP, para 29 
52 NRP, para 17 
53 NRP, ibid. 
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commits itself to denying support to “refugees in whatsoever way to sabotage, attack or 
attempt to remove by force Governments of countries of origin”. The NRP’s ‘Mission 
Statement’ in turn cites “national and state security” in addition to “ law and order” and 
“ever rising criminality in refugee hosting areas” as matters of “national interests and 
priorities”. ‘Security’ is also cited as one of four  challenges that have necessitated the 
formulation of the NRP54 (the other three being, economic development, environment 
and social services). Finally, security considerations will also lie at the core of the 
screening of asylum seekers among whom could be persons prejudicial to “national 
security, law and order”.55 Let us now look more closely and objectively at the security 
implications of refugee presence for Tanzania. It is fair to begin by pointing out that 
certain characteristics of the country are pertinent to security. First is the fact of close 
proximity to Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, countries which have seen prolonged violent 
clashes, cyclical genocide, and mass displacement. It is also worth noting that the 
overland borders with Burundi and Rwanda as well as the median boundary on Lake 
Tanganyika with DRC are long and porous. Thirdly, that the Tanzanian administrative 
Regions of Kagera, Kigoma and Rukwa bordering conflict prone neighbours and home 
to over 95% of the refugees found in Tanzania, are very remote (located about 2,000 
kilometres from the centre of political power, Dar es Salaam) and highly 
underdeveloped. Finally, there is the phenomenal magnitude of the refugee problem. 
Whereas, the earlier influxes (of the 1950/60s) involved comparatively modest numbers, 
recent flows have ranged from 100,000 to as high as 800,000 bringing the total refugee 
population at one point to a one million high.  
 
The security implications have become particularly dramatic if not tragic in Tanzania’s 
external relations, especially with Burundi. More contentious has been the assertion 
according to which rising criminality in Refugee Hosting Areas (RHAs) should be 
attributed to refugee presence per se. A recent study conducted by researchers of the 
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, found little if 
any evidence to support such a nexus. In the main, the study showed that within the 
RHAs of Kigoma and Kagera Regions there are refugees who are criminals. Data on 
crime from the Police, statistics on inmates and court cases clearly confirms this. 
However, close examination also reveals that the number of refugees tried and 
convicted for (the most serious) criminal offences is not as dramatically huge as is 
commonly believed. Data for Kagera Region for 2000 on murder, armed robbery and 
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, indicated that the contribution of 
refugees was 3%, 4% and 10.5%, respectively. Another prevalent assertion in this 
regard, is that rising criminality in RHAs is largely fuelled by weapons illegally brought 
into the innocent country by refugees.56 The CSFM study cited earlier did indeed 
establish the RHAs as Regions with a marked problem of proliferation of illegal 
weapons but did not succeed in establishing a direct link between refugee presence and 
the proliferation of arms. Researchers were not convinced about the nexus for the 
simple reason that the preponderant majority of weapons seized by the Police, are of the 
type associated more with local inhabitants than refugees. Take for example the data on 
weapon seizures in Kagera Region for the year 2001. Of a total of about 1,150 captured 
weapons more than a 1,000 were the home made muzzle loaded rifles, known to many 
communities in Tanzania as gobore. The study also made comparisons between the 
                                                 
54 NRP, para 4 
55 NRP, para 27 
56 See for example the Speech by the Minister for Home Affairs in the July session of Parliament made in 
July 2004, para 20. 
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ratio of refugee inmates and the refugee population generally so as to gauge the level of 
criminality within the refugee community. A similar exercise was carried out in respect 
of Tanzanian inmates in the RHAs. The result was that whereas 0.0053 per cent of the 
refugee community within Kasulu District were convicted felons, the comparable figure 
for Tanzanians in the same District was 0.0046 per cent, leading to the reasonable 
conclusion that the two respective figures are comparable and suggest that a refugee is 
no more likely to commit a felony than would a Tanzanian. The study accordingly 
began considering other possible factors and found two that better explain the rising 
criminality in the RHAs. The first and perhaps the more important is close proximity to 
conflict prone countries (or, the ‘contagion of conflict’ as Hammerstad terms it) coupled 
with the long, porous nature of the common boundary with these countries. The second, 
and related factor is the location of the camps close to an already unmanageable 
border.57  
 
Besides the problem of ‘refugee warriors’ is the related issue of paramilitary activities 
or the harbouring and feeding of armed elements.58 If one takes into account the fairly 
huge populations found in camps, the porous nature and vastness of camps and contrasts 
this with the skeletal, ill-equipped staff available to ensure law and order, one begins to 
appreciate why refugee presence is viewed from the prism of ‘security’.59 Indeed, there 
have been cases of refugees being found with offensive weapons in the camps, the 
murder of civilians and destruction of property. In the resultant deterioration of security, 
Government officials are known to resort to stringent and restrictive measures such as 
clamping down on any contact between refugees and communities in the surrounding 
RHAs, freezing the issuance of permits allowing refugees to leave the camp area and 
the closure of barter trade between refugees and host community members.60
 
As regards Tanzania’s responses to refugees, both in terms of legislation and practice, 
one can identify two distinct periods. There was the de facto open-door policy of the 
1960s – 80s, and the restrictive approach from the 1990s to the present. 
 
The magnanimity and tolerance of the “open-door” policy sharply contrasted with some 
of the draconian provisions one finds in the law of that time, the Refugees (Control) 
Act, 1966. Between the 1960s – 80s, refugees were given liberal recourse to group 
determination of status, land was allocated not only for housing but also for farming, 
schools and hospitals were built for the refugees, and finally, the right to seek 
naturalisation was extended almost universally. Former South African President, Nelson 
Mandela pays glowing tribute to Tanzania’s policy of those years in his 
autobiographical work ‘Long Walk To Freedom’. 
 
What accounts for the discrepancy between law and practice? How does one also 
explain the shift from a de facto open-door policy to a de jure restrictive regime? 
                                                 
57 The NRP does in this respect commit itself to locating camps at a distance of “at least 50 km from the 
border”. While close proximity to borders has the security implications discussed, voluntary repatriation 
becomes a lesser logistical nightmare on account of the relatively short distance refugees have to cover. 
58 Hammerstad, A., “ Making or Breaking the Conflict Cycle: The Relationship Between 
Underdevelopment, Conflict and Forced Migration”, 2004. 
59 Incidentally, all the five camps in Kibondo District of Kigoma Region are positioned in close proximity 
to the border and are administered by a lean administrative team of officials from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. The five Camp Commandants (for Mtabila, Mtendeli, Kanembwa, Mkugwa and Nduta) 
administer over a total population numbering almost 146,000.  
60 As often happens in Kibondo. 
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Compared to the Refugees (Control) Act of 1966, the 1998 Refugees Act is legally 
more sophisticated, displaying sensitivity to international refugee law. Nevertheless, in 
practice, treatment of refugees after the 1998 Act has been increasingly restrictive. 
Answers to these questions lie in external as well as internal factors: changing political 
climate, sliding economic fortunes, and the sheer magnitude of the refugee problem.61  
 
Besides the changed character of conflicts there are equally changed socio-economic 
conditions. While the population has continued to grow markedly, intermittent droughts, 
a debilitating national debt burden, and dwindling returns on exports pose awesome 
challenges for the economy. Combined with mismanagement and the conditions 
imposed by multilateral financial institutions, countries like Tanzania have found 
themselves on the UN lists of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs). Since the legendary “African hospitality” (toward asylum 
seekers) is a function of availability of resources, the dire economic situation in 
Tanzania necessarily brought about a reconsideration of the open-door policy. The 
changed political and socio-economic conditions in themselves might not have led to a 
policy shift had four other factors not come into play.  
 
First, the magnitude of mass influxes has dramatically increased since the 1980s. The 
resulting demographic imbalance and environmental degradation is not only well 
documented in study reports but was evident even to the uninitiated residents in the 
refugee-populated areas. Second, barriers against asylum seekers are going up 
worldwide—a development that has not gone unnoticed in countries such as Tanzania. 
Third, and closely related, is the view that the international community is “shifting” 
rather than “sharing” the burden of hosting refugees to those countries unfortunate 
enough to be located near refugee-generating regions. Finally, largely for political 
reasons, government officials in RHAs want to be seen as being responsive to host 
community complaints related to refugee presence. 
  
The threat of a refugee influx can also be more direct. At the Regional Refugee Policy 
Workshop, one official noted the perception that “generosities” such as providing land 
for refugees would dissuade refugees from returning home, lead to a demographic 
imbalance in favor of refugees, promote the infiltration of refugees into the government 
as legislators, and create conditions in which “refugees will ultimately consider taking 
charge of government” (as in the case of Banyamulenge in the DRC). 
 
Many allege that the mass exodus of batutsi refugees is associated with a desire by the 
bahima dynasty—purportedly entrenched in Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and attempting 
to grab power in the DRC—to establish an “empire” transcending the current 
international frontiers. Two situations in the region may explain why this highly 
questionable perception has gained currency. 
 
The ruling elite in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are believed to be strains of the 
Bahima peoples, which is then taken to explain these countries’ sympathy and support 
for the Banyamulenge of eastern DRC, who trace their roots to Rwanda. Proponents of 
the Bahima expansionism theory also cite the erstwhile mutual military assistance 
between the ruling elite in Uganda and Rwanda as further evidence of a conspiracy. 
They note the conspicuous involvement of Rwandese refugees in the armed struggle 
                                                 
61 See also the earlier discussion on ‘Causes and Consequences of Forced Migration’ supra. 
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that brought the incumbent Ugandan administration into power in 1986, and the 
subsequent assistance Ugandan authorities extended to the Rwandese Patriotic Front’s 
incursion and eventual takeover of Kigali in July 1994. Lastly, the appointment of 
prominent Banyamulenge in Laurent Kabila’s Cabinet was also noted with disquiet by 
proponents of the Bahima conspiracy. They insist that it does not bode well for the 
security of the countries of the region, and hence advocate vigilance with respect to the 
local integration and particularly, the naturalisation of Batutsi refugees. This argument 
must be taken with utmost caution. There has yet to be a sustained and coherent study 
supporting the Bahima expansionism theory62 and there are other factors that help to 
explain the developments described above.  
 
4.1.1. The Refugees Act of 1998  
An examination of the laws pertaining to refugees also offers useful insights into the 
nature of a country’s responses to the refugee issue. Tanzania’s legislative history is 
fairly rich. British colonialists gave the country its first ever refugee specific legislation 
in 1946. The Refugee War Ordinance was rendered legally obsolete with the 1996 
enactment of independent Tanzania’s first refugee specific statute, the Refugee 
(Control) Act, which in turn, was repealed by the Refugees Act, 1998. Tanzania’s 
Refugees Act of 1998 carries a more encompassing (but now antiquated) definition of 
refugees that was introduced by the 1969 OAU Convention. The Act addresses a 
number of issues key to the promotion of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. 
These provisions, in a fairly bold manner facilitate the implementation of Tanzania's 
treaty obligations under international refugee law.  
 
The provisions in the 1998 Refugees Act that deserve specific mention are those 
pertaining to governance of refugee settlements and constitutionality of orders 
emanating from authorities. The earlier provision sets the stage for participatory, 
democratic governance through the creation of “Councils” or “Village Committees” to 
which leaders and representatives will be elected on principles of equality and universal 
suffrage, without discrimination based on sex, clan, tribe, nationality, race, or religion. 
The other provision requires authorities to “have regard” for international refugee law 
instruments. 
 
On closer inspection, however, one finds a number of shortcomings. For example, not 
only is the establishment of Councils or Village Committees left to the discretion of the 
Minister. To become operational, they must obtain a “Certificate of Incorporation” from 
the Director of Refugee Services. Should the application for incorporation be rejected, 
then appeal lies with the Minister who may legitimately “vary the decision of the 
Director as he deems appropriate and the decision... shall be final” (emphasis added). 
Provisions relating to discretionary powers and finality of decisions by authorities litter 
the Refugees Act of 1998. 
 
Ultimately, the Refugees Act of 1998 implicitly recognises a number of key “basic 
rights and fundamental freedoms” relevant to refugees. These include the freedom of 
movement, right to own property, and freedom of association. Yet, while doing so, the 
                                                 
62 It is for an example widely acknowledged that Laurent Kabila not only politically fell out with both 
Rwanda and Uganda but such was the deterioration in mutual ties that the latter invaded the DRC in what 
came to be known as ‘Africa’s First World War’ on account of the alarming number of countries drawn 
into the war. For the motivations of the parties to that war see M. Baregu, “The DRC in the Great Lakes 
Conflict Formations” passim. 
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Act laces the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms with restrictions—raising 
questions about their practical utility to refugees. At this juncture it is appropriate to 
recall the National Refugee Policy (NRP) and summarise its possible impact as regard 
the enjoyment of the basic rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the Refugees 
Act. From the earlier analysis of the NRP it is evident that ‘local integration’ has ceased 
to be regarded as a permanent, durable solution and with that the possibility of 
enjoyment of political rights in any significant way. Secondly, is the issue of social and 
economic rights. These too are unlikely to be enjoyed fully on account of the consistent 
lack of recognition given to the possible contribution of refugee presence to national 
development and adherence the practice of encampment or the warehousing of refugees 
(as opposed to other more liberal and acceptable forms of settlement). We noted the 
consistency with which policies on refugees be they on education or employment have, 
as their goal, the repatriation of refugees. These policy tenets, it was argued, are to a 
large extent informed by the questionable ‘securitisation’ of the refugee problem.  
 
4.2. Kenya 
Like her two fellow East African states, Kenya is party to the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention, the Protocol of 1967, and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. In terms of 
specific responses to her obligations arising from international refugee law, Kenya is in 
a class of her own. Despite an involvement with asylum seekers and refugees spanning 
nearly five decades, Kenya has neither a refugee-specific legislation nor a national 
refugee policy. Kenya’s legal framework is not based on consolidated legislation, but 
draws authority from a host of diverse statutory instruments. There does exist a draft of 
a bill entitled “The Refugees Bill.” It made its debut in 1992, but overwhelming public 
antipathy and outright xenophobia toward refugees scuttled the legislative initiative. 
Fresh efforts were initiated two years later, but for similar reasons, the process 
floundered. The existing draft to which this paper refers was drawn in 2000. 
 
At the general level, in Kenya one finds legislative and policy shifts similar to those in 
Tanzania. This includes an aversion to local integration as a solution, ascendancy of 
individual over group recognition of status, and a tilt towards mandatory residence in 
camps. But in other instances, Kenya’s response toward refugees has been novel and 
bold. 
 
The retrogressive trend can be partly explained by the dramatic increase in the 
magnitude of refugee flows, the changed nature of conflicts, and the interplay of such 
factors as the proliferation of weapons, brutal inter-ethnic conflicts and local electoral 
politics. A senior government official makes two significant observations. He contrasts 
the relatively modest numbers of asylum seekers in earlier periods with the “floods” of 
the 1990s, and also observes that in those earlier periods asylum seekers were 
(sympathy evoking) victims of either  “colonial rule,” “apartheid” or “oppressive and 
barbaric regimes.” In contrast, present day conflicts pose a knife-edge dilemma for the 
Kenyan government. Today refugees are characterised by their violent opposition to 
their home governments. Offering protection exposes the country of asylum to criticism 
for supporting subversive acts against a fellow Partner State, contrary to the 1963 OAU 
Charter and 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.  
 
In Kenya, the initially modest numbers of asylum seekers did not warrant the 
establishment of a permanent national body. The “manageable” volume of business was 
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such that it was common for “many refugees (to be) locally integrated,” namely, to 
“secure employment in the public and private sector, put up business and also mix with 
rural folks”. And even more, once integrated, the refugees “enjoyed the same rights with 
Kenyans on provision of services like health facilities and education opportunities.”  
 
As in Tanzania, dramatic increases in the numbers of asylum seekers and the changed 
character of the conflicts help explain the emergence of restrictive legislation. The 
insistence on having refugees reside in camps, as opposed to settlements and urban 
areas, and the mass dismissal from the public sector of refugee professionals, were in 
large part directly influenced by the overwhelming size of refugee flows and the related 
political and security challenges. The acute shortage of arable land, insufficient social 
services in the urban sector, deepening rural and urban poverty, and high rate of 
unemployment, are additional factors.  
 
It is presumed that once the Refugees Bill becomes enacted into law, it will occupy 
centre stage in the regulation of asylum and administration of refugees. Given this 
assumption, it should be viewed as a benchmark for assessing the country's responses to 
its international obligations. Included is a provision for the rights of refugee women and 
children and an insistence on their “appropriate protection and assistance” that 
represents a significant innovation in approach. 
 
Despite these advances, there are holes. Contrary to Kenya’s obligations under the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, there appears to be 
little effort in the draft Bill to address the rights to education, work, social assistance, 
and health. The closest the draft Bill gets is the omnibus declaration that refugees and 
members of their families “shall be entitled to the rights and be subject to the 
obligations contained in (the 1951 UN Refugees Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 
1969 OAU Convention).” Neither does the draft Bill provide for legal representation for 
asylum seekers or refugees—as is the case with the corresponding Ugandan draft—be it 
during oral interviews where the question of status is being determined, or at the appeal 
level.  
 
These deficiencies notwithstanding, adoption of the draft Bill represents a bold step. 
The mere existence of a refugee-specific statute is a welcome change. Even the 
government acknowledged that its absence was a fundamental shortcoming. Further, the 
bill has several promising aspects. First are the envisaged institutions. The limitations of 
the thinly-staffed Eligibility Committee were dramatically exposed by the 
unprecedented refugee influx of early 1991. In contrast to the Eligibility Committee, 
which occupied the status of a mere “section” within the bureaucracy, the draft Bill 
provides for a “Directorate.” This body will be relatively more independent and 
administratively superior. Thus, it will arguably be entitled to more human, financial, 
and material resources. There is also provision for a Refugee Appeal Board to which 
one finds no analogy in the Tanzania Refugee Act of 1998. Granted, one may question 
the Board’s independence, but an aggrieved person is also entitled to appeal to the High 
Court on a point of law, against a decision of the Board.  
 
Considered in its totality, the legal framework envisaged by the draft Bill places Kenya 
in a far better position to meet its obligations under refugee instruments than has thus 
far been possible. 
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4.3. Uganda  
Like her two other East African sister states, Uganda lacks a documented national 
refugee policy. But unlike Kenya, Uganda has a refugee-specific statute in place, the 
Control of Alien Refugees Act of 1960 (hereafter, the Act). While its existence is 
important, it is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is archaic. 
 
One observer summarised the Ugandan statute in the following terms: “The Act neither 
provides for basic rights nor incorporates the provisions of the (UN Refugees 
Convention).” He adds that the Act “is also completely inconsistent with Uganda’s 
Constitution [of 1995] and international human rights standards”. Such a view is shared 
by other researchers and stresses how “the Act treats refugees as undesirable intruders 
rather than people in need of protection from prosecution.” Also, its application is 
confined to “aliens” by which is meant persons who are not Ugandan citizens or citizens 
of the Commonwealth, effectively shutting out asylum seekers from the latter group of 
countries. 
 
Despite these concerns, there is a welcome discrepancy between the Act’s precepts and 
actual practice—an incongruence also observed in Tanzania and Kenya. For instance, 
whereas according to the law the decision to grant asylum is the prerogative of the 
Minister, in practice, this function has been executed by a collegial body, the Refugee 
Eligibility Committee, on which also sits a representative of the UNHCR. Likewise, 
while the Act is explicit in its demand for mandatory residence in camps, in practice, 
this requirement applies “only to a spontaneous large influx of refugees,” while 
individuals whose asylum applications are successful reside in places of their choice. In 
addition, the enforcement of a number of provisions would preclude the integration of 
refugees. Instead, the practice has been to facilitate “local integration” of refugees, 
including their absorption into the labour market, military, and police. Lastly the 
authorities have rarely resorted to the draconian disciplinary or police powers the Act 
confers.  
 
A Refugee Bill has been drafted which, if passed into law, would repeal and replace the 
archaic Control of Alien Refugees Act. Drawn in 1998 and revised in 2000 and 2001, its 
preamble reads:  
 
“An Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to refugees to conform to 
international conventions and obligations in relation to the status of refugees 
and their rights and obligations, and to provide for the administration and 
regulation of refugee matters, and for other matters connected with the above” 
(emphasis added). 
 
The envisaged statute seeks to fulfil four objectives: First, to bring under one instrument 
the varied and independent pieces of legislation pertinent to refugees; second, to ensure 
that these laws correspond to rules of international law that are applicable to refugees; 
third, to ensure that refugees are granted the rights to which they are entitled; and 
fourth, to provide institutions and procedures governing refugees.  
 
The second objective is particularly interesting because it deals with Uganda’s treaty 
obligations. For a dualist legal system, it is more than symbolic that the Bill’s opening 
statement recognises international law. It may create the conditions for a progressive 
national judge to seize the opportunity to apply the more advanced and fair, but legally 
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“alien,” rules of international refugee law to domestic cases. Or it may provide the 
avenue for the bench to advance the promotion of international refugee law by lending a 
favourable and forward-looking interpretation of existing municipal laws.  
 
At the core of international refugee law are the principles relating to asylum, non-
refoulement, protection, non-discrimination, international cooperation, and durable 
solutions. It is heartening to find provisions in the Bill recognising, the right of asylum, 
and prohibiting refoulement, expulsion, or extradition. In a markedly novel 
development, the Bill also acknowledges “gender discriminating practices” as a ground 
for granting asylum. In another and no less important development, the Bill goes 
beyond the corresponding provision in the Tanzanian statute by requiring key national 
institutions to be guided by a broad spectrum of legal texts and related instruments.  
 
While recognising group determination of status, the Bill also contains the traditional 
clause that precludes persons who have occasioned serious violations of international 
law, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the peace. The 
prominence given to the UNHCR in the Bill also deserves noting, bearing in mind the 
obligation of states signatory to the UN Refugee Convention to cooperate with this UN 
agency. UNHCR’s role both in the Appeals Board and the Eligibility Committee is of 
exceptional significance in promoting respect for the law. 
 
There exists no legislation in the region that adopts a laissez faire attitude regarding the 
right of movement of refugees. Invariably, all tend to take a restrictive approach, 
motivated by a policy of “containment” and so too does the Ugandan Bill under 
discussion. However, it does demand that the restrictions be reasonable, non-
discriminatory, and consistent with the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.  
 
Like the Kenyan equivalent, the Ugandan Bill distinguishes itself by its specific 
provisions for the rights of refugee women and children. Finally, the Bill is distinct in 
the bold and consistent manner with which it addresses the conventional solutions to the 
refugee crisis, namely, local integration. Property rights are explicitly recognised, as are 
the right to education, the right to practice one’s profession, and the right to seek 
naturalisation.  
 
Unfortunately, the boldness with which the Bill addresses economic, social, and cultural 
rights is replaced with a distinct timidity and ambivalence in respect to civil and 
political rights. Refugees are entitled to the rights enshrined in such international human 
rights instruments as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women and the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 




5. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
5.1. International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) 
Of all the IGOs active in the GLR in respect of the question of forced displacement, 
none has such a presence and possibly, influence, as the UNHCR. In Kenya, UNHCR 
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has responsibility for the screening, status determination and related governmental 
duties. In Tanzania, UNHCR has a major presence in all the RHAs and is actively 
engaged, directly or through so called implementing agencies, in a variety of service 
provision programmes. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda pushed over 500,000 asylum 
seekers into Tanzania’s Ngara District within Kagera Region. While the relief operation 
mounted in response was largely swift and effective, it soon became evident that a 
major discrepancy had emerged in the standard of living and quality of services enjoyed 
by refugees as compared to that of the local population. This gave birth to an ambitious 
project in 1994 titled ‘Special Programme for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAA). 
SPRAA had 3 clusters of concerns: 
 
• Environmental protection and management; 
• Rehabilitation of school buildings and health facilities; and 
• Capacity building for local authorities 
 
A total of USD 20,966,514 was spent between 1995-2003 in Kagera Region alone.63 
The CSFM study cited earlier on found evidence that, contrary to the widely held 
opinion, the contribution of UNHCR and other IGOs (particularly, WFP and UNICEF) 
in ameliorating the adverse impact of refugee presence in northwestern Tanzania is 
considerable. The study in particular cites the road network, health facilities, and the 
education sector has having benefited the most and with tangible outputs to show. With 
IGO support for example, Ngara District was able to climb up from the bottom in 
national ratings on Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination results. From the 
112th position in 1998, Ngara District scaled to the 9th in the span of 4 years. At the 
Regional level the District’s performance has been equally astounding. From the last 
position in 1999 it occupied 2nd position in 2002.64 In the health sector, there is the 
dramatic transformation of the Kibondo District Hospital (KDH). Not long ago it had ill 
equipped, poorly staffed, unsanitary wards with barely any running water or stable 
power supply, but has since witnessed considerable changes.65 With funds from WFP, 
UNHCR, EU (and the Bill Gates Foundation) KDH now has the following facilities:  
 
• Steady supply of safe, running water; 
• Incinerator and solid waste disposal system; 
• Increased bed capacity and new equipment in the Maternity Ward and Delivery 
Room; 
• Provision of food for in-patients; 
• Guaranteed source of electricity; and  
• Regular visits by Specialist Medical Doctors.  
 
While on mission in the RHAs one often hears the complaint that the presence of 
refugees and particularly the transmission of relief aid and other materiel to refugees has 
had an adverse effects on the road network (let alone airstrips and ports in the RHAs). 
Our experience and observations has generally been that while considerable damage 
was occasioned to the transport network by cargo planes, water vessels and trucks, a 
                                                 
63 UNHCR, Support to Refugee Affected Areas in Western Tanzania 1995 – 2003, UNHCR October 31, 
2003. 
64 Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, “The Impact of the Presence of 
Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania”, September 2003, pp. 32, 33. 
65 Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, ibid. pp 28 – 31. 
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considerable effort has been made to rehabilitate the same. Through interviews it 
became evident that while the conditions of the roads in the area may compare poorly to 
other parts of the country (the northern and southern corridors, for example), roads in 
the RHAs, Kigoma in particular, are comparably better now than they were before the 
arrival of refugees. Evidence comes from the local host community members 
themselves, for example, many concede that it takes a relatively shorter time to travel 
from Kigoma to Kibondo than was previously the case. They also concede that there are 
now far more bus service providers travelling at greater frequency between the various 
towns in the Region as well as such far off destinations as the municipality of Mwanza 
on the shores of Lake Victoria. In Kigoma, UNHCR rehabilitated the 94 km long 
Nyakanazi-Kibondo road, the main artery connecting Kagera and Kigoma Regions and 
between 1995 and 2002, the agency spent close to USD 4 million on road construction 
in Northwestern Tanzania, aside from nearly USD100,000 spent on road maintenance in 
RHAs. 
 
5.2. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
Of the NGOs active in the RHAs one must isolate the Tanganyika Christian Refugee 
Services (TCRS), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC). Also present and active in the RHAs are REDESO, UMATI, 
SAEWU, AFRICARE, CARE, CONCERN, and TWESA. The CSFM study details their 
individual involvement but also points out at their constraints. By far their most 
common and serious constraint would appear to be weak or absent coordination and 
information sharing between themselves and on occasion between these individual 
actors and governmental authorities at the local level. For example, we were able to 
observe how the government drawn Ngara District Development Plan details the 
individual contribution of the various NGOs active and present in the District, while the 
comparable document for Kibondo District contains no such inputs from NGOs. 
Because NGOs generally operate on the basis of time bound projects with little leverage 
in utilisation of project funds it is not uncommon to encounter an NGO abandoning one 
project for another even if when there is a clear demand from the beneficiaries for its 
continuity. Institutional rivalry is equally common as is duplicity in the work of NGOs. 
What would appear to bother governmental authorities at the local level is what they 
perceive as the absence of ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ by these important 
stakeholders. 
 
Compared to the magnitude of the problem of forced migration in the GLR it is fair to 
say that there are few indigenous civil society organisations with an explicit and 
exclusive mandate for forced displacement. In Kenya, probably the most high profile 
civil society body is the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) with offices in the 
capital. It produces a quarterly newsletter ‘Refugee Insights’, runs a legal aid clinic and 
workshops and undertakes advocacy work as exemplified in its presentations for the 
adoption of a refugee-specific legislation.66 The Centre for Refugee Studies (CRS) has 
been particularly active in teaching and research and publishes, since 2002, CRS 
Occasional Paper Series on a variety of topics on forced displacement.67 The Refugee 
Law Project (RLP) is a unit of the Faculty of Law, Makerere University and particularly 
active with training, legal aid, research and advocacy. It was established in November 
                                                 
66 See for example, RCK, Refugee Insights, Issue No 6, October – December 2003, pp. 3-5. 
67 They include Occasional Paper No 1 on ‘Refugees in Law and in Fact, Occasional Paper 2 entitled 
‘Blaming the Environment: Ethnic Violence and Political Economy of Displacement in Kenya’. 
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1999 with the aim of protecting and promoting the rights of forced migrants in Uganda. 
Among its publications is the Refugee Law Project Working Paper series.68 RLP also 
maintains a website. 
 
Established in 1995, the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM) has been 
engaged in 4 main categories of activities: teaching, training, research and advocacy. In 
2000 it launched a ‘Summer School’ on forced migration targeting field personnel in the 
GLR. Following an agreement with CRS and RLP, the Summer School began to be held 
on a rotational basis among the 3 institutions. The School, which draws its Faculty 
exclusively from the Region, admits an average of 35 participants although the demand 
is far higher. Funds permitting, CSFM will host it in 2005. The School’s principal 
financiers have been the Ford Foundation (2000 – 2002) and the Andrew Mellon 
Foundation (2003 – 2005). Among the major studies undertaken by CSFM was the 
2001 study commissioned by the Office of the Prime Minister with funding from the 
EU, this sought to examine the impact of refugee presence in 5 areas: status 
determination, education, employment, local integration and governance at local level. 
A second study was the joint work with, among others, the Refugee Studies Centre, 
University of Oxford, and the Institute for the Study of Forced Migration (ISIM), 
Georgetown University titled ‘Complex Forced Migration Emergencies: Towards a 
Humanitarian Regime’. Finally, there is the ‘Impact of the Presence of Refugees in 
Northwestern Tanzania’ study commissioned by a group of 7 humanitarian agencies.69
 
A number of loose, fledgling networks of indigenous civil society organs exist but 
perhaps the most pertinent is the East African Network for the Study of Forced 
Migration (EANFSFM) co-founded by CRS, CSFM and RLP. Among the most 
debilitating factors these institutions encounter none is more threatening than the 
shortage of human resources, financing, premises and equipment. The case of CSFM 
may be indicative of the general situation in the region. Firstly, permission from the 
pertinent University authorities to establish the Centre was given only following 
assurances that at no point in time would the Centre seek direct financial assistance 
from the University. This has meant that the Centre is unable to acquire or rent premises 
demanded by existing and anticipated activities. Neither can it expand its human 
resources beyond a Research and Administrative Assistant working full time. Financial 
constraints also mean that the acquisition of equipment (such as computers, printers) 
and their maintenance become insurmountable challenges in the absence of alternative 
sources of funding. These in turn jointly conspire to retard research outputs 
considerably. 
 
5.3. UN Millennium Development Goals 
Global thinking on matters of development have to a large extent come to be dominated 
by the what are called UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the 2000 
session of the General Assembly.70 The Millennium Declaration purports to offer a 
                                                 
68 See for example L. Hovil et al., “Refugees in Arua District: A Human Security Analysis”, RLP 
Working Paper No. 3, September 2001. 
69 Africare, Concern, IRC, MSF-Spain, NPA, OXFAM, and TCRS. The 7 came under the Refugee 
Interested Network Group (RING). 
70 The original International Development Targets (IDTs) were derived from a series of UN global 
conferences during the 1990s. At the 2000 UN Summit representatives from over 180 countries formally 
agreed to an augmented set of targets with corresponding indicators. Tanzania was represented at the 
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common and integrated vision on how to tackle some of the major challenges facing the 
world. The eight challenges that States have set themselves to achieve by 2015 are: 
 
• Eradicate poverty and hunger; 
• Achieve universal primary education (UPE); 
• Reduce child mortality rate (MR); 
• Improve maternal health; 
• Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
• Ensure environmental sustainability; and 
• Develop a global partnership for development.  
 
The MDGs have a clear implication in the question of forced displacement. In one way 
or another each of the eight goals is a critical factor in the dynamics of forced migration. 
In our view, MDG Goal 1 (the eradication of poverty and hunger) and MDG Goal 8 (the 
development of global partnership for development) more than any, have a direct 
bearing in the discourse on the causes and consequences of displacement and thereby on 
durable solutions. Take the issue of poverty. 
 
Discussing the ‘push factors’ in countries of origin, we pointed out armed conflict, 
generalised violence and the insecurity they engender as the most immediate and 
prevalent factor. We also added that there is a school of thought which attributes these 
armed conflicts to grinding poverty71 (but also as ‘ethnic’ and/or ‘resource based’). 
With regard to the poverty nexus we cautioned that available information is far from 
conclusive. It was pointed out for example, that it is indeed true that all the conflict 
prone countries in the GLR (Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC, in particular) rank very low 
on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. But relying on this ‘poverty criteria’ in 
isolation from other variables is questionable since not all countries at the rock bottom 
of the list of ‘the poorest of the poor’ are locked in conflict. And yet it cannot be 
disputed that ‘poverty’ is a critical factor in understanding and addressing the conflicts 
raging in the GLR. As we argued, conflicts found in the GLR tend to be of an internal 
nature (despite the involvement of ‘foreign elements’), with over 90% of their casualties 
being civilians. Another and more pertinent characteristic of the conflicts in the GLR 
are their grave effects on economic growth and livelihoods. By addressing these 
problems, namely of per capita income, income inequality, inequalities beyond income 
and reducing hunger in the rural areas of conflict-prone countries, conditions may be 
created that would facilitate a speedy and irreversible repatriation of refugees. It may be 
recalled that repatriation facilitates a return to cordial relations between source and host 
country governments (when the home country is denied the excuse to question the 
motives of the host country in granting asylum as in the case of Tanzania/Burundi and 
Tanzania/Rwanda bilateral relations). Repatriation also provides the manpower, both 
skilled and unskilled, necessary for nation building. Here the nexus between poverty 
and conflict is seen less from the ‘push’ angle (as a cause of forced migration) but more 
from the ‘pull’ side, that is a factors that would attract refugees to repatriate - bringing 
peace dividends, encouraging economic growth and significantly alleviating the burden 
on countries of asylum. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Summit and is among the first countries to produce a progress report as required under the terms of the 
Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly. 
71 A ready example is the UNDP’s Human Development Report series. 
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Just as Goal 1 (poverty eradication) is critical to the discourse so too, is Goal 8 (global 
partnership for development). As we have pointed out earlier all the six countries (save 
Kenya) comprising the GLR belong to the UN’s LDCs category with a debilitating debt 
burden. Two of them, Rwanda and Burundi, are landlocked. We also know that Goal 8 
seeks to: 
 
• Develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system; 
• Address the special needs of LDCs, landlocked (and small island) developing 
countries, including the launch of a programme of debt relief for the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC); 
• Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of Developing Countries through 
national and international measures; 
• In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for 
decent and productive work for youth; 
• In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable 
drugs in developing countries; and 
• In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communication 
 
What of the status and the prospects for the implementation of this laudable goal? The 
2002 UNDP Human Development Report justifiably, and generally, draws a sceptical 
picture. It notes for example that around $56 billion is given as development assistance 
each year by industrialised countries. This amounts to 0.5% of the GNP of the countries 
on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, and significantly, 
substantially less than the 0.7% agreed at the UN General Assembly in 1970. There are 
serious constraints with regard another key target - trade and foreign investment. The 
Report observes how, despite a general increase in foreign direct investment (from 0.9% 
to 2.5% of GDP of recipient countries), developing countries, and LDCs in particular, 
received only a drop in the ocean.72 Likewise on employment, while the UNDP Human 
Development Reports (2002 and 2003) contain no data on the situation of 
unemployment among the youth in the GLR, anyone travelling through the countries 
and particularly urban areas, is always struck by the promiscuous presence of young 
persons and adolescents clustered in groups around street corners with no apparent 
preoccupation. 
 
Writing for the International Herald Tribune recently, 73 Tanzania’s State President, 
Benjamin Mkapa, gives an indication of what it takes to accomplish the MDGs. The 
article stresses three factors: political will and good governance in the poor countries; 
local ownership of initiatives, achieved through direct participatory democracy in 
setting priorities, planning, implementation and evaluation; and a supportive 
international environment, particularly as regards direct aid, debt relief, enhanced 
market access and reform of agricultural subsidies in rich countries. It is probably 
because of the continued absence of an enabling international environment that only 
modest achievements have been recorded. President Mkapa shows for an example, how 
“tremendous successes” were achieved in relation to Goal 2 (attainment of universal 
primary education) in a record time. Good governance led to increased revenue 
                                                 
72 UNDP, Human Development Report, UNDP, 2002, p 31. 
73 In a piece (July 2004) entitled ‘A Better Way to Help the Least Development Countries’. 
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collections but also facilitated the adoption of clear and coherent policies, namely the 
Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). But the country also received debt relief 
under the World Bank’s enhanced HIPC Initiative which in turn prompted more donors 
to provide financial assistance directly into the national budget or into a pooled fund for 
the PEDP. As a consequence, the number of children in school increased by 50%; gross 
enrolment ratio rose by 27%; 31,825 classrooms and 7,530 teachers’ houses were 
constructed; 17,851 new teachers were recruited with a further 14,852 sent to upgrading 
courses; pass rate at school examinations rose from 19.3% in 1999 to 40.1% in 2003; 
and around 12,689 school committees were trained to build capacity for local 
implementation of projects and management of the schools.  
 
One can say there is emerging consensus on the decisive role an enabling international 
environment can play in allowing LDCs to achieve the MDGs. Equally there seems to 
be consensus on the prospects, with more and more observers projecting rather modest 
progress in the bulk of countries, particularly the poor.  
 
The authoritative UNDP Human Development Report (2002) identifies that many 
countries have made progress. However much of the world, generally the poorest 
countries, seems unlikely to achieve the goals. In particular, 33 countries with 26% of 
the world’s people are failing on more than half the Goals. The Report however isolates 
Goal 2 (universal primary education) and Goal 3 (gender equality and empowerment of 
women), eradication of hunger (part of Goal 1), and improving water supplies (part of 
Goal 7) as the areas with the most optimistic chances. Also, given the gains on universal 
primary education and gender equity and their importance to the general question of 
development, it can be reasonably concluded that this augurs well for the remaining 7 
Goals. But the Report quickly serves a caveat. It notes with alarm that current positive 
trends not withstanding, more than 40 countries, with 28% of the world’s people, are 
not on track to halve hunger and that 25 countries, with 32% of the world’s people, may 
not halve the share of people lacking access to an improved water source. Most 
pressing, the Report observes, are prospects on reducing the mortality rate among 
children. 85 countries with more than 60% of the world’s people “are not on track to 
achieve the goal”.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. With a total population of around 1,530,047 refugees and asylum seekers and a 
further 4,730,348 IDPs, the six GLR countries of Tanzania, Burundi, DRC, 
Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda together constitute the area with the largest 
displaced population in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also a problem that has 
increased astoundingly over the last four decades. The GLR is at the same time a 
region of considerable economic potential given its vast natural and human 
resources. Sustained international attention on this region is therefore warranted. 
If neglected the threats confronting the GLR could predictably be a source of a 
major humanitarian catastrophe, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is testimony to 
this.  
 
2.  The search for appropriate policy responses to the problem of forced 
displacement in the GLR must acknowledge the multiple nature of causes 
(economic, political, social, geopolitics) and the dynamism in their interplay 
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such that responses must also assume a ‘multi-pronged’ character. Policy 
responses have to be designed in such a manner as to distinguish between root 
causes (political and economic marginalisation, gross and systematic human 
rights abuses, statelessness), triggers (economic decline, unemployment, armed 
conflict) and manifestations (social stigma, extremists propaganda) in order for 
the appropriate policy responses to be effective and sustainable. 
 
3. Accordingly, those initiatives resolving the problems confronting the GLR 
countries in a holistic, comprehensive manner deserve unwavering support. The 
experience of the GLR has been and continues to be that instability initially 
generated by internal factors in one country rapidly spreads to create a dynamic 
of conflicts in the entire region. The initiative taken by the UN Security Council 
to convene an international conference on the GLR in November 2004 is a step 
in the right direction and similar initiatives (e.g. by the African Union, EU) 
deserve the unwavering support of the international community, including 
DFID.  
 
4. Generally, the Open Door Policy of earlier decades known for its egalitarian 
considerations has given way to a ‘restrictionist’ refugee regime, the existence of 
forward-looking national laws on refugees notwithstanding. As justification for 
the policy shift, governmental authorities cite the purported adverse impact of 
refugee presence on security, environment, infrastructure, social services and 
local administration. Research findings generally acknowledge this correlation 
but dispute a linear, simplistic interface. Governments should therefore be 
encouraged and supported to undertake independent, expert studies on this 
correlation. 
 
5. A major characteristic of the new policy response in a number of countries in the 
GLR is the effective rejection of local integration as a durable solution and in 
particular, the granting of citizenship to erstwhile refugees. Instead, prominence 
is given to repatriation (and to a lesser extent resettlement), and the 
establishment of ‘Safe Zones’. Along with this is the entrenchment of 
‘encampment’ (as opposed to ‘self-settlement’) and the adoption of parallel 
(rather than integrated) social services (education and health in particular). This 
is another area where Governments should be encouraged and supported in 
carrying out independent studies durable solutions that are realistic, appropriate 
and effective. For example, research in northwestern Tanzania seems to indicate 
that if harnessed well, interventions by humanitarian agencies in the area of 
education and health can bring significant benefits to refugees and host 
community members alike.  
 
6. Legislation and practice in the GLR increasingly is making the enjoyment of the 
right to work complicated. Yet studies have repeatedly shown that despite the 
availability of food aid and services in places of encampment, forced migrants 
prefer freedom and the autonomy to decide and rebuild their own lives. By 
suppressing the creative energies of refugees, relief programmes become 
expensive and wasteful in both human and financial terms. Enjoyment of the 
right to work, presently curtailed by encampment policy, work permits and 
restrictions on the freedom of movement should therefore be reviewed. 
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7. In contrast, ‘self-settled’ refugees in rural areas (e.g., western Tanzania) have 
converted the inhabited local area into a major breadbasket for the country 
further bringing into question the virtues of the encampment policy so prevalent 
in the region. Observers cite Egypt, Gambia, Kenya (urban refugees), Uganda 
(Moyo District), Zambia (Maheba), Cote d’Ivoire to illustrate the positive 
impact of self-settlement on the refugee hosting areas, the nation at large, and 
individual refugees. Case studies do exist and countries with an exclusively 
encampment policy should be encouraged and supported in drawing the 
appropriate lessons. There is also consensus among many authoritative observers 
that the prevalent ‘relief and maintenance’ should be displaced by a 
‘developmental’ approach. 
 
8. Addressing the root causes of the conflicts in the GLR entails adopting structural 
measures around three key issues. Firstly, decentralisation and devolution of 
governmental authority and responsibility. Governments in Africa, and the GLR 
included, assume authority and consequent responsibilities so much that “the 
African government promises all, satisfies few and antagonises most”. Without 
the means necessary to satisfy boundless demands, the government is left with 
little choice other than coercion to suppress these. Devolution can reduce this 
source of tension and the ensuing conflict. 
 
9. Secondly, the temptation to impose national unity and attain a ‘post-ethnic’ state 
should be resisted. ‘Enforced integration’ has proven to be counterproductive 
and costly. Rather, the approach should be one of ‘benign integration’ that is, by 
policies and measures drawn with the participation of those communities being 
integrated. Critically, the said policies and measures should not threaten or 
restrict the values and needs of the concerned communities.  
 
10. Thirdly, governance and political exclusion is a major constraint. Ideally, 
elections ensure popular participation in governance but also represent an 
opportunity to bring about change in the leadership. The ‘winner takes all’ 
electoral system prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa may be perverted and rob 
elections their legitimising function. This may happen where the majority ethnic 
community succeeds in monopolising power to the permanent exclusion of 
minority groups (or vice versa). The unintended result therefore of an otherwise 
‘free and fair’ election could well be the ‘tyranny of the majority’. Conversely, it 
is undemocratic, politically objectionable and historically unwise for a ruling 
minority to imagine their hold on power will be sustainable with the majority 
relegated to the periphery of the national polity and their basic socio-
psychological needs ignored or suppressed.  
 
11. Characteristic of migration in the GLR is that it is cyclical, induced by war, with 
the greater bulk of victims being civilians, often, poor, rural inhabitants and the 
most vulnerable. It is critical to check this cycle of impunity (if indeed it exists) 
by giving national legal articulation of a well-known war crime. Both IDPs and 
refugees are at times the victims of the practice of mass deportations. All States 
of the GLR are signatories of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 (not to mention the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 1998), which does recognise such an offence. 
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12. Perceptions on IDPs and more so refugees have undergone a dramatic change 
over the last decade or so. A strategic approach should be to create an 
atmosphere in which policy-makers take decisions on an informed basis utilising 
state of the art analytical tools. In tandem, members of the general public should 
be exposed to dissemination campaigns whose purpose is to allow them to 
acquire as objective and accurate an understanding as is possible of displaced 
persons. Equally campaigns should help displaced persons to appreciate the 
environment within which they find themselves and more importantly, the 
expectations of host communities.  
 
13. It is not rare to be confronted, especially in the refugee hosting areas (RHAs), 
with employees of such key government institutions as the Immigration, Police, 
Judiciary, Local Government, who despite a routine and intensive engagement 
with refugee matters, lack the basic knowledge and skills (let alone equipment) 
essential to the competent and effective discharge of their duties. Training of this 
cadre, and the general teaching of refugee law, presents itself as an indisputable 
priority. Host States have legitimate (and some questionable) security concerns. 
But by and large, this is an area in which the international community shows 
considerable reluctance to fund, as is clearly the case in Tanzania.  
 
14. Conceptually imprecise, politically controversial as they may be, the principles 
of international co-operation and burden sharing constitute key elements in 
permitting economically, politically and socially challenged host countries to 
fully meet their obligations. Continued discourse on the practical ramifications 
of these principles should be encouraged. When they are given lip service or 
ignored all together they prompt already overwhelmed host states to adopt 
extraordinary measures (such as ‘safe zones’) whose ultimate result is a further 
deterioration in the standards of treatment asylum seekers and refugees are able 
to enjoy, not to mention increased tensions in inter-State relations.  
 
15. The problem of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons is real and huge 
so much so that one GLR nation, the DRC, is the “most dangerous country” on 
account of the high rate of weapons related deaths. More research has to be 
conducted to identify source countries, transit points and buyers, as a first step 
towards keeping out lethal weapons from an already volatile space. France, 
China, the USA and Russia (pre-eminent members of the very UN body 
entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security) are the 
world’s leading merchants of arms. The value of all arms transfer agreements 
with developing nations in 2001 was nearly $16 billion, with the USA raking in 
43.6% of these agreements. Developed nations should be asked to reign in their 
arms merchants. 
 
16. The virtue of economic integration in spurring development and enhancing the 
competitiveness of the global market has been long accepted, and this explains 
the proliferation of economic integration blocs globally. Presently, Rwanda, 
Burundi and the DRC are poised to join Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in the 
East African Community (EAC). Sceptics point to the possibility of extant 
conflicts in these countries ‘spilling over’ to the territories of the existing Partner 
States. Optimists, on the other hand justifiably focus on peace dividends, 
enhanced market opportunities and socio-cultural dynamism from having the 
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Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda inside, rather than outside the EAC. In this respect, 
efforts to strengthen and expand the EAC deserve support.  
 
17. By its very nature, forced displacement requires the inputs of a variety of actors. 
In GLR one cluster of stakeholders is hugely disadvantaged. While at the centre 
are Governments, IGOs and a handful of indigenous NGOs, a motley crew of ill-
equipped, poorly-staffed civil society bodies (including academics) struggle to 
remain at the periphery. Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (Tanzania’s 
only public research institute) depends for funding solely on the unpredictable 
generosity of foreign based charity organisations. Capacity building for research 
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1. DEVELOPMENT OF FORCED MIGRATION IN THE REGION 
 
1.1. Refugees 
For more than the last five decades South Asia experienced population movements of 
various sorts. The politics of partition triggered off large-scale migration in 1946-47 
with about 8 million Sikhs and Hindus moving from the newly created state of Pakistan, 
and 6-7 million Muslims from India to Pakistan. In 1971 about 10 million Bangladeshis 
sought refuge in India to flee the persecution of the Pakistani military forces. In all the 
above cases the receiving governments provided much needed assistance. While 
international support was virtually non-existent in 1947, such support was crucial for 
the care and maintenance of refugees in 1971.  
 
The region also received people from Burma, Tibet and Afghanistan. Although 
following the overthrow of the Taliban, many Afghan refugees returned home, an 
estimated one million stayed back in Pakistan. In 1978 and later in 1991-2, Bangladesh 
experienced two major influxes of refugees from its neighbour, Burma. On both 
occasions about a quarter of a million of the ethnic Muslim Rohingyas were forced out 
by the Burmese military from the adjoining state of Arakan of Burma.  
 
In the post-independence period, the South Asian states also experienced refugee 
inflows from their neighbours. To escape violence of communal riots in the early 1980s 
and later the civil war, hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in the 
neighbouring south Indian state of Tamil Nadu.  
 
The discriminatory policies of the Bhutanese government against the ethnic Lhotsampas 
of southern Bhutan had led to an exodus of about 100,000 to neighbouring Nepal in the 
early 1990s. The bulk of these refugees have been living in the Jhapa camps of south-
east Nepal; enjoying the support of the Nepali state and the international community.  
 
The discriminatory policies leading to military action of the Bangladesh rulers against 
the ethnic hill people of the south-east led to the creation of 64,000 refugees, seeking 
shelter in the Tripura state of India. Following a peace agreement between the political 
leadership of hill people and the Bangladesh government in 1998, the refugees returned 
to Bangladesh.  
 
1.2. IDPs 
South Asia also hosts a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). IDPs are 
created by many factors: human rights violations, environmental degradation and ill 
planned development initiatives. This paper, however, deals with the IDPs who are 
victims of human rights violations, committed both by state and non-state actors.  
 
The Tamils in Sri Lanka’s 1 north and east constitutes the largest stock of IDPs in South 
Asia. UNHCR estimates that about 1.2 million people were internally displaced in Sri 
Lanka. 78 percent of the displaced are Tamils, 13 percent are Muslims and 8 percent are 
Sinhalese. (Senanayake, 2003) 
 
 
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 




                                                
In India it is estimated 250,000 Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir, are internally 
displaced. To escape violence in the hills, these people mostly moved to the adjoining 
provinces, some to major metropolitan areas of India. Conditions that gave rise to 
generation and movement of hill refugees from Bangladesh to India also created an 
unspecified number of IDPs in the hill districts of Bangladesh. In the mid 1970s, 
demographic engineering of settling Bengalis from the plains to the hills, by the state, 
preceded this.  
 
Constructions of dams contributed to the displacement of a large number of people in 
South Asia.1 As these projects are generally located in remote hill districts they 
adversely affect the marginalised lower caste, tribal and poor communities. 
Displacement has led to their loss of livelihood, assets, habitat and severance from the 
traditional ecosystem that sustained them. In most cases project planning did not 
account for appropriate and adequate compensation packages. The non-governmental 
sector also generally has limited programme coverage in the areas where they relocate 
themselves.  
 
1.3. Un-Registered Asylum Seekers 
This category of people does not fall into any of the other groups of forced migrants 
such as refugees, asylum seekers or IDPs. They crossed international border claiming 
persecution in the host country but did not get any opportunity to place their case before 
any competent authority. In other words, they have been denied the right to stake a 
claim for refugee status in their country of current stay. Unofficial estimates suggest that 
Bangladesh hosts tens of thousands of Rohinygas from Burma, while Nepal and India 
hosts about 20,000 and 7,000 Bhutanese respectively.  
 
These groups of unregistered people are in a vulnerable situation as they do not have 
documents authorising their entry and stay in the countries they are currently located. 
They do not enjoy any protection of UNHCR or host governments and are not formally 
entitled to any basic facilities offered by UNHCR and other international agencies like 
food, shelter, health and education. Legally, they cannot be engaged in any gainful 
activity. Although the authorities tolerate their stay and have not formally taken any step 
to forcibly repatriate them, absence of formal recognition of their status makes them 
vulnerable to ill treatment, harassment and exploitation.  
 
 
2. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FORCED MIGRATION 
 
If one analyses forced migration situations in South Asia one finds an array of factors 
contributing to it. Firstly, forced migration was an integral part of the state formation 
process in the region. Politics based on religious division led to the birth of India and 
Pakistan in 1947. Communal riots among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs contributed to the 
 
1 The Kaptai Dam Project (1957-62) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts led to the displacement of 100,000 hill 
people and loss of 40 percent arable land of the district. 40,000 Chakmas had to seek refuge in North-East 
India. 21,000 families were uprooted and relocated in the states of Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab when 
the Pong Dam inundated their homes in India in the late 1980s. In addition, the Arun III project of Nepal, 
Kalabagh and Bhasha dams in Pakistan, Mahaveli Project in Sri Lanka and Sardar Sarovar and Tehri 
projects in India were all controversial development initiatives. that in most affected the marginalised 
lower caste, tribal and poor communities. 
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massive movement of minority groups who fled their habitual place of residence to 
protect life and liberty.  
 
Secondly, occupation by foreign powers has been another important cause of forced 
migration. The Chinese annexation of Tibet and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
led to large refugee exodus to their neighbouring countries.  
 
Thirdly, the use of coercive force by the state has also generated forced migration. The 
exodus of the 10 million Bengalis in the wake of Bangladesh’s independence was 
triggered off by the brutal military suppression of Bengalis’ aspiration to form their own 
government following the first ever general elections in then East Pakistan. Likewise, 
the Bangladesh military’s campaign in the hill districts in the 1980s also contributed to 
refugee flows to India and internal displacement. Campaigns by the military and non-
state actors in Sri Lanka, Nepal and in the Kashmir province of India have also created 
internal displacement in all these countries.  
 
Fourthly, in many instances force was used to quell the linguistic, cultural or ethnic 
aspirations of minority groups. The refusal to accommodate the aspirations of the 
minority groups (or the majority group in case of Bengalis in Pakistan) often led to their 
launching of political struggle within the formal political process. The persistent 
rejection of the minority groups has led to radicalisation of such movements, only to be 
challenged the by coercive power of the state apparatuses controlled by the majority. 
Such situations have often escalated to generalized violence, uprooting people and 
triggering forced migration - international and internal. The Bengali’s struggle for self-
determination within the framework of Pakistan, the Tamils’ struggle in Sri Lanka, the 
hill people’s struggle in independent Bangladesh and the Kashmiris, Rohingyas and 
Lhotshompa’s in India and Pakistan, Burma and Bhutan respectively, are all testimonies 
to this effect.  
 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS AND DIRECTIONS 
 
3.1. Shared Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Identity 
Generally, various groups of forced migrants of South Asia share some common 
characteristics. In most cases, they share same religious, ethnic or linguistic traits. 
Religion was the single most binding factor of those uprooted and displaced during the 
state formation period of 1946-48. The overwhelming bulk of those who migrated to 
India were the Hindus and the Sikhs. Likewise, the Muslims constituted the reverse 
flow from India to Pakistan.  
 
The forced migrants from outside the region also enjoyed shared ethnic or religious 
bonds. The Tibetan refugees were the followers of Dalai Lama and the Rohingya and 
the Afghan refugees were Muslims. It is interesting to note that in the first two instances 
although they constituted the majority in Tibet and Arakan regions respectively, the 
denial of their autonomous status, settlement policies pursued by the central government 
of China and Burma and the militarization of these territories created conditions for 
members of these ethnic-religious groups to flee. The case of the Afghan refugees was 
somewhat different. Initially their movement was induced by the presence of a foreign 
occupation army and later by the extreme religious orthodoxy of their co-religionists. 
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The militarisation and the resultant ethnic conflict and later coming into power of the 
religious zealots, the Taliban, had forced the Afghans to move.  
 
Common ethnic and religious traits were also the hallmark of the refugee populations 
that were generated within the region. The groups of refugees from the hill districts of 
Bangladesh who sought shelter in India in the 1980s belonged mostly to the Chakma 
community. Likewise, the Sri Lankans who were fleeing the civil war were mostly 
Tamil Hindus and the Bhutanese who sought refuge in southern Nepal were all ethnic 
Lhotsampas.  
 
Ethnic, religious and linguistic traits were shared by various groups of the internally 
displaced population as well. The IDP of Sri Lanka belonged to the Tamil ethnic group. 
Likewise, Kashmiri Pundit IDPs were all Hindus. The bulk of the IDPs of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh also belonged to the Chakma ethnic 
community. Civil war, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations also displaced 
members of other communities. A substantial number of Muslims of northern Sri Lanka 
were uprooted by the Tamil separatists in execution of their plan for the creation of 
Tamil land in the region. Likewise, the operation of the Indian security forces and non-
state agents in the Kashmir state has displaced a segment of the Muslim population 
there. The activities of the Maoists engaged in guerrilla warfare and the excesses 
committed by the Royal Nepali Army in its counter insurgency operations has displaced 
an unspecified number of the Nepalis in many districts.  
 
3.2. Group Movement 
An important characteristic of the refugee and asylum seekers of South Asia has been 
their tendency to move in large groups. The processes through which they get uprooted 
make them vacate their habitual place of residence and move in large groups.  
 
During and in the immediate aftermath of the communal holocaust that engulfed the 
region during the partition of 1947 people belonging to various religious faiths began 
moving into areas, which they considered safe and secure. In most cases, they moved as 
groups. Belonging to a group provides a degree of security during the course of the 
movement. Historical and literary narratives of partition of the subcontinent chronicle 
movement of massive numbers of people across the newly demarcated border between 
India and Pakistan.  
 
Banding together has been a major feature shared by various refugee groups both from 
outside and generated within the region. This feature marked the flights of the Tibetans, 
Chakmas and Sri Lankan Tamils into India, the Afghans into Pakistan, the Rohingyas in 
Bangladesh and the Lhtotshampas in Nepal. However, in all cases after the initial flight 
in large numbers, refugee flows are likely to continue in small numbers.  
 
3.3. The Issue of Return 
When conditions in the country of origin mark substantial improvement and the sources 
of threats to life and liberty (that contributed in the refugee flow in the first place) cease 
to exist, the refugees return home rather quickly.  
 
 
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 




Immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh the bulk of the ten million refugees in 
India went back. Such return was spontaneous and quick, and was not contingent upon 
manpower, structures and institutions that were envisaged for the facilitation of 
organised return. The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was also marked by 
large numbers of Afghans returning to the country. Of course, due to uncertainty 
prevailing in the country about a third of the refugees are yet to go back. 
 
The progress in peace talks between the State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) was also followed by the return of the refugees from Tamil Nadu in India. 
Similarly, repatriation of the hill refugees to Bangladesh from India took place within a 
short time following signing of an agreement between the political wing of the insurgent 
Shanti Bahini and the Government of Bangladesh.  
 
In the country of origin where there is a lack of substantive improvement in conditions, 
where sources of threats to life and liberty continue to exist and the state and non-state 
agencies pursue their coercive policies refugees feel unsafe to return and prolong their 
stay. The caseloads of the Tibetans in India, Lhotsampas in Nepal and the Rohingyas in 
Bangladesh are pertinent examples.  
 
 
4. MOVEMENT OF FORCED MIGRANTS 
 
4.1. Routes and Destination 
As in other large-scale refugee situations, immediate neighbours became the most 
important destination of all refugee flows in South Asia. Despite the fact that the 
partition refugees were generally welcome in their destination countries and support 
services were extended to them, the trauma of communal riots and concomitant 
uncertainty, and their sheer volume contributed to major hardships in their movement. 
The rail route that existed at the time across Punjab and Bengal ferried the bulk of the 
refugees from major towns. Many refugees used steam ships that operated between the 
Calcutta port and Goalundo. People of the bordering villages, however, crossed borders 
by foot with their material belongings on their shoulders or on bullock carts. 
 
Most of the post-independence refugee groups had to negotiate difficult terrain to reach 
their destination. Many had to overcome rugged ground. Of all the groups, it was the 
Tibetan refugees who had to negotiate the most difficult terrain, to reach their 
destinations in India and Nepal. The Afghan refugees also had to pass through difficult 
Hindukush Mountains before entering Pakistan.  
 
The Chins and people of other nationalities of Burma generally cross Burma’s long 
north-western border with India by foot. The rough topography and the deep jungles 
posed major challenges. Rohingya Burmese from the Arakan had to cross the Naf river 
to reach the Teknaf region of Bangladesh. Crossing the river was not difficult. 
Patrolling of the border by the NaSaKa, the Burmese Border Guards, and the 
Bangladesh Rifles further increased their risk. The Nepali speaking Lhotsampa refugees 
from Bhutan had to cross Indian territory near Darjeeling to reach their destination in 
southern Nepal. The Chakma refugees of Bangladesh also had to negotiate hill and 
forest conditions to reach their places of destination in the plain lands of Tripura in 
India.  
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4.2. Secondary Movements and Migration Networks 
The forced migrants do not necessarily end their journey once they reach a safe country. 
While most may choose to remain in their first port of call that brings in security, others 
may decide to move on. In a very few cases these secondary movements are 
documented and regular where refugees may secure asylum or other authorization to 
travel to a third country through valid means. In most other instances they proceed 
through an irregular route.  
 
The decision regarding secondary movement may be guided by several factors. The 
migrants may be denied entry in the country of first asylum, as happened to Lhotsampas 
in India and move on to a second destination. In situations of mass influx, which is often 
the case in the region, the authorities of host countries usually put the refugees in camps 
that entail many restrictions such as on freedom of movement, freedom to pursue 
income-generating activities and seek employment and freedom to organize. Though in 
the camps residents are provided with basic rations, medical services and sometimes 
opportunities for education, they need cash to buy vegetables, fish or other foodstuff, 
toiletries and other items. All these make some households explore opportunities to 
enhance income. Some work outside the camps illegally, but continue to live in the 
camps; others move out of camps, risking losing their refugee status.  
 
For those who command some resources, further migration can be yet another option. 
The secondary migration of Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia is commonly recognised phenomenon. These migrants may, on the one 
hand, send remittances to the families left behind in the first country of destination; they 
may also secure jobs and sponsorship for facilitating subsequent migration of other 
family members. In many instance they secure their travel documents often concealing 
information about their own country of origin.  
 
Social networks of the migrants play a major role in secondary migration. There exist 
extensive support institutions in many countries particularly if the community 
concerned is engaged in a political struggle. The settled migrants belonging to those 
communities consider it as their obligation to help settle a fellow community member. 
Such support could be in the form of providing shelter, securing work, directing to 
access social security, health care and other services. Sometimes political or religious 
groups help them with the expectation that they could be potential recruits to their 
cause. The Tamil diaspora of Sri Lanka has been particularly active in many developed 
countries. The Tibetan and the Burmese diaspora, though relatively small in number, 
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5. NUMBER OF FORCED MIGRANTS 
 
Table 1: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Others of Concern to UNHCR, End 2002  
 









Bangladesh 22,025 22 -  22,047
India 168,855 501 -  169,356
Nepal 132,436 11  132,447
Pakistan 1,227,433 1608  1,229,041
Sri Lanka 28 13 466 447,080 236,206
Source: 2002 UNHCR Population Statistics (Provisional) 
 
The above table indicates the size of forced migrants in South Asian countries. Barring 
Sri Lanka, all the countries under the study host a sizeable number of refugees. In 2002 
both India and Nepal host more than 100,000 refugees, while Pakistan sheltered a 
staggering 1.22 million.  
 
South Asia is not an attractive destination for individual asylum seekers. The figures 
above indicate that only Pakistan and India had to consider a small number of asylum 
applications, 1,608 and 501 respectively. The share of the other countries was 
negligible. Sri Lanka hosted 11.83 percent of global total of IDPs making it the largest 
IDP generating country in South Asia. UNHCR figures do not suggest existence of IDPs 
in other South Asian countries. 
 
Table 2: Number of IDPs in Selected Countries 
 
Country  Number of IDPs  Estimate Date  
Bangladesh 150,000-520,000 Oct. 2003 
India 650,000 May 2002 
Nepal 100,000-200,000 Oct. 2003 
Pakistan 45,000 June 2002 
Sri Lanka 386,000 Dec. 2003 
Source: Global IDP Survey 
 
The Global IDP project takes a broader definition and includes not only the victims of 
human rights violations, but also those affected by ecological factors and human 
induced disasters. Under this widened definition the number of IDPs is calculated to be 
higher in India and Bangladesh than of Sri Lanka.  
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Population Current location Number
24 Afghans Iran and Pakistan 2,100,000
21 Sri Lanka India 100,000
15 Burmese India 50,000
14 Tibetan Nepal 20,000
12 Bhutanese Nepal 114,000
12 Indian Kashmiris Pakistan 17,000
10 Burmese Bangladesh 22,000*
Source: USCR World Refugee Survey 2004;  
*Based on UNHCR estimates.  
 
In the recent past refugees placed in closed camps have drawn international attention. 
The USCR World Refugee Survey Report 2004 makes a detailed case about the 
conditions of the “warehoused refugees”. The practice has been defined as “keeping 
refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and 
dependency” with their lives put on indefinite hold. USCR argues that such practice of 
“condemning people who fled persecution to stagnate in confinement for much of the 
remainder of their lives is unnecessary, wasteful, hypocritical, counterproductive, 
unlawful, and morally unacceptable.”  
 
The USCR report informs: 
 
In South Asia hundreds of thousands of refugees remain warehoused in varying 
conditions. Over 100,000 Sri Lankan refugees have remained in India without 
rights for up to 20 years. In Nepal, some 114,000 Bhutanese refugees have been 
encamped since 1992 without hope of a durable solution or a change in 
conditions. ... Denied the right to work, to own property, to have a livelihood, 
the enforced idleness has taken a harsh toll on the refugees’ lives. (UNSC, 2004) 
 
The report, however, notes that the Pakistani government is moving forward to improve 
protection. Although Afghan refugees do not enjoy legal rights, the Pakistani 
government largely tolerates their employment and free movement, and allows them 




6. DIMENSIONS OF VULNERABILITY: WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
REFUGEES  
   
Women and children constitute a very large segment of any refugee population. Despite 
this they still remain the least researched areas in refugee studies. (Hans, 2001) 
Although over time, agencies such as the UNHCR have become more gender sensitive, 
women’s needs still remain to be adequately addressed in framing policies and 
programmes, particularly by the national authorities in South Asia.  
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Rape constitutes a major threat to vulnerable groups such as refugees or internally 
displaced women. Soldiers, militants, camp officials and male refugees often become 
sources of such threats. In addition, women belonging to forced migrant categories are 
also subjected to sexual humiliation, trafficking, forced marriage, prostitution, 
abduction and domestic violence.  
 
In many refugee situations in South Asia women suffered sexual assaults. In Sri Lanka, 
the security forces, the LTTE and the Indian Peacekeeping Forces were responsible for 
such assaults. When they were in India, the country of refuge, these women were 
subjected to abuse by the security forces. The Rohingya women refugees experienced 
similar treatment in the hands of Burmese security forces before and during flight, and 
by the Bangladesh security forces, camp officials and fellow refugees during their stay 
in camps. The combatants in Afghan war deliberately targeted the Afghan women. 
Bangladesh security forces committed sexual and other abuses against the Chakma 
women that triggered their flight to India. The Lhotsampa refugee women also faced 
rape and molestation in the hands of the Bhutanese security forces during flight.  
 
Women headed households with young and adolescent female members remain 
particularly vulnerable in all stages of their flight. Incarceration of their spouse on 
flimsy grounds by the national authorities remains a major source of insecurity for the 
Rohingya refugee women in camps as well as Afghan urban refugee women. 
Bangladesh authorities often employ this method to extract consent for ‘voluntary 
repatriation’. 
 
Poor design of camps can also adversely affect women in terms of privacy and security. 
Their vulnerability increases if latrines and sources of water are located at a distance 
and if the camps are poorly lit. Distribution of food rations only through men put 
women at a disadvantage. Women heads of households were made to offer sexual 
favours to claim part of the ration that were withheld by camp officials in collusion with 
the refugee leaders. (Khandaker and Haider, 2000: 61) 
 
Although in most countries refugees are not allowed legal employment, many male 
refugees find jobs or self-employment opportunities. Women refugees face problems in 
accessing them due to lack of skills, education and training.  
 
Traditional male domination and deep-rooted cultural practices continue to survive in 
displaced situations. They become major constraints for agencies that are committed to 
enhance the position of refugee women and children. Values and beliefs against girl 
child’s education and skills development of women and practices of early marriage, 
polygamy and dowry are some of the major impediments in improving the condition of 
the Afghan and Rohingya refugee women. When Afghan refugee women in India began 
joining and opening beauty parlours that they carved out as a niche for themselves, they 
faced major resistance from religious heads of the community.  
 
There are also instances where refugee women were empowered despite their 
vulnerability. Hans (2001) notes that through their creative ability “women refugees 
have learned to network with local communities and mastered the art of negotiating 
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with local bureaucracies”. (Hans, 2001: 5) The Lhotsampa refugee women have also 
demonstrated that how even under adverse conditions they themselves can effect change 
in their life through collective initiative (Sharma, 2001: 4).  
 
6.2. Children 
Refugee children also face a fair share of problems. They are subjected to violations of 
rights to life, health, education, and an adequate standard of living and need protection 
from abuse, exploitation, neglect, oppression, discrimination and recruitment into the 
military. (Levine, 1997: 6) It was in the late 1980s that the issue of refugee children 
gained serious attention, following the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 
 
To avoid recruitment by the guerrilla groups many of the Tamil refugee children in 
India live outside the camps. These destitute children miss out on the educational 
opportunities offered to camp residents and become susceptible to getting involved with 
criminal syndicates. Others join fishing communities.  
 
In Bangladesh, for the first seven years the authorities did not allow UNHCR open 
schools for refugee children. It was only after a protracted persuasion by UNHCR and 
NGOs that the authorities relented. In the absence of formal schooling the refugee 
community organised informal schools so that the children could be educated. Lack of 
resources precludes many urban refugee families from sending their children to schools 
in India. As accessing education in the English medium incurs high costs, refugee 
households who could commit resources to children’s education could only place them 
in Hindi schools. This however would not help in their eventual resettlement.  
 
 
7. SECURITISATION OF FORCED MIGRANTS 
 
In South Asia states have to tread a difficult course in dealing with the forced migrants. 
Though refugees and asylum seekers are generally considered to be persons of 
humanitarian concern, in some instances they are also viewed as security threats.  
 
Baral and Muni have identified the following reasons for viewing refugees as security 
threat: 
• inherent tension among refugee groups along clan, regional, religious and ethnic 
loyalties; 
• likelihood of getting involved in petty crimes and criminal syndicates;  
• competition with local population for scarce resources;  
• likelihood of having an influence on local politics;  
• likelihood of engaging in armed struggle against their own countries of origin. 
(Baral and Muni, 1996: 25) 
 
In South Asia many instances of forced migration are triggered by violent armed 
conflicts. Sometimes militants who are parties to the conflicts take shelter as refugees 
and asylum seekers without the knowledge of the host country. Their presence among 
the Afghan in Pakistan and the Sri Lankan Tamils, particularly among the post-1990 
caseload has been noted. At other times, the host countries use these people to achieve 
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their political objectives in their home country. The imparting of training and supplying 
of arms to the militant Afghan refugees by Pakistan and Tamil refugees by India is 
widely acknowledged. 
 
Refugees have also been alleged to be involved in trafficking in drugs, small arms, 
women and children, and have been said to be contributing to the deterioration of the 
law and order situation in their host countries. The proliferation of drug use in Pakistan 
after the Afghan refugee inflow, the widespread illegal proliferation of guns among the 
Afghan and Tamil refugees, the armed fights among the Tamil groups in India and 
criminal activities in localities that host the Rohingyas are some of the examples that are 
often cited. However, a close examination of the cases would reveal that refugees’ own 
role in such matters is marginal. (Chandran, 2003:153) 
 
Influx of refugees may be considered as a threat to the livelihoods of the community 
that hosts them. A rise in the price of essentials, a drop in wages, and environmental 
degradation are some problems that are attributed to refugees in the receiving 
community. While these observations generally hold true for most of the refugee case 
loads in South Asia, it is equally true that refugee situations also bring in resources to 
the local community that create jobs, contracts and demand in the market, bring in 
cheap labour for construction, agriculture, manufacturing, transport and service sectors.  
 
In situations where migrants’ stay in the host country becomes prolonged, their impact 
on its political scene may create a cause for concern. This issue becomes particularly 
complicated for the ethnic or religious composition the group concerned. The local 
leaders have used the Afghan refugees in Pakistan as vote banks to further their own 
political interests. The large flow of the Pashtun Afghans into the Baluchistan province 
in Pakistan generated fears among Baloch leaders that they may become a minority in 
their own land.  
 
The South Asian states view cross-border migration as a bilateral issue under the 
framework of national security. It is this mindset that has precluded migration to be on 
the agenda of any regional forum or dialogue. 
 
 
8. STATE RESPONSE 
 
8.1. India 
India has been a host nation of refugees from across several bordering countries. 
Tibetans from Tibet, Bengalis from the then East Pakistan, Tamils from Sri Lanka, 
Chakmas from independent Bangladesh and Chins from Burma are some of the major 
refugee groups that took shelter in India.  
 
The escape of the Dalai Lama and exodus of some 100,000 Tibetans took place soon 
after the Chinese rule in Tibet was firmly established. Over 98,000 Tibetan refugees 
were successfully resettled in several Indian states. These refugees have been provided 
assistance to build their houses. Infrastructural and educational institutions along with 
civic amenities were also created for their rehabilitation. 
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In 1971, India was faced with the mammoth task of providing shelter to 10 million 
refugees from Bangladesh who were fleeing from massacre by the Pakistani forces. The 
refugees were mostly hosted in the camps set along the bordering districts of West 
Bengal, Tripura and Assam. With the support of the international community, India 
mobilized a massive relief operation. After Bangladesh became independent most of the 
refugees voluntarily repatriated within a year of their arrival.  
 
The ethnic tension between the majority Sinhalese population and the minority Tamils 
have over time led to a series of Sri Lankan Tamil outflows from the island nation. The 
geographical proximity and ethnic affinity of the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu made 
it a safe haven for the Sri Lankan Tamils. They arrived in India in different phases and 
in all cases the flows were linked to the Sri Lankan Army’s operation in the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) controlled areas. The Indian government’s Sri Lanka 
policy also had major ramifications for the refugees. The competitive nature of the 
Tamil Nadu politics and the central government’s decision of arming the Tamil 
militants led to the setting up of a large number of militant camps in the state. 
(Suryanarayan, 2003: 42) Overtime, the Tamil Tigers emerged as one of the most 
effective guerrilla fighting forces in Asia. However, the assassination of the Rajiv 
Gandhi by the Tamil guerrillas brought about a major change in the India’s treatment of 
the refugees. The LTTE was outlawed and the state government demanded immediate 
repatriation of all Tamil refugees. The central government responded by exerting 
pressure for repatriation and by curtailing some of the entitlements of the refugees.  
 
India also hosts a good number of Burmese refugees. Soon after the military crackdown 
on the pro-democracy movement thousands of students and other political activists 
crossed into the bordering north-eastern states of Manipur and Mizoram. Over the years, 
the two states became sanctuaries of the persecuted ethnic communities of the Chin and 
the Arakan states of Burma. US Committee for Refugees estimates the number of Chin 
refugees in India to be between 20,000 and 40,000. (USCR, 1996: 104) In most cases, 
these refugees have been fending for themselves. The recent improvement in the 
relations between India and Burma with commitment to curb and contain insurgency in 
the border region and the opening of cross border trade between the two countries may 
have adverse repercussions for the Burmese refugees. (Datta, 2003:131)  
 
India’s treatment of refugee groups varies significantly. While the Tibetans were 
encouraged to settle permanently, India always insisted the temporary nature of 
protection to other refugee groups. The Tamil refugees enjoy free housing, medicine 
and education. Clothing and utensils are also provided free of cost, while rice and 
kerosene are supplied at a subsidised rate. The state government has permitted Tamil 
refugees to take up work outside the camps, a privilege not accorded to any other 
refugee groups. Compared to other refugee groups in India the Chakma refugees and 
Chins received the least favourable treatment. The UNHCR is given a very limited 
mandate, looking after the cases of hardly 9.3 percent of the total refugees in India. 
(Lama, 2000: 38) While the agency has been allowed to set up an office in New Delhi it 
has not been granted access to any of the refugee groups or camps. It was only after an 
international outcry that UNHCR was allowed a nominal presence in the departure 
centres for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.  
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In the absence of formal legal structures and procedures, the Supreme Court of India 
and National Human Rights Commission played a key role in safeguarding and 
promoting the rights of the refugees. In quite a few instances these two institutions have 
restrained the government from forcible expulsion of refugee groups and repatriation of 
individual refugees. 
 
8.1.1. Economic Boom and Forced Migration 
India is currently experiencing a major economic boom. All macro economic indicators 
point to a relatively sustained growth in the foreseeable future. A pertinent question 
therefore is what implications this phenomenon would have on forced migration. In 
addition to the massive growth in its indigenous manufacturing sector, the large non-
resident Indians in the developed world have been credited for India’s accelerated 
economic growth for their investments in the information technology and 
communications and other sectors. The country has also created a major niche in 
capturing outsourcing of contracts of companies based in the developed world.  
 
It is true that this success in the economic realm has contributed to the major growth in 
the ranks of the Indian middle-class. However, it may be a little too early to positively 
impact on forced migration patterns in the country and in the region. The economic 
boom is yet to touch the 375 million people that still live below the poverty line in the 
country. It will take a while for this boom to positively impact on the neighbouring 
countries that produce a good section of forced migrants. One may however argue that 
India’s economic growth could further induce forced migration. The energy requirement 
for the burgeoning economic sectors may demand building of more dams and other 
infrastructure facilities. These, in turn, may lead to further displacement. 
 
8.2. Nepal  
The Lhotsampa refugees from Bhutan first moved into Indian districts of Darjeeling and 
Jalpaiguri for shelter. After being chased away by the Indian authorities they moved into 
the eastern parts of Nepal. The Nepalese government admitted the refugees and set up 
camps and subsequently invited the UNHCR to manage them. The services provided in 
these camps such as education, health care, water and sanitation, are considered to be 
the best in the region. A series of inter-ministerial talks between the two governments 
have not yielded any meaningful result. While the Bhutanese government demands 
strict adherence to its own categorisation of refugees that would allow only the return of 
about 10,000 refugees, the lack of stability and continuity of governments in Nepal 
seriously undermined their ability to negotiate. 
 
8.3. Sri Lanka  
Despite the prolonged nature of the conflict the authorities were little prepared to cope 
with the pressure when large-scale displacement took place. In 1990, in spite of early 
warnings of expulsion of the Muslims, little was done. It has been claimed that troops 
were mobilised to stop Muslims from moving into the South. (Fais, 2002) Even when 
the government launched an offensive against the LTTE stronghold in the north in 1995, 
it had no contingency plan to deal with exodus of the civilian population.  
 
The state in Sri Lanka takes some responsibility for the majority of the displaced. But its 
policy has been largely shaped by the military considerations. The defence apparatus 
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“has played a crucial role in determining the extent and nature of the humanitarian 
response to the displaced”, and also in the timing of humanitarian supplies. (Gomez, 
2002:10) 
 
Dry food ration is the principal form of assistance; supplemented by materials for 
shelter construction. Financial assistance for relocation and resettlement are also 
available. Analysts note that the provisions do not always reach the IDPs and when they 
did at times they were of insufficient quantity. The policy of the state of providing 
insufficient supplies to the IDPs in the LTTE held areas, the refusal of material supply 
for shelter and the imposition of an economic embargo (including medicine), made 
these IDPs quite vulnerable to malnutrition and disease. Because of the ethnic nature of 
the civil war the Tamil IDPs are particularly subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention and 
torture.  
 
8.4. Politics and Forced Migrants 
Forced migration scenarios in South Asia at times are also affected by developments in 
other parts of the world. The decision of UNHCR to withdraw from the Tibetan refugee 
operation following China’s admission into the United Nations is an important case in 
point.  
 
Pakistan received massive U.S. support to finance the Afghan refugees during the 
Soviet occupation. A section of the Afghan refugees were trained and armed by the 
Pakistan, with the US support to fight the Soviets. The US support registered a sharp 
decline with the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan was left to finance the refugee support 
largely by itself despite the continued presence of a significant Afghan refugee 
population as the civil war continued. The 9/11 event and the U.S.’s subsequent re-
engagement with the Afghan issue turned the situation in favour of Pakistan. As the 
fight against the Talibans in Afghanistan advanced Pakistan was bestowed with the 
honour of being the most important non-NATO ally of the United States and was 
rewarded with increased cooperation in intelligence and defence, major debt relief and 
foreign aid programmes. Despite the warming of relationship and increased cooperation 
between the US and Pakistan, Afghan political leadership believe that the latter 
continues to be a major source of support to the Talibans. Elements within the military, 
particularly at the lower echelons and the tribal community in the bordering districts 
still appear to be sympathetic to the cause of the Taliban.  
 
The Karzai government’s control over the whole of Afghanistan remains tenuous. 
Although elections have been planned and voters’ registration process has begun, the 
feuding of the warlords continues. To a large extent the full return of the refugees will 
depend on the ability of the government to establish effective control over the territory.  
  
 
9. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 
 
9.1. International Agencies and NGOs 
The involvement of the UNHCR in providing protection and care to refugees varies 
significantly from country to country in the region. In a large country like India that has 
experienced various types of flows the relationship also varied depending on caseloads. 
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Although India granted UNHCR permission to open an office in New Delhi, the 
government does not allow the UN body or international agencies such as the 
International Committee for the Red Cross access to refugee camps. Initially India 
allowed the UNHCR provide assistance to the Tibetan refugees. However, to the 
country’s dismay the UNHCR withdrew its activities after China became a member of 
the United Nations. It is only with regard to the Afghan refugees that UNHCR has been 
given some role in care and maintenance. India denied UNHCR access to Tamil 
refugees from Sri Lanka, Chakmas from Bangladesh and Burmese dissidents in 
Manipur and Mizoram states. Following the progress in peace talks between the 
government and the Tamil groups, when repatriation process commenced the 
government granted a limited role to the UN body. But when repatriation of the 
Chakmas began following the signing of an accord between the Bangladesh government 
and the representatives of the hill people, the Indian government denied any role of 
UNHCR or ICRC.  
 
The government of India’s differential policy in giving access is also evident in granting 
permission to NGOs. Initially it allowed NGOs to work with the Tamil refugees, but the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi led to curtailment of NGO involvement. 
NGOs were not allowed to render services to the Chakma refugees in any major way.  
 
The governments of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan had invited and given access to 
refugees to UNHCR and other international agencies as soon as the situation demanded. 
In all three countries the UNHCR was allowed a role in determining status and 
coordinating assistance programmes.  
 
With their specialised knowledge on health, nutrition and education in distress situations 
the NGOs have become important partners in providing assistance to the refugees in 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. NGO involvement in South Asian refugee 
situations have resulted in experimentation with innovative programmes that are 
essential for rendering services to large caseloads with limited resources.  
 
Participation of Refugee Women’s Forum in health care services for the Bhutanese 
refugees in Nepal provides important insights. With adequate training, supervision and 
follow up, women health volunteers of the Forum has made a major difference in 
developing an efficient health care service to the refugees and the host community. 
Making recipients pay for service generates incentives for the volunteers and in turn 
contributes to the project’s sustainability. Likewise involving refugee children in 
developing health messages also resulted in better success rate in dissemination 
activities. 
 
The UNHCR’s policy of promoting self-reliance of refugees pending a durable solution 
has made important progress in the Indian case. In this scheme NGOs like the Young 
Men Christian’s Association (YMCA) have developed schemes such as needs 
assessment and resource assessment of refugee families, job placement, vocational 
training, language training and forming self-help micro credit groups. Another NGO, 
the Voluntary Health Advocacy Dal (VHAD) is responsible for health referrals and 
facilitates refugees’ access to local government hospitals.  
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NGO involvement with women refugees in the region is geared towards: 
• developing a community based approach to raise awareness of issues among 
refugees, UNHCR and implementing partners; 
• encouraging women to participate in the decision making and training them to 
take over the management of activities themselves; 
• incorporating activities like income generation, skills training, literacy, micro-
credit programmes; 
• imparting the idea that access to learning would lead to empowerment and 
financial independence.  
 
The experience of the Bhutanese Refugee Aiding the Victims of Violence (BRAVVE) 
is an important success story of a vulnerable group building its own organisation. 
Founded in January 1993 by a small group of educated Bhutanese refugees, it is now an 
important membership-based organization running vocational training and credit 
programmes and supported by a number of international agencies. 
 
9.2. UNHCR-NGO Relations 
NGOs have become important partners of the UNHCR in protection and assistance to 
refugees. Despite their involvement with different caseloads in varying sectors and 
degrees in the countries of the region, some international NGOs feel that UNHCR is yet 
to uphold the Oslo Declaration on Partnership in Action (ParInAc)2 in letter and spirit. 
A section of NGOs view that relations between UNHCR and NGOs are not always 
guided by the ‘spirit of greater accountability, transparency, exchange of information 
and cooperation’ that ParInAc proposes. UNHCR’s reluctance to share information 
about its dealing with the host governments, its failure to take a stand in favour of 
NGOs when governments limit the latter’s role, its reluctance to deal with cases of ‘new 
arrivals’, and its policy of promoting repatriation to situations where substantive 
improvement had not taken place, are some major issues of concern for the NGOs. The 
NGOs deem that in some instances the UN agency’s overemphasis on early return has 
resulted in return movements in less than favourable conditions.  
 
9.3. DFID Perspectives 
As an institution DFID is undergoing a major restructuring process. Earlier, the country 
offices enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. Sectoral teams at the country level were 
largely responsible for conceiving a project, developing it, identifying partners, 
mobilising resources, and executing it with hopes that the project would bring desired 
effects. With institutional reforms and ever increasing emphasis on the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals some in the agency view that there is a likelihood that 
the scope to develop and execute projects at the country level would gradually wither 
away. It is also likely to undermine innovation at the country level. In a sense, those 
working at the country level would essentially be executing policy directives issued 
from London.  
 
The impact of the restructuring process is quite visible in DFID offices, one member 
stated. The staff strength in some field offices has been substantially reduced. The 
 
2 International Council of Voluntary Agencies and UNHCR 1994 Oslo Declaration and Partnership In 
Action (ParInAc) Plan of Action. 
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earlier ‘hands-on’ approach of the agency is giving way to more impersonal corporate 
approach. Under the new dispensation, with emphasis on trimming administrative costs, 
DFID is likely to favour entering into partnership with other agencies such as the 
UNDP. In such a scenario it is possible that bigger projects would draw funding, 
perhaps at the cost of innovative and smaller ones. Some in the agency view that it 
would be ideal if a niche can be found between these two approaches.  
 
At the country level the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) would also have 
major implications for DFID’s work on issues such as forced migrants. At the behest of 
the donors many countries are now preparing their PRSPs. Once the PRSPs are ready, 
donors will essentially mobilise resources for projects that would be included within the 
scope of the respective PRSPs. If forced migrants are included in the PRSP then 
projects targeting them are likely to draw resources from agencies such as DFID. But if 
they do not figure at all in the document then it may become difficult for agencies to 
support projects that target them.  
 
Traditionally DFID has been a cautious agency in pursuing the rights issue. Though 
there has been some movement forward in espousing rights issue, admittedly there is 
not much pressure to move in that direction. The Scandinavians have been more focused 
in this regard. In the donor consortium meetings and also in the bilateral dealings with 
the recipient countries they are open and persistent about rights matters.  
 
 
10. CASE STUDY: THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH 
 
In 1978 and again in 1991-92 Bangladesh experienced the Rohingya refugee influx 
from her eastern neighbour, Burma. The refugees of the 1978 influx were sheltered in 
makeshift camps and provided with basic care. Following a bilateral agreement between 
the two governments the refugees were sent back home within sixteen months of their 
arrival. The next outflow of the Rohingyas began in November 1991. At the peak of the 
refugee influx a total of 270,000 took shelter in Bangladesh. The Government of 
Bangladesh (GoB) admitted the refugees who were eventually accommodated in 20 
camps. International non-governmental and UN agencies, including the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, were invited to engage in refugee 
assistance programmes. At the peak of the refugee situation there were as many as 32 
NGOs working in the 20 camps. 
 
A major policy consideration for the GoB had been the ‘quick and safe return’ of the 
refugees to their country of origin. The GoB considered the refugee problem to be a 
short-term one, and signed a MoU with Burma on 28 April 1992. Following a separate 
agreement between the UNHCR and the Burmese government, the repatriation process 
gained momentum. By the end of August, 204,000 Rohingya refugees were repatriated 
(UNHCR Update, 1996) 
 
Over the last ten years while the bulk of the refugees were repatriated, about 21,000 
remained in camps under difficult conditions. The repatriation process has virtually 
come to a standstill, while the number of children being born in the camps exceeds the 
number of refugees repatriated.  
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The refugees have been kept in two camps in the southeastern district of Cox’s Bazar. 
They are provided with dry ration that includes rice, pulses, sugar, blended food and oil, 
clothes, and fuel for cooking. Field findings suggest that items and food provisions 
supplied by UNHCR are not considered by the refugees to be adequate to meet their 
needs. In order to bring a variety to their diet the refugees trade part of their ration for 
fresh vegetables and fish. A recent Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland report observes 
that Rohingya refugees “still live in emergency-like conditions that are substandard and 
unhealthy”. They have been confined to congested spaces, with limited water and 
sanitary services, and restricted access to education. 58% of the refugee children and 
53% percent of the adult population have been reported to be suffering from chronic 
malnutrition, exposing them to disease and physical and mental retardation.  
 
In order to deny the refugees any sense of belonging in the host country, a series of 
measures were put in place. It was not until the 1996 that the Government of 
Bangladesh allowed formal schooling in some camps. In 2000 the distribution of 
vegetable seeds and chickens among vulnerable households was unofficially approved. 
The freedom of movement of the refugees has been restricted and they have not been 
allowed to seek employment and engage in any activities outside the camps.  
 
The GoB from the very beginning insisted that asylum for refugees was temporary and 
encouraged their immediate return. However, several factors have prompted the 
UNHCR to suggest temporary settlement of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. 
These include, (a) the unwillingness of the Burmese authorities to accept the total 
residual caseload, (b) the reluctance of a large section of the refugees to return to a 
situation where the incidence of forced labour and violation of rights of the people is 
still rampant, and (c) the lack of enthusiasm of the donor agencies to continue to fund 
the Rohingya operation, what they see for an indefinite period, without any durable 
solution in sight. The UNHCR proposed a policy of temporary settlement, which would 
entail dismantling the camps and allowing refugees engage in income generating 
activities. The GoB has so far refused to consider any proposal that calls for allowing 
refugees to move out of camps on the grounds that as one of the most densely populated 
countries of the world with major resource constraints, Bangladesh can ill afford any 
such scheme. It further argues that such a measure may trigger a fresh influx of 
Rohingya from across the border.  
 
With little prospects for repatriation to the country of origin with dignity in the 
foreseeable future, the unwillingness of the Bangladesh government to consider 
temporary integration and the reluctance of the donors to continue with funding the 
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11. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
11.1. DFID 
DFID should develop a critical appraisal of the role of international agencies, 
particularly of that of UNHCR, to determine if they should be strictly performing their 
mandated tasks or be part of wider development tasks. 
 
DFID should ensure that repatriation is conducted and promoted to situations where 
there has been marked improvement in places of origin that contribute to forced 
migration in the first instance, that returnees have scope to pursue basic livelihood 
opportunities and effective international monitoring mechanisms are in place. 
 
In view of increasing tendency of international agencies to de-prioritise protection 
issues particularly in protracted refugee situations the country offices of DFID should 
monitor if appropriate and adequate numbers of protection personnel of the mandated 
agencies are in place. Other agencies such as ICRC may be encouraged to perform such 
activities. 
  
DFID should encourage governments in both countries of origin and receiving countries 
to incorporate forced migrants in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.  
 
In protracted refugee situations DFID should consider engaging in infrastructure and 
services development initiatives (building and renovating schools, roads, culverts, 
medical centres, community centres, planting of trees) to offset negative attitudes about 
the refugees in areas that experience mass influx. 
 
The DFID should specifically develop a programme to strengthen the capacity of its 
country offices to monitor the violations of the rights and the concerns of the forced 
migrants. Officers should be provided training on relevant standards.  
 
The country offices of DFID through their gender specialists may monitor if gender 
guidelines in the treatment of forced migrants are being adhered to. Monitoring of the 
treatment of other vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied children and the aged also 
needs to be ensured. Local NGOs and support groups may be encouraged to engage in 
such activities.  
 
DFID should strive to increase the capacities of the non-governmental sector to monitor 
and document violations of rights of the forced migrants, suggest solution and remedies, 
further engage other institutions of the civil society, facilitate communication between 
the authorities and the forced migrants, negotiate with the military authorities during 
conflict situations to ensure supply of food, health care, sanitation, shelter, clothing and 
education. 
 
DFID may actively engage in the care and treatment of forced migrants through NGOs 
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DFID should actively support skill development, training and credit programmes both in 
the host countries/areas and in countries/areas of origin where forced migrants return, 
particularly in post-conflict situations. 
 
11.2. Governments of Receiving Countries 
There is an absence of comprehensive policies and guidelines on displacement and 
relief, protection and assistance issues are dealt with by various ministries and agencies 
of the government. Governments should consider setting up a central body on forced 
migrants in their respective countries. The body should have authority over all actors 
involved in protecting and assisting the forced migrants. Such a body may be entrusted: 
• to frame a comprehensive policy on forced migrants modelled on the South 
Asian Declaration on Refugees of the Eminent Persons Group and the Guiding 
Principles of Internal Displacement; 
• to monitor the implementation of such a policy by the various ministries and 
agencies of the government; 
• to monitor all other policies and practices that affect forced migrants, including 
those of the law enforcing agencies and the military; 
• to integrate concerns about forced migrants in overall government policy and 
ensure that state agencies focus on these needs when implementing the policy; 
• to receive, forward and act upon complaints from forced migrants.  
 
 
There is a lack of a coherent policy and legal framework in dealing with internal 
displacement. Often policies are vague and shifting, shaped by political and military 
considerations rather than on recognition of their rights. States are to be informed about 
the humanitarian dimension of the IDP problem and the Guiding Principles that have 
been framed for dealing with them.  
 
Concerned governments should take up the issue of statelessness and de-facto 
statelessness (the plantation Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Biharis in Bangladesh) of the 
groups of people who are currently staying in their territories and actively consider 
giving them legal status such as citizenship to bring an end to their long standing plight. 
DFID may extend cooperation for their rehabilitation and reintegration by supporting 
their livelihood programmes.  
 
Governments should facilitate the voluntary return of IDPs to their areas of origin by 
vacating occupied property, clearing mines, speeding up reconstruction efforts and 
ensuring compensation packages for resettlement. In relocation and rehabilitation 
programmes due consideration should be given to livelihood options.  
 
Humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs including food, sanitation, shelter and 
health care should be in conformity with the Sphere standards expounded in the 
UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, in particular on caloric need, minimum space and 
health care. 
 
Agencies of the government concerned with women and children matters should be 
directed to address the hitherto largely unattended issues of concern to refugee and IDP 
women and girls of rape, domestic violence, incest, prostitution and trafficking. They 
 
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 




should work in conjunction with women’s groups and humanitarian organizations in 
responding to the specific concerns of refugee and IDP women and girls.  
 
A study may be conducted to understand the problems of those Bhutanese and 
Rohingyas who have been residing irregularly in Nepal, India and Bangladesh, and 
claim to be persecuted in their countries of habitual residence and demand refugee 
status. The study should also look into their vulnerability and coping mechanisms. The 
findings of the study should be disseminated among the respective governments, UN 
and other international humanitarian agencies and national civil society organisations to 
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As a region beset by political instability and repression of opposition groups, 
widespread discrimination towards ethnic and religious minorities, and war and conflict, 
the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) is home to the largest numbers of 
refugees in the world. Significant flows of refugees and other forced migrants within 
MENA include Palestinians, Sudanese, Kurds, Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Iranians. 
In addition, there have been huge numbers of refugees from Afghanistan to Iran. This 
report outlines some of the main flows and characteristics of forced migration in the 
MENA region in the context of changing international refugee policies, ongoing 
conflict and instability, shifting patterns of local and transnational practices, and the 
unresolved Palestinian question. We present region-specific challenges to addressing 
the vulnerability of refugees and other forced migrants in terms of the problem of 
Palestinian refugees, an overall lack of rights for non-citizens, the urban nature of the 
refugee situation in the region, and the transnational circumstances of most forced 
migrants today. The specific dimensions of vulnerability of forced migrants in MENA 
are characterized as relating to lack of ethnic and minority rights, gender insecurity, and 
poor support for children. The report highlights the unclear distinction between forced 
and voluntary migration from the Middle East, using the case of Iraqis as an example. In 
the final section, the report presents some of the policy initiatives that are being 
developed to tackle the challenges highlighted in our thematic overview. In doing so, 
we present many of the actors with whom DFID may think about developing projects, 
as well as policy areas where DFID might take the lead in designing innovative 
approaches. Given the historical patterns of forced migration in MENA and the 
consequences for refugee, IDP, and host populations as identified above, we suggest 
that DFID tailor its response strategies along five themes: addressing the Palestinian 
refugee issue, designing programmes and projects around citizenship and rights, finding 
ways to assist forced migrants in an urban context, bridging the gap between 






As a region beset by political instability and repression of opposition groups, 
widespread discrimination towards ethnic and religious minorities, and war and conflict, 
the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) is home to the largest numbers of 
refugees in the world. Significant flows of refugees and other forced migrants within 
MENA include Palestinians, Sudanese, Kurds, Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Iranians. 
In addition, there have been huge numbers of refugees from Afghanistan to Iran.  
 
However, with the exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the continued displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, the issue of refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) within MENA has not received much attention. It has not only been 
largely absent from academic writings on the region, but has also not been a priority 
topic for policy makers in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. Especially when compared 
with other regions of concern to DFID such as Africa, Southeast Asia and West Asia, 
the countries of MENA are considerably underrepresented; in terms of policy towards 
refugees and the process of forced migration, this deficiency is compounded by the lack 
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of a ‘joined-up’ policy towards the Palestinian issue and a hostile stance towards asylum 
seekers from the conflict zones of Iraq, eastern Turkey, Sudan, and Iran. It must be 
noted that many of the forced migrants from these zones are also Muslim and have been 
further penalized under government policies to combat terrorism seen to be associated 
with Islamist groups and governments.  
 
Reflecting a hardening of policies towards asylum seekers and refugees in Europe and 
generally, governments of MENA states have adopted increasingly harsh policies 
towards forced migrants within their borders, as well as those seeking entry. These 
include strict visa requirements, police round-ups and detention of foreign nationals 
including many refugees, and in some cases, deportation. Over the last several decades, 
citizenship requirements in MENA states have narrowed, with the result that second and 
third generation migrants and forced migrants have fewer rights than their parents 
enjoyed; this can be seen in policies of ‘kuwaiticization’ in Kuwait, where non-nationals 
are able to participate in fewer types of employment, or in the virtual impossibility of 
becoming a naturalized citizen of Egypt. Changing government policies towards non-
citizens are compounded by limited protection for refugees, as most MENA countries 
are not signatories of the 1951 Convention nor do they have domestic legislation 
protecting refugees.  
 
In this report, we first outline some of the main flows and characteristics of forced 
migration in the MENA region in the context of changing international refugee policies, 
ongoing conflict and instability, shifting patterns of local and transnational practices, 
and the unresolved Palestinian question. We then present region-specific challenges to 
addressing the vulnerability of refugees and other forced migrants, which we group 
under five themes: Palestinian refugees, citizenship rights, an urban setting, 
development assistance vs. relief aid, and the transnational circumstances of most 
forced migrants today. Next, we revisit each of these themes to tease out the policy 
implications for DFID, using examples of successful initiatives and good practice in the 
region. Finally, we set out our overall policy recommendations for DFID and its 
partners in the region. 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF FORCED MIGRATION IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST  
 
This section provides information about refugees and IDPs in the MENA region (See 
Appendix A for a definition of MENA), and asylum seekers from MENA, particularly 
those in Europe. While we differentiate between refugees1 as persons who are forced or 
obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence and who have sought refuge 
                                                 
1 In this report, refugees are defined as follows in Article 1 of the OAU convention:  
“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his 
country of origin or nationality. 
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outside their countries of origin or nationality, and IDPs2 as those fleeing similar 
conditions but who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border, we note 
that conceptually the difference may be blurred by unresolved border issues and that 
many persons in MENA may be both IDPs and refugees during their lifetime. 
 
2.1. Refugees 
The vast majority of refugees in the Middle East are Palestinians, making up about 
2,975,000 of the total of 5,377,400 refugees (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2003; see 
Appendix B for a compilation of statistics from MENA)). In addition to an estimated 
1,506,000 people in the cities, villages, and refugee camps of the Israeli-occupied 
territories of the west Bank and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian refugees are hosted by Syria 
(476,000), Lebanon (403,000), Saudi Arabia (240,000) Jordan (1,170,000), Iraq 
(100,000), Egypt (50,000), and Kuwait (50,000). Other major populations of refugees 
are Afghanis, mostly located in Iran (2,000,000); Iraqis in Jordan (4,000, though this 
figure is contradicted by UNHCR statistics, below), Kuwait (15,000), Turkey (700), 
Saudi Arabia (5,200) and Iran (203,000); Somalis in Egypt (7,000) and Yemen 
(79,000), and Sudanese in Egypt (20,000) (although Sudan also has a strong labour 
migration tradition to several Middle East countries). If North African states, with a 
population of 434,000 refugees, are included in the overall volume, the total figure rises 
to 5,811,400 in the region. Significant populations include Sahrawis in Algeria (80,000) 
and Mauritania (25,000) and Eritreans in Sudan (280,000).3
 
The most recent flows of refugees relate to the war, occupation and ongoing violence in 
Iraq, which account for displacement inside the country (i.e. thousands of people left 
Falluja and went to Baghdad) as well as to neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, 
Turkey and Iran.  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is known to host the largest refugee population in the 
world. In 1999, Iranian officials reported that there were over 1.8 million refugees in 
Iran: Afghans make up the largest group (about 1.3 million) and there are also about 
half a million Kurdish Iraqis (USCR, 2000, in Harrell-Bond et al., 2003). The most 
recent war and conflict in Iraq failed to produce the large-scale flow of refugees to Iran 
that were widely predicted and happened in 1991. However, mainly Iraqi Shi’a from the 
south as well as Iraqi Kurds continue to escape to Iran. Most Iraqi refugees have settled 
close to the Iran-Iraq border. Because of the freedom of movement that refugees enjoy 
in Iran, under five percent of the total refugee population live in camps (ibid.). 
 
Jordan is another country which has received a great number of refugees related to war 
and instability in neighbouring Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories. In the wake of 
the 1991 Gulf War, about one million forced migrants arrived in Jordan, fleeing from 
                                                 
2 Internally Displaced Persons will be referred to as IDPs throughout this report. The UN’s Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement provide a definition of IDPs: 
Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or 
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. 
3 The main source for this information is the U.S. Committee for Refugees (2003) 
http://www.refugees.org/WRS2003.cfm#statistics. Figures for the number of refugees in the region vary 
widely. Additionally, it is important to note that UNHCR figures for refugee populations do not include 
Palestinians. 
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Iraq and Kuwait (Chatelard, 2002). After the 1991 uprising of Iraqi Shi’a in the south 
and its brutal repression by the previous regime, thousands of Iraqi Shi’a fled to Jordan. 
In 1996, UNHCR reported that about 1 – 2 million Iraqis had entered Jordan since the 
Gulf War (ibid.). In the wake of the last war of 2003, thousands more Iraqis left for 
Jordan. While many of them returned last year, a large number has remained in Jordan 
and there has been a small yet continuous trickle of Iraqis entering Jordan over the past 
months. Flows of Palestinian displaced people continue to arrive in Jordan after each 
Israeli clampdown in the occupied Palestinian territories. During the recent Al Aqsa 
intifada of 2000, Jordan took measures to control mobility of displaced Palestinians 
from the West Bank into Jordan.  
 
Turkey, due to its geographical position, has received thousands of refugees from 
several major wars in the region, including the Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1991 Gulf 
war, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and, most recently, Afghanistan. Ethnic Kurds 
from Iraq and Iran have also sought asylum in Turkey. It is also a major producer of 
asylum seekers, mainly Kurds, who follow historical transnational pathways to Europe, 
especially Germany.  
 
2.2. Internally Displaced Persons 
According to the Global IDP Project (2004), while the Middle East is home to the 
world’s largest single refugee population – the Palestinians – regionally, it has one of 
the smallest internally displaced populations. Across the region there are an estimated 
1.8 million internally displaced persons; this estimate should be treated with caution, 
however, as many IDPs in the region have never been registered. At the same time, the 
number includes many descendants of IDPs, reflecting the fact that internal 
displacement in the region has often spanned over several generations. In fact, over half 
the internally displaced people in the Middle East have been displaced for at least 
twenty years (ibid.). 
 
The wars between Israel and its neighbours after 1948 caused large-scale displacement, 
including the internal displacement of Arabs within Israel and of inhabitants of the 
Golan Heights within Syria. These IDP populations, each of which now totals several 
hundred thousand, have been displaced for decades and there is little prospect for return 
any time soon (ibid.). Hundreds of thousands of people were internally displaced by the 
civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. Some 300,000 IDPs remain unable to return 
because of continued instability in the southern part of the country, which despite the 
withdrawal of the Israeli army in 2000 is still plagued by clashes between the Lebanese 
guerrilla group Hizbollah and Israeli forces. The current state of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has caused additional internal displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, such as the 6,000 Palestinians displaced by the wholesale 
destruction of Jenin refugee camp in 2002 by Israeli forces, while continuing tensions 
between Israel and Syria have prevented the return of the IDPs displaced from the 
Golan Heights (ibid.). 
  
Historical conflict between the Turkish state and the large Kurdish minority in south-
eastern Turkey, estimated to number between 12 - 20 million (US DOS, 2003), has led 
to the wide-scale displacement of Kurds within Turkey, mostly to shantytowns at the 
outskirts of larger villages and cities. At the height of the conflict, estimates of Kurdish 
IDPs ranged from the conservative Turkish government figure of 353,000 to between 1 
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and 4.5 million by outside observers and Turkish NGOs (UN Mission Report 2004). 
The Global IDP Project (2004) points out that “internal displacement in the country is 
also part of a broader rural to urban migration, which was exacerbated by the violence 
in the southeast.” 
 
The main event affecting IDPs in the Middle East in 2003 was the US-led armed 
intervention in Iraq followed by the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The UN 
had feared that an additional one million people would become displaced within Iraq as 
a result of the war. While displacement did not take place on this scale, close to 80,000 
people were forced from their homes during the fighting (ibid.). In the wake of the fall 
of Saddam Hussein, a number of international humanitarian organisations, including 
some assisting IDPs, established a presence in Iraq. Many left the country in the second 
part of the year, however, because of growing insecurity and the direct targeting of 
humanitarian actors. This reduction in humanitarian operations in Iraq has diminished 
the likelihood of finding solutions in the near future for the many Iraqis who remain 
displaced.  
 
2.3. Development-Induced Displacement 
Over the last decade, research on population displacement by development projects has 
considerably expanded. However, while researchers of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
have produced a great deal of writings on resettlement processes and their failures, 
literature on the MENA region has been relatively scarce (Ben-Achour & Cernea, 
2004). This is despite the fact that displacements have become more frequent in the 
region in recent years, especially in urban settings, due to urban regeneration and 
infrastructure investments, as witnessed extensively in Lebanon and Egypt, for example 
(ibid.). Displacement related to rural areas is often linked to water security, i.e. the Ilisu 
dam on the river Tigris, which threatens to displace thousands of Kurds and the Taiz 
Municipal and Flood Protection Project in Yemen, which affects the already 
marginalized Akhdam caste (ibid.). Large-scale development projects, such as the 
South-Anatolia Project (GAP) and natural disasters have also been the cause of 
displacement (OHCHR, 2002). 
 
2.4. Asylum Seekers from MENA in Europe 
In the 1990s, two of the top 10 countries of origin of asylum seekers to Europe were 
MENA countries, namely Iraq and Iran. In 2000, for instance, there were more than 
90,000 asylum seekers coming to Europe from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, accounting for 
more than one fifth of the total asylum seekers to the EU (Içduygu and Toktas, 2002). 
Iraq produced more asylum seekers in Europe than any other origin country in 2002, but 
only half as many in 2003. Iraqis were the third main refugee caseload in the world in 
2001 (Chatelard, 2002). Another large group of forced migrants originate in Turkey, 
and are mainly of Kurdish origin (as are many from Iran and Iraq). Factors relating to 
instability and conflict, such as ethnic or religious discrimination, human rights abuses, 
war and a large proportion of internally displaced people relative to the total population 
account for the large number of refugees and asylum seekers from MENA countries to 
Europe. 
 
Despite attempts to repatriate Kurdish and Iraqi asylum-seekers by some EU 
governments, it is clear that both groups are not only extremely reluctant to return under 
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present circumstances, but that an additional number of Iraqis may be predicted to wish 
to leave the country as soon as the security situation will allow them to travel to either 
Jordan or Turkey. Based on informal interviews with Iraqis outside and inside Iraq, 
there is a growing concern that the security and humanitarian situation will not stabilize 
in the short run. Despite a trend of return migration during the first months after the fall 
of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqis have increasingly lost faith in both the occupying 
forces and the process of political transition.  
 
In addition to Iraqi, Kurdish and Iranian refugees and dissidents, recent years have also 
witnessed an increase in Palestinian migration from the occupied territories, Lebanon, 
and Jordan to Western Europe. Many of these migrants have been part of transnational 
social and family networks, which often facilitate the migration process in light of 
tighter asylum policies and border controls.  
 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED MIGRATION IN MENA 
 
This section is designed to help policy makers at DFID identify what we see as the key 
factors of vulnerability affecting the well-being of forced migrants in the region. Some 
of these factors are common to forced migrant populations generally, such as the 
detriments to refugee well-being of being excluded from development resources, the 
increasingly urbanized setting for refugees, or the global trend towards established and 
active transnational networks interacting with forced migrant populations in 
disadvantaged regions; other factors have to do with the history of the region, such as 
the Palestinian refugee situation and the lack of citizenship rights for large sectors of the 
populations of MENA countries. These five themes are revisited in Part II with the aim 
of identifying policy options. 
 
3.1. Significance of Palestinian Refugees  
Several aspects of the situation of Palestinian refugees support the tendency to see them 
as a case apart from other refugees in the region, and indeed, the global context 
generally. As the longest running unresolved refugee problem in the world, as well as 
the case with the greatest numbers of displaced people due to any one conflict, 
Palestinians furthermore do not come under the auspices of the UN agency, the High 
Commission for Refugees. This is because the 1948 Arab-Israeli war leading to the 
mass displacement of Palestinians predates the establishment of the UNHCR, which 
additionally was limited geographically and to a specific time period. However, the UN 
agency set up to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees, the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has no protection mandate and as such, 
Palestinians remain outside of the framework of rights and protection of refugees 
overall.  
 
At the regional level, the Palestinian refugee case maintains a high profile due to a 
political stance adopted by the League of Arab States (LAS) for their eventual return to 
an independent Palestinian state. Three regional wars between LAS countries and Israel 
have been fought in relation to the unresolved issue of a homeland for Palestinians, 
while internal political and military disputes have set Arab host governments against 
Palestinian militias and political interests (e.g. conflicts in Jordan in 1970, Egypt in 
1976, and Lebanon in 1978).  
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Several commentators have argued that the specific situation of the Palestinians has 
shaped the way regional governments and policy-makers have perceived refugees and 
IDPs in more general terms. In principle, Palestinians living in Arab League states 
should benefit from the 1965 Casablanca Protocol (The Protocol), which asked 
signatories to uphold the Palestinians’ right to work, to enjoy full residency rights, and 
freedom of movement within and among Arab countries. Eventually, the absence of 
clear and well-defined legislation regulating the status of the Palestinians in the Arab 
countries has sacrificed their civil basic rights (Shiblak, 1995). To overcome such a 
restrictive environment, many have chosen to leave, even illegally, an act which in itself 
may make them more vulnerable, both in terms of living conditions and due to their 
lack of identification papers.  
 
3.2. Obstacles to Refugee Protection 
It has been noted that the options available to refugees in the region are very much 
shaped by the overall stance of national governments towards the Palestinian refugee 
question. Several commentators have noted the difficulty of governments to pursue 
integration of foreign nationals, including refugees, into their societies as long as 
Palestinians remain politically impossible to integrate. Strategies and experiences of 
non-Palestinian forced migrants, therefore, are very much shaped by their position as 
temporary residents with few rights and little protection. 
 
Due to the political and ideological difficulty of naturalizing Palestinians, the notion of 
naturalization and citizenship rights for any foreigners has not been an integral concept 
amongst MENA states. The situation is even further complicated by patriarchal and 
patrilineal notions of identity, which account for the fact that women from MENA who 
are married to non-national refugees are not able to pass on their citizenship to their 
partners and children. This, of course, has serious implications in terms of pro-poor 
policies and processes of development, as non-citizens are often not eligible for national 
poverty reduction projects.  
 
The initial perception of Palestinians as being a temporary phenomenon and the debate 
about ‘the right of return’ has also affected the way regional policy makers have dealt 
with other refugee groups. Arab countries were instrumental in bringing about the 
unique role of the United Nations in relation to Palestinian refugees. The UN recognised 
that it was partially responsible for creating the refugee situation through General 
Assembly Resolution 181 which recommended the partition of Palestine (Akram, 
2001). However, Arab states advocated Palestinian exclusion from the 1951 Convention 
and from UNHCR’s mandate primarily because they were concerned that, if included 
under the UNHCR mandate, Palestinian refugees “would become submerged [within 
other categories of refugees] and would be relegated to a position of minor importance” 
(Takkenberg, 1998).  
 
Rather than basing policies and structures on international conventions and legal 
treatises, most Arab governments have taken a hands-off approach and left the welfare 
and survival of refugees to the principles of Islamic charity and Arab hospitality. The 
outcomes have been contradictory: on the one hand it has allowed a large number of 
refugees to evade refugee camps, have a relatively high level of freedom and mobility 
and take advantage of local solidarity networks based on family, kinship, ethnic and 
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religious ties. This has been the case with Iraqi refugees in Iran, for example, who were 
able to become relatively self-sufficient. On the other hand, refugees and IDPs in 
MENA have been extremely vulnerable to poverty, discrimination, repression and the 
threat of deportation. In Egypt, for example, many Palestinian, Sudanese, Somali, 
Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees often suffer great hardship and economic deprivation 
due to the lack of national laws on refugees and the current un-written non-integration 
policy of the Egyptian government (Zohry, A. and Harrell-Bond, 2003).  
 
With the exception of a few states (Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Israel and Yemen), most 
countries in the region have not ratified the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol. Even those states that signed the Convention of Rights have done this with 
numerous reservations and often apply very loose interpretations4 (Morvaridi, 2004). 
 
In addition to the still unresolved Palestinian question, local authorities raised other 
concerns as well, stressing both domestic and regional constraints such as limited 
resources and the economic burden newcomers would present to the host country, the 
need to maintain good relations with neighbouring countries and the fear of becoming a 
“dumping ground” for rejected refugees from other countries in the area (Zaotti, 2004). 
Although, by and large, local authorities have accepted UNHCR’s authority and 
decisions, they have not provided formal guarantees for refugees and they have 
continued to fall under the legislation applicable to foreigners in general (ibid.). At the 
same time, political expediency, coupled with shortage of funding and more generally 
the weakening of the refugee regime at the global level, has meant that UNHCR neither 
has the willingness nor capacity to push for radical change (ibid.). 
 
3.3. Urbanization of Forced Migrant Populations 
As has been noted in other parts of the world, refugees and other forced migrants in 
MENA are also becoming an urban phenomenon. With the exception of Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Algeria, most forced migrants in MENA—whether encamped or 
not—live largely on the outskirts of larger towns and cities or within major peri-urban 
centres such as Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, Beirut, and Amman. The long-standing nature 
of the Palestinian refugee problem has fuelled the development of quasi-permanent 
encampments, many of which are now urban neighbourhoods in enlarged Middle 
Eastern cities (e.g. Amman).  
 
The urban setting is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between forced 
migration, poverty and development in the MENA region. A large number of refugees 
in the region are settled in urban spaces, where they interact with IDPs and recent 
migrants from rural areas, as well as with long-term residents. Compared to other recent 
urban migrants, urban refugees in MENA are vulnerable in terms of their access to 
protection and to resources, both of which impact on poverty alleviation and 
development. Kagan (forthcoming) identifies a procedural difference in determining 
refugee status that differentiates between rural refugees, generally granted protection as 
                                                 
4 In Egypt, for example, refugees do not have the right to access state education, free health services or 
housing benefits. In Jordan, refugees are discouraged from integrating and their residency is limited to a 6 
months period after which they are either forced to move to a third country or risk being fined for every 
day they overstay (UNHCR, 2003). In Iran, distinctions have been made between Afghani and Iraqi 
refugees where the latter have not been subject to repatriation programmes and have benefited from 
greater access to resources, including work, education and health care (Harrell-Bond, 2003). 
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a group, and urban refugees who access protection through an individual status 
determination process. Unlike in Western countries where recognition is a means of 
granting asylum, status determination in MENA and other states in the developing 
world “has often been a means of separating refugees from their host societies and 
transferring responsibility for their care onto the international community” (Kagan, 
forthcoming).  
 
Problems arising from the lack of domestic protection for undocumented refugees in 
cities is matched by the lack of access to resources. Both local governments and 
international aid/policy organisations differentiate between citizens with rights to access 
resources (e.g. government sponsored health care or inter-governmental agency 
programmes in poverty reduction) and refugees. In Egypt, for example, there are free 
health clinics for impoverished Egyptians, while refugees are not allowed to use these 
facilities. Refugees are also often excluded from the distribution of subsidized foods and 
goods and the allocation of ration cards.  
 
The strain on urban resources is particularly problematic in a situation of war and 
conflict, as can be witnessed by the hardships facing IDPs in Baghdad and Kirkuk, for 
example. Kurds deported from Kirkuk and other Kurd-majority cities by Saddam’s 
Arabization campaigns throughout the 1990s were forced to live in make-shift camps on 
the edge of war-torn cities in Iraqi Kurdistan (Zanger, 2002). 
 
3.4. Exclusion from Development Resources 
Generally speaking, forced migration increases poverty and hinders development. This 
is particularly true in the context of MENA countries where states have failed to 
integrate refugees into state structures and institutions in which poverty reduction 
programmes are administered. At the same time, non-state providers, such as NGOs, 
charitable organizations, religious associations and international organizations are often 
at odds with the state. In many MENA countries, but most notably in Egypt, it appears 
that it is predominantly non-Egyptian nationals who work with refugees, while Egyptian 
professionals are involved in poverty reduction programmes for nationals.  
 
The strain on urban resources is particularly problematic in situations of war and 
conflict, as can be witnessed by the hardships facing IDPs in Baghdad and Kirkuk, for 
example. It is worth pointing out that forced migrants in MENA countries (like all 
foreigners in general) pay legislated higher prices for housing, schooling, and often 
health care. As such, they do provide a significant economic contribution to local 
economies. Some of the money available to refugees within MENA countries is based 
on remittances sent by their relatives living abroad, and can therefore be counted as 
foreign currency earnings. 
 
3.5. Transnational Features of Forced Migrant Populations 
Several commentators describe the Middle East currently at the crossroads of various 
new migration trends and changes in migration orders. Moving away from a migration 
system mainly based on labour market demands (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) oil-
producing countries) and needs on the one hand, and war and conflict, on the other hand 
(Palestine, Iraq, Turkey), the Middle East has increasingly become part of a complex 
and globalised migratory system. Transnational networks based on family, friendship, 
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religious, ethnic, village or political ties have come to play a major role in shaping 
current migration flows and patterns. Gender also intervenes in differentiating and 
shaping transnational projects, practices and possibiltiies of movements, with refugee 
women and men experiencing membership in both the country of settlement and origin 
differently. Despite, and sometimes even as a reaction to, the tightening of migration 
control policies throughout the EU, these networks facilitate movement from the 
MENA region to the EU.  
 
Whether Palestinian networks based on family and village ties (Dorai, 2003), Lebanese 
networks based on ethnic and religious affiliation (Pedersen, 2003), networks of 
Kurdish migrants or Iraqi Shi’a religious affiliation (Chatelard, 2002), these networks 
often defy border controls and economic logic. However, in most cases, transnational 
social networks represent solidarity networks that shape the development and 
organization of migratory processes in both the country of origin and the destination 
country. Dorai (2003), who has carried out an in-depth study of Palestinian migrant 
networks between refugee camps in Lebanon and European countries (initially 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden, but more recently the United Kingdom and Belgium) 
argues that these solidarity networks, along with the social capital and information they 
facilitate, often develop locally first before they take on a transnational dimension. This 
has been true for Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon as much as Iraqi Shi’a in 
Baghdad or in the south of Iraq. 
 
 
4. DIMENSIONS OF VULNERABILITY OF FORCED MIGRANTS IN MENA 
 
For reasons mentioned previously—namely, a regionally underdeveloped civil society, 
ongoing conflict and violence in many parts of the region, an inadequate protection 
regime, rapid and inequitable urbanization, and the lack of access to citizenship and 
naturalization for foreign nationals, refugees in MENA are among the most 
underprivileged and marginalized social groups with poor access to services and little 
recourse to their rights. In terms of protection, living in MENA as an undocumented 
person contributes greatly to both political and socio-economic marginalisation. While 
areas of refugee vulnerability overlap with other populations in MENA, such as ethnic 
and religious minorities, rural migrants, and others, often xenophobia and racism are 
compounded by extreme insecurity over residency and access to services. While 
UNHCR has extended some level of protection to populations “of concern” but without 
refugee status, MENA still hosts a significant number of stateless individuals who fall 
outside of state and international protection5.  
                                                 
5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights unequivocally states that “everyone has the right to 
nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality” (Article 15). Article 1 of the 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless persons of 1954 defines a stateless person as one “who is 
not considered as a national by any state under the operation of law”. As it was considered a limited 
definition only to the de jure stateless persons, the 1961 Convention on the reduction of Statelessness 
adopts the same definition of stateless persons and fills in the gap of the 1954 convention by 
recommending that ‘persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de 
jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality.’ In Takkenberg (1998), Weis differentiates 
between de facto statelessness, which refers to the lack of an effective nationality, and de jure 
statelessness. Weiss explains that, ‘A person may either be stateless at birth, as a result of the fact that he 
does not acquire a nationality at birth according to the law of any state, or he may become stateless 
subsequent to birth by losing his nationality without acquiring another” (Takkenberg:1998:176). 
Palestinians, denied their rights in their nationality and the right to be naturalised in countries of habitual 
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In terms of specific characteristics of the region, vulnerability according to gender 
stands out. The role of migrant women as domestic workers constitutes one of the main 
forms and characteristics of the feminization of migration flows from MENA to Europe. 
Many women migrants remain totally at the mercy of their employers if they do not 
have immigration status. Refugee women working in domestic labour markets in 
MENA (specifically, Egypt, Lebanon, and Gulf countries) are even more vulnerable, 
where even gaining residency does not offer them protection from unscrupulous 
employers. While much research on gender and refugees highlights a particular concern 
toward the vulnerability of women and children (e.g. to sexual violence, trafficking, and 
access to humanitarian resources), the urban characteristics of refugees and access to 
informal labour markets in some MENA countries indicate that men may be vulnerable 
in specific ways. In Cairo and Beirut, for example, refugee women have been able to 
access the niche labour market of domestic employment (Abderahman, 2002; Wani, 
2002) while their husbands are often unable to find work.  
 
Children of forced migrants in MENA are also vulnerable. In most MENA countries, 
women are unable to pass along their nationality to their children, so even those with 
mothers from the host society married to forced migrants cannot avail themselves of the 
protection of their governments nor access services, including education. There is 
generally no provision for the protection of unaccompanied minors and other especially 
vulnerable children. Indeed, recent research in Cairo has indicated that children locked 
into their homes by their single working mothers may be at great risk of household 
accidents, threats from neighbours, and other dangers. 
 
 
5. THE MIGRATION-ASYLUM NEXUS IN MENA 
 
Policy makers may aspire to make clear distinctions between economic and forced 
migrants, but many migrants have multiple motivations for moving. The ‘Migration-
Asylum Nexus’ reflects a growing recognition that it is increasingly difficult and 
perhaps even undesirable to distinguish between forced and voluntary migration. The 
history of the Iraqi diaspora is a case in point.  
 
Oppressive policies of the regime of Saddam Hussein, especially the persecution of 
Kurds in the north and the Shi’a in the south, Arabization programmes, as well as the 
general oppression of political opposition account for the large numbers of Iraqi 
refugees since the mid 1970s. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Gulf crisis starting 
with the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf war in 1991, as 
well as the recent war (2003) and ongoing conflict have all contributed to internal 
displacement and refugee flows within the region as well as to Europe and elsewhere.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
residence, are stateless people. This legal in limbo status renders them vulnerable to mobility and to 
acquisition of their rights. Furthermore, most of the Arab countries discriminate against the rights of 
women, to pass on her nationality to her husband or her children. for example, when a Jordanian woman 
is married to a Gazan (a Palestinian refugee from Gaza strip), a holder of a temporary passport, children 
are included in his passport and not hers. Hence, the children are de jure stateless. Many Arab countries 
have not yet ratified the law permitting Arab women, more specifically when they become a refugee, to 
pass on her nationality to her children. 
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However, it is important to stress that Iraqi refugees are a good example of the fact that 
the analytical distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is not as clear-cut as 
policy-makers would like us to believe. In 1996, 4 million Iraqis were reported to live 
abroad (USCR, 1996, in Chatelard, 2002). Although a large number of Iraqi refugees 
have fled for clear political reasons related to oppression by the previous regime 
(mainly Kurds and Shi’a), a large number of Iraqis left the country during the 1990s due 
to a combination of factors, including political repression, ongoing conflict (especially 
in the North and South) as well as a severe economic crisis due to the imposition of 
comprehensive economic sanctions put in place between 1990 and 2003. For those parts 
of the population, like Kurds, Shia, and to some extent Christians, who have been 
collectively denied access to scarce resources, emigration becomes clearly motivated by 
a mixture of both economic and political factors (ibid.). But even Sunni Arabs were 
being denied political rights and were suffering from the dire economic situation caused 
by the comprehensive sanctions regime. 
 
Around an estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugees have returned to Iraq out of their own accord 
(Romano, 2004). These refugees mainly returned during the initial 6 months period 
after the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime, when the security and humanitarian 
situation was slightly better and prediction more optimistic than during the recent 
months. In addition to these numbers, UNHCR and IOM have assisted the return of 
2,800 refugees who were previously based in Saudi Arabia and a similar number from 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. However, due to the dire security situation, the lack of 
assistance and adequate housing as well as insufficient finances, many of these 
returning refugees have now become new IDPs (Romano, 2004). 
 
The legacy of the previous regime, 13 years of comprehensive sanctions, ongoing 
political instability, lack of security, violent insurgencies, unemployment and 
deteriorated infrastructure are all factors that account for widespread poverty within 
Iraq. Virtually all Iraqis are poor by any standard. Under these circumstances, it is not 
difficult to predict a continuous flow of forced migrants inside Iraq as well as to its 
neighboring countries. This will be particularly the case once the security situation on 
the roads to Iraq’s borders has improved. Many people are held back these days by the 
fear of road-side bombs and sniper attacks. Based on informal interviews with Iraqis 
there exist both a desire to return as well as to leave the country once the security 
situation improves (Romano, 2004). 
 
 
6. MENA REGION POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
 
DFID has only recently begun to think about ways of incorporating migrants and forced 
migrants into its development, poverty reduction, and pro-poor policies, but several 
strategies may be identified to support DFID’s aims in this arena. In general, we urge 
DFID to take a stronger advocacy role given the complementarity of DFID’s areas of 
funding with the special characteristics of forced migration in the Middle East. 
Necessarily, we raise the issue of DFID’s response to heightened security concerns 
around migration from the Middle East to the UK. 
 
Currently, DFID is able to support only three on-the-ground programmes in the Middle 
East—Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine. Existing programmes in Jordan and Egypt are due to 
close within the next 18 months. DFID’s capacity in the region for addressing forced 
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migration is thus quite thin, especially given the nature of mobile populations that span 
more than one country. However, the renewed attention given to refugees in the region 
has spawned initiatives and programmes among and within NGOs, IGOs, and host 
governments, offering DFID the possibility of working with implementing partners to 
address key issues of concern. 
 
In this section, we draw on our collective experience in the region to present some of 
the policy initiatives that are being developed to tackle the challenges highlighted in our 
thematic overview. In doing so, we present many of the actors with whom DFID may 
think about developing projects, as well as policy areas where DFID might take the lead 
in designing innovative approaches. Given the historical patterns of forced migration in 
MENA and the consequences for refugee, IDP, and host populations as identified 
above, we suggest that DFID tailor its response strategies along the lines of the five 
themes outlined in Section 3; that is, the Palestinian refugee issue, the lack of a 
citizenship option for most refugees, the urban setting for forced migrant populations, 
the blurring of the humanitarian relief/development assistance distinction, especially for 
long-term refugees, and the transnational quality of most forced migrant populations.  
 
6.1. Addressing the Situation of Palestinian Refugees 
DFID’s policy response to the protracted disruption of everyday life for Palestinian 
refugees in MENA has been addressed through the ongoing support of UNWRA, 
initially designed as a relief operation but later taking on the role of a development 
agency. Funded by states, UNWRA nevertheless has been given the responsibility for 
negotiating policy on behalf of its funders despite its lack of a protection mandate for 
Palestinians. In the context of the breakdown of peace talks between the state of Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority and Israeli hostility towards UNWRA, states need to do 
much more not only to address the development needs of increasingly impoverished 
Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories, but also to lobby on behalf of Palestinians’ 
human rights.  
 
DFID already spends half of its framework on supporting the work of UNWRA. DFID 
officials describe current policy as supporting UNWRA in its policy discussions with 
Israeli and other governments. Could DFID take a more active role in shaping policy, 
particularly within the context of the relief aid/development assistance debate? Further, 
could not DFID—given its strong financial support of UNRWA’s activities—advocate 
more openly for Palestinian rights? As we have shown, the acute lack of protection for 
most refugees in the Middle East and in particular of Palestinian refugees has directly 
contributed to their severe socio-economic vulnerability. Supporting the human rights of 
Palestinians more explicitly falls under DFID’s existing mandate to address the root 
causes of poverty. 
 
DFID might also find ways to support other regional partners in their support of 
Palestinian development initiatives. In Egypt, for example, the UNHCR has begun work 
with Palestinian NGOs to develop projects for the most vulnerable members of the 
Palestinian refugee community there following a survey of Palestinian livelihood 
strategies carried out by Oroub El Abed and the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies 
Program at the American University in Cairo. Additionally, this is an example of the 
overlap between the lack of protection available to Palestinians in Egypt and the 
concomitant vulnerability in socio-economic terms, since UNHCR’s protection mandate 
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was not seen to extend to Palestinian refugees in Egypt with the result that families 
lived in constant insecurity. The research findings enabled Ms El Abed and Forced 
Migration and Refugee Studies Program, American University in Cairo to lobby 
UNHCR on behalf of Palestinian refugees.  
 
6.2. Citizenship and Rights 
Recent policy discussions around citizenship in Europe and in North America have 
expanded the concept beyond membership within a nation-state, with all the rights and 
obligations implied, to so-called ‘post-national’ citizenship in a locality or transnational 
network (Tambini 2001). In the context of refugees and asylum seekers, this approach 
suggests that non-citizens of a state be seen as members of a local community with 
rights in that community, rather than needs. This implies that their integration into a 
host society need not require full-fledged national citizenship but at the very least the 
same rights to services.  
 
Participants in this consultation have pointed out that advocating on behalf of 
naturalization of refugees in MENA is a thorny issue, not least because of the long 
shadow cast by the Palestinian situation despite governments’ assurances of a full 
complement of rights for Palestinians as outlined in the Casablanca Agreement (see 
above). In policy terms, however, DFID could support the integration of refugees into 
the MENA societies of which they are currently part. Practitioners and researchers have 
repeatedly warned of the repercussions from development agencies treating refugees 
separately from their hosts, such as xenophobia, social exclusion, exploitation by 
employers, and other social ills. While it may be beyond the scope of DFID to advocate 
full citizenship rights for Palestinians and other non-national refugees in MENA, 
practical support of local integration—with its implication of social and economic 
rights—could be explored.  
 
Practical examples include policy level and project level initiatives. At the policy level, 
the “localization” of refugee work—that is, involving members of the host community 
in the design and delivery of services rather than the more typical pattern in MENA of 
bringing in non-nationals to implement refugee programmes—could be supported. This 
approach was very successful in Sudan with regards to addressing the needs of Eritrean 
refugees through local Sudanese agencies; more recently, the Legal Aid Project in Cairo 
has trained Egyptian lawyers to handle asylum cases and advocate for refugee rights in 
Egyptian courts. At the regional level, there is generally poor understanding of the 
rights of refugees under international law, compounded by a lack of legal 
documentation in Arabic. To address this need for awareness, the Forced Migration and 
Refugee Studies Program at the American University in Cairo convened a seminar for 
high-ranking judges and Ministry of Justice officials to introduce the legal basis of 
international obligations of refugee protection. This was accompanied by a 
straightforward, but highly effective, project to translate key documents and training 
materials on international refugee law into Arabic. A more recent seminar for Egyptian 
judges held in Cairo in June 2004 recommended the formulation of national legislation 
on refugees in Egypt to bring Egypt’s practices in line with its international 
commitments under the 1951 Convention, as well as further education of Egyptian 
judges and lawyers.  
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At the project level, integration of refugees and forced migrants into development 
initiatives remains problematic due to the persistent separation of funding mandates 
between relief and development, on the one hand, and non-national and national, on the 
other. Example after example has shown how developing separate programmes for 
refugees and often severely disadvantaged host populations creates the opposite 
conditions to those required for integration and access of refugees to rights. A recent 
example of a collaborative attempt to redress this problem in MENA is a community 
health project in a squatter settlement in Cairo populated by poor Egyptian labour 
migrants and South Sudanese refugees; DFID could support development projects such 
as this which seek to meet the needs of communities rather than discrete populations. 
Further examples of initiatives supporting local integration of refugees into 
communities where they are seen as having rights may be found at 
www.aucegypt.edu/academic/fmrs/integration. 
 
6.3. Assisting Forced Migrants in the Urban Context  
The dilemma faced by refugees and forced migrants in Middle Eastern cities is best 
described by Gaim Kibreab’s description of their presence as ‘what the eye refuses to 
see’ (Kibraeb, 1996). Often undocumented and forced into a hidden and marginal 
existence, forced migrant populations are open to exploitation in the informal labour 
market, subject to police harassment and detention, and excluded from social 
programmes designed for nationals. At the same time, studies show that in most cases 
refugees live among their hosts in neighbourhoods and districts characterized by lack of 
resources, difficult access to education, and overall economic, social, and political 
neglect by the host government. It is therefore difficult—and ill-advised—to separate 
out refugees from the urban poor and other marginalized groups.  
 
According to Sperl (2001), UNHCR policy on refugees in urban areas, which formerly 
promoted a self-reliance strategy and sought to discourage “irregular movement” of 
refugees between countries by limiting UNHCR assistance to them, must be 
reconsidered given the obstacles to genuine integration into Egyptian society (2001: 7). 
Currently, for example, Egypt places reservations on access to education, social 
insurance, and severe restrictions on employment, a situation mirrored in other MENA 
countries. Self-reliance, as an earlier UNHCR evaluation carried out in New Delhi 
points out, is meaningless if refugees “live in abject poverty and are obliged to engage 
in illicit activities in order to survive” (Obi, N and Crisp, J. 2000: p.5). 
 
Much more needs to be understood about the livelihood strategies of forced migrants in 
cities where official integration is discouraged yet local and international assistance may 
be limited or intermittent. Remittances from refugees resettled under specific schemes 
seem to play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of urban refugees. Urban 
settings may provide opportunities for some forced migrants to enter economic niche 
markets, such as domestic labour (Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Eritrean women in Cairo, 
Beirut, and Amman), construction work (Sudanese and Afghani men in Cairo and 
Tehran), and other informally organized employment. Urban settings may also promote 
the development of refugee community organizations which in turn support self-help 
initiatives, as evidenced by the flowering of Sudanese NGOs in Cairo in the 1990s 
(Fabos, 2001).  
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Our previous section regarding the importance of promoting social and economic rights 
for forced migrants is particularly pertinent in urban settings, where UNHCR tends to 
have greater difficulty in extending its protection mandate to large numbers of people, 
and refugees consequently live in great insecurity. DFID may find ways to support 
UNHCR and other local assistance schemes for the most vulnerable members of 
displaced populations. An example from Cairo is a church-funded day-care centre 
located in a squatter settlement which is home to both Sudanese refugees and poor 
Egyptians; having a safe place for their children to go allows disadvantaged women 
from both communities to find employment in the urban labour market.  
 
6.4. Bridging the Gap Between Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid  
As recognized in much of the literature on refugee relief, the split between development 
aid and humanitarian assistance is detrimental to a large number of refugees in the 
MENA region. On the one side, humanitarian aid oriented towards refugees and IDPs is 
cause for resentment amongst the wider population in a general context of war, conflict 
and widespread poverty, as is the case currently in Iraq. On the other hand, development 
projects tend to target citizens or local peoples, thereby further marginalizing refugees 
and IDPs. The fact that one either has to be a refugee or a citizen to receive a specific 
kind of aid undermines attempts to produce integrated programmes. In the MENA 
context, there is also the challenge of defining UNRWA’s responsibility in addressing 
development needs in the context of lack of Palestinian sovereignty. 
  
When UNRWA was first established it aimed to provide technical assistance and 
managed provision of relief projects to registered Palestinian refugees. As socio-
economic and political conditions in host countries changed, UNRWA adjusted its 
programmes. Although projects perceived as leading to settlement were resisted, 
UNRWA established development projects based on (basic) education and vocational 
education, providing skills responding to market needs at the regional level, particularly 
for Gulf countries. Pollock (1999) comments that long-term support of Palestinian 
refugees has produced a de facto resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration for most 
refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Syria. Following the first 
Intifada, UNWRA was involved in relief and social welfare activities, expanding to 
include restoration of camps in Lebanon, but due to budget constraints and donor 
countries’ unwillingness to fund relief projects, UNRWA moved towards promoting 
refugee self-reliance, as outlined in the 1994 Peace Implementation Programme (PIP).  
 
As a major funder of UNRWA, DFID may be able to support UNRWA in creating the 
policy conditions to move more fully towards a development assistance model, although 
as the protracted crisis continues in the Palestinian territories it is hard to see how the 
need for relief aid will disappear in the near future. According to several UN reports, 
Israeli authorities have been blocking delivery of basic food items, medicines and fuel 
to the Gaza Strip, and UN humanitarian access to the West Bank has been impeded by 
bureaucratic procedures. UN agencies and NGOs active in the Palestinian Territories are 
increasingly reorienting resources from development to relief to meet the growing 
humanitarian needs of the population.  
 
The complex emergency situation in Iraq brought about by political and economic 
instability followed by war raises different issues for donors such as DFID. The UK 
government department responsible for humanitarian assistance, CHAD, stepped in to 
 18
DEVELOPING DFID’S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
A research consultancy by the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 
Regional Paper III: Middle East and North Africa 
provide emergency relief for Iraqis displaced by the fighting in 2003, but DFID has 
already recognized the need to coordinate longer-term development assistance, stepping 
in to work with the Iraqi Ministry of Refugees and Displaced People to support the 
reintegration of Iraqi IDPs, refugees, and oustees. In addition to directing funding 
through World Bank reconstruction programme, suggestions were also made to 
strengthen relations with international NGOs such as Oxfam, which have very good on-
the-ground understanding of specific development needs.  
 
6.5. Engaging Diasporas in Reconstructing Post-Conflict Zones in MENA  
The significance of refugee communities for reconstruction and development in MENA 
has been clearly illustrated in the cases of Lebanon and Jordan. The rapid reconstruction 
plan in Lebanon, in which hundreds of millions of pounds were poured into loosely 
regulated bodies, failed to meet expectations in part because it was based on the 
realization of regional peace. It is only the continuous flow of remittances from the 
Lebanese diaspora as well as new Arab investments that have kept the country afloat 
(http://www.dailystar.com.lb/). In the Jordan case, more than 360,000 Jordanians (the 
majority of Palestinian origin) were obliged to leave their residencies in Gulf countries 
during the first Gulf War in 1990 and return to Jordan (Van Hear, 1998). Despite 
restrictions on their ability to take in some cases decades of accumulated investments, 
many nevertheless invested their remaining assets in Jordan, leading to a period of 
growth between 1992 – 1995. This was indicated in a construction boom, investment in 
schools and universities, shopping areas and the import of consumption goods. 
 
Another example of the important transnational role of refugees is the Iraqi diaspora. 
Ever since the severe economic crisis after the Gulf war in 1991, Iraqis abroad 
increasingly supported their families and friends inside Iraq. Remittances, aid and 
donations sent by Iraqi refugees helped a large part of the Iraqi population to survive 
during the sanctions regime. During the previous regime, Iraq’s private banks controlled 
less than eight percent of total banking assets and offered very limited services. Under 
the new Banking Law, 10 of Iraq’s 17 private banks are already making international 
payments and remittances, and issuing letters of credit. International payments and 
remittances into Iraq are now roughly estimated at more than $5 million per 
day (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004). 
 
In considering issues around engaging diaspora groups in DFID’s development policy 
for MENA, it is useful to be reminded of some of the scholarly analysis around factors 
that may help or hinder such engagement. Although to a greater or lesser degree all 
diasporas now engage in transnational activities (i.e. lobbying, remittance-sending and 
investment, or cultural participation, in addition to individual family strategies), they 
may not have equal “transnational capabilities” (Al-Ali et al., 2001). This may be 
affected by the degree to which individuals and communities identify with the social, 
economic, or political processes in their home countries, which is a prerequisite for 
them to engage in transnational activities (ibid.). This may be beyond the control of 
policy makers to influence.  
 
However, at a more practical level, the capability of individuals, families and 
communities to become involved may depend on the skills and resources available to 
them, which in turn is influenced by factors such as length of time and opportunity 
structures in their countries of destination. Capabilities also centre upon the internal 
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organisation of migrant or exile communities, and the level of motivation to maintain 
group solidarity. This is often related to the politics of integration in the country where 
exiles reside—do they have rights to citizenship, can they participate in multi-cultural 
agendas? According to Glick-Schiller (1999), states which encourage and foster 
affiliations and identification with exiles’ country of origin, especially among second 
generation, are more likely to be able to make use, for example, of their ability to reach 
out to new markets.  
 
More needs to be understood about the ways in which forced migrants and refugees are 
incorporated or excluded within their society of settlement; trends towards creating 
temporary, seasonal or undocumented and unsteady workers are continuing apace in 
some European countries. Whereas some migrants from the MENA region might 
develop transnational practices by virtue of their dual citizenship which allows them a 
degree of mobility and political participation between and within two countries, other 
migrants, particularly refugees, are either limited or impeded from maintaining relations 
with their country of origin. Recently in Italy, with the coming into power of the right 
wing coalition lead by Berlusconi, changes to immigration laws have been proposed 
which aim to transform even long-term settled migrants into flexible, undocumented 
and cash in hand workers, whose resident permit could be withdrawn in case of 
unemployment. 
 
States of origin seem also to be more and more interested in pursuing "diasporic" 
policies (Smith, 1999) to foster the sense of belonging among their nationals abroad and 
are increasingly allowing dual nationality or dual citizenship. The crucial role of 
‘sending states’ in forging and creating transnational political and economic fields often 
reflect their increasing dependency on migrants' remittances. In a world characterised 
by global economic restructuring, migrants’ investments are essential for the viability of 
the sending countries' economies (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998).  
 
Practical strategies for engaging members of diasporas with the advantage of real 
integration within British society (i.e. citizenship or dual citizenship) might first look 
upon them as skill-bearing actors in the reconstruction and development of their 
societies back home. For example, Iraqis with special skills (specific medical 
professions such as physical therapy, for example) could be encouraged to return to Iraq 
for short-term training projects. Above all, exiled Iraqis, as well as other exiled 
nationalities from MENA, need to be included in the consultative process that DFID 
carries out in its identification, development, and implementation of projects. For 
example, Palestinian NGOs in the diaspora were included in the development of the 
country strategy for Palestine; is this a regular practice or should DFID try to more fully 
incorporate consultation of refugees and exiled groups into its work in the region?  
 
Less obvious than the diasporas comprising exiled nationals or ethnic groups from 
MENA, such as Iraqis, Iranians, Palestinians and Kurds, are groups representing 
religious—specifically Muslim—diasporas. As a supra-national identity, Islam is a 
unifying factor and call to positive action for millions of Muslims from the MENA 
region in exile in Europe and Britain. DFID already maintains a relationship with the 
religious NGO Muslim Hands in Pakistan; Islamic Relief, which supports refugee relief 
projects throughout MENA, is also tipped for potential collaboration. Despite the strong 
tendency in UK policy circles to view Muslim refugees as a possible security threat, it 
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seems more fruitful to view them as we do ethnic or national diasporas, as a 
development resource for skills transfer. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In light of the requirement to identify a ‘joined-up’ policy position generally, there is a 
need for DFID to foreground the unresolved Palestinian refugee issue, particularly the 
relationship this has to MENA policies towards non-Palestinian refugees. 
 
Policy-makers may aspire to make clear distinctions between economic and forced 
migrants but in reality many migrants have multiple motivations for moving (migration-
asylum nexus). Acknowledgement of these complexities and inter-linkages will help to 
optimise potential of migrants.  
 
War and conflict is responsible for poverty and large-scale refugee movements within 
and from the region. There is a clear need to tackle root causes of war and conflict and 
support peace-building initiatives involving grass-roots actors, NGOs and governments 
in the region. 
 
Given the urban character of much of the refugee caseload in the MENA region, 
integrated approaches to protection and development initiatives for these populations 
should be developed. 
 
Rapid urbanization processes and migration of economic migrants, refugees and IDPs, 
put increasing pressures on resources and infrastructures of cities within the MENA 
region. Development agencies should focus on integrated projects to incorporate both 
long and short-term residents. 
 
Many labour and forced migrants form MENA countries are eager to get involved in 
economic, social, political and cultural development in countries of origin. Rather than 
viewing refugees from MENA as a problem and challenge to security, we need to 
consider ways to make migration an instrument for development. Encourage creative 
policies and schemes to allow ‘development by means of migration’. 
 
Legal insecurity hinders migrants from transforming their desire and willingness to 
contribute to development into actual practices and activities. Access to legal status and 
legal rights in the receiving country will optimise migrants’ ability to contribute to 
alleviation of poverty in MENA countries. 
 
Cheaper and more reliable transmission of remittances is needed to ensure more 
efficient use of remittances not only on individual family level but also in terms of local 
development and investments. Need to facilitate the creation of investment frameworks 
and technology transfer opportunities.  
 
Amnesty schemes for undocumented refugees should be instituted to avoid economic 
exploitation and human rights abuses. 
 
‘Transnational’ and ‘virtual’ links between skilled and highly educated migrants and 
forced migrants and their countries of origin should be facilitated. 
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Migration policies should be placed within overall development strategies in individual 
Arab countries, and within the region.  
 
Dialogue is needed between sending and receiving countries to ensure mutual benefits, 
and to limit the negative outcomes of migration, particularly in the cases of forced, 
illegal migration and transit migration. 
 
Addressing forced migration issues exclusively in terms of security and administration 
fails to provide comprehensive solutions to the problems. Policies must address the 
human rights of migrants, with emphasis on the provision of social integration 
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APPENDICES 
  
Appendix A: Definition of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region can be defined in multiple ways. 
Definitions which group Arab countries together may overlook the role of the non-Arab 
countries of Iran, Israel, and Turkey in the historical development of the region, while 
the acknowledgement of the strong Muslim character of most of these countries needs 
to take into account that the majority of the world’s Muslims live outside the region. 
The countries which comprise DFID’s MENA remit are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, West 
Bank/Gaza Strip (including UNRWA), and Yemen; Sudan falls under the responsibility 
of the Africa division.  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Middle East and North Africa (Source: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/maps.htm)  
 
The conceptual separation of the Middle East from North Africa makes a certain 
amount of sense from the perspective of the main flows of forced migrants in the region 
both historically and currently. However, from a policy perspective, there is an 
argument for considering the regional political bloc of the League of Arab States (LAS), 
which includes 21 states including those of North Africa and the Arab gulf. Populations 
of this region are knit together by centuries of migration and forced migration, and share 
important historical, religious, and linguistic characteristics. More importantly, it is a 
regional bloc with political objectives, most clearly in the stance taken towards the 
rights of Palestinian refugees to return to a homeland in Palestine. 
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Appendix B: Refugees in MENA by Country 
 
Source: World Refugee Survey 2003, US Committee for Refugees 
http://www.refugees.org/WRS2003.cfm#statistics 
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